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Tab A

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

(1)

Nevada Revised Statutes § 78.140 (law prior to

1991 amendment)i1
1.
Directors and officers shall
exercise their powers in good faith and
with a view to the interests of the
corporation. No contract or other
transaction between a corporation and one
or more of its directors or officers, or
between a corporation and any corporation,
firm or association in which one or more of
its directors or officers are directors or
officers or are financially interested, is
either void or voidable solely for this
reason or solely because any such director
or officer is present at the meeting of the
board of directors or a committee thereof
which authorizes or approves the contract
or transaction, or because the vote or
votes of common or interested directors are
counted for such purpose, if the
circumstances specified in any of the
following paragraphs exist:
(a) The fact of the common
directorship or financial interest is
disclosed or known to the board of
directors or committee and noted in
the minutes, and the board or
committee authorizes, approves or
ratifies the contract or transaction
in good faith by a vote sufficient for
the purpose without counting the vote
or votes of such director or
directors• . . .

1.

The 1991 amendment to this section deleted the first
sentence of paragraph one which read: "Directors and
officers shall exercise their powers in good faith and
with a view to the interests of the corporation."

2.
Common or interested
directors may be counted in determining the
presence of a quorum at a meeting of the
board of directors or a committee thereof
which authorizes, approves or ratifies a
contract or transaction, and if the votes
of the common or interested directors are
not counted at the meeting, then a majority
of the disinterested directors may
authorize, approve or ratify a contract or
transaction.
3.
Unless otherwise provided in
the articles of incorporation or the
bylaws, the board of directors may fix the
compensation of directors for services in
any capacity.
Stat. § 78.140 (law prior to 1991 amendment).

Nevada Revised Statutes § 78.135:
1.
The statement in the certificates
or articles of incorporation of the
objects, purposes, powers and authorized
business of the corporation constitutes, as
between the corporation and its directors,
officers or stockholders, an authorization
to the directors and a limitation upon the
actual authority of the representatives of
the corporation. Such limitations may be
asserted in a proceeding by a stockholder
or the state to enjoin the doing or
continuation of unauthorized business by
the corporation or its officers, or both,
in cases where third parties have not
acquired rights thereby, or to dissolve the
corporation, or in a proceeding by the
corporation or by the stockholders suing in
a representative suit against the officers
or directors of the corporation for
violation of their authority.
2.
purposes
upon the
officers
exercise

No limitation upon the business,
or powers of the corporation or
powers of the stockholders,
or directors, or the manner of
of such powers, contained in or

implied by the articles shall be asserted
as between the corporation or any
stockholder and any third person•
3.
Any contract or conveyance,
otherwise lawful, made in the name of a
corporation, which is authorized or
ratified by the directors, or is done
within the scope of the authority, actual
or apparent, given by the directors, binds
the corporation, and the corporation
acquires rights thereunder, whether the
contract is executed or is wholly or in
part executory.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.135 (1949 Supp).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

OLSON, PAYNE & COMPANY, INC.
a Utah Corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. C-91-6266

vs.
DAVID ENZER and L.A.
ENTERTAINMENT, INC., a
Nevada corporation,
Defendant.

This action was commenced as an interpleader proceeding by
plaintiff Olson, Payne & Co., Inc. on October 2, 1991. Recognizing
it had no claim to the interpleaded fund, the plaintiff sought an
order from this Court to deposit the res of the dispute with the
clerk of court, namely, $568,231.25 cash, and 3,030,500 shares of
L.A. Entertainment ("LAET") stock issued to David Enzer ("Enzer").
This Court ordered the deposit March 3, 1991.

The respective

defendant crossclaimants presented evidence at trial held February
9, 1993 through February 11, 1993. The Court took the matter under
advisement to further consider the exhibits received, the testimony
elicited, the respective trial Memoranda and proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and is now prepared to rule.

M-ZWQ
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essential

issue
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

in this case

is which

of

the two

contenders to the fund on deposit with the court has better claim
to the same.
Enzer argues that the stock was duly authorized and issued to
him by virtue of actions of the Board of Directors of LAET as
compensation for his services, both as a director and consultant.
Enzer claims that 3.5 million shares were issued to him (2 million
for consulting

services, and

1.5

million

shares as director

shares), pursuant to duly constituted and authorized Board of
Directors Resolutions of May 3, 1991, Ex. 131; June 14, 1991, Ex.
155; the second June 14 Resolution, presumably effective January
22, 1991, Ex. 153; and July 19, 1991, Ex. 173.
Enzer claims entitlement to the fund on the basis that the
shares were validly authorized and issued to him by the pertinent
resolutions, signed by himself and the other Board member, Daniel
Lezak

("Lezak"); the stock was then

issued to Enzer by the

authorized transfer agent at the direction of LAET's independent
counsel, which conduct, it is alleged, was ratified by LAET.
LAET, on the contrary, claims that the authorization and
issuance of the shares was ultra vires, and beyond the authority of
either

or

both

Enzer,

and

Lezak,

due

to

the

Articles

of

Incorporation and By-Laws of LAET; that the Consulting Agreement

(k.C'CB!
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purportedly approved by Enzer on 12/1/90, Ex. 34, and certain of
the

pertinent

resolutions

were

the

subject

of

fraud

and

manipulation; and that the actions of Enzer while a director and
attorney constituted breaches of his fiduciary duties toward LAET,
and

thus

pursuant

resolutions

to

Nevada

represented

benefit to LAET,

law,

the

a windfall

to

Consulting
Enzer,

Agreement

with

no

and

tangible

and are thus void or voidable by LAET.

The evidence establishes as follows:
1.

LAET is a Nevada corporation, with its headquarters in

Los Angeles,

California.

During

stock of LAET traded publicly

the relevant

on the NASDAQ

time period,

index.

the

LAET was a

reporting company with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission.
2.

Enzer

is a graduate of the Hastings

School of Law

in

1986, and engaged in the private practice of law for two and onehalf

years,

specializing

acquisitions and securities.
3.

in

corporate

finance,

mergers,

Ex. 576.

Enzer became a director of LAET in approximately

April

1989, and continued as such through September 26, 1991.
4.
least

At the time that Enzer became a director, LAET had at

four

directors

on

its

Board,

including

Daniel

Lezak,

founder of the company and director since 1984.

v 0 ^ ,«. ,„
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At the time that Enzer became a director, the Fifth

Article of Incorporation of LAET (Ex. 501), provided in pertinent
part, as follows:
The number of directors may
increased or decreased in such
provided by the By-Laws of this
that the number of directors shall
than three (3). . . .
6.

from time to time be
manner as shall be
corporation, provided
not be reduced to less

At the time that Enzer became a director, the Ninth

Article of Incorporation of LAET, provided as follows:
[T]he board of directors is expressly authorized:
Subject to the by-Laws, if any, adopted by the
stockholders, to make, alter or amend the by-Laws of the
corporation.
7.

At the time Enzer became a director, the By-Laws of LAET

(Ex. 502), Article III, Section 11, provided for the payment of a
fixed sum or a stated salary to directors for attendance at each of
the meetings of the Board of Directors.
8.

On November 1, 1989, after giving the required notice

(Ex. 506) , LAET held a special meeting of shareholders of the
company.

Both Enzer and Lezak were in attendance.

At that

meeting, a motion was made and unanimously passed to eliminate
director's fees (Minutes, Ex. 507).
9.

At the November 1, 1989 special meeting of shareholders

of LAET, Lezak ceased being a member of that Board, and the Board
was thereby reduced to three in number.

oo:063
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10 • From late 1989 until September 26, 1991, when he resigned
from the Board of Directors, Enzer acted as an attorney for LAET,
representing himself to be such. He gave advice to LAET on legal
matters, prepared documents customarily prepared by attorneys, and
submitted a statement or statements for his services rendered in
that regard.
11.

(Exs. 1, 2 & 534).

As of August 3, 1990, with the resignation of LAET Board

members, Enzer became the sole director and chairman of LAET.

He

continued in this capacity until January 22, 1991.
12.

On December 1, 1990, Enzer, as sole director, held a

meeting of the LAET Board, at which time he voted to approve a
Consulting Agreement between LAET and himself

(Ex. 34) .

Said

Consulting Agreement provides as compensation to Enzer, monthly
payments of $200.00, commencing December 1, 1991.
13.

On January 22, 1991, Lezak rejoined the LAET Board of

Directors as Chairman, with Enzer continuing as a director.
14.

For the time period January 22, 1991 through September

26, 1991, Lezak had limited involvement in the affairs of LAET.
Enzer actively directed the operations of LAET. As of January 22,
1991, LAET's stock was listed on the NASDAQ index at $.03 per
share.

OLSON, PAYNE V. ENZER
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On May 23, 1991, Enzer signed on behalf of LAET a Letter
(Ex. 5) , to merge with certain Japanese

referred to as "Marutaka."

companies

Enzer understood as of the date of the

signing of the Letter of Intent that Marutaka had booked assets
valued in excess of $1 billion.
16.

On May 30, 1991, Enzer sent a letter to George Houston

("Houston"), transfer agent for LAET stock, misrepresenting that he
had purchased shares of LAET stock constituting the majority block
of LAET stock, and requesting that the block of stock be placed in
his name.
17.

Enzer was not successful in this endeavor.
On June 4, 1991, Jehu Hand ("Hand"), outside counsel for

LAET, forwarded to Enzer by telecopy, a photocopy of SEC Regulation
S.
18.

On June 4 and 5, 1991, Enzer finished preparation of

certain purported minutes of special meetings of the LAET Board of
Directors, and certain stock option agreements referenced in said
minutes.

These purported minutes referred to meetings supposedly

held on May 3 and 7, 1991, at the offices of Lezak in Calabasas,
California, at which the LAET Board resolved to issue LAET stock,
with an agreed value of $60,000.00 to Holmby Capital Partners, and
$30,000.00 to C D . Management, Inc., together with certain stock
options to each party.

(.;!?
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The minutes

completed

on June

MEMORANDUM DECISION

4 and

5,

1991 were

backdated to make it appear that the action memorialized therein
had occurred prior to the execution of the Mirutaka Letter of
Intent of May 23, 1991, when in fact all discussions of the
issuance of shares to the entities listed occurred after May 23,
1991.

This was done with Lezak's knowledge and acquiescence.
20.

On June 6, 1991, Hand forwarded to Enzer and Lezak

separately, a draft Form S-8, for the issuance of 3 million shares
of LAET stock to consultants, directors and professionals, with
blank signature pages. Hand directed each to execute the signature
page and return it to him.
21.

Lezak executed the blank signature page to the S-8, and

returned it to Hand.

The S-8 as finally filed with the SEC called

for the issuance of 20 million shares of LAET stock.
22.

On June 6, 1991, Enzer caused a paragraph to be added to

the form of his Consulting Agreement as approved at the Board
meeting of December 1, 1990, that was numbered as paragraph 3, and
read as follows:
Consultant shall receive, at its choice, cash or
LAET common stock as a bonus in the following percentages
for transaction engaged by consultant and closed by LAET
in the following "booked" asset amounts: 5% of the first
100 million, 4% of the next 100 million, 3% of the next
100 million, 2% of the next 100 million, 1% of each 100
million thereafter. LAET stock shall be valued on the
closing day or the prior business day.

OLSON, PAYNE V. ENZER
23.
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Enzer photocopied from a Consulting Agreement to which

Sherman Mazur ("Mazur") was a party, the signature of James Kolitz,
who had been the President of LAET when the December 1, 1990 Board
meeting took place.

He "cut and pasted" this copied signature

(Exs. 577, 578 & 7), to the revised Consulting Agreement, with the
intent to make the resulting document appear to be bona fide. This
document or a copy was admitted at trial as Exhibit 577.

Exhibit

3 was derived from Exhibit 577. (Cf. Exs. 581 & 582 overlay
transparencies) .
24.

On June 7, 1991, Enzer and Mazur met with Hand and his

law partner, Roland Day ("Day") .

Lezak was not present at this

meeting. Thereafter, on June 7, 1991, Enzer sent a letter to Hand,
enclosing therewith, a copy of Exhibit 577, and representing it to
be his (Enzer7s) Consulting Agreement.
25.

On June 14, 1991, following instructions from Enzer, Hand

telecopied to Lezak the signature page only (Ex. 521) , of a twopage document styled "Unanimous Written Consent of the Board of
Directors or L.A. Entertainment, Inc."

(the "Resolution"), with

directions that Lezak sign the document and return it by Federal
Express to Hand.
26.

Before signing the signature page, Enzer spoke to Lezak.

Enzer instructed Lezak to telecopy the signed signature page to
LAET's offices, rather than forwarding it to Hand.

Enzer falsely

OLSON, PAYNE V. ENZER
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represented to Lezak that the first page of the Resolution set
forth the amount of shares to be issued, as memorialized in the
purported minutes of the May 3 and 7, 1991 Board meetings.
27.

Relying on the representations of Enzer with respect to

the contents of the first page of the Resolution, Lezak executed
the signature page of the Resolution and forwarded it by telecopy
to LAET's offices.
28.

Two hours later, Enzer received from Hand by telecopy the

first page of the Resolution.

Enzer executed the signature page

telecopied by Lezak, and attached it to the first page from Hand.
This document was then telecopied to Hand, with instructions from
Enzer that Hand "coordinate with Houston".
29.
LAET

The Resolution provided for the issuance of 2 million

shares

to

David

Enzer

for

"Consulting

Services

under

Consulting Agreement," and 1 million shares to David Enzer as
"Directors Shares".

Although executed on June 14, 1991, the

Resolution purported to be effective as of January 22, 1991.
30.

As of June 14, 1991, LAET stock was selling on NASDAQ for

$.31 per share
31.

(Ex. 511).

This Resolution was forwarded to Houston in order to

obtain issuance of the shares identified.

!»(.:068
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32.. While in Japan with Day during the week of June 17, 1991,
Enzer

agreed

Resolution.

to

certain

changes

on

the

first

page

of

the

These were communicated to Hand, who made the changes

and forwarded a first page of the Resolution, revised to show the
agreed changes, to Houston, with a copy to Enzer, but no copy to
Lezak.
33.

Thereafter, in late June, 1991, 3.5 million shares of

LAET common stock were issued to Enzer.
34.

On June 19, 1991, Lezak executed a telecopied signature

page for the 1991 LAET Form 10-K at the Los Angeles offices of BDO
Seidman. At the time he executed the signature page, Lezak had not
reviewed any draft of the Form 10-K.
35.

While at the Seidman offices, Lezak also executed a

second signature page to the Resolution.

Enzer did not review the

first page of the Resolution to which the signature page was to be
attached.

With respect to the Form 10-K and the Resolution

signature page, Lezak was told and understood that only signature
pages were available.
36.

Following the execution of these signature pages, Lezak

learned on or about July 19, 1991, that the amount of certain
shares set forth in the Resolution, including those for Enzer, was
much greater than the amount that he had understood was approved in

«1i,r, > C\
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the purported minutes of May 3 and 7, 1991, special meetings of the
Board of Directors. He demanded a meeting with Enzer and Mazur at
the offices of LAET on Saturday, July 20, 1991, to discuss this
matter before Enzer and Mazur left for Japan.
37.
offices

On July 20, 1991, Lezak, Enzer and Mazur met at the LAET
and

Resolution.

discussed

the

number

of

shares

listed

in

the

Lezak expressed his disagreement with the increased

number of shares.

Enzer and Mazur represented to Lezak that they

would deal with the matter during the trip to Japan, and take care
of it before the filing of the Form 10-K.
38.

In reliance on these representations, Lezak took no

further steps at that time with respect to the shares of LAET stock
approved for issuance to Enzer.
39.

On August 6, 1991, Hand filed with the SEC the 1991 LAET

Form 10-K (Ex. 183) . This signature page of the Form 10-K was the
telecopied page signed by Lezak of July 19, 1991, which also bore
the signature of Enzer.
40.
document

Before signing the 1991 L.A. ET Form 10-K, Enzer read the
and

thereby had knowledge

of

its contents

and the

representations contained therein.
41.

The misrepresentations contained in the 1991 LAET Form

10-K included the purported issuance on January 22, 1991, of stock

iU2;
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to David Enzer in the amount of 3.5 million shares, with the
explanation that the company entered into a Consulting Agreement
with Enzer, a director, providing compensation for $200.00 per
month, commencing December 1, 1991.
42.

Attached to the LAET Form 10-K as Exhibit 10.12, was a

copy of the Consulting Agreement created by Enzer on June 6, 1991.
This copy of the Consulting Agreement was supplied to Hand by Enzer
on June 7, 1991, with the intent that Hand and LAET rely on its
contents in preparing documents to be filed with the SEC.
43.

In making representations set forth above, Enzer made

knowing and intentional misrepresentations of material fact, and
intentionally failed to disclose certain material facts to the SEC,
to the investing public, and to LAET.
44.

Enzer made such misrepresentations and omissions with the

intent that LAET and its agents rely on them to carry out and
affirm the issuance of 3.5 million shares of LAET common stock to
him.
45.

LAET reasonably relied on such misrepresentations and

material omissions in permitting the filing of the 1991 LAET Form
10-K, and in not taking immediate action to prevent the issuance of
the stock to Enzer.

0 U2G7 i
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On September 16, 1991, Lezak and Enzer held a formal

meeting of the Board of Directors of LAET, the first since Lezak
rejoined the Board on January 22, 1991.

Enzer conducted the

meeting.
47.

Following the September 16, 1991 Board meeting, Enzer

forwarded by telecopy to Lezak draft minutes (Ex. 527), of the
meeting.
48.

Lezak did not approve the draft minutes.
By September 20, 1991, Enzer had sold 469,500 shares of

the LAET stock issued to him pursuant to the Resolution.

The

proceeds of these sales, together with the remaining 3,030,500
shares of stock, were ultimately transferred to the plaintiff
Olson, Payne and Company.
49.

On the afternoon of September 26, 1991, Enzer caused the

draft minutes of the September 16, 1991 Board meeting to be edited,
to provide for express approval by the Board of the issuance of the
3.5 million shares of LAET stock to him.
50.

A half hour later, Enzer dictated a memorandum to the

Board of Directors of LAET announcing his resignation from the
Board, and telecopied that document to Lezak.
51.

On October 2, 1991, Olson, Payne and Company commenced

this action by interpleading into this court the stock and proceeds
held by them in the account of Enzer.

0020', 2
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The shares of LAET stock issued to Enzer were treasury

stock of the company.
Enzer's testimony at trial was not persuasive or convincing.
It was characterized by evasiveness, lack of candor, insider selfdealing,

and document manipulation. His testimony was wholly

unsatisfactory

in his

attempt

to explain

the errors

documents he either drafted or caused to be drafted.

in the
Lezak's

testimony was, on the contrary, believable, persuasive and candid.
In this Court's view, the evidence has established clearly and
convincingly

that

Enzer committed

common

law fraud

on LAET.

Moreover, Enzer has failed to meet his burden by proving by a
preponderance

of

the

evidence

that

he has

better

claim

or

entitlement to the interpleaded stock and funds on deposit with the
clerk of court.
The stock and proceeds held by the Court are ordered to be
released to LAET.
This Court accepts the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law of LAET, and directs counsel to submit the final draft and
Judgment.
Dated this

of February, 1993

J. PWNIS
DIOTRICT'fojUBfT JUDGE

002CV3
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this 3JJ?^

day of

February, 1993:

Brent V, Manning
Attorney for Plaintiff
111 E. Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Eric C. Olson
Attorney for Defendant LAET
50 S. Main, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

0UCG7 4

TabC

fc

T.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Eric C. Olson (4108)
Marvin D. Bagley (4529)
Jon E. Waddoups (5815)
Attorneys for Defendant L. A. Entertainment
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OLSEN PAYNE & COMPANY, INC. , a
Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
DAVID ENZER, and L. A.
ENTERTAINMENT, INC. , a Nevada
Corporation,
Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 910906266CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

)

On February 9 through February 11, 1993, this Court
held the trial in this matter.

The defendant David Enzer

("Enzer") was represented at trial by Brent V. Manning and Sheri
A. Mower of the law firm of Holme Roberts & Owen.

The defendant

L. A. Entertainment, Inc. ("LAET") was represented at trial by
Eric C- Olson and Marvin D. Bagley of the law firm of Van Cott,
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy.

The Court having heard and

considered the evidence at trial, having reviewed the trial
briefs setting forth the legal arguments of the parties, having
issued its Memorandum Decision dated February 26, 1993 and being
otherwise sufficiently advised,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Court enter
the following as its findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

LAET is a Nevada corporation with its

headquarters in Los Angeles, California.

During the relevant

time period, the stock of LAET traded publicly on the NASDAQ
index.

Further, LAET was a reporting company with the United

States Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC").

Previous

to the time period relevant in this action, LAET was known as
"Supermarket Video" and "Super Video."
2.

Enzer is a resident of Los Angeles, California.

He is a 1986 graduate of the Hastings School of Law and engaged
in the private practice of law for two and one-half years in the
areas of corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions and
securities.
3.

Enzer became a director of LAET in approximately

April, 1989 and continued as a director of the company through
September 26, 1991.
4.

At the time that Enzer became a director, LAET

had at least four directors on its board including Daniel Lezak
("Lezak"), a founder of the company and director since 1984.
5.

At the time that Enzer became a director, the

Articles of Incorporation of LAET, Fifth Article read as follows
in pertinent part:
The governing board of this corporation shall be known
as directors, and the number of directors may from
time to time be increased or decreased in such manner

as shall be provided by the By-laws of this
corporation, provided that the number of directors
shall not be reduced to less than three (3), except
that in cases where all the shares of the corporation
are owned beneficially and of record by either one or
two stockholders, the number of directors may be less
than three (3), but not less than the number of
stockholders.
6.

At the time that Enzer became a director, the

Articles of Incorporation of LAET, Ninth Article read as follows
in pertinent part: "[T]he board of directors is expressly
authorized:

Subject to the by-Laws, if any, adopted by the

stockholders, to make, alter or amend the by-Laws of the
corporation. "
7.

At the time that Enzer became a director, the By-

Laws of LAET, Article III, Section 11, read as follows:
The directors may be paid their expenses, if any, of
attendance at each meeting of the board of directors
and may be paid a fixed sum for attendance at each
meeting of the board of directors or a stated salary
as director. No such payment shall preclude any
director from serving the corporation in any other
capacity and receiving compensation therefor. Members
of special or standing committees may be allowed like
compensation for attending committee meetings.
8.

On November 1, 1989, after giving the required

notice, LAET held a special meeting of shareholders of the
company.

Both Enzer and Lezak were in attendance at this

meeting.

The minutes of the November 1, 1989 Special Meeting of

Shareholders state in pertinent part:
Lawrence Kieves made a motion to eliminate directors
fees by modifying Section 11 of the Corporate Bylaws.
The motion was seconded by Norman Gross. A vote was
called and by unanimous consent the Bylaws were so
modified to eliminate directors fees.

-3o

* i

*"«

9.

At the November 1, 1989 Special Meeting of

Shareholders of LAET, Lezak ceased to be a member of the LAET
board of directors and the members of the board were reduced to
three.
10.

From late 1989 when he became involved in

advising LAET regarding the Grand Union transaction until he
ceased to be a member of the LAET board on September 26, 1991,
Enzer acted as an attorney for LAET representing himself on
occasion to be such, giving advice to LAET on legal matters and
preparing documents customarily prepared by attorneys.
11.

Following the resignations of LAET board members

on June 22, 1990 and August 3, 1990, Enzer became the sole
director and chairman of LAET.

He continued as sole director

until January 22, 1991.
12.

On December 1, 1990, Enzer as sole director held

a meeting of the LAET board at which time he voted to approve
consulting agreements between LAET and himself and Sherman Mazur
respectively.

The Court finds that Exhibit 34 is the Consulting

Agreement approved by the LAET board on this occasion.

As

compensation to Enzer, that Consulting Agreement provides for
monthly payments of $200 commencing on December 1, 1991.
13.

On January 22, 1991, Lezak rejoined the LAET

board of directors as chairman with Enzer continuing as a
director.
14.

For the time period from January 22, 1991 through

September 26, 1991, Lezak had limited involvement in the affairs

of LAET.

He visited the company' s offices approximately twice a

week and participated occasionally in informal directors
meetings.

Enzer was actively involved in the operations of the

company.
15.

As of January 22, 1991, LAET was experiencing

financial problems and its common stock was listed on the NASDAQ
index at $. 03 per share.
16.

On May 23, 1991, Enzer signed on behalf of LAET a

Letter of Intent to merge with certain Japanese companies
hereinafter referred to as "Marutaka."

Enzer understood as of

the date of the signing of the Letter of Intent that Marutaka
had booked assets valued in excess of $1 billion.
17.

On May 30, 1991, Enzer sent a letter to George

Houston ("Houston"), transfer agent for LAET stock,
misrepresenting that he had purchased certain shares of LAET
stock constituting the majority block of LAET stock and
requesting that the block of LAET stock be placed in his name.
Enzer was not successful in having the block of LAET stock
placed in his name.
18.

On June 4, 1991, Jehu Hand ("Hand") as outside

securities counsel to LAET forwarded to Enzer by telecopy a
photocopy of SEC Regulation S.
19.

On June 4 and 5, 1991, Enzer finished preparation

of certain purported minutes of special meetings of the LAET
board of directors and certain stock option agreements
referenced in the purported minutes.
"5"

These minutes referenced
o r c£\

meetings supposedly held on May 3 and 7, 1991 at the offices of
Lezak in Calabasas, California at which the LAET board resolved
to issue LAET stock with an agreed value of $60,000 to Holmby
Capital Partners and $30,000 to C D . Management, Inc. together
with certain stock options to each party.
20.

The minutes completed on June 4 and 5, 1991 were

backdated to make it appear that the action memorialized therein
had occurred prior to the execution of the Marutaka Letter of
Intent on May 23, 1991 when, in fact, all discussions of the
issuance of shares to the entities listed occurred after May 23,
1991.

This was done with Lezak' s knowledge and acquiescence.
21.

On June 6, 1991, Hand forwarded to Enzer and

Lezak separately a draft Form S-8 for the issuance of 3,000,000
shares of LAET stock to consultants, directors and professionals
with blank signature pages.

Hand directed each to execute the

signature page and return it to him.
22.

Lezak executed the blank signature page to the S-

8 and returned it to Hand.

The S-8 as finally filed with the

SEC called for the issuance of 20,000,000 shares of LAET stock.
23.

On June 6, 1991, Enzer caused a paragraph to be

added to the form of his Consulting Agreement as approved at the
board meeting of December 1, 1990 that was numbered as paragraph
3 and read as follows:
Consultant shall receive, at its choice, cash or LAET
common stock as a bonus in the following percentages
for transaction engaged by Consultant and closed by
LAET in the following "booked" asset amounts" 5% of
the first $100 Million, 4% of the next $100 Million,
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3% of the next $100 Million, 2% of the next $100
Million, 1% of each $100 Million thereafter. LAET
stock shall be valued on the closing day or the prior
business day.
Enzer further photocopied, from a Consulting Agreement to which
Mazur was a party, the signature of James Kolitz, who had been
the president of LAET when the December 1, 1990 board meeting
He "cut and pasted11 this copied signature to the

took place.

revised Consulting Agreement with the intent to make the
resulting document appear to be a bona fide Consulting
Agreement.

This document or a copy thereof was admitted at

trial as Exhibit 577.
24.

Exhibit 3 was derived from Exhibit 557.

On June 7, 1991, Enzer and Mazur met with Hand

and his law partner, Rowland Day.
meeting.

Lezak was not present at this

Thereafter, on June 7, 1991, Enzer sent a letter to

Hand enclosing therewith, among other things, a copy of Exhibit
577 and representing it to be his (Enzer7s) consulting
agreement.
25.

On June 14, 1991, following instructions from

Enzer, Hand telecopied to Lezak the signature page only of a
two-paged document styled "Unanimous Written Consent of the
Board of Directors of L.A. Entertainment, Inc. " (the
"Resolution") with directions that Lezak sign the document and
return it by Federal Express to Hand.
26.
with Enzer.

Before signing the signature page, Lezak spoke
Enzer instructed Lezak to telecopy the signed

signature page to LAET' s offices rather than forwarding it to
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Hand.

Enzer further falsely represented to Lezak that the first

page of the Resolution set forth the amount of shares to be
issued as memorialized in the purported minutes for the May 3
and 7, 1991 board meetings.
27.

Relying on the representations of Enzer with

respect to the contents of the first page of the Resolution,
Lezak executed the signature page of the Resolution and
forwarded it by telecopy to LAET" s offices.
28.

Two hours later, Enzer received from Hand by

telecopy the first page of the Resolution.

Enzer executed the

signature page telecopied by Lezak and attached it to the first
page from Hand.

This document was then telecopied to Hand with

instructions from Enzer that Hand "coordinate with Houston."
29.

The Resolution provided with respect to Enzer as

follows:
Name

Consideration

Shares

David Enzer

Consulting Services under

2, 000,000

Consulting Agreement
Directors Shares

1,000,000

The Resolution further provided for the issuance of 500,000
options to Holmby Capital Partners at a price per share of $. 03.
Although executed on June 14, 1991, the Resolution purported to
be effective as of January 22, 1991.
30.

As of June 14, 1991, LAET stock was selling on

NASDAQ for $.31 per share.
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31.

Hand forwarded the Resolution to Houston as part

of the process of obtaining the issuance of the shares
identified in the Resolution.
32.

While in Japan with Day during the week of June

17, 1991, Enzer agreed to certain changes in the first page of
the Resolution.

These were communicated to Hand who made the

changes and forwarded a first page of the Resolution, revised to
show the agreed changes, to Houston with a carbon copy to Enzer
but no copy to Lezak.
33.

Thereafter, in late June, 1991, 3. 5 million

shares of LAET common stock were issued to Enzer.
34.

On July 19, 1991, interrupting his vacation,

Lezak executed a telecopied signature page for the 1991 LAET
Form 10-K at the Los Angeles offices of BDO Seidman.

At the

time he executed the signature page, Lezak had not reviewed any
draft of the Form 10-K.
35.

During his visit to the BDO Seidman offices,

Lezak also executed a second signature page to the Resolution.
Enzer did not review the first page of the Resolution to which
the signature page was to be attached.

With respect to the Form

10-K and the Resolution signature page, Lezak understood that
only signature pages were available.
36.

Following the execution of these signature pages,

Lezak learned that the amount of certain shares set forth in the
Resolution including those for Enzer was much greater than the
amount that he had understood was approved for Holmby Capital
-9-

Partners consistent with the purported minutes for the May 3 and
7, 1991 special meetings of the board of directors.

He demanded

a meeting with Enzer and Mazur at the offices of LAET on
Saturday, July 20, 1991 to discuss this matter before Enzer and
Mazur left for Japan in connection with the Marutaka
transaction.
37.

On July 20, 1991, Lezak, Enzer and Mazur met at

the LAET offices and discussed the number of shares listed in
the Resolution.

Lezak expressed his disagreement with the

increased number of shares.

Enzer and Mazur represented to

Lezak that they would deal with the matter during the trip to
Japan and take care of it before the filing of the Form 10-K.
38.

In reliance on these representations, Lezak took

no further steps at that time with respect to the shares of LAET
stock approved for issuance to Enzer.
39.

On August 6, 1991, Hand filed with the SEC the

1991 LAET Form 10-K.

This signature page for the Form 10-K was

the telecopied page signed by Lezak on July 19, 1991 which also
bore the signature of Enzer.
40.

Before signing the 1991 LAET Form 10-K, Enzer

read the document and thereby had knowledge of its contents and
the representations contained therein.
41.

Among other representations in the 1991 LAET Form

10-K were these:
On January 22, 1991 the Company awarded common stock
to members of its Board of Directors for their
services as board members and for consulting services
-10-
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under an Consulting Agreement as follows. All shares
issued to Mr. Lezak were registered in the name of
C. D. Management, Inc. , a corporation controlled by
him.
David Enzer
Daniel Lezak
(p.

3, 500,000
1,250,000

U.)

On January 14, 1991, the Company entered into a
Consulting Agreement with David Enzer, a director,
providing for compensation of $200.00 per month
commencing December 1, 1991, and, a bonus for any
acquisition made by the Company arranged by that
consultant.
(p. 12. )
42.

Attached to the 1991 LAET Form 10-K as Exhibit

10. 12 was a copy of the Consulting Agreement created by Enzer on
June 6, 1991.

This copy of the Consulting Agreement was

supplied to Hand by Enzer on June 7, 1991 with the intent that
Hand and LAET rely upon its contents in preparing documents to
be filed with the SEC.
43.

In making representations set forth in paragraph

41 above and in acquiescing in and approving of the attachment
of the Consulting Agreement as Exhibit 10. 12 to the 1991 LAET
Form 10-K, Enzer made knowing and intentional misrepresentations
of material fact, and intentionally failed to disclose certain
material facts, to the SEC, to the investing public and to LAET.
44.

Enzer made such misrepresentations and omissions

with the intent that LAET and its agents rely on them to carry
out and affirm the issuance of 3. 5 million shares of LAET common
stock to him.
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45.

LAET did reasonably rely on such

misrepresentations and material omissions in permitting the
filing of the 1991 LAET Form 10-K and in not taking immediate
action to prevent the issuance of the stock to Enzer.
46.

On September 16, 1991, Lezak and Enzer held a

formal meeting of the board of directors of LAET, the first
since Lezak rejoined the board on January 22, 1991.

Enzer

conducted the meeting.
47.

Following the September 16, 1991 board meeting,

Enzer forwarded by telecopy to Lezak draft minutes of the
meeting.

Lezak did not approve the draft minutes.
48.

By September 20, 1991, Enzer had sold

approximately 500, 000 shares of the LAET stock issued to him
pursuant to the Resolution.

The proceeds of these sales

together with the remaining 3, 000, 000 shares of stock were
ultimately transferred to the plaintiff Olsen Payne & Company.
49.

In the afternoon of September 26, 1991, Enzer

caused that the draft minutes of the September 16, 1991 board
meeting be edited to provide for express approval by the board
of, among other matters, the issuance of 3,500,000 shares of
LAET stock to him.
50.

A half hour later, Enzer dictated a memorandum to

the board of directors of LAET announcing his resignation from
the board and telecopied that document to Lezak.
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51.

On October 2, 1991, Olsen Payne & Company

commenced this action by interpleading into this Court the stock
and proceeds held by them in the account of Enzer.
52.

The shares of LAET common stock issued to Enzer

were treasury stock of the company.

CONCLUSIONS QF LAW
1.

All issues of corporate governance and authority

in this action are governed by the law of Nevada and,
specifically, by Nevada Revised Statutes Title 7, Chapter 78.
2.

All issues with respect to the duties and conduct

of directors are governed by the law of Nevada.
3.

All issues with respect to duties of attorneys,

failure of consideration, constructive fraud and common law
fraud are governed by the law of California.
4.

The powers of Enzer and Lezak, as directors, to

act for the company are subject to the limitations set forth in
LAET' s Articles of Incorporation.
5.

Any limitation on the authority of directors set

forth in the LAET Articles of Incorporation may be asserted in
this action between LAET and Enzer.
6.

The actions of the LAET board of directors in

approving the issuance of shares to Enzer as set forth above are
void for noncompliance with the requirement of the LAET Articles
of Incorporation that the LAET board of directors consist of at
least three persons.

7.

All actions of Enzer and Lezak as directors were

subject to the By-laws of LAET adopted by the stockholders of
LAET and any action taken contrary to such By-laws was without
actual authority and may be voided by LAET.
8.

Enzer and Lezak as directors did not have power,

either expressly or by implication, to waive or alter any
provision of the By-laws of LAET adopted by the stockholders of
LAET.
9.

The issuance of LAET stock to Enzer as "Directors

Shares" constituted directors fees and is void as contrary to
the By-laws of LAET as amended by the LAET stockholders.
10.

Enzer7 s rights to any stock or proceeds held by

this Court must be defined solely by written agreements duly
approved by a sufficient vote of the board of directors of LAET
and legitimately executed by an authorized agent of the company.
11.

The transaction memorialized in the June 14, 1991

and July 19, 1991 Corporate Resolutions superseded any rights
created by the May 3 and 7, 1991 Corporate Minutes and Enzer may
not now seek enforcement of any resolutions set forth in these
superseded minutes.
12.

At trial, Enzer had the burden of proving that

any Corporate Resolution providing for the issuance of the LAET
stock to him, Lezak and others was approved by a vote sufficient
for the purpose of said approval without counting the vote of
any director having a financial interest in the subject matter
of the Corporate Resolution.
-14-

k,

r* *

i

13.

Both Enzer and Lezak were interested directors

with respect to the transactions memorialized in the May 3 and
7, 1991 Corporate Minutes and the June 14, 1991 and July 19,
1991 Corporate Resolutions and their votes were not sufficient
to approve the Corporate Resolution.
14.

In the absence of votes sufficient to approve the

Corporate Resolution, Enzer had the burden of proving that the
issuance of LAET stock to him was fair as to LAET at the time it
was authorized.
15.

Enzer has failed to meet his burden of proving

the fairness to LAET of the issuance of 3. 5 million shares of
LAET stock to him and that issuance is void.
16.

As a director and as an attorney, Enzer stood in

a fiduciary relationship to LAET and, as a consequence of that
relationship, owed LAET a duty to act with a view to the
interest of LAET, to act honestly with respect to LAET, to
exercise his powers as a director in good faith and consistent
with the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of LAET, to
disclose to LAET material facts known to him with respect to the
stock issuance in dispute in this action, and to account to the
company for any profit obtained by him at the expense of LAET.
17.

LAET has met its burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that Enzer breached his fiduciary
duty to LAET by reason of the following acts and omissions:
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a.

Enzer accepted corporate benefits approved

in violation of the Article of Incorporation, By-laws
of LAET and the statutes of the State of Nevada.
b.

Enzer manufactured and published the "cut

and past" Consulting Agreement that was attached to
the 1991 LAET Form 10-K and cited in both the 1991
LAET Form 10-K and the Corporate Resolution as the
purported basis for the issuance of LAET stock to him.
c.

Enzer misrepresented the terms of the

Resolution and failed to disclose the true terms of
the Resolution prior to Lezak' s signing of the
Resolution' s second page.
d.

Enzer misrepresented the occurrence of and

date of the meetings of the LAET board memorialized in
the May 3 and May 7, 1991 Corporate Minutes.
e.

Enzer misrepresented the date of approval of

the issuance of shares to him and other directors and
professionals in the 1991 LAET Form 10-K.
f.

Enzer backdated documents to give the false

appearance that stock had been approved for issuance
to him before the execution of the Marutaka letter of
intent rather than after that material event.
g.

Enzer accepted stock that, on the day its

issuance was approved, had a public market value of
over ten times the value recited for the stock in the
document authorizing its issuance.
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h.

Enzer authorized the issuance of stock for

services rendered under a Consulting Agreement that
did not obligate LAET to make any payment to him.
i.

To the extent that Enzer deemed the issuance

of stock to constitute payment for services to be
rendered in the future, Enzer authorized issuance of
the stock in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78. 210.
18.

Enzer' s approval of the issuance of LAET stock to

him under any set of minutes or corporate resolution before the
Court is void by reason of his breach of fiduciary duty.
19.

Enzer committed common law fraud on LAET by

reason of his conduct cited at Conclusion of Law No. 17(b)
through (h) above.
20.

The award of LAET stock to Enzer, insofar as the

consideration cited is "Consulting Services under Consulting
Agreement, " is void for lack of consideration, and the
Consulting Agreement is void because its execution was not
authorized by a sufficient vote of the LAET board of directors
and because the referenced document has been tampered with and
manipulated by Enzer.
21.

Enzer has failed to meet his burden of proving by

a preponderance of the evidence any estoppel theory advanced in
this Court because any payment of stock could only legally be
for past services and, hence, there could be no detrimental
reliance as to future performance.
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22.

Enzer has failed to meet his burden of proving by

a preponderance of the evidence that LAET, acting with full
knowledge of the facts relevant to the issuance of 3. 5 million
shares of LAET stock to Enzer, ratified that issuance or waived
any objection to that issuance.
23.

(a) Enzer' s having no valid claim to the stock

and proceeds held by this Court and (b) both the stock now held
by the Court and the stock from which the proceeds were derived
having come from the treasury of LAET, LAET is entitled to the
entry of Judgment declaring it the rightful owner of the stock
and proceeds and directing the Clerk of this Court to release
to LAET such stock and proceeds held by that office in
connection with this action.
DATED this

u l ^ day of March, 1993.
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MINUTES OF A SPECIAL MEETING
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
L.A. ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
A special meeting of the Board of Directors of L.A. Entertainment,
Inc. a Nevada corporation was held May 3, 1991 at the offices of
its Chairman, Daniel Lezak, 23801 Calabasas Road, Suite 2050,
Calabasas, CA, 91302. All members of the Board received notice of
the meeting in accordance with the Company's by-laws or
approximately waived notice thereof.
The following directors were present:
Daniel Lezak
David Enzer
The Chairman indicated that the meeting was called to compensate
certain Directors and Consultants to the Company for work performed
on the Company's behalf to date. Mr. Lezak indicated that Mr.
Enzer, a Director and Consultant to the Company, and through his
partnership, Holmby Capital Partners ("Holmby"), has worked
diligently without any compensation therefor, and has expended
substantial resources to date on the Company's behalf with respect
to numerous outside transactions, internal financing and
restructuring, and working with the investment community. In light
of all of the foregoing and the Company's desire for Mr. Enzer to
continue the efforts described above, Mr. Lezak proposed
compensating those parties by granting Common Stock to Holmby
equivalent to a bonus of $60,000, and granting Holmby 500,000
options to purchase common stock at $.03 per share.
It was
therefor (Mr. Enzer not voting),
RESOLVED, that the Board hereby grants a bonus of $60,000 to Holmby
Capital Partners, payable in L.A. Entertainment Common Stock, at an
issuance price of $.03, or the amount equal to the bid price at
this date as found on NASDAQ;
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Board hereby grants Holmby Capital
Partners an option to purchase 500,000 shares of Company Common
Stock at $.03 per share pursuant to the forms set forth in the
Stock Option Agreement attached hereto.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Company shall cause to be issued such
shares to Holmby that are freely tradeable and not restricted and
that such shares shall be issued upon completion of the current
registration statement currently under review by the S.E.C., and
the Company shall execute the Stock Option Agreement attached
hereto;
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Company shall pay the tax upon Holmby at
such time as such is required to be paid by Holmby for the stock
and options granted hereby, whether such is a federal or state tax,
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Special Meeting of the Board of Directors, L.A. Entertainment
May 3, 1991
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owing by Holmby;
RESOLVED FURTHER, that all prior acts of the Company's directors or
officers to date is hereby approved, confirmed and ratified.
There being no further business to come before the meeting, it was
upon motion duly made and seconded and carried, adjourned.
By execution of these minutes jfette'BoardXmembers^^AGknowledge
received a copy of these minutes/and waive notice to^6his meeting.

Daniel Leeakl Chairman

Attests

r

Ffancene Wilson, Secretary
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L. A. Entertainment
STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT
I.

STOCK OPTION.

A stock option for a total of Five Hundred Thousand (500,000)
shares of Common Stock, no par value, of L. A. Entertainment, a
Nevada corporation at 1875 Century Park East, #2679, Los Angeles,
CA 90067 (the "Company") is hereby granted to Holmby Capital
Partners, a California limited partnership (herein the "Optionee") .
Subject in all respects to the terms and provisions set forth
hereunder. The date of this grant is May 3, 1991.
II.

OPTION PRICE.

The option price as determined by the Board of Directors of the
Company is $.03 per share (three one-hundreths of One Dollar).
III.

INVESTMENT REPRESENTATION.

This Option may not be exercised if the issuance of share of Common
Stock of the Company upon such exercise would constitute a
violation of any applicable Federal or State securities or other
law or valid regulation.
The Optionee, as a condition to its
exercise of the Option, shall represent to the Company that the
shares of Common Stock of the Company that is acquires under this
Option are being acquired by it for investment and not with a
present view to distribution or resale, unless counsel for
Optionee, with Company's approval, is then of the opinion that such
a representation in not required under the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended or any other applicable law, regulation, or rule of any
governmental agency.
IV.

TERM OP OPTION.

The term of this Option shall be for a period of five (5) years
from the date hereof.
In no event may the Option be exercised
after five (5) years from the date hereof.
The Option may be
exercised in whole or in part, at any time, during its term, or
from time to time.
The holder of the Option shall not have any of the rights of a
stockholder of the Company with respect to the shares covered by
the Option except to the extent that one or more certificates for
such shares shall have been issued to it upon the due exercise of
the Option. This Option may be exercised during such term only in
accordance with the terms herein.
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Tab 2

MINUTES OF A SPECIAL MEETING
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
L.A. ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
A special meeting of the Board of Directors of L.A. Entertainment,
Inc. a Nevada corporation was held May 7, 1991 at the offices of
its Chairman, Daniel Lezak, 23801 Calabasas Road, Suite 2050,
Calabasas, CA, 913 02. All members of the Board received notice of
the meeting in accordance with the Company's by-laws or
approximately waived notice thereof.
The following directors were present:
Daniel Lezak
David Enzer
The Directors indicated that the meeting was called to compensate
certain Directors of the Company for work performed on the
Company's behalf to date. Mr. Enzer indicated that Mr. Lezak, a
Director to the Company, and has worked diligently without any
compensation therefor, and has expended substantial resources to
date on the Company's behalf with respect to numerous outside
transactions, internal financing and restructuring, and working
with numerous investors and broker dealers in the investment
community.
In light of all of the foregoing and the Company's
desire for Mr. Lezak to continue the efforts described above, Mr.
Enzer proposed compensating those parties by granting Common Stock
to Mr. Lezak's management company, C D Managment, Inc. ("CD")
equivalent to a bonus of $30,000, and granting 250,000 options to
purchase common stock at $.03 per share. It was therefor (Mr.
Lezak not voting),
RESOLVED, that the Board hereby grants a bonus of $30,000 to CD,
payable in L.A. Entertainment Common Stock, at an issuance price of
$.03, or the amount equal to the bid price at this date as found on
NASDAQ;
RESOLVED
purchase
pursuant
attached

FURTHER, that the Board hereby grants CD an option to
250,000 shares of Company Common Stock at $.03 per share
to the forms set forth in the Stock Option Agreement
hereto.

RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Company shall cause to be issued such
shares to CD that are freely tradeable and not restricted and that
such shares shall be issued upon completion of the current
registration statement currently under review by the S.E.C., and
the Company shall execute the Stock Option Agreement attached
hereto;
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Company shall pay the tax upon CD at
such time as such is required to be paid by CD for the stock and
options granted hereby, whether such is a federal or state tax,
upon request by CD upon written notice of the amount of tax
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owing by CD;
RESOLVED FURTHER, that all prior acts of the Companyfs directors or
officers to date is hereby approved, confirmed and ratified.
There being no further business to come before the meeting, it was
upon motion duly made and seconded and carried, adjourned.
By execution of these minutes the^^Board'Nmembers acknowledge
received a copy of these minutes and waive notice to this meeting.

Attes

dttfUf•fjd*L,

'rancene Wilson, Secretary

LAET01485

L. A. Entertainment
STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT
I.

STOCK OPTION.

A stock option for a total of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (250,000)
shares of Common Stock, no par value, of L. A. Entertainment, a
Nevada corporation at 1875 Century Park East, #2679, Los Angeles,
CA 90067 (the "Company") is hereby granted to C D Management, Inc.,
a Nevada corporation (herein the "Optionee").
Subject in all
respects to the terms and provisions set forth hereunder. The date
of this grant is May 7, 1991.
II.

OPTION PRICE.

The option price as determined by the Board of Directors of the
Company is $.03 per share (three one-hundreths of One Dollar).
III.

INVESTMENT REPRESENTATION.

This Option may not be exercised if the issuance of share of Common
Stock of the Company upon such exercise would constitute a
violation of any applicable Federal or State securities or other
law or valid regulation. The Optionee, as a condition to its
exercise of the Option, shall represent to the Company that the
shares of Common Stock of the Company that is acquires under this
Option are being acquired by it for investment and not with a
present view to distribution or resale, unless counsel for
Optionee, with Company's approval, is then of the opinion that such
a representation in not required under the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended or any other applicable law, regulation, or rule of any
governmental agency.
IV.

TERM OP OPTION.

The term of this Option shall be for a period of five (5) years
from the date hereof. In no event may the Option be exercised
after five (5) years from the date hereof. The Option may be
exercised in whole or in part, at any time, during its term, or
from time to time.
The holder of the Option shall not have any of the rights of a
stockholder of the Company with respect to the shares covered by
the Option except to the extent that one or more certificates for
such shares shall have been issued to it upon the due exercise of
the Option. This Option may be exercised during such term only in
accordance with the terms herein.

LAET01486

V.

MANNER OF EXERCISE.

This Option may be exercised by written notice delivered to the
Company stating the number of shares with respect to which the
Option is being exercised, together with cash or check in the price
of such shares and the written statement provided for in Paragraph
III hereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this agreement
as of the date first above written.
da corporation

D Management, Inc.,/a Nevada corporation

By:
Danielc^ezak, president

IAET01487
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RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY UKAHI2«DU8 WRXTTCT CONSSUT OF
TEE BOARD OP DIRECTORS OF L.X. BHTBRTACDtlNT , ZKC.
The undersigned members of the Board of Directors of L.A.
Entertainment, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the "Corporation"),
acting pursuant to Section 78*315 of the Nevada Revised Statutes,
hereby consent to take the following actions and adopt the following resolutions effective as of January 22, 1991:
WHEREAS, the Company presently does not have cash
available to compensate certain of its directors, consultants and
service providers, and such persons have served without substantial
cash or other compensation to date.
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the appropriate
officers of the Corporation with the assistance of counsel, be and
they hereby are, authorized to prepare and execute and file with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") for and
on behalf of this Corporation, one or more Registration Statements
on Form S-8, and all amendments thereto, including the Prospectus
and any and all exhibits and other documents relating thereto, for
the registration, insofar as required under the Securities Act of
1933, pursuant to which the Corporation may register under the
Securities Act of 1933, 20,000,000 shares of Common stock,
including shares offered under the 1990 stock Option Plan; and
RESOLVED, that the Corporation authorize for issuance
Shares of its Common Stock to the following persons and for the
consideration set forth below, to be registered for sale under the
Registration Statement:

Hams

consideration

Shares

David Enzer

Consulting Services
under Consulting
Agreement
Director shares

2,000,000
1,000,000

Daniel Lezak
Director shares
1,000,000
to be issued in the name of C D Management, Inc.
Sherman Masur

Consulting Services
under Consulting
Agreement

2,000,000

Rowland W. Day II

Legal Services

250,000

RESOLVED FURTHER, that the exercise of five year options
issued on January 22, 1991 at $.03 per share by C 0 Management,
Inc.
(250,000 options) and Holxaby Capital Partners (500,000
options) be, and the same hereby is, accepted by the Corporation,
and any director or officer of the Corporation is hereby directed
to cause such 750,000 option shares and the other shares described
above pursuant to the Form s-8.
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McKITTRICK, JACKSON, OeMARCO & PECKENPAUGH
4041 MacArthur Blvd.
Newport Beach, California 92660
P. 0. Box 2710

EAK &QVER S&M.HQ
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

TO:

Name:
Company:

Mr. George Houston
California Stock Transfer

Fax No.:

(503)273 9168
Number of pages, including this cover memo: 6
We are transmitting from a Panafax UF-400AD

PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY IF NOT RECEIVED PROPERLY. CALL (714) 7S*$S$5.
ASK FOR KIM PETERSON.
FROM:

Name:

Jehu Hand

Pax No.:

(714) 757-0649

File No.

22632

Client
Matter
Date:

June 16,1991

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
CAUTION; CONFIDENTIAL' THE DOCUMENT BEING TELECOPIED TO YOU MAY
CONTAIN INFORMA TION PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CUENTJWORK PRODUCT
PRIVILEGES. It is Intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended
recipient or an authorized agent* then this is notice to you that dissemination, distribution or copying of
this document is prohibited. If this was received in error, please call us at once and destroy the
document

MCKJTTRICK, JACKSON, DEMARCO & PECKENPAUOH

George Houston
June 17, 1991
Page -2-

Sherman Mazur
(address to be supplied)
Rowland W. Day II
1 Hampshire Court:
Newport Beach, California

2r000,000

250,000
92660

Please call me if you have any questions. The Company
also would like you to send a shareholder list to my attention
dated on or about June 1, 1991•
yours,

JH:kp
cc: David Enzer
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The undersigned meabars of the Board of Directors of L.A.
Intertainment, Inc., a Kevada corporation (the "Corporation"),
acting pursuant to Section 78.315 of the Kevada Revised Statutes,
hereby consent to take the following actions and adopt the Colloving resolutions effective as of January 22, 1991:
WHEREAS, the Company presently does not have cash
available to compensate cartain of its directors, consultants and
service providers, and such persons have served without substantial
cash or other compensation to date.
NOV THZRSTORS, BE IT ABSOLVED, that the appropriatt
officers of the Corporation with the assistance of counsel, be and
they hereby are, authorised to prepare and execute and file with
the Securities and exchange Coamission (the "Commission") for and
on behalf of this Corporation, one or more Registration Statements
on Form S-8, and all amendments thereto, including the Prospectus
and any and all exhibits and other documents relating therato, for
the registration, insofar as required under the Securities Act of
1933, pursuant to which the corporation may register under the
Securities Act of 1933, 20,000,000 shares of Common Stock,
including shares offered under ths 1990 Stock Option Plan; and
RESOLVED, that the Corporation authorize for issuance
Shares of its Common stock to the following persons and for th«
consideration set forth below, to be registered for sale under the
Registration Statement:
KAlft

Consideration

SbftU!

David Enter

Consulting Services
under Consulting
Agreement
Director shares

2,000,000
1,500,000

Daniel Lasak
Director shares
1,230,000
to be issued in the name of C D Management, Inc.
Sherman Kasur

Consulting Services
under Consulting
Agreement

2,000,000

Rowland W. Day ZZ

Legal Services

400,000

RXSOLVZD FURTHER, that tha officsrs of tha Corporation ara
haraby authorized, empowered, and directed, in tha name and on
behalf of tha Corporation, to tafce any and all othar aotion which
in tha judgment of tha officar taking tha same as necessary,
advisable, or appropriate in order to render such aecurities
eligible for offering and sale under the so-called Blue Slcy Lavs
of any stats in which ths offering is to be made, and that the
forms of resolutions specifically prescribed for such purpose by
the various states are hereby authorized and approved and
incorporated herein by reference with the same effects* if set
forth herain in their entiraty.

Daniel LesaX

LAET00548
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McKITTRICK, JACKSON, DeMARCO & PECKENPAUGH
A LAW CORPORATION
4041 MacArthur Boulevard, Fifth Floor
Post Office Box 2710
Newport Beach, California 92658-8995
(714) 752-8585

DATE:

June 13, 1991

TO:

Dan Lezak

FROM:

Jehu Hand

SUBJECT:

L.A. Entertainment, Inc.

ENCLOSED PLEASE FIND:
One copy of the Form S-8 Registration Statement for
the above referenced corporation.

FOR YOUR FILES
FOR YOUR INFORMATION
IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR REQUEST
PLEASE COMMENT
PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN
PLEASE TELEPHONE ME
PLEASE ADVISE ME HOW TO REPLY
PLEASE HANDLE

*V<*
EXHIBIT

A/7

As filed June 13, 1991

CONFORMED COPY
FORMS-8
REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

LA. ENTERTAINMENT. INC.
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)

NEVADA
88-0199674
(State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization)(IJLS. Employer Identification No.)

401 East Pine Street Seattle, Wa«h™f*rm Qftir>
(Address of Principal Executive Offices)(Zip Code)
1990 Stock Option Plan
Stock Compensation Plan
(Full Title of the plans)

Larry Trusty. President L A Ent^rr*™™*"*'| inc. 401 East Pine Street Seattle, W»<hinpton 98122
(Name and address of agent for service)
f206) 329-0928
(Telephone number, including area code, of agent for service)

CALCULATION OF REGISTRATION FEE
Proposed
securities
to be
registered

Proposed
Amount to be
registered

mflYiirmm
maTfrmim offering

aggregate offering
price

Amount of
registration fee

$5312,000

$1^28

price per unit
Common StockW

20,000,000

$2656( 2 )

(1) Represents 1,500,000 shares of common stock issuable under the 1990 Stock Option Plan, and
18,500,000 shaies issuable as compensation pursuant to informal stock plans, and includes reoffers of
such shares.
(2) The registration fee is based upon the average of the bid and asked prices of the common stock on
June 11,1991.
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PROSPECTUS
LA. ENTERTAINMENT, INC

Up to 3,000,000 Shares of Common Stock
Received by Directors and Officers
Under Employee Benefit Plans and
Reoffered by Means of this Prospectus
This Prospectus shall be supplemented from
time to time as the identity of these
officers and directors becomes known
Investors should note that the Company's independent auditors, Laventhol & Horwath, whose report is incorporated by reference in this Prospectus, filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code on November 21, 1990. That filing may have an adverse effect on an investor's ability to
sue and recover damages from that auditing firm with respect to its report on the Company's finanri^l
statements. Further, Laventhol & Horwath discontinued performing accounting and auditing services on
November 21, 1990; as a result, it was unable to consent to the incorporation of its report in this
prospectus, and did not perform any subsequent review procedures with respect to the financial statements
incorporated in this Prospectus. The lack of a consent by Laventhol & Horwath may preclude investors
from suing that firm for damages under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. See Tacperts."
Selling shareholders will offer their shares through the over-the-counter market or through NASDAQ, if the Company's common stock is then included for quotation on NASDAQ. Selling shareholders,
if control persons, are required to sell their shares in accordance with the volume limitations of Rule 144
under the Securities Act of 1933, which restricts sales in any three month period to the greater of 1% of
the total outstanding common stock (or 329,000 shares) or the average weekly trading volume of the Company's common stock during the four calendar quarters immediately preceding such sale. It is expected
that brokers and dealers effecting transactions will be paid the normal and customary commissions for
market transactions.
RISK FACTORS
The purchase of the securities offered hereby is subject to risk. Investors should evaluate these
risk factors carefully.
L

Operating History. The Company has incurred losses in fiscal year 1988 and a small loss in
fiscal year 1989. Although normal profitability has returned, Investors should not expect the
Company to generate significant profits over the short term.

2.

Capital Requirements, In order for the Company to continue with its expansion plans, it will
require capital beyond the amounts currently available from operations.

3.

Dependent on Customers. The Company is substantially dependent on one customer, Safeway
Stores, which accounted for approximately 60% of the Company's gross revenues for the year
ended March 31, 1990. The Company expects that this dependence will diminish in the current fiscal year as other retail operations are expanded. Safeway has notified the Company
that it intends to eliminate all of its video departments, and is operating on a month to month
basis with the Company.

-2-

4.

Competition. The videocassette rental industry is highly competitive, both within the industry
and with other sources of video entertainment such as broadcast television, movie theaters and
cable television. Many of the Company's competitors have greater financial resources.
INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO THE COMPANY

This prospectus is accompanied by the Company's Annual Report to security holders for the year
ended March 31, 1990 and the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 1990
or the latest Annual Report and Quarterly Report filed subsequent thereto. These Annual Reports and
the Form 10-Qs as well as all other reports filed by the Company pursuant to Sections 13(a), 13(c), 14 or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are hereby incorporated by reference in this prospectus and
may be obtained upon the oral or written request of any person to the Company at 401 East Pine Street,
Seattle, Washington 98122.
INDEMNIFICATION
The Company's Bylaws and Section 78.751 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provide for indemnification of directors and officers against certain liabilities. Officers and directors of the Company are indemnified generally against expenses actually and reasonably incurred in connection with proceedings, whether
civil or criminal, provided that it its determined that they acted in good faith, were not found guilty, and, in
any criminal matter, had reasonable cause to believe that their conduct was not unlawful.
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act of 1933 may be permitted
to directors, officers and controlling persons of the registrant pursuant to the foregoing provisions, or
otherwise, the registrant has been advised that in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission
such indemnification is against public policy as expressed in the Act and is, therefore, unenforceable.

-3-
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PART II

5.

Incorporation of Documents by Reference.
The Registrant incorporates the following documents by reference in the registration statement:
(a) The Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K filed for the year ended March 31,1990;

(b) The Company's Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q for the quarters ended June 30, 1990,
September 30,1990 and December 31,1990;
(c) A description of securities is incorporated by reference from the Registrant's Registration
Statement on Form 8-A, File No. 1-17874.
(d) All other documents filed in the future by Registrant after the date of this Registration
Statement, under Section 13(a), 13(c), 14 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, prior to the
filing of a post-effective amendment to this Registration Statement which deregisters the securities covered
hereunder which remain unsold.
Item 6.

Indemnification of Officers and Directors

The Company's Bylaws and Section 78,751 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provide for indemnification of directors and officers against certain liabilities. Officers and directors of the Company are indemnified generally against expenses actually and reasonably incurred in connection with proceedings,
whether civil or criminal, provided that it its determined that they acted in good faith, were not found
guilty, and, in any criminal matter, had reasonable cause to believe that their conduct was not unlawful.
Item 7.

Exemption from Registration Claimed

All of the sales are exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended, by virtue of Section 4(2) thereof covering transactions not involving any public offering or not
involving any "offer" or "sale*. As a condition precedent to each sale or gift, the respective purchaser was
required to execute an investment letter and consent to the imprinting of a restrictive legend on each stock
certificate received from the Company.
Item 8.

Exhibits

4. Instruments defining the rights of securityholders are incorporated from the following previously filed exhibits:
3.1

Articles of Incorporation of Registrant, as amendedW.

32

November, 1988 and 1989 Amendments to Registrant's Articles of Incorporation^).

33

ByiawsC1).

3.4

December, 1989 Amendment to Registrant's Articles of Incorporation™.

3.5

Certificate of Determination for Series A Preferred Stock(2).

-4-

5.0 Opinion of McKittrick, Jackson, DeMarco & Peckenpaugh regarding legality of shares
being issued(^).

(1)

24.1

Consent of Benson & McLaughlin, P.S. (3).

242

Consent of McKittrick, Jackson, DeMarco & Peckenpaugh (contained in its opinion
filed as Exhibit 5 to this Registration Statement^).

(2)
(3)

Incorporated by reference to the Company's Registration Statement on Form S-4, File No. 3329746 filed on July 3,1989.
Filed with Amendment No. 1.
Filed herewith.

Item 9.

Undertakings
(a) The undersigned registrant hereby undertakes:

(1) To file, during any period in which offers or sales are being made, a post-effective
amendment to this registration statement:
(i) To include any prospectus required by section 10(a)(3) of the Securities Act of
1933;
(ii) To reflect in the prospectus any facts or events arising after the effective date of
the registration statement (or the most recent post-effective amendment thereof) which, individually or in
the aggregate, represent a fundamental change in the information set forth in the registration statement;
(iii) To include any material information with respect to the plan of distribution not
previously disclosed in the registration statement or any material change to such information in the registration statement, including (but not limited to) any addition or election of a managing underwriter.
(2) That, for the purpose of determining any liability under the Securities Act of 1933,
each such post-effective amendment shall be deemed to be a new registration statement relating to the
securities offered therein, and the offering of such securities offered at that time shall be deemed to be the
initial bona fide offering thereof.
(3) To remove from registration by means of a post-effective amendment any of the
securities being registered which remain unsold at the termination of the offering.
(b) The undersigned registrant hereby undertakes that, for purposes of determining any liability
under the Securities Act of 1933, each filing of the registrant's annual report pursuant to Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (and, where applicable, each filing of an employee benefit
plan's annual report pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) that is incorporated
by reference in the registration statement shall be deemed to be a new registration statement relating to the
securities offered therein, and the offering of such securities at that time shall be deemed to be the initial
bona fide offering thereof.
(i) Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act of 1933
may be permitted to directors, officers and controlling persons of the registrant pursuant to the foregoing
provisions, or otherwise, the registrant has been advised that in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange

-5jh215/22632/000/p481/§.8

Commission such indemnification is against public policy as expressed in the Act and is, therefore, unenforceable. In the event that a r\**n% for indemnificaaon against such liabiliaes (other than the payment by
the registrant in the successful defense of any action, suit or proceeding) is asserted by such director, officer or controlling person in connection with the securities being registered, the registrant will, unless in
the opinion of its counsel that matter has been settled by controlling precedent, submit to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the question whether such indemnification by it is against public policy as expressed
in the Act and will be governed by the final adjudication of such issue.
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SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, the registrant has duly caused this
registration statement to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized in the City
of Los Angeles, California, on June 7,1991.
LJL. ENTERTAINMENT, INC.

By:

/s/ Lanv Trusty
Larry Trusty
President

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, this registration statement has been
signed by the following persons in the capacities indicated on June 7,199L
Signature

Title

/s/ Larry Trusty
Larry Trusty

President (principal executive officer)

(*{ Daniel Lgrak
Daniel Lezak

Director

(*/ Flamft Mftlnyfc
Elaine Melnyk

Chief Financial Officer (principalfinancialand
accounting officer)

/s/ David Enzer
David Enzer

Director
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L. A. Entertainment, Inc.
401 East Pine Street
Seattle, Washington 98122
Re:

Registration Statement on Form 8-8

Gentlemen:
L. A. Entertainment, Inc. (the "Corporation") has requested
our opinion as to the legality of the issuance by the Corporation
of up to 20,00,000 shares of common stock, par value $.001 (the
"Shares"), all as described in a Registration Statement proposed
to be filed on Form S-8 pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 (the
"Registration Statement"). All terms not otherwise defined herein
shall have the meaning set forth in the Registration Statement.
As your counsel, we have reviewed and examined:
1.
The Articles of Incorporation, as amended to date (the
"Articles") of the Corporation as certified to us by the Secretary
of State of the State of Nevada;
2.
The Bylaws of the Corporation, as certified by the
Secretary or Assistant Secretary of the Corporation;
3.

The minute book of the Corporation;

4.
Certain resolutions of the Corporation, as certified to
us by the Secretary or Assistant Secretary of the Corporation;
5.

The Registration Statement;

6.

The 1990 Stock Option Plan; and

7.
Such other matters as we have deemed relevant in order
to form our opinion.
In giving our opinion, we have assumed without investigation
the authenticity of any document or instrument submitted us as an
original, the conformity to the original of any document or instrument submitted to us as a copy, and the genuineness of all
signatures on such originals or copies.

KJTTR'.CK, JACKSON, DEMARCO & PECKENPAUGH

Based upon the foregoing, and subject to the qualifications
set forth below, we are of the opinion that the Shares, if sold as
described in the Registration Statement, will have been duly
authorized, legally issued, fully paid and nonassessable.
Our opinion is subject to the qualifications that no opinion
is expressed herein as to the application of state securities or
Blue Sky laws*
This opinion is furnished by us as counsel to you and is
solely for your benefit. Neither this opinion nor copies hereof
may be relied upon by, delivered to, or quoted in whole or in part
to any governmental agency or other person without our prior written consent.
Notwithstanding the above, we consent to the use of our
opinion in the Registration Statement. In giving this consent, we
do not admit that we come within the category of persons whose consent is required under Section 7 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission promulgated thereunder.
Very truly yours,

MCKXTTRICK, JACKSON, DEMARCO
& PECKENPAUGH

^v6.t./
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CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Form S-8 Registration
Statement under the Securities Act of 1933 pertaining to the Stock
Compensation Plan and 1990 Stock Option Plan for the registration of shares of
common stock of L.A. Entertainment, Inc. (formerly Supermarket Video, Inc.
and Subsidiary) and in the related Prospectus of our report dated June 3, 1988
except for Note 1 as to winch the date is November 1,1989 and for Note 2 as to
which the date is June 28, 1989 with respect to the consolidated financial
statements and schedules of LA. Entertainment, Inc. for the year ended
March 31,1988, filed with the Securities and Exchange CommissionBenson & McLaughlin, P.S.

Seattle, Washington
June 6,1991
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.G 20549
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PARTI

ItemL Business
General
LA. Entertainment Inc, formerly known at Super Market Video, Inc. (the 'Company') was iacrn
pocated unlet the law of the State of Nevada in May, 1984. The Company maiotaina its principal bun
neas and executive offices * 401 East Pine Street, Seattle, Waihmgton 96122, telephone (206) 329*0928.
The Company is primarily engaged b the busbiess of operating concessions for the renting of pt*
recorded videocassettes in super markets located is the Northwest United Stales. The Company has u
stand-alone retail videocassettc rental location in Seattle.
On June 26, 1991 the Company entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement with Maniaka lrnxi
Company, Ltd., Hollywood Land Tokyo, Ud n and Haniau Redevelopment Ca Ltd. pursuant to which UM.
Company will acquire all of the capital stock of these three Japanese real estate companies tor 1,000 than.;.
of a new Scries B Preferred Stock. The Series B Preferred Stock has voting rights equal to die number of
shares into which the Preferred Stock would be converted, including the right to elect a majority but aot all
the board of directors* is to be convertible after one year into a number of shares of common stock equal
to 60% of die total Company outstanding stock. These three Japanese companies own or control two goli
courses under construction, have an option on a third golf coarse, a 23»acre parcel outside Tokyo to \H
developed into mixed use property, including hotels, commercial and industrial brikBop, and 32 office ami
catertatnment properties near Osaka. The closing is antiripatftd to take place in August, 1991, and i
subject to the completion of certain dueriffigemrprocedure*.
VMeofental
As of March 31, 1991, the Company operated concessions in 40 supermarkets in the North** »
Uaked States. Such concessions include 15 m Safeway stores, 13 in Uddenberg retail stores, 9 in indepc *
dent grocery and convenience stores, and 3 in 741 convenience stores. Since year end, the Company ha,
doted 3 Safeway stores and 4 independent stores. However, since year end, the Company has added
additMMml concession* in 7-11 convenience store locations, 2 in Carousel supermarkets (these were 2 of il.
independents closed since year cad), 2 in Stockmarket supermarkets and 1 m a Thriftway wpcrmark
The Company is also under contract to hutall concessions in 2 Thriftway supermarkets, and Sentry Maikt.
supermarkets. Pursuant to the concession agreements between the Company and the concessionaire, ti
Company is entitled to s fixed percentage of the udeo rental receipts, and the Company supplies it.
vidaocasaette rental inventory, the retail display fistures and materials, and the software and hardwan
required to admmister die check-out and return of videocsasette tapes. Labor for on site rental i
provided by the concessionaire, and the Company's distribution managers visit the stores on appraomat< .
a twice weeldy basis to inspect inventory, restock, and review and prepare billingfromrental transactions.
Each concession stocks from 750 to 3,000 videocassettes, with emphasis on new releases and fi.
run movies. The concession areas occupy from 18 co 72 lineal feet and are primarily located toward il
front of the supermarket where they are highly visible to shoppers.
The Company's one retail store is located in Seattle, Washington, and stocks approximately 6,1* o
prerecorded videocassettes for rental.
The Company purchases its prerecorded video cassettes for rental from various suppliers (see m>u
10 to the financial statements included ekewfaere herein). The Company does not presently intend to aiM
items for sale to its Seattle store. Tbe Company does bowercr, intend to addfree-standingretail stoma u
tbe Seattle area, as they can be affordabty capitalized, which can operate on a modest scale.
-1jtt is/mxjtoo/csw letiitt

Dtpe&cace upon Customers • Competition
The Company's principal concessionaire ts Safeway Stores, which accounted for approximately 53 *
of t i e Company's gross revenues for the fiscal year ended March 31* 1991 Safeway accounted for q,
praaaaately 64% and 68% of the Company's grow revenues for 1990 and 1989 respectively. Uddenbciy
stores constituted 26% of the Company's revenue base in 1991, 16% in 1990, aad 14% ia 1989, respectively
The Company operates the videocassette rental concessions in approximately one-third of the larger Safe
way stores in the Pacific Northwest The Company expects that its dependency upon the Safeway duin
wfl decline in its current fiscal year as it enatimms to open new supermarket aad comemence store concessions. The Company's contract with Safeway expired Jane, 1990, bet the Company continues to opera!<
such concessions on a month to month basis. The Company continues to have discussions Mth Safeway
regarding extensions to its existing relationship. However, Safeway baa mrijcaftrd that it intends to plum
oat concessions in future years and has closed 3 stores since year end
The videocassette concession business is extremely competitive. Factors associated with compeatio t
ia the industry include the percentage of cnacrssion revenues, the number and qeaity of videocassette tide ±
stocked by the concession operator, the level of service provided, and the financial wherewithal of the co»
ccmionaae. The Company believes it is in a competitive position wkh respect to each of these categoric
The Company competes with other concessionaire in super marheta, with video specialty stores, con
veaaence stores, drug stores, record stores, and videocassette vending machines. There has also been >
trend recently ia ±c industry coward a leased department, which as compared to a revenue sharing <•
raagement that utilizes supermarket employees, operates strictly ss a lease of die premises to the opera; >
at a fiicd rent using hired outside employees (and perhaps iadudes some percentage rent component)
The Company is prepared to operate concessions in this new structure. The Company is also in coaipu.
tkm or may be affected by various forms of revenue sharing arrangements with motioa picture product u .
companies commonly called "pay-per-view," which provide customers with the ability to view movies throu <.
cable ccoaected television. The Company also competes with movie theaters, cable television and otli..
special events. To date mail order sales of prerecorded vidaocasscttes have not been a competitive factor
Employees
As of March 31,1991, die Company had 19 employees, inriuding five administrative and execuu
personnel, 6 full time field staff, and 4 full time and 2 part time employees in the Seattle retal store.

The Company operates its concessions through a written license with die concessionaire*. 11
lease for the retail store ia Seattle, which also houses corporate offices aad warehouse space, conum..
approximately 9*800 square feet, of which, approximately 2,500 is retail space. Total monthly rental pa\
aaafe are 53,000 through November, 1992 wkh a five year Teaewal option. The Company also hat u
aaceth-to-asoisth lease on leas than IJOOQ square feet in Hollywood, California far certain accounting a<i<i
acfeaiaistrative functions. The Coaapany believes that its current leased bolides are adequate to tupptut
current and future operations.

Ugal LsnHiassa&gi
On November 8,1969, the Company fifed a complaint in the U S . District Court, Orntial Dmt.u i
of California, against The Grand Union Company. The complaint alleges that the Cooapany and Grin i
Uaioo entered into a license agreement and asset purchase agreement on October 13, 1989, aad th<t
Graad Union failed to perform ia accordance with these agreements. The Cosapany seeks $20,000,000 I.I
compensatory damages The Grand Union Company filed an answer to the complaint denying all alky.,
doss. The court dismissed the Company's complaint oa November 6,1990; such dismissal was set aside .. .
appeal of the Company on February U , 199L Tlisactiooasdiodafcdtcgptotml«iktel9Ql.
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A rnmplnint for open account was fifed in Soperior Court of Los Angeles, California against the
Company on April U, 1990 by Lieberman Enterprises, a supplier of video and mode merdiandise for talc
(Uebermai*), concerning Liebennan's provision of same to the Company's Eaciao Store. The Company
fifed its cross- complaint on or about June 4, 1990 against Liebennan far damages arising out of Ueber
man's fmhre to perform its supplier agreement with the Company. Ibe Company entered bto a stipulated
jucfcpncat in the approximate net amount of $190,000, which requires the Company to amke monthly pay
nents to satisfy such amount The Company made partial payments thereon, and settled this matter in Jufy
W91 by a payment of $100# » •
On August 10, 1990 Video Trend fifed a onmplaim for S13Q.890 against the Company in U»
Angeles Superior Court far amounts allegedly due on a trade account The Company believes thai Vide*
Tr end is not entitled to the M amount sought, but a total of $100,500 has been accrued for this Hafaifity.
On April 30, 1990, Matin & Dvoretzky Architects, Inc. fifed a complaint in Los Angeles Super*..
Court 9eeking $47,000 for services allegedly rendered The Company fifed an answer, alleging breach •
contract by MatUa, on June 26,1990. On April 1,1991 the parties settled for $15,000 to be paid by th*
Company at $500 per month.
la 1991 various legal complaints were fifed against the Company for the safe of goods and service
The Company has answered these complaints denying liability, for die total amount sought of $27,500, e»
eluding one claim settled for $15,000. Two other video suppliers have threatened to fife claims for i <
aggregate of $71,600.
The Company is being sued for $250^000 of damages incurred by the lessor of the supersio,
subsequent to the closure of the superstore. A preliminary motion may be able to dfemiss the Compni.
from thk case; however, in management's and legal counsel's opinion, the ultimate settlement is s...
expected to have a material adverse effect upon the financial statements.
Item 4

SiibmkfflnnnfMattminVf^

On January 22, 1991 the registrant held its annual shareholders' meeting. At the meeting David Eozer an<
Daniel Lezak were elected to serve as directors. No other matters were submitted to shareholder vote.
PART II
l i B E l M y * * for Rfffffrjfffs Corajnonffiflrttl yj ftfourf Sfrckhqlfrf Matt**
The Company Common Stock has been traded an NASDAQ since January 24, 1990 under tin
symbol "LAET, and prior thereto in the "pink sheets', with its price quotations pnhfahcri in the National
Daiy Quotation Service ("NDQS*) of the National Quotations Bureau. As of May, 1991, there were 6fe.
bolters of record of the Company Common Stock.
The table below shows the high and low bid prices as reported in the NDQS since April 1, 1<*>
aad cm NASDAQ since January 24, 199a No cash dividends have been paid on the Company Conn* i.
Stock. The quotations for the Company Common Stock reported by the NQB represent prices betvu i
dealers without adjustment of retail mark-ups, markdowns or commisuons, and amy not represent actu.
transactions.
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The Company has not paid any dividends on its common stock, and anticipate tfant any dividend
wil not be paid in theforeseeablefature and any earning wil be retained lo develop the Company's butt
ac& The Company has outstaadmg 2,642,468 shares of Series A Preferred Stock aa ol March 31, 199)
No dividends may be paid on the Common Stock unless all accrued dividends in the Series A Preferred
Stock have been paid. As of March 31, 1991, afl accrued dividends had been paid by the iasuaaee of ad
dJtiooal shares of Series A Preferred Stock at the relevant conversion rate at Mnrcfe 3L199L
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Item 7, M m g r ^ s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition tt>d Rrjyrfr tf Qp^flons of J*
Company
Etsetts of Operations:
Year coded March 31,1991 compared to year coded March 31,1990.
total Reveaues
Gross revenues from rental transactions were $2,306£7Q for die year eaded March 31, 1991 ai
compared to $2,277,140 for die same period ia 1990. The increase ia revenues was due in part to
successful marketing and merchandising program* which resulted in generally higher revenues pet More,
offset ia part by the loss of Safeway locations. Additionally, revenue* for the present period were com
parably better than 1990 becaase the Company was adversely affected by a strike in 1990 by supermarket
employees in the Seattle area which affected 22 concessions located ia Safeway, Stock Market ami
Thriftway supermarkets for that latter period Further, the; increase in revenues was obtain**)
notwithstanding che fact that the Company operated 13 fewer confessions in the Pacific Northwest area *t
die end of the current period than it did at the end of die comparable period in 1990. See discussion
regarding die Company's dependence upon revenuesfromSafeway superaarkets it Item L
SaksEetenues
Gross revenues from sale transactions were $63*106 for the year ended March 31, 1991 as com
pared to 5206,610 for the same period ia 1990. Sales for the current period were due priaurily to tht
Company's efforts to sell previously viewed rental tapes in its Seattle retail location and one concessit*
location, whereas sales for the comparable period in 1990 were derived principally from musk* video anj
other related products at the Company's masic and video superstore located in Enema* California, which
store the Company sold in March, 1990. The Company hopes to increase the number of retail location*
seling previously viewed video tapes in Company concessions where agreements can be secured.
Salts Growth
The Company has been informed by Safeway that it intends to phase out concessions in fetuir
years and has dosed 3 coaensions since year cod Commencing in die 1991 fiscal year, die Company
eas&arked on an aggressive program to increase its video rental concession base. It is also seeking to
impiirmmf sales programs in new concessions opened The Company will also continue to espion
opportaaaies to acquire other onmpanios which operate video rental or compatible businesses
Management believes thai it wil be able to acquire additional new financing necessary to support thia
powth, which will oftet the anticipated loss of Safeway store omieessinns.
Operating Income
The Company had an operating loss of $609,098 for the year ended March 31,1991 as comparul
to an operating loss of $ljQ89,1Q3 tot the same period in fiscal 1990. Four significant factors contributed
to die improvement for the current period first, and most significantly, die Company sold its Eacinc vc«
which eliminated the operating losses of that location; secondly, the 1991 Ions was anaffected by lat^.
strikes; third implementation of marketing and merchandising programs in easting concessions i*re mi
oassful; and fourth, the Company's lone retail store in Seattle ahwed revenue growth. Offsetting d**.
improvements was the fact that dm Company operated 13 fewer concessions at die end of dm csT^t:
period than it did for the comparable period ia 1990, and an increase m general aad admmstxition x i ,
due to stock compensation paid m fiscal 1991 to consultants aad directors, oAct by a decrease m
accounting, travel aad salary eapwura during die current period as compared to the same period n 1990
which resultedfromdecreased acquisition and expansion activity.

4jMUftSS3t/m*/QSD]/lf»lMK

Operating Coats, Genera) aad Administrative Expcaees
The Company incurred store and concern* operating costs of 5868351 for the year ended
March 31,1991 as compared to 5U55,306 for the same period in 1990. This decrease was due pranarity
to the fact that the 1990 expense* included costs incurred primarily in behalf of the Badno tore* now
sokL
Year ended Man* 31,1990 verses Year coded March 31,1919,
•natal Revenues
Gross revenues from rental transactions were $2^77,140 for the year ended March 31, 1990 a?
compared to $2,099,967 for the same period in 1989. Two offsetting factors ooatribrtcd to the change in
revenues for that period: first, overall revenues iacreaacd due to the adefidon of seven rental concession
in the Seattle area, and the addition of the music and video superstore in Eacino, California (the 'Eurino
Store1) during Angwt, 1989, secondly, total revenues were reduced significantly during May, 1989, dtfoogt*
August, 1989, due to a strike by supermarket employees in the Seattle area which affected 22 coocesaona
located in Safeway, Stock Market and Thriftway supermarkets. The combined net effect of these factor*
resulted! in a modest increase in total rental revenues for that period
For concessions that were in operation for the full Escal years 1989 aad 1990 which were act
affected by the strike, revenues on a per concession basis increased by an average of 111% for the year.
Comparatively, revenues for concessions affected by die strike thai were m opcradon for those same
periods decreased by an average of 16.7%.
Saks Revenues
Gross revenues from sale transactions were 5206,610 for dm year ended March 31, 1990 as com
pared to 537,136 tor the same period in 1989. This increase is substantially attributable to the Eacino
Store. Overall kales results for the Eacino Store were less than expected, which the Company believes M
attributable in part to poor performance by dtaribttcrs servicing that store. Managcanrnt determined
that economic conditions, competition in the local consumer video rental market and for mnsunirr enter
tainment dollar* were particularly intense. As a result, the Company determined that h was in its best
Interests to sel die Eacino Store rather than utilize other concession cash flow to support maturity of the
Enciao Store.
Operating Lous
Although the Company had a sizeable operating loss for the year ended March 31,1990, this was
substantially dan to the Company's Enciao Store, which was sold March 30, 1990. The results of the
Enciao Store are amreftiDydetailed betow.
Opaatfag Casta! General aad Administratis Expenses
The Company incurred an operating loss of $1*089/703 for the year ended March 31, 1990 *
compared to operating income of $13,495 for the comparable period in 1989. The substantial compooea>
of the loss was the expense incident to developmeat aad operation of the Encmo Store, which incurred a
net operating loss of 5777,271 Operating costs related to pre-opening expenses consisting of six aoatk>
rent for the Eacino Store, or 1127,284, aad salaries of $19,980. The Eacino Store was sold for S48B.G26,
receivable as a promissory note ("Note9) to the Company beariag iaterest at 14%, dae March 30, 1993
(See Note 4 to Consolidated Financial Statements). The Note k secured by al of the preferred stock in
the Company owned by Ac Company's principal tharehnkter.

-7.
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The Company incurred $132,413 additional general and administrative expenses during the yeai
ended March 31, 1990 o v o the same period ended March 31, 1989, $55,395 of which were travel et
peases. The major portion of these inaeaaed expeaaea were incurred by the Company in its attempt to
acquire other video companies. The Company spent substantial resources to acquire 125 concessions from
The Grand Union Company which ultimately resulted in a breach of contract action filed by the Company
against Grand Union that the Company is currently pursuing afpesaively. Travel aad adaamistrstwe expenses were also incurred from the Company's effort* to acquire Comet Entertainment, Inc. which operated 19 free standing video retail stores in five western states, and had six franchises in two states at the
that af the proposed acquisition.
The Company experienced an overall increase of $197,368 far salaries and related expenses as s
result of the foregoing efforts and the related expenses incurred to gear up for the aihstanrial mfkapatrd
frowth resulting therefrom. However, the Company did experience a reduction in co&sattmg fee expenses
of $59,282 for 1990 over 1989, and subsequent to March 31* 1990, the Company has reduced its corporate
staff and related expenses to more accurately reflect the sippoit necessary for the existing bushiest, la
this structure the Company anticipates operating profitably.
Year Ended Mairfi 111 1HM m ant Year Ended March 31,198S
Rental Rertaaes
Gross revenues were $2*137,483 for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1989 as coaapared to grow
revenues of $1,977,122 for fiscal year ended March 31,1968. The increase in sales was attributable to the
increase in quantity and quality of the Company's cassette library m the supermarket concessions operated
in the Pacific Northwest and the opening of six new concession operations,
For the year ended March 31, 1989, the Company's 28 concession operations in Safeway Store*
accounted for 68% of its sales. The Safeway contract expired in June, 1990
Operating Losa
There was a net operating loss in fiscal 1989 of $5,259 *$ compared to net operating income ol
$77,128 for fiscal 1988. The decboe in operating incosne was attributable to two principal factor*. FUMI,
depreciation expense of the videocassette library increased to $539,980 in fiscal 1989 as compared i».
1443,411 in fiscal 1988 reflecting Che additional investment in the video library in fiscal 1989. Secoiut
general and administrative expenses increased to $461326 in fiscal 1989 at compared to $247,910 in Sac*,
1988. More than $83,000 of the increase in the general and administrative expenditure area was ia kgpl
and crHvailting services associated with the recapitaixataon acfakwd in December 1988.
The set loss of $5,259 far the fiscal year ended March 31, 1969 compares with net income ol
184,631 for the fiscal year coded March % 1988. The decline in act bcoane resulted from the tame at
lactcn dfarnsf it afrfffr
U^aMtty and Capital Ram 111111
At March 31, 1991 the Company had a working capital deficit of $603,473! as compared with
working capital deficit of $576305 as of March 31* 1990. The increase in this deficit (or the current
period resulted primarily from additional provisions far losa contingencies m connection with Htigarinn
Tic Company is dealing with iu distributors on a a s h on defivery basis, hut k current in pay
meats. The Company is trying to acquire trade credit. The Company wil sko be attempting to raise
capital by aefling stock in the Company in the near fature.

*
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At March 31, 1991, the Company bad reduced its notes outstanding to banks of $86,206, from a
balance erf $135,433 at Mart* 31, 1990. The Company also had a revolting credit qreemeot of 150,000
which matured oo July 1, 1969. On July 13, 1989 aa agreement was signed to draw $44,000 on this line
of credit based on a percentage of the then outstanding accounts receivable as dcilcrrngrd by a bank. On
March 9, 1990, this bank and the Company agreed to consolidate the line of credit and term ban into a
oew term baa for $132,433, which bean interest at 1% over the prime rate and is payable over two yean.
Tbe Company funded certain other rapanaion activities by ^ ^ ' « « g two interest-bearing eotc*
origbudly payable to Omni Video, lac which totalled $677,300 at the end of September, 1989, which were
converted into 2^35^17 ifaares of preferred stock. The outstanding shares of preferred stock bear i
cumulative dxvidead of 14% per annum, which w equivalent to $47,281 as of March 31, 1990. Onmi
Video, Inc. made further advances aggregating $49,232 during 1990, nrHading agpegale accrued tntere&i
of $15,962 These unpaid amounts, along with obligation aggregating 527,667 for overhead and rent expenses accrued to other affiliates, were canceled effective March 31, 1990, by the conversion into 482,901
additional shares of Series A Preferred Stock. The Company also paid additional shares of Scries A
Preferred Stock and redeemed other shares for payment of liabilities by and to it at year end (as dis
ckxed in Notes 3 and 7 to the Financial Statements.) Tin: Company obtained a $400,000 lme of credit in
July, 1991 from an affiliate, which it befieves will supply sufficient cash for its operating requirements
The line of credit provides for borrowings of up to $403,000 with interest of 12% per annum, payable
monthly, on the outstanding balance. Principal and accrued but unpaid interest is due and payable
Jaaaary 15,1993.
Inflation
Tbe Company believes that inflation does not have a signifirarl impact upon the coatiauing bun
aess of the Company.
ItemS, HoaDCialS^tdniei^si^Suppkn^a^D^.
See 14(a).
Item 9. Chaanes and Disagreements with A * ™ r i — | ™» A m ^ * and Financial Disclosure.
On November 21,1990, die Company's independent auditors, Laventhol ft Horwath, who audited
tbe Company's financial statements for the years ended March 31, 1990 and 1969, filed for protection
from e r r o r s under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code (The "Bankruptcy Code*.) In the
event , e^oideis desire to assert a daim against Laveathol ft Horwath far a violation of the federal
securities laws for fake and mjaltariiag financial tfstfaieafi or disclosures or under other appicable la**>
shareholders will be adversely affected and m some instances baned by the Bankruptcy Code. Under UK
Bankruptcy Code, it is likely that any legal action against Laveathol ft Horwadi which is commenced aftei
Nbveanber 21,1990 will have to be filed in tbe United States Bankruptcy Court lor the Southern District
of New York and, if filed elsewhere, will Bkely be suyed pending dm Bankruptcy proceedings Share
holders should ako note that any meritorious legal claims of tbe nature descried above, to the enent
penaktsd, are typically treated aa general unsecured claims against Laveathol ft Horwath^ bankruptcy
estate. Although die Company has been mfaned that Laventhol ft Horwadi is a general partnership ami
aa such its general partners are Sable for some of the firm's obligations, the stains and nature of such
Udbiky, if any, in unclear at this time
Additionally, concurrent with this bankruptcy fifing, Laventhol ft Horwath discontiaurd perform
iog accounting and auditing services and substantially all of its partners withdrew from the partnership
As a result, Laventhol ft Horwalk did not perform any subsequent review procedures with respect to :h«
flaimdal statements covered by their report which are iadoded ia dus Form 10-K, and did not sip *•
conscait to the use of its report in the Company's Fbnn S-8.
-9jMis/nsa/ooo/ojoi/itiiMK

The discussion regarding certain efforts of the Laveatbot & Horwath bsnfcroptcy as set forth
above is aot meant and should not be construed ia my way is legal advice to toy party and any shareholder should consult with his or her own counsel with respect to the effect of the Laveatbol k Horwath
baokrupecjr.
Oa January 22, 1991, the Company appointed BDO Scidinaa as its new independent accountant*
The Compaiy dki not consult with BDO Seidman or any other *erf»*^g firm regarding the application
of accounting principles to a specified transaction, either completed or proponed, or the type of opinion
that might be rendered regaining the Company'sfinancialstatements, nor dad the Company consult with
BDC Seidman with respect to any accounting disagreement or any reportable event, at any time prior to
die appointment of such firm.
PART IU

The foUowhtg table sets forth the name, age, position held, and term of office of each director sod
iiffkrM of the Company,

Position Held

ttmi
Larry Trusty

Ag£
44

ffittitiigfftrow*

Position Held
Continuouaiy

SPOT

President fundi line,
1991)

1991

OavidJ.Enzer

jl

Director

1989

Elaine Melnyk

42

Vice President • Finance

1990

DanidLezafc

57

Chiiiman

1991

Burins* EipaiiumefDtaetan and « ^ ^
The blowing is a summary of the besmear cspexience of the Dircctora and Bmcutive Officers <>i
the Company
Larry Trusty was president of tke Company from March to June, 1999U and has been Chief Optrrn
mg Officer since March, 199L from September 1985 to that time he was Regional Sake Manager f«>.
Consoadasrd Video Systems, in Seattle, Washington Consolidated Video Systems operated video depaii
mnnta in 1200 convenience stores. Mr. Tmaty was responsible for wry warehouse petaouel andfortysal
people in the Western US. and Hawaii Ftam 1978 to 198S he was Regional Account Supervisor of B&t
Safes, Ia&, respoustte for a staff of 25 salespeople in (he Western U 5 He received a degree in bushn..
mlmiwtrrationfromthe University of Montana.
Mr. Enaer has been active in real estate and other burinem investments since March, 1989. 11
was elected President in Jane, 199L Mr. Enter was an Associate * the lawfirmsof Christoneen, Whu.
Miler, Fink & JacobsfromApril 1988 to March, 1989, Cooper, Epstein and HunwtzfromSeptember 198/
to March 1988, and at Jeffier, Mangels and Butler from September, 1986 to August, 1987. Mr. Ewer ha>.
ako been Chairman of Davcor, a corporation involved ia real estate development sod land planning aiul
eattiement work, since December, 1988. Mr. Enter graduated PHI BETA KAPPA aad BETA G A M M A

-10JKli/2SSir/8QQ/SfSt71itimi

SIGMA from the Uawenity of California at Berkeley in 1982 where he graduated with a B5 ia Account
iag aad Real Estate from the Undergraduate Business School Mr. Enzer patted Che California CPA exai
ia May 1983, and graduated with a JD- as a Thurston Society ©ember from the Halting* College of Lav
mJ*ael986.
Daniel Lezak, 58, has beea a director of the Company since 1989. He is the president and director of Weaver Anns, Inc. (currently ia Chapter 11 bankruptcy), The Lezak Group, and a director of Gen
oral Residential Corp., Lucky Chance Mining Company, Inc. (currently ia Chapter 11 bankruptcy) and
various other publidy and privately held companies. Mr. Lezak is a business management coasafeanl ipt
ciaihing ia the rekabiltatioa offinanciallydistressed companies, aad has beea involved in over 50 bankruptcy reorganizations. Mr. Lezak received a B-S. in Accounting from Roosevelt University and is s cei
tified public accountant.
Elaine Melnyk has beea Vice President • Finance for the Company since August, 1990. M,
Melnyk held the position of Vice President for a privately held real estate syndication and property mait
agneoi company. Ms. Melnyk was involved in all facets of cash m i n i y * * ^ partnership aad corpora
accounting as well as payroll aad risk management. Ms. Melnyk studied at UCLA and Cat State North
ridge majoring in Business Administration and Economics.

The table below sets forth the compensation for fiscal 1991 for (a) ail of the executive officers <!
che Company whose compensation exceeded $60,000 and (b) all the executive officers of the Company as J
group.
Capacities

(1)

(2)

(3)

Cash

James KolitzW

$67,399

AB Executive Officers
as a Group (6 Persons
in the year ended
March 31,1991)

$175432

The Coaipany also reimburses all travel aad entertainment and auto expense of the executive ,,i
Seers incarred ia connection with activities of the Company. All such expeascs duringfiscal191M
amounted to less than fMOQQ.
Excludes certain compensation comkting of personal use of expense accounts, ices paid by tin
Company for industry memberships aad publications, aad auto allowance. Such compensation Hi,|
not erneed the leaser of 10% of the compensation reported as cash compensation for the group '•SStyOOQ.
Mr.Kofitzwasempb^byiheOimpaayfrom^

Slack Optfoaa mad Grants.
Oa January 22, 1991, the Company awarded cmaaaon stock to members of its Board of Director
far their services as board members and for ronanhing mrvices under a Consulting Agreement aa folio**
Afl shares issued to Mr. Lezak were registered in the aame <tf CD. Management, Inc, a eorporatioa am
trotted by mm.
David Enter
Daniel Lezak

3^00,000
l^SQJJOO
•11-

j*isaa3t/m/osoi/i«u«

iflBJi,

Secunrv Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owneq aH Ml^MTTT 1

The following table sets forth information as of March 31, 1991 relating to the benefice)
ownership of the Company's Common Stock by the Company's Directors, Officers and Directors of th,
Company as a group and all persons known by the Company to be beneficial owners of more than five
percent of the outstanding Compaoy Common Stock. Unless otherwise noted, all person have sole toting
sad disposkioa power with respect to ail shares listed as owned by (hem, subject to comrauniry proper!,
laws.
Name i Address
tfB^fc^Q^Wr
Dav il Emer^M2)

Number of Shares
V9$50jUOfl)

&B&
49.9%

Larry I'mscy**')

-

Daniel Leak( 2 )

2^50,000

5.6%

DPI Video, Inc.
c/o Drown News Agency
13172 Golden West Center
Westminster, CA 92683

2,000,000

5.0%

Sherman MaznrC*)

4jOOQvOOO

5.0%

All Officers and
directors as a
Group (4 persons):

22^00l000(1)

54.4%

Elaine MetaykC2)

(1) Mr. En2er is president of That Pac Corporation, the General Partner of Holmby Capital Partner,
and thus may be deemed to be the beneficial owner of the 16,450,000 shares of the Company coot
mon stock held by Holmby Capital Partners. Does not indnde 25,424^80 common shares iasnahli
upon conversion of the Series A Preferred Stock also held by Holmby.
(2) Tbe address of each of these persons is care of the Company.
(3) Includes aOQgOOO Shane of common stock held by The Lezak Group, which * a pri>lc company en*
trotled by Mr. Lezak, and IfSOflXl Shares held by CD. Management, Inc, a prifHe company con
trolled by him.
(4) Indmfca 2^00^00 Shares held by I t a ^

On January 14, 1991, the Cosapany entered into a Qmsotfag Apeemenc with David EJECT,
director, providing for refipra
any acquisition made by the Company arranged by that consnhant The agreement provides for paymti i
of ecpeneas and indemnification to Mr. Enxer for liability for hk actions as a director or actions under tl <
agreement (excluding wiUibl misconduct) and other term*

-12J t f l i MltlllJ Hill IN 111 II II1 II II II llll

In July, 1991, the Company executed a $400,000 revoking note arrangement with Hie Lezak Groi»|,
a corporation controlrd by a Director, pursuant to which the Coopany ouy borrow op to $40X000 for
working capital purposes. The note bean interest at 12% tad a& principal borrowed it due in Jammry,
1S93.
Tke Company sold its Encino retail store to S M . Acquisitions, Inc^ a corporation affiliated with
Omni Video, Inc. (then a holder of 18,450,000 sbaxet of common stock) for the assumption of ail Telatc I
liabilities and a non-recourse note for $488,026, which was equal to tke net book value of tke assets tram
(erred Tke note was collateralized by a pledge of all of the Seriet A Preferred Stock held by Omni 11M
Company repurchased certain of the assets for $308)761, by reducing the note by that amount. The it
maiader of the note receivable was paid on March 30, 1991 by the redemption of 36QJH3 shares of t)i
Series A Preferred Stock, valued at $.62 per share, the fair value of the common stock into which the Preferred Stock was then convertible. The above aittkmrnt of the note receivable resulted in a charge i*
operations of appro&mately $44,300 in 1991.
Additional shares of Preferred Stock were issued and cancelled for payment of other liabiiitk*
See Note 7 to the Financial Statements.
PABTIV
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Fxfajhits Financial Statements. Schedules and Reports on Ftarm » K

(a)

Financial statements required by Item B of this form are filed as a
separate part of this report fallowing part IV:

(1)

£ag&

Reports of Independent Certified Public Accountants

F-2

Consolidated Balance Sheets at March 31,1991 and 1990

F-*

Consolidated Statements of Operations for the yean ended March 31,
1991,1990 and 1989
r^mfrfltfffif/)

P*

$Mrjn*4tH ^ Struct* AH»T« F/fMty for ffaf

yean ended March 31,1991,1990 and 1989

F'

Consolidated Statements of Cash Ffawtfarthe yean ended March 31,
1991,1990 and 1989

Fh

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements
(2)

Fin

Schedules required by Regulation S«X are filed with the Financial Statrmranr

V

Property, Plant A Equipment

P

VI

Accumulated Depredation, Depiction and
Amoctiiuooo of Property, Plant and

F--1

DC

Short-Tern Borrowings

F-21!

X

Supplementary Statement of Operations
ion
-13*

F-2^

xwrnwrnummmm

Schedules oot listed above have been omitted because the information required to be set forth therein i
not applicable or is shown is tic financial stateaaeuts ootet thereto.
(3)

Exhibits

Exhibit No.
Purchase Agreement between Ragktraot and Omni Video, Inc. dated March
a , 1990 far assets of Endao StoreW.
Stock Purchase Agreemcat between. Registrant and Marutaka Land Compaq >,
Hollywood Land Tokyo. LtcL, and Haaiau Land Co, Ltd, dated June 2*
1991, as amended August 2,199l(4X
Articles of Incorporation of Registrant, as amendedW.
tion(2).
ByW1).
December, 198S Amendment to Regjiatraafa Artides of Incorporation.^).
Certificate of Determination far Series A Preferred Stock®.
M).4

Loan Agreemcat between Registrant and Key Bank (flea Seattle T"1! ui) ^ law I
January 7,198* 1 ).

109

NotesfromRepaUrant to Omni Video, h e dated June and August 19®( 2 ).

10.10

Stock Purchase Agreement between Regatrant and SBL Capital, lnc, »•» \
asaigned lo Omni Video, Inc^ aa aaeadedv).

10.11

Reprised Key Bank Loan Agreement^).

10.12

Cnnsnlring Agreement with David Bmerffl.

10.13

Promatory Note to The Lezak Groqpl 4 ).

24J
(1)

Conaeat
SadnuRegistration Statement on Form S-4 Hie No. 33-2974*1
Incorporated by reference
to of
theBDO
Company'!
filed on Jaly 3,1989 (the "Rcgntraiion Statemeat").
(2) Piled with Aneadmenl No. 1 to the Registration Statement
(J) FUedi^AiieadBaeiMhfa.2totiMRegpatratkaStatemea^
(4) Filed herewith.
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Report of Independent CartIflad Public Accountanta

Board of Directors and Shareholders
L.A. Entertainment, Inc.
Los Angelas, California
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of L.A.
Entertainment, Inc., as of March 31, 1991, and the related statements
of operations, shareholders9 equity, and cash flows for the year then
ended* He have also audited the 1991 schedules listed in the
accompanying index. These financial statements and schedules are the
responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to
empress an opinion on the? . financial statements and schedules based < i
our audit. The financial statements and schedules of L.A.
Entertainment, inc. as of March 31, 1990 and 19S9 vers audited by otht>
auditors who have ceased operations and whose report dated August 1,
1990 expressed an unqualified opinion on those statements.
We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards- Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial
statements and schedules are free of material misstatement. An audit
includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts
and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes
assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates ma. I.
by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement
presentation. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis
for our opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above
present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of
L.A. Entertainment, Inc., at March 31, 1991, and the results of its
operations and its cash flows for the year then ended in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles.
Also, in our opinion, the 1991 schedules present fairly, in
all material respects, the information set forth therein.

7&o %juJL~~
BDO SEICMMI

Los Angalas, California
July 10, 1991
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Form £*, Pile No. 33-41305, filed for prauctn uader depict l l o f tte BoUotplcy Cote oa No*»bci 2lf 199a Tkat fiiag aiy hive
ao advene effect on aa sfajrcfcoidtfs's ability .0 we tod recover Innayt ftoa Ual aattitfet S ™ ^ laptd to • «pon oa ifat
Comaon/a SaiAoal tfjtemeou. Ptrtbcr. U w t h c l k Ekraadi daoaoiiflacd pctfenpiafacgMaiiaajaa^aadiaagaegncg
21, WC, u a cuult. it %a* uoabfe co cooienc 10 tbe uae of its report ia toe Pom M . aad CM! aoc pttfom any aafcaaqucnt amor
pfocedures with respect -JQ the fsuaKai tttttaaeaa uiduded * thai Ajuiaai Report as Fum 10-K. Tae lack of a oanaeau by Laveaahoi
A fJoTOiaraa? preclude s l r c b o i d ^ of 0 ^
Set *^c3i 9, Changes and DiaaptcaKoa wka AccouaJAaa oa Accotfatt* tad FliaacaM Daafatas *

Tafl«ffl4^irt aVrilten' I r a n
Board of Directors and Shaxeboldaurs
&• A. tatertaioaant, Xnc* #
feraerly Jaioirn as
Super larfcat Video, Ice.,
•ad Subsidiary
L O T Angeles, California
Ha have audited the acccapaoying balance sheets of ki«
tBtertainaexxt, Inc., formerly kDcaa aa Super Mexfeet Video, laas-, aad
Subsidiary « o M U r c h 31, 1S9« and 1SS9, aad tbe related statements
eat apacatioas, shareholders • equity, and cash flow* for the years
thee eadad* These financial stataaents are the respeasibility of the
Caaapesy's nanageaent. Oar responsibility is to express en opinion oa
Jthafe financial stataasnts baaed en oar audits.
*e coadacrted oar audits Ln accordance with generally accepted
matltlnrj standards. Those standards require that we plan aad perform
Che aaaltt to obtain reasonable assurance about vhather the financial
statements are free of aatauriel aisartataaant. la aadit includes
aasainiag, oa a teat basis, erideaca suppuiiitng the aaouuta aad
diaaolosuras is the fiaeneial statsaaBts* Aa aadit alao l«—VrT~a
teesating the accounting priaeiplaia used aad significant aatlnatos
abde by aanageaent, as veil es evaluating the overall financial
atsmaiait presentationla baOieve that our audita provide a
reeeeaable basis for oar opinion.
In oar opinion, the financial stataaents referred to above present
fairly, in all* aatarial respects, the financial position of L. A.
fatartaiaeaot. Inc., foraerlytaoaroas Super Kartost Video, Inc., aad
Subsidiary *• of March 31, 1990 aad m s , aad tbe results of its
nasTSttw and its cash floats for the years then eaded in ooaforaity
vith generally aoceptaad accounting principles.
In n nana i.t loo with our audit of ti* financial stataaanta referred to
above, «e aad it ad the financial stataaent schedules listed, under Itea
••
In our opinion, tha*se financial stataaent achorinloa presamt
fairly, in all aatarial respects, the information stataid therein,
Yhea considered in relation to the financial stataaMnts taken as a
utole.
aa» ^scussed in note 2 to the financial stataaents, the Ooapeny has
rftairjad froa presenting a stataaent of rhanqos in financial position
for the year andad Harch 31, I M S , to presenting stataaents of cash
flaws for the years ended March 31, 1390 and 1519.

lAvnwaox. t aosmsB
Los Angeles, California
August 1 1390
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BALANCE SHEETS

March 31,
ASSETS

1991

CORXEHT:
Cash

%

11 000

1990
$

43 i/,

Accounts receivable, lass allowance for
doubtful accounts, $10,000 (Note 5)
Prepaid expenses

59 986

78 2<

18 793

19 0 < M

-

Videocassettes held for sale

T O T A L CURRENT ASSETS

89 779

RENTAL VIDtOCASSBTTE LIBRARY, at coat less
accuaulated depreciation o f $2,866,827
and $2,286,165 (Notes 2 and 5)

929 499

F0RMIT0R1 AMD EQUIPMENT, net (Note 4)

267 860

81 2 8 1 138

F-4

17 12a

157 56/

896 47

__2flfi_3Jj,

81 362 392

BALANCE SHEETS
(Concluded)
March

LIABILITIES AND
SHMCTOLDERS' EQUITY
CURREMT LIABILITIES:
Currant portion of notes payable, banks
(Note 5)
Notes payable to shareholders (Note 6)
Trade accounts payable
Accrued expenses (Note 11)
Capital lease obligations, current portion
(Hote 4)
Due to officers and affiliate
TOTAL CUBRENT LIABILITIES
HOTSS PAYABLE TO SHAREHOLDERS (Note 6)
DOS TO OFFICERS AND AFFILIATE
NOTSS PAYABLE (Note 5)
CAPITAL LEASE OBLIGATIONS, net of current
portion (Rote 4)
Total liabilities
C0MCIT«afTS AND CONTINGENCIES (Note 11)
KORIHOLDERS9 EQUITY (Notes ? and 14):
Preferred stock, $.001 per value;
authorized 20,000,000 shares; issued
and outstanding, 2,642,468 and
2,818,420 shares (aggregate
liquidation preference of $766,316
and $317,342)
Coeeon stock, $.001 par value;
authorized 200,000,000 shares; issued and
outstanding 40,050,000 and 32,900,000
shares
Additional paid-in capital
Accumulated deficit
Treasury stock, at cost (500,000 shares
of coaaon stock)

1991

$

86 206

264 327
325 036
1? 661

693 252
73 540
47 833

814 «S

2 643

40 050
2 263 195
(1 806 900)

$

64
66
301
245

05.;
02 it
016
4)0

57 3'J/
5 40ft
739 29P

•

12 4,V»
823 1J 4

2 81

32 90d
2 145 52i
(1 121 48J)

(32 475)
466 513

1 059 759
(32 47M

466 513

f48a 02>,i
S39 258

SI 281 138

51 362 39;

See aumnary of accounting policies and
notes to financial atataaenta.
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1990

71 3HI

Less: Note receivable for stock issued
Laaax Mote receivable froa affiliate (Note 3)
TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY

n

L.A. ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS

Y M f tlrfid KttrSfc 311

1991
CROW RENTAL REVENUES
GR06J SALES REVENUES
Total gross rental
and salas revenue

$2 308 870
63 106

1989
$2 099 96 7
37 51*

2 483 750

l_127_i*<

662 778

619 235

614 42i

3« S37

153 567

i£JU"

701 315

772 802

630 42 1

i 67Q " i

X 710 948

868 351

1 555 306

491 75H

646 808
7*4 600

651 006

394 23?

539 980
*61 82«,

3 27? 7g?

2 800 6S1

J 4,93 561

Total concession commissions
and cost of video and
audiocassettes sold

OPERATING EXPENSES:
Concession and store operating
costs
Videocassette library
depreciation
General and administrative
Total operating costs
and expenses

$ 2 277 140
206 610

2 371 S76

CONCESSION COMMISSIONS
COST OF VIDEO AND AUDIOCASSETTES
SOLD

Net rental and sales
revenue

1990

Operating (loss) income
OTHER INCOME (EXPENSE):
Interest expense
Miscellaneous income

(f09 098)

(1 08? 793)

(30 300)

(43 227)

88 4 W
38 10?

1 307 o;

3 010
(38 217)

NIT LOIS

» (S79 988> »ri 127 9201 $

NXT LOSS PER SHARE OF
CGBBIQlf STOCX

s

fo.021 $

U U ) $.

Sea avmaary of accounting policies and
notaa to financial statements.
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13 491
(37 591)
18 83a
(18 7SO
LS-ii."

JD

L.A. UriERTAHtMnrT, IHC.
STATtMEMTB OP SHAREHOLDERS • NUTTY
YEMU

nrosD

IUMCH

3 1 , 1 9 * 1 , 1*90

Oorft»» A

*Ultlo»*l
paU-la

I f t f t r i H riffr

AMD

(A«o%a*ul*t«4
*»flelt)
rotalno*

19*9

TroomiT ffofli

lacalvaala
l o r acock

JaiaL
•ALA*Ct, i p r t l 1 . 10*0

14 450 MO

414 4 f t

I t 43* 000

10 430

4

032 433

4

30 # 7 /

$ < » ?44)

000 34$

4 005

3tot l o * «
32 000 000

32 000

(20 470)
( I 7«A)

33 710

1 331 000

A441tl«Ui

1
Hj

Bmt l o » *
1AJL24K*, More* S I , 1000

2 010 420

2 010

-

014 323

_
,,
0 010 420

-

(47 201)

„
2 010

32

32 000

2 143 523

( 1 121 403)

D l v l A m U 4 M U M 4 OO
Oorloo A P r e f a c e * * Ocaak
(Data 7 )
I I M M M M #f I t r l t t A Frafar***
* t a e * (Oata 7 )

4 005

jA-m>

aUUUKX. Nactli 3 1 . l M f

D i v i 4 m 4 » Ooclarotf M I l e i i t i
A trmtmwfd
Stack (Hot* F)

A74 000
715 013

0«t ^ y w a t i *o««i*o4 M I
iuit« roe*l<r»»l«

• 1 0«rl«» A Proforr** Itock
( * • * # 7)

4

(32 473)

(114 420)
104 541

105

• t a x * UttMrf (Oata 71

114 243
7 150 000

7 150

220 504

t l m a f eomm
pvavidUd • • c a l l a t a r a l l o r
• a e a r a a a i v a a l a (Bat a 7 )

C500 000)

( 3 2 415)

1 307 030

( 2 700)

017 342
(47 ZBl)
ff 127 | 2 J l
1 Ol? 224

-

(114 420)

-

233 734

114 420

32 475

Otia^atlan af k r l i *
A P r a f a c c a * Ocack »xavlaa4

• • aallatacat fat* attt

r a e a i a a t l a a i 1 1 1 l a t a ( » a t a 7)
••t

(340 313)

<341>

(223 137)

(223 510)
JUZJLH!)

lot*

BAUmcm. Naralr. 3 1 , 1001

(570 003)

UUUM

'-LM1

HJtt-fttt

HtJUt

*IMJUU

H

Se* suouMry of accounting p o l i c i a l and
notes to financial atatenenta.

)
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STATEMENTS OF CASH PLOWS
Increase (decrease) in cash

Year andad March 31.

-122SL

.1221.

•1262

CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES:
Cash received from customers
$2 390 250 $1 B82 358 $1 520 012
Cash paid to suppliers and
(760 1(M)
1 896 110) (1 769 384)
employees
•
2 214
17 0(.i
Interest received
<33
0/n
"
3
227)
Interest paid
fI?
? )
"

Ket cash provided by operating
activities
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIBS:
Capital expenditures
Proceeds froa sales of assets
tits

Met cash used in investing
activities
CASH FLOWS FROM FIKAKCIMG ACTIVITIES:
Payments on notes payable to
shareholders
Payments on note payable to bank
Payments on capital leases
Proceeds received on shareholder's
note
Proceeds froa sale of cosuaon stock
Proceeds fro* bank note
Increese (decrease) in due to
officers and affiliate

743 8U,

(528 969}
76 872

(347 612)

(796 9) ij

-

-

(121 214)

(452 097)

™ « 7 612)

(918 14')

(19 361}
(46 240)
(62 867}

(56 1 M )
(69 SI.*]
(34 3 M )

—

.
-

48 43?

CASH, beginning of year
5

*»

5 9.-*
715 0.

44 000

-

M

(363 119)

43 179

406 228

Q0Q

5 4(«i

*

W 35?

««•>

(32 179)

"•

-

(3 M 9 )

(58 9 « )

M R (DECREASE) INCREASE IN CASH

F-8

71 961

(49 227)
(52 171)

Met cash provided by (used in)
financing activities

CASE, end of year

478 883

11022

392 048

_U_250
S

406 29H

STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
(Concluded)
Increase (decrease) in cash

Year andad March 31.
H91

IMP

1212_

RECONCILIATION OF NET LOSS TO NET
CASH PROVIDED BY OPERATING
ACTIVITIES:
Net lose
S T57Q 9891Sfl 127 920) $
Adjustments to reconcile net loss
to net cash provided by operating
activities:
Depreciation and aaortization
782 807
902 442
Issuance of canon stock for
consulting services and
directors fees (Note 7)
233 736
tfrite-dovn of assets to
aarket
(44 253)
Cain on sale of video library
cassette*
(8 483)
Accrued interest on shareholder
note receivable
(2 796)
Decrease in deferred incone
taxes
(6 582)
Increase (decrease) froa changes
in:
Accounts receivable
18 274
27 843
Prepaid expenses
207
5 399
Videocassettes held for sale
17 128
15 969
Trade accounts payable
(126 689}
73 730
Accounts payable, affiliate
7 517
Accrued expenses
169 628
ita 876
1 I** 881

1 049 «?2
NET CASK PROVIDED SY OPERATING
ACTIVITIES

S

478 883

8

71 961

See suaaary of accounting policies and
notes to financial stateaenta.
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671 lfi •

(1 83a)

(19 44 S)
(5 19 2)
8 74 '
66 3«i>
3 On t
2A_271
749 01 ,

8

743 8.V.

SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTING POLICIES

VIDIOCASSETTES HELD FOR SALE
Vidaocaaaatte inventory hald for purpoaaa of raaala ia valu< I
at tha lower of coat or market. Coat ia determined by tha firat-in,
firat-out (FIFO) aathod.
DEPRECIATION METHOD FOR RENTAL VIDEOCASSETTE LIBRARY
Rental videocaseettee ara depreciated on tha rental uaaga
aathod over their estimated useful livea of five yeare. The rental
uaaga aethod ia baaed on the Company9a hiatorical experience regarding
tha rental of ita vidaocaaaatte inventory. The Coapany9a experience
fcae ehcwn that the rate of uaaga ia greatest in the firat year froa th«
date of release to the video rental narket, and decreases in the second
through fifth years. Based upon experience, the annual depreciation
rataa are 57% in the first year, and 13%f 13%, 9% and 3% in the
subsequent yeara. Company management believee tha rental uaaga aathod
ia an appropriate repreaentation of depreciation for rental
vldeocaeeettes since usage moat accurately matches the expiration of
coat with rental income.
FURMTORE AND EQUIPMENT AND DEPRECIATION
Furniture and equipment are depreciated on the straight-line
method over their estimated useful livea of five years.
INCOME TAXIS
Deferred income taxes are provided for differences in
financial reporting and income tax reporting.

Loaa

PER

comoN

SHARE

Lose per common share ia computed by dividing net loss,
increased by preferred stock dividends, by tha weighted average number
of common eharee outstanding. Common atocic equivalenta have been
excluded from the 1991, 1990 and 1989 computations since their effect
womld be anti-dilutive. The weighted average number of common share*
outstanding warn 34,138,766, 32,900,000 and 21,723,014 for the yeara
ended March 31, 1991, 1990 and 1989.
JOSCIASSIFI CATIONS
Certain amounts within the accompanying financial statement*
have been reclassified for comparative purpoaea only*
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NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

N O W 1 - NATURE OP BUSINESS
L.A. Entertainment, Inc. ("Company"), is primarily engaged in
the bueineas of oparating praracordad vidaocaaaatta rantal concesaiona
within aajor supermarket chains located in Washington and Oregon. Tha
Ccaqpany also has one stand-alone retail videocassette rantal location
in Seattle, Washington.
A majority of tha Company'a outstanding common stock is avne.i
by Bolmtoy Capital Partners, Ltd. (See Notes 3 , 7 , 9 and 11)
NOTE 2 - CONCESSION OPERATING AGREEMENTS AND MAJOR CUSTOMERS
Tha Company operates video rental outlets under concession
oparating agreamenta which provide that tha Company bear all of the
ooata of oparating tha outlets (exclusive of personnel coats relating
to ranting of tha tapes) and that the store owner receive between 301
to 35% of the outlets1 rental revenues. At March 31, 1991, the Company
oparatad 40 auch outleta.
Tha Company received approximately 53%, 64% and 68% of the
gross rantal revenues from outlets in varioua atoraa of one aupermarkat
chain for tha years ended March 31, 1991, 1990 and 1989. Tha Company ,
concession agraament with this supermarket chain expired in June, 1990.
However, the Company continuea to operate the outleta on a monthly
basis.
In addition, tha Company received approximately 26%, 16% and
14% of ita gross rantal revenues from outlets in various stores of
another supermarket chain for tha years ended March 31, 1991, 1990 and
1989.
NOTE 3 - NOTE RECEIVABLE PROM AFFILIATE
In August 1989, the Company opened a laasad retail
"muperetore" located in Encino, California, which stocked praracordad
videocaaaettas and entertainment related items for rental and sale.
lfce Company oparatad the store until March 30, 1990, at which time the
retail operation waa aold to an affiliate. The affiliate purchased al
of the Company4a assets hald in the retail store and assumed all
related liabilities in exchange for a note having a principal amount
equal to the net book value of such asseta and liabilltiee, which was
determined to be $488,026 aa of March 30, 1990. The note was nonrecourse and was receivable quarterly in interest-only installmenta
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NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(Continued)

MCTE 3 - NOTE RECEIVABLE FROM AFFILIATE (Continued)

at 14% per annua with the principal and all unpaid interest due on
April 1, 1993* The note was collateralized by a pledge of all of the
shares of Series A preferred stock held by another affiliated entity.
The note is presented as a reduction of shareholders1 equity on the
accompanying balance sheet at March 31, 1990.
On November 1, 1990, the Coapany entered into an agreement t<>
repurchase certain of the assets, including video rental tapes and
video shelving, of this "superstore19 for a $308,761 reduction of the
related note receivable* The remainder of the note receivable was
settled on March 30, 1991 through the redeaption of 360f 513 shares of
aeries A preferred stock which were valued at $0.62 per share (see Notr
7)• The above settlement of the note receivable resulted in a charge
to operations of approximately $44,300 in 1991.
The accompanying financial statements include the Company•*
results of operating the superstore during the year ended March 31,
1990 which are summarized below:
Gross revenues
Operating costs

$ 312 069
1 M 9 342

Loss from operations

$ f777 2731

In connection with the operation of the superstore, during
the years ended March 31, 1990 and 1969, approximately $255,000 and
$442,000 in rent for the retail space was paid to an affiliate.
NOTE 4 - FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT

Furniture and fixtures
Equipment
Computer software
Leasehold improvements
Automobiles

$493
281
86
28

Less accumulated depreciation
and amortization

S30
113
651
330

OIL'
53«.
6* 1
33o

_2JL£i2

12 «;»

910 571

848 211>

$42 711

"9

nv m

P-12

$44 3
277
86
28

860

$308 3S>

NOTES TO FIMAHCIAL STATEMENTS
(Continuad)

•OTI 4 • FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT (Continuad)
As of March 31, 1991 and 1990, total capitalised laaaa
aquipaant includad in furnishings and aquipaant abova vae $175,742 for
both years- Accumulated amortization tharaon vaa $84,825 and $49,677.
•OTI 5 • NOTES PAYABLE, BANKS
Tha Company renewed its commercial loan agraaaant with a Ba<
on March 9, 1990, evidenced by a new note in the principal aaount of
$135,433, which combined the unpaid balances of $91,433 and $44,000
borrowed under expired loan and line of credit agreements- The note
bears annual intareat at 1% above the bank's index rate, which waa 10%
as of March 31, 1991. The note ia payable in 24 equal monthly
installments of $6,310 through March 1992 and ia collateralized
primarily by accounts receivable and videocaaaette assets.
SCTI 6 - NOTES PAYABLE TO SHAREHOLDERS
Notes payable to shareholders, bearing annual interest at lot
are unsecured and payable on demand after April 1, 1992. Interest
expense recorded on these notes waa approximately $6,685, $7,600 and
$12,200 for the years ended March 31, 1991, 1990 and 1989.
MOT1 7 - CAPITAL STOCK
During the year ended March 31, 1991, the Company iaaued
4,750,000 ahares of common stock to the directors of the Company aa
compensation for their aervices as directors and consultants to the
Company. In addition, the Company issued 2,000,000 sharas of common
etocX to an outtide consultant and 400,000 shares of common stock to
outside attorneys in consideration for aervicea provided to the Compaq
during the year and amounts owing from the prior year. The above
transactions resulted in a charge to general and administrative expenii
Of $233,736.
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NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(Continued)

JTOTE 7 - CAPITAL STOCK

(Continued)

During 1987, the Coapeny issued 500,000 shares of common
stock to an individual in exchange for a promissory note in tha amount
of $25,000. in September, 1990, tha nota with a balance of $32,475
including accrued but unpaid interest was due and payable. In March,
1991, ae payment was not forthcoming, the 500,000 shares vera redeemed
in settlement of the balance due.
During the year ended March 31, 1990, the Board of Directors
authorized the designation of 4,000,000 shares of Series A Preferred
Stock. Holders of this class of preferred stock are entitled to
receive cumulative dividends, payable quarterly, at the rate of 141 pi i
annua and may at their option convert their preferred shares into
shares of common stock at any time after June 30, 1991, at the rata of
ten shares of common stock for each share of preferred stock. The
Company may, at its option, issue additional shares of common stock to
satisfy cumulative but unpaid dividends* This clams of preferred stoi t
generally carries no voting rights and is redeemable at the option of
the Company at any time at a redemption price of $.29 per share plus
emulative dividends accrued and unpaid.
The Company had two notes payable to its then controlling
shareholder, Omni Video, Inc., for $400,000 and $277,300. These not**
were due on demand and bore interest at 12% per annum. On September
30, 1989, the principal of the notes vas canceled in exchange for
2,335,517 shares of Series A Preferred Stock converted at a rate of
$0.29 per share. The outstanding shares of preferred stock bear a
cumulative dividend of 14% per annum, which was equivalent to $47,281
as of March 31, 1990. Omni Video, Inc., made further advances
aggregating $49,232 during the year ended March 31, 1990, excluding
aggregate accrued interest of $15,862. These unpaid amounts, along
with obligations aggregating $27,667 for overhead and rent expenses
accrued to other affiliates, were canceled effective March 31, 1990, by
thm conversion into 482,903 additional shares of Series A Preferred
•took.
Accrued dividends on Series A Preferred Stock totalled
$114,428 for the year ended March 31, 1991. On March 31, 1991,
additional preferred shares were issued in satisfaction of the unpaid
dividends at the rate of $0.62 per share.
On March 31, 1991, 360,513 shares of Series A Preferred Stoci
were redeemed in settlement of the then outstanding balance of $223,51 n
on the note receivable from an affiliate. See Mote 3.
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NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(Continuad)

NOTE 7 - CAPITAL STOCK

(Continuad)

Tha Company's Board of Diractora has authority, without
action by tha shareholder*, to iaaua all or any portion of tha
reoeaining authorized but uniaauad prafarrad etoctc in one or mora serit*
and to determine tha voting rights, prafarancaa as to dividanda and
liquidation, conversion rights, and othar rights of such aariaa. Sued
prafarrad stock aay carry rights auparior to thoaa of tha common stocV.
VOTE I - INCOME TAXES
As of March 31, 1991, tha Company has nat oparating loaaas
for both financial raporting purpoaaa and fadaral income tax purpoaaa
of approxiaataly $1,546,000 expiring principally in tha yaar 2005.
VOTE 9 - REIATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS
From Fabruary 1969 to Juna 30, 1990, tha Company aharad
oorporata offica spaca and aacratarial services vith an affiliata und« i
a month-to-month sublaasa arrangeaent with tha affiliata. Tha fair
aarket valua of tha shared offica apaca was chargad to tha Coapany
baaad upon tha anount of apaca occupied until March 31, 1990. The rant
was $5,000 par month for tha yaar ended March 31, 1990 and approxiaataly $51,000 was chargad to rant axpanaa undar this arrangement. See
notaa 3 and 7.
MOTE 10 - MAJOR SUPPLIER
Tha Coapany had purchases of vidaocaasattee of approxiaataly
114$,600, $601,000 and $601,000 froa a aajor supplier during tha yearn
ended March 31, 1991, 1990 and 1989.
MOTS 11 - COMMITMENTS AMD CONTINGENCIES
Operating leases
Tha Coapany occupies space under operating leaaaa and rants
office furniture and equipment on a month-to-month baais. Total rant
expense chargad to oparatlona under noncancellabia lease agreements fo
the years ended March 31# 1991, 1990 and 1989 was approximately
$45,987, $47,000 and $45,500.
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NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(Continued)

NOTE 11 - COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES
Oparating laaaaa

(Continuad)

(Continuad)

Schadulad ainimum laaaa payaenta undar theee laaaaa for yeam
eubeequant to March 31, 1991, ara praaantad below:
Taar andlng

march n<

_i*Qimi_

1992
1993
1994

$46 310
24 728
JUttft
S73 104

Manageaent agreeaenta
On March 28, 1990, tha Coapany antarad into a one-year
aanagaaant agraaaant with Oani Video, Inc., purauant to which tha
Company would aanage all concaaaiona purchaaad by Oani Vidao, Inc., in
a euperaarkat chain in Texae in exchange for a aanagaaant faa of 19% u
groaa oparating ravanuaa darivad froa tha vidao rantala. In addition,
tha Coapany haa an option to purchaaa tha concaaaiona at Oani Vidao,
Inc.(a coat.
Oani Vidao, Inc.1a purchaaa of thia oparation ia currantly i i»
dlaputa with tha seller, and tha Coapany la not currently racaiving
ravanuaa froa tha aanagaaant agraaaant.
Litigation
Liabaraan Entarpriaaa
A coaplaint for opan account waa filad againat tha Coapany 1W
April 11, 1990 by Liabaraan Entarpriaaa ("Liabaraan19}, a aupplier of
vidao and auaic aarchandiaa for aala, concaming Liabaraan1 a provision
of auch aarchandiaa to tha Coapany'a auperetore. Tha Coapany filad it
croaa-coaplaint on or about Juna 4, 1990 againat Liabaraan for daaag*
arialng out of Liabaraan1a failura to parfora ita auppliar agraaaant
with tha Coapany. Tha Coapany antarad into a atipulatad judgaent in
tha approximate nat amount of $190,000. Sutoaaquantly, in July, 1991,
tha judgaant waa aattlad by a payaant of $100,000 to Liabaraan which
haa been accrued on tha accoapanying balanca ahaet by a charga to
oparationa.
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NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(Continued)

W0T1 11 - COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES
Litigation

(Continued)

(Continued)

Video Trend
During 1991, Video Trend filed a claim for $130,890 regarding
the sale of video cassettes to the Company. During the pendency of tht
action payments have been made to Video Trend reducing the balance of
this claim to approximately $100,500 as of March 31, 1991. While the
Company believes it has substantial affirmative defenses and that Vid*.
Trend is not entitled to the full amount sought, an accrual of $100,Sou
ham been charged to operations to provide for probable losses.
Bast Texas Distributing, Inc.
The Company has an agreement with East Texas Distributing,
Inc. ("ETD"), to purchase from ETD an average of $10,000 per month of
new videocassettes at competitive prices for a total of $105,000. Th*
term of the videocassette purchase obligation was from February 15,
ISM, to December 31, 1988, However, the Company has not purchased an •
videocassettes from ETD due to what it believes was the alleged breach
by ETD of the competitive price provision of the contract. East Texai
Distributing, Inc., refiled two complaints against the Company clalmiiM
damages arising out of the agreement. The Company has settled one ot
these claims for $15,000, which has been accrued on the accompanying
balance sheet by a charge to operations. The Ccapany has begun to sal
partial payments thereon while negotiating a settlement of the
remaining claim. East Texas Distributing, Inc., has offered to settu
the remaining claim for $10,000. While the Company believes it has
substantial affirmative defenses, an accrual of $10,000 has been
charged to operations to provide for probable losses.
Matlin « Dvoretzlty Architects, Inc.
On April 30, 1990, Matlin 6 Dvoretzky Architects, Inc.
(•Ratlin8) filed a complaint against the Company alleging that
approximately $47,000 is owed for services allegedly rendered. On June
26, 1990, the Company filed an answer to the complaint asserting
Hetlin's prior breaches of contract. On April 1, 1991, settlement was
reached for $15,000 to be paid $500 per month. Therefore, an accrual
of $15,000 ham been recorded as of Kerch 31, 1991.
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MOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(Continued)

NOTE 11 - COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES
Litigation

(Continued)

(Continued)

Casino USA
The Company is being sued for lost rants of $250,000 by the
leaser of the Encino "superstore* subsequent to the closure of the
related store. In the opinion of legal counsel and management of the
Company, a preliminary notion will be made to disaiss the Conpany frou
this case; however, in management1s and legal couneel's opinion, the
ultimata outcome is not expected to have a material adverse effect on
the Company.
Miscellaneous
During 1991, various businesses filed claims aggregating
approximately $30,800 for the sale of goods and services. One of the:,<•
cases was settled for $15,000. While the Company believes it has
substantial affirmative defenses and that these businesses are not
entitled to the full amount sought, an accrual of $27,500 has been
charged to operations for possible losses.
Threatened Litigation
Two businesses have threatened to file claims for $71,600
relating to the sale of videos, while the Company believes it has
substantial affirmative defenses and that these businesses are not
entitled to the full amounts sought, an accrual of $55,000 has been
cbarged to operations to provide for possible losses.
NOTI 12 - STOCK OPTIONS
Under the 1990 Stock Option Plan, the Company may grant
either Incentive or non-qualified stock options to any director,
officer or employee of the Company to purchase up to 15,000,000 sharai.
of oommon stock. The option price say not be leas than 100% of the
fair market value of a share on the date the option is granted, for
incentive stock options and 85% of the fair market value for nonqualified stock options. Options are exerciaable generally over 10
years beginning one year after the date of grant. The plan also
provides for granting stock appreciation rights in conjunction with
options granted. As of March 31, 1991, no options have been granted
under the plan.

F-18

i*»A»

uriSKTJlLJlAUfT,

INC.

BOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(Concluded)

NOTI 13 - NONCASH TRANSACTIONS
Noncash transactions during the years ended March 31, 1991
and 1990 consists of the following:

1*90
Dividends declared on Series A
Preferred Stock
Issuance of Series A Preferred Stock
Issuance of Common Stock
Redemption of Conaon Stock
Redemption of Series A Preferred
Stock
Receipt of fixed assets in exchange
for forgiveness of note receivable
from affiliate that was presented
as a reduction of shareholders1 equity

$(114
114
233
(32

428)
428
736
475}

$(47

2lii)

817 34
-

(223 518)

308 761

NOTI 14 - SUBSEQUENT EVENT
Subsequent to year end, in June, 1991, the Company entered
into a stock purchase agreement whereby the Company vill acquire all <>f
the outstanding common stock of three Japanese companies (the
'Companies") in exchange for 1,000 shares of newly authorised Series H
Preferred Stock to be issued by the Company. The Companies are
principally engaged in the leisure, entertainment and real estate
industries in Japan.
Also, immediately after the issuance of the newly authorize!
Series B Preferred Stock, the three Japanese companies will appoint a
majority of the Board of Directors.
The Series B Preferred Stock will have certain preferences
and privileges, including voting rights, and will he convertible at a*.,
time after twelve or eighteen months of issuance, depending upon the
outcome of certain future events, into 60% of the common stock of ths
Company after giving effect to the conversion of the Series A Prefem.i
Stock. The Company anticipates accounting for the transaction as a
reverse acquisition.
The above transaction is contingent upon the successful
completion of certain due diligence procedures being conducted by the
Company and the completion of audits of the financial statements of ti
Japanese Companies by independent certified public accountants.
In July, 1991, the Company entered into a promissory note
with an affiliated company whereby the Company may borrow up to
$400,000. The note is unsecured and provides for monthly interest only
peyments at the rate of 12% per annus on the outstanding balance.
frincipal plus accrued but unpaid interest is due and payable January
15, 1993.
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Description
Year ending Haroh 31, 1991:
Rental vldeocassette library
Automobiles
Equipment
Furniture and fixtures
Leasehold improvements
computer software

Year ending March 31, 1990:
Rental vldeocassette library
Automobiles
Equipment
Furniture and fixtures
Leasehold improvements
computer software

COLUMN B

COLUMN C

Deletions

at ptriofl

Moment

$3 182 638
12 683
277 536
443 012
28 330
86 .£31

$

655
264
577
234
-

$(127 968)
(9 716)

SJUUfl.Ji\8

$. •37 730

$<122_£ftl>

$2 528 488
18 919
242 402
358 889
148 913
86 _£51

$

765
8
3
60

839
4
57
99
591
1

416
359
461
167
241
601

$1 936
30
226
247
27
86

371
455
922
132
822

$

622 701
•••

19 486
111 757
121 091
—

.£21

$2_£&5 151

—

$(171
(8
(22
(15
(711
(1

266)
595)
347)
044)
824)
6Q1>

COUttttE-—
other changes
add (fleducU
$(29 999)
•
-

22_?££)
$< 12 000)
—
••

—

*<23JLJ&2Z>

$2 380 Mi
Year ending March 31, 1969:
Rental vldeocassette library
Automobiles
Equipment
Furniture and fixtures
Leasehold Improvements
computer software

COLUMN D

Balance at
beg inn Ing

$.

97S 91&

r-20

$ (32 584)
(13 536)
(4 006)
mm

—

$ (go » £ )

CQLVHN F
Balance at
end of

Bsrlfid—
$3 790
20
281
493
28

ft£.£21

™o a*?
$3 182
12
277
443
28
86
MO

$

«.
—
—

$, —

326
947
113
530
330

$2 526
16
242
358
146

638
683
536
012
330
651
"A
488
919
402
889
913

_8$ $51

$2. »ft m$i

SCHEDULE VI
L»A. EHT1HTAIHHBIIT, IMC.
ACCOMDIATBD DEPRECIATION, DEPLETION MID JlliaRTISATIOR OF PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT

CQMJHH A

Description
Year ending March 31, 1991 r
Rental videocassette library
Automobiles
Equipment
Pumitura and fixtures
Leasehold improvements
Computer software

Year ending March 319 1990s
Rental vldeocassette library
Automobiles
Equipment
Furniture and fixtures
Leasehold improvements
Computer software

Year ending March 31, 19891
Rental vldeocassette library
Automobiles
Equipment
Furniture and fixtures
Leasehold improvements
Computer software

counoi a

Balance a t
beginning
9t p+rlofl
$2 2 8 6
8
213
237
13
66

165
104
985
313
633
824

cOLwm c
Additions
$670
1
19
73
5

239
335
975
978
666

maw

$ (89 577)

$1 704
10
151
160
8
50

$650
3
64
79
88
15

$ (69
(6
(2
(2
(82

412
447
771
310
597
9QS

H P97 Hi

$9jDJ2_4Jtf

$1 190
15
114
97
2
33

$539
3
41
63
5

980
987
166
349
562

$.
089)
179)
521)
888)
965)

[1£3_£12)
$ (25 328)
(6 547)
(3 461)

8

>n

•v

r-2l

509 538
16S
104
985
313
633
824

*?& B24

$&

$

$1 704
IO
151
160
8
SO

842
836
735
891
001
919

$1.

"«

2

137 »«>

827
439
960
575
299
438

$«

-

$

2.

$2 2 8 6
8
213
237
13
66

$

17 13»
$£ZJLi&2

DalLance a t
Mid Of
12ft£lfid
$2 8 6 6
9
233
301
19
78

$

11 614
$

n 1M 375

3LUMM F

(9 716)

$7M ffft7

190
396
030
542
437
780

COLUMN E

other changes
8<M Uteductl

BfiJ

S2 8 2 6 0 2 4
842
836
735
891
001
919

D

$_

_2
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COLUMN B

COLUMN C

COLUMN D

COLUMN E

Category of aggregate

Balance
•nd of
period „

Weighted
average
Interest
rate

Maxieue aaount
outstanding
during the
period

Weighted average
Interest rate
during the
period
m

short-tsni bprrowinqa
Year ending March 31, 1991:
Notes payable to banks

$86 206

10.00%

$135 433

11.0%

Year ending March 31, 1990:
Note payable to bank

$135 433

11.00%

135 433

11.0%

Year ending March 31, 1989:
Note payable to bank
Bank line of credit

$137 673

10.90%
9.75%

$185 260
20 000

(1)

10.73%
9.75%

The weighted average internet rate la calculated by dividing the related intereet expense bj
the weighted average balance outstanding for the year.
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SCHEDU) i X
L . A . ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
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SfiUOIILJL

Htm

OimTtfd

to

e n « t « and « * p « n — •

YMg «nd«d March 3 1 .

1?91

1*90

1**9

Mftinttntnc* and r e p a i r s

$16 429

$21 854

$ 9 474

A4v«rtising c o o t s

$ 8 246
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E m a i l 2.2
AMENDMENT TO
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT
This Amendment ("Amendment1) dated at of the 2ad day of August, 1991 is between
LA. Entertainment, loo, a Nevada Corporation fBuyeO, Hapme Wnda ^Seller0) tad himtaka Co^
lid. of which Selkr is die 100* owner of al of the outttsmding capital stock.
The parties desire to amend certain sections of that certain Stock Purchase Afreeaxnl
daced June 77,1991 CAgreaDBac^.aocordiag^
A.

The folowmg paragraph inductions of te

The preamble paragraph is ammrird as (OHOM:
AGREEMENT, dated ss of the 27 day of June, 1991, among LA. Bnftectaiameut, Inc. a
Nevada corporation (the •Buyer' or Xtapany"), and Hajfee Wada CSeOeO* who is the owner of aO of
the issued and outstanding shares of capital stock of Marvtaka Co, Ltd, fMarutaka* or "Purchased
Company).
AJ1 references to Purchased Company* shad now be to Purchased Company and al
references to Sellers shall now be to Seller.
LL Sale of Shares. Section 1.1 is amended as follows:
At the 1st Closing (as defined ia Section 2) (the 1st dosing") and subject to the terns
and conditions of this Agreement, the SeBar hereby seOs to Buyer all of the Shires of the PvcJuaed
Company (the •Purchased Shares") b encfaange for 5,000000 shares of Bayer's Common Shares
("Common Shares-) and Bayer's Series B Preferred Stock, 1001 par value (the Ttefsned Shares'). The
holders of Series B Preferred Shares shaO have the following rights (a) the right to elect a m^crity of
the Board of Directors of the Company, (b) therightto convert after twelve months upon the receipt by
the Company of information and documentation prepared by third party consokinh retained by the
Company saflident to allow the Company to raise $10,000,000 for development costs of proposed golf
coarse*.
L2. P«YBflrt ?f ftp Purchase Price. Section L2 is amended as feBoan
At the 1st Closing (as defined heranX the Bayer shall deliver co Seler, in accordance
with Schedule JL2, such aamber of shares of Preferred Shares so Chat open cowversioa of the Preferred
Shares! in addition to Ae SfltRJBBD shares of Common Slock to be defeated to Seller, Seler wtt own
52% of the outatandfag Common Stock of Bayer after giving effect to the evrdse of al options and
warrants omatandmg as of the 1st Closing and dm conversxm of the Series A Preferred Slock.
L4 PaBwrrrfCommTShifffl' Section 14 is amended as fallows:
At the 1st Closing the Company shall deleter to Seller the Common Shares and the
Preferred Shares and the resignations of the Company's ofieers, as wefl as a certified resolution of the
Board of Directors electing immediately two desipees of Seler to dm Board of Dkecton, with a third
desqpoe of Seller to be appointed vpon the eleventh day after Bayer has (Bed ia notice of change of
control with the U<S» Securities sod Bochaage Commission, to coasdtnte the Board of Directors together
with two members of the current Board of Directors or their designees. Saeh notice shsllbefBed by
Buyer promptly fbOowbg the cavntinn of this AfeemeaL The Certificate of Determinadoa m
proposed to be filed for the Preferred Shares is attached hereto as BriiibitlA
^^yiHJtfei

Thel*tseaeenceofSectk»120kdeletodkitsentkety.
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This Section ihafl be amended mfafloa*

43
ilfflWiif*^ ** ft*"-* "«* ywfcffil a y ™ Seller ihafl oectte and deliver
u iaftatmeat rcpraKatatioa letter at the lat Ocaing ia the Com attached aa Exhibit 43.
5JO IjitTJitifjf H e reference* to the dale Docffliher 31, 1991 dull be aaraded to
readf December 31,19».*
6^£sisaflBr Thesecondsentenceof diis Section k aaeaded m blows:
Seikr and Marutaka acknovriedge that 41 eaqpeaae of the accountant* and legal coeaael
ahril be paid by Seller and Marutaka.
7

* flfflill FJniT"iillf P1W T^* section is amended aafoOow

The partiea shall prepare a plan of financing to facilitate the development of
aakaproved real estate ri^ta owned by Maruuki far the development into gotf comics. Company ahal
aae ks best efforta to arrange for a public or private finairiag to rafae ao leas than tH^OOOjDOO for the
Purchased Company's business plan.
7,6 I&idgg. This aectioa ia eliminated.
7J£s^asdiJattSl9&& Thkaedkmiaelimmnted.
7.

C w # W ftecec|cnt tp toQfrftgalwq of tfc ftffy ft flag. Section 7 is aateaded by

adding:
7A ^ H l l l i ^ Y P;|l fj|Mfft flilhtt S c U c r shall have completed prior to the tat
Closing the acquisition of all of the real estate rights pertaining toftGeand the 30% of Hollywood Land
Tokyo aot currently owned by Seller and Seller's aJBiaie*.
123 Notfres. Section 123(H) * amended by deleting the copy requbeamnt to Kagel &
Seiner.
B.

Al other aecdona of die Agreemeat arc aot aetnutori.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the paitka have escorted (Ms Amendment oa the date first above

winea.
I* A. Entertainment, Inc

»f
DmidEoBr
•SELLER*
»T

HtfaeWtda
MARUTAKA CO, LTD.

Bf.
HqtaeWada

•2-

STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT, dated as of the
day of Jeae, 1991, among LA. Entertainment,
Lac t Nevada corporation (the "Bayer* or 'Company-), » d each of the person whose names, addresses
and shareholdings are set forth on Schedule A annexed hereto (each a 'Seller1 aid colectivtiy the
"Sellers"), who Mtc the owners of all of the issued aod outstanding shares of capital stock of Manitaka
Co., LtA, CMarutaka")The Sellers are die owner* of all of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock,
of Marutaka, being
issued aid ootstandmg ihaiet of common stock, $
par valae
per share, of Marutaka, and
issued and outstanding shares of common stock,
S
par value per share. The Sellers wish to seS all of their Shares and the Buyer wishes to
purchase such Shares upon the terms and conditions of this Apeement
Accordingly, the parties hereto agree as follows:
L

Sale and Purchase of Shares.

LI. Sak of Shares. At the lit Closing (at defined in Section 2) (the 'lit dosing-) and
subject to the terms sad conditions of this Agreement, the Sellers hereby sell to Buyer all of the Shares
of Manuka (the "Purchased Shares') ia exchange for shares of Series B Preferred Stock, 1001 par
value of Buyer (the •Preferred Shares'). The holders of Series B Preferred Shares shall have the followiagrights(a) the right to elect a majority of tbe Board of Directors of the Company, (b) the right, after
twelve months or eighteen months from the receipt by the Company of information and docmaentstioa
prepared by third party rnmnltants retained by the Company -<***«•* to allow the Compaay to raise
$20^000,000 for initial development costs for a proposed theme park, to vote oa tbe same basis as tbe
common stockholders for tbe dissolution or liquidation of the Company.
1.1 Payment of tfc Pm^Tff? P™r At the 1st dosing (as defined herein), the Buyer
shafl deliver to the Sellers, m accordance with Schedule L2, suck number of shares of Preferred Shares
so thai, upon conrersioQ of the Preferred Shares, Seller will own 60% of tbe outstanding Common Stock
of Buyer after giving effect to the exercise of all options and warrants cmtsfiwtiag as of die 1st Closing
and the conversion of the Series A Preferred Stock.
1 J. Delivery of Pffflitf* Myes. At die 1st Ooeiag, the Sellers shal deliver or cause
to be delivered to the Buyer stock certificatesrepresentingafl of the Purchased Shares, duly eadoraed in
blank, and wit h all appropriate stock transfer tax stamps affixed.
IA t v f i y p nf fi-MCTT yfrpfr At the 1st dossa* the Company shafl deliver to
Sellers the Preferred Shares and the reaignadons of all of the Company's officers, as well as a certified
resolution of the Board of Directors electing immediately two designees of the Sellers to the Board of
Directors, with a third dongnee of Sellers to be appointed upon the eleventh day after Bayer has fled
its aoth* of change of control with the US. Securities and Exchange Ounmisainn, to constitute the
Board of Directors together with two members of tbe current Board of Directors or their draigrrra
Sncb twice shall be fifed by Buyer promptly following the execution of this Agreement, tbe Certificate
of Determination as proposed to befiledfortbe Preferred Shares is attached hereto as EaUbk 1.4.
r
1
HffifE r i t F r t P ^ ^ ' n * P"ties have executed this Agreement aa of the date tel
forth above. At the first closing f l * doing 1 ) tbe parties thai coafirm this Agreement, and all filngs
related thereto, and Buyer shall thereupon own all tbe Purchased Shares. Duriag the period of time
prior to the 1st dosing and thereafter up to the 2nd Closing, BDO Sddman, U 3 A , and its afiiate ia
Tokyos Japan, Asafai SUnwu & Co* Certified Pubic Accoimtaata, and tbe attorneys for Buyer,
McKtarkk, Jackson, DeMarco & Peckeapaugh and Amida * Hsrokawa, thai begjn performing due
dttgence and complete tbe Audited Finandak Tbe parties expect to cmopbte all the kgal due
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dfljgTM* on or prior to June 30,1991 tod for the lit Going to occar on or prior to that due (tbe *bt
C U a f Dam"). Tie second doriag C2ad Closing-) ihafl take place on tbe date (tbe *2ad doling
Dale") the Aidtted Financials have been completed. The 1st Oosiag and 2nd d o i n g ire each referred
to as a •Closing' and the 2nd Doling Date and 1st Closing Date are each referred to as "Closing Date.1
Within 5 days after the 2nd Cosing, the requiredfinancialstatements will be included on a Form 8-K to
befiledby the Company.
1
Bffprrftftttarioni and Warrants g* tfr Saflm and Marutaka, The Sellers aad
Marutaka, jointly and severally, represent and warrant to the Buyer as follow:
31. Due Incorporation and Authority Marutaka is a corporation duly organised,
validly editing and in good standing under die law of Japan and each has aD requisite corporate power
aad lawful authority to own, lease and operate its respective assets, properties and business and to carry
on its respective business as now being conducted.
32. fiyfajtivfiffi Each of the corporations Bated an Schedule 32 (the "Subsidiaries'),
is & corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good tending under the laws of its respective
jurisdtaiou and each has ail requisite corporate power and lawful authority to own, lease and operate its
respective assets, properties and business and to carry on its respective busmeas as now being conducted.
Other than those Subsidiaries, Marutaka does not directly or indirecdy own any interest in soy other
entity, aod Marutaka owns 100% of the S ubtidiaries.
33. Company RffBTfllrift* E * i o t Marutaka and SubsuSaries is duly qualified or
odwwise authorized as a corporation, to transact basiness> and is in good standing in each jurisdtaioa
set forth on Schedule 13 and those jurisdictions each m doing busiaem m; the failure to obtain such
qualification or authorization in any other jurisdfetioe does not have a material adverse cAed on the
'coodkioa of the Company4 (as defined in Section 1313). Certified copies of Company Registration are
attached as Exhibit 13 hereof for Marutaka and Subsidiaries.
14. fo^ffllffol rr*flfcrt Sfflfc The authorized, issued aad outstanding capitalization
and ownership of each of Marutaka and Subsidiaries is set forth on Schedule 3.4. Marutaka has good
and valid tile to all of the issued aad onttfanHing shares of the capital stock of the Subsidiaries which is
also reflected on Schedule 3.4 (the "Subsidiary Shares1). The Sellers have good aad vafid tide to afl of
the issued and outstanding Shares free and clear of any Ben or other encumbrance. No ctfhcr dam of
capital stock or other equity interest of any Marutaka or Subsidiary is authorized or outstanding. AM o(
the Shares and aD of the Subsidiary Shares are duly authorised, vaKdty issued and fully paid aad nonassessable*
15. Option or Q*hff Pfrte ' I ^ e i t * M outstanding right, subscription, warraat, call.
unsatisfied, preemptive right, option or other agreement of any kind to purchase or otherwise to receive
from Marutaka or Subsidiary any of the outstanding; authorized but unissued, nnauthorimd or treasury
shares of the capital stock or any other security or equity tnfeittf of Marutaka or Subsidiary, and there
* no outttairifng security of any kind convertible into such eapkal ttock or other equity interest, eaeept
as described on Schedule 3J.
I d MltaltHI flf WriM ftf tofflrBSato Each of Marutaka and Subsidiaries has
heretofore delivered, or by the 1st Closing will defiver to the Buyer, true aad complete copies of its
certified copies of Company Regiatiration (certified by the appropriate governmental authorities) and its
Articles of Incorporation (certified by its Secretary) an m effect on the dale hereof. Article* of
Iacorporatioo are attached an Exhibits 16 for Marutaka and Sabadkriea.
I T ffmmill ftgtmak The combined balance Aeets cf Marutaka and Subsidiaries
m ot June 30, 1969,1990 and 1991, and the related combined slaieme** of income, stockholders' equity
and capital and cash flows for the years then emfcd, mdtxfiog the footnotes to the foregoing thereto,
-2jh21S/2263MU0MXD(Vpurchaae

ifeU be certified by BDO Seidman sod Asaiu Sliiuwa St Co. (Ac 'Accountanto*) nidi an unquaKBed
report thereon, sod will be delivered to the Buyer a the 2nd dosing, aod thai fiuriy present the
financial position of Marutaka and Subsidiaries as al inch dates aod the combined results of operations
of Marutaka and Subsidiaries, m each case in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
consistently applied for the periods covered thereby. (Theforegoingfinancialrtatcanenttof Maruuka
and Subsidiaries as of June 30,1989,1990 and 1991 and far the years then ended, are tomcrimes heron
referred to as die "Audited Financials"). The Audited Haaaciais, to bo attached hereto as Exhibit 3.7,
shal fairly present thefinancialposition and the results of operations of Marutaka and die Subsidiaries,
as of such dates and for sack periods as are staled therein. Hie unaudited combined balance sheet of
Marutaka and Subsidiaries as of June 30, 1987,198B, 1989 and 3990, and the related combined statements of income for the years then ended, which lane been previously delivered to the Buyer, to the
bast knowledge of Sellers fairly present the combined financial position of Marutaka and Subsidiaries,
and tesulte of operations, In each case in conformity with Japanese generally accepted aocouating principles applied on a bask consistent with the prior year.
18. No Material ^ffarft Q*ym Hacepc for the items listed in Schedule 18 attached
hereto, as of the 2nd Closing Dale, to die knowledge of the Setters, there has been no material advene
change in the condition of Marutaka or Subsidiaries, and die SeUm know of no inch change which is
threatened, nor has there been any damage, destruction or lorn which could have or has had a material
adverse effect on due condition of Marutaka or Subsidiaries whether or not covered by insurance.
19. laLMlttfia
3.9.L Marutaka and Subsidiaries have paid all uses or governmental assessments (including estimated taxes) (Taxes") required to be paid by any of them through the date hereof
and through the Closings (other than taxes not material in the aggregate and the Unity for winch is
adequately reserved for in the Audited Financials), and all drficieacies or other additions to tax, interest
and peoakies owed by any of them; and shall timely pay (co or before the npntinn of the appropriate
period or say extensions ftereof) any such Taxes, including additions, interest and penalties, required to
be paid by any c£ them on or before the 2nd dosing Date.
3.9.1 Marutaka and Subsidiaries have timely filed (on or before the expiration
of die appropriate period or any eartcasions thereof) all tax returns required through the date hereof,
and shall prepare and timely file (on or before tic expiration of die appropriate period or any extensions thereof), in a manner mnifatnf with prior years, all tax returns required on or before die 2nd
Closing.
193. Schedule 19 seta forth die status of any and ail tax audits of the returns
of Maruuka and Subsidiaries for each fiscal year for which the statute of Bmitarions or similar appficafab law has not expired, including dm amounts of any deficiencies or addbioas to tax sssrssmmnti,
lateral aod penalties that have been made or proposed, and the amnunft of any payments made with
respect thereto. Each tax return filed by Marutaka and Subsidiaries for which die tax audit has not
been ranpkrttd accurately reflects the amount of its tax Kab&ty for such period. Neither Marutaka aor
the Srifars kaow of any material adverse change in the rates or basis of macsanrnt of any tax (other
than income tax) effective for die fiscal yours oatfiag 1987,1988* 1989,1990 sad 1991, of Marutaka or
Subafciaries or of any uaaaaosaed tax deficiency proposed <y threatened agjunst M a r r ^
110. SgosiiaSBJBItLidU Except for the envkomneatat matters listed in Schedule
110, none of Marutaka or Subsidiaries is in violatioa or has received any notice of any alleged violation
of any applicable law, ordmaaoa, regulation, order, judgment, Jnjmrrion, award, decree or other
requirement of any governmental or regulatory body, court or arbitrator, winch violation could have a
material adverse effect on the condition of Marutaka or Srisidiariee. Bach of Marutaka and Sabsitiarm h t t a l licenees, permits, orders or approvals of, snd has made al required icgntialions with, sny
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governmental oc icgulatoiy body that tre material to tlie conduct of tke business of Marutaka and Subddiaries (collectively, •Pcnnki"). Without limiting tke foregoing a d c*xpt for the environmental mitten lined la Schedule 3.10, (I) aone of Msmtaka or Subsidiaries ia ia violation, or hai received lay
aodce of say alleged violation, or has received any notice of aay alleged violation, of aay law rclatiag to
pollution or protection of the environment, induriiiig, without limitation, law relating to ^nrisfanny diachargra, releases or threatened releases of pollutants, ooataminaats, chemicals, or iadustrial, toaic or
hazardous substances or wastes into the environment (indudm& withoutfr»kmfvMambient air, surface
water, ground water or land), or odierwke relating to the manufacture procesufc diafrihufinn, use,
treatment, storage, disposal transport or handling of pollutants, contaminants, cheaurah or industrial,
task or hazardous substances or waste* except to tbc often* suck £aiure to comply coald not have a
material adverse effect on the condition of Marutaka and Subsidiaries, and (n) to tke knowledge of tke
Sellers each of Marataka and Subsidiaries is in compfiaaoe with all terms and coadiriors of inch
required environmcncal permits, aad is also in compliance with all other imitations, restrictions, conditions, standards prohibitions, requirements, oMigarinns, schedules and timetables contained in such
eavircsBoeatal laws or contained in any regulation, code, plan, order, decree, judgment, injunction, notice
or demand letter issued, entered, promulgated or approved thereunder except to the extent failure to
comply could not have a material adverse effect oa die coocitkm of Mantaka and Subsidiaries. All
Permits are luted on Schedule 310 and are in full force sad effect No material violation* are or have
been recorded in respect of any Permit; and no proceeding is pending or, to Sellers' knowledge,
threatened to revoke or limit any Permit. Except as set forth in Schedule 110 none of Marutaka,
Subsidiaries or Sellers has actual knowledge of any current or proposed Ifgitlarinn which has or may
have material advene effect on the condition of Marntaka or Subsidiaries.
3.1 L M * ft—^Tfr The cjopcntion, delivery and performance of the Agreement will ant
(L) violate, conflict with or result in the breach of any provision of the Articles of Incorporation of aay
of Marutaka or Subsidiaries; (i) violate or resalt in the breach of any of the material terms of, result m
a material modification of, or otherwise give aay other contracting party the right to terminate, or
declare (or with notice or lapse of time or both declare) a default under any material caacract or other
agreement to which any of Marataka or Subsidiaries, by or to which any of them or aay of their respective assets or properties may be bound or subject; (fi) violate say order, nrit, judgement, injunction,
award or decree of any court, arbitrator or governmental or regulatory body binding upon any of
Marutaka or Subsidiaries or upon any material part of tke assets any of Marutaka or ubskSarier, (w)
violate any statute, law or regidatioo of any jurisdiction, which viclatioe ooald have a material advene
elect on tke condition of Marutaka or Subsidiaries; (v) violate or resalt in the revocation or niaprnsina
of any Permit
3.12 Action and Procecdiaas. Eacept as set forth on Schedule 112 involving the
equivalent of US. SlOQjOOO or more per daim, there are ao outstanding orders, jwlgririrfs, injunctions,
awards or decrees of any court, arbitrator or governmental or regulatory body binding upon any of
Maritaka or Subsidhries. Except as set forth on Schedule 112, to tke knowledge of Marntaka,
Sahshiarios or Sellers, there are ao actions, suits or danas or legal, aibniaistiatiw or arbitral proceedings or awfsligarirns (whether or not the defense thereof or kafaffitfcs in respect thereof are cowered by
insurance) pending or threatened against or involving any Marutaka or Subodiaries or any or tfaeir
respective properties or assets which, indfoiduafiy or in the aggregate, coald have a material advene
effect upon Marataka or Subsidiaries. None of Marntaka or Subsidiaries has at any time during tke last
five years had, nor, to tke knowledge of Marataka or Subsidiaries or Sellers, as there now doeainaed, a
strike, picket, work stoppage, work slowdown, or other labor trouble that had or may have a material
adverse effect cm tke coaditko of Marutaka or Subsidiaries. None of Mar Oka or Sufcakfiarics is aware
cf any peodbg or threatened union activity,tfrika,picket, work stoppage, work slowdown, or other labor
trouble with respect to the employees of aay of tke fuppBer* or customers fitted on Schedule 121 tkat
may have a material adverse effect oa tke condition of Marutaka or Subsidiaries. All notices required
to have been given to any insurance ooopany fisted as insuring against any action, sait or daim set forth
on Schedule 112 have been timely and duly given and ao insurance company has asserted, orally or in
writing, that suck dafaa is not covered by the applicable policy relating to such daim. Except as set
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forth in Schedule 112, there arc no product liabSky claims again* or involving any of Marutaka Of
Subsidiaries invoking the equivalent of US. $25,000 or more per daim or per aerie* of churn* ariaiag
from any one incident and no such claims have been sealed, adjaduaied or otherwise disposed of since
June 20,1990.
3.13. Contracts and Otter Agreements. Schedule 3.13 sets forth afl of the fallowing
contracts and other agreements to which any of Manitaka or Sobaidiariea is a party or by or to which
aay of them or their assets or properties ire bound or subject: (I) contracts a d other agreements with
aay current or Conner officer, director, shareholder or other afiQbte or with any other curea! employee
or consultant or with any entity in which any of the foregoing is a controlling entity: (a) contracts and
other agreements with any labor union cr moriation repreaeoting any employee; (S) cootracu or other
agreements for the sale of any of their assets other than in the ordinary course of business or for the
grant to any entity of any opdon or preferential rights to purchase any of their assets; (iv) joint venture
agreements; (v) contracts or other agreements under which any of them agrees to indemnify any party or
to share tax liability of any party, (vi) contracts and other agreement* which can be cancelled without
liability, premium or penalty only on amety days' or more notice; (vii) contracts and other agreements
with customers or suppliers for the sharing of fees, the rebating of charges or other simlar arrangements; (viii) contracts and other agreemeals containing covenants of any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries not
to compete in any line of business or with any entity in any geographical area or covenants of any other
entity not to compete with any of Manitaka or Subsidiaries in anytineof business or in any geographical
area; (be) contracts and other agreements relating to the acquisition by aay of Manitaka or Subsidiaries
of any operating business or the capital stock of any other entity, entered into since June 30, 1990 or
under which any of Manitaka or Subsidiaries has existing obligations; (x) contracts and other agreements
requiring the payment to any entity of an override or similar oomnrigirm or fee; (n) contracts and other
agreements relating co the borrowing of money; ( » ) cootracu and other agreements not made in the
ordinary course of business; or (xfi) any other contracts and other agreements puissant to which paymenu in eacess of the equivalent of UJS. SSQjOOO have been or may hereafter be amde. Scllen have
delivered to the Buyer true and complete copies of all the contracts and other agreements set forth on
Schedule 3.13 or on any other Schedule. All of such contracts and other agreements are valid and bmdmg upon each of Manitaka and Substduries* as the case may be. None of Marutaka or Subaidiarisa is
ha default in any material respect under any such agreements* nor, to dmfrnowtrrlgrof any of Manitaka,
Subsidiaries or Setters, is any other party to any such contract or other agreement in default thereunder
m any material respect, nor does any condition emit that with notice or lapse of time or both would
coaatitutc a material default thereunder. Schedule 113 also lists all contracts and other agreements
carrcudy in aegotiatioa or proposed by any of Marutaka or Srividiariea of a type which if entered into
by aay of Marutaka or SUbskfieriea would be reqahed to be listed on Schedule 113 or en any other
Scheduirr The Sellers have delivered to dm Buyer true and correct drafts or summaries of al such
coatracu and other agreements and copies of ail doannrnli relating thereto. Whenever the term 'officer* is used ia this Agreement, it shall refer to the appropriate equivalent undo Japnoeae law aad
wage.
114. n "TH l f a *1** Approvals. The execution and defiwry by the Selen of this
A^pecmeat, die performance by the Selen of their obligations hereunder, the ooarinnanm m fall force
and effect of al contracts and agreements aet forth on Schedule 114 do not require the Selen,
Marutaka or Subsidiaries to obtain aay consent* approval or notion o£> or make anyfflmgwith or give
aay notice to, any entity or any governmental or regulatory body, except as aet forth in Schedule 114
(the °S*8en Required Consents"). The patties recognize and unrtenrfand that aodficatfaa of the tranaactioas contemplated by this Agreement must be given to the Japanese Ministry of Finance through the
Bank of Japan by the Company, pursuant to the Japanese Foreign Erchaagc and Foreign Trade Coatrol
law, and that thk Agreement will not be effective until such notice has been gtoen in accordance with
such llaar. The Compaay agrees to give such notice immediately fallowing the eamcadon of this A^ree-
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3.15. Real Estate, TV Properties owned or leued by Marutaka and Subsidiaries are
set forth on Schedule 3.15J hereto, with their address and legal description. A (rue and correct son*
maty of all leaies and other agreements relating to die properties s attached as Schedule 115.1 Attached as Exhibit 2,153 are certified copies of ail land and balding rcgistrarioas owned or leased by say
of Marucaka or Subsidiaries,
3.16. Receivables. All sccotmfs, lease obfigatioos and notes dae and racnikxtrri as
reflected on the qnndilcd combined balance sheets of Marutaka and Subsidiaries aa cf June 30, 1990
(the 'Balance Sheet") fRecembies") and, all Receivables due and uncolecied arising subsequent to
Jane 30, 1990: (i) have arisen in die ordinary course cf business of Manitaka and Subsidiaries, (it) represent valid obligations due to Manitaka or Subsidiaries enforceable in accordance with their tons and,
(S) subject only to a reserve for certain bad debts cornpind in a manner mnsistnnf wkfa past practice
have been collected or are collrctiblc in die ordinary course of business of Marutaka and Subsidiaries in
the igtfcgaki recorded amounts thereof in accordance widi their terms- Schedule 3.16 lists any obligor
«hkk together with aO of ks affiliates owed accounts and notes due and unroBrctftri were refected on
the Balance Sheet as of June 30, 1990 in an aggregate amount of dm equivalent of U£$SQ,0OO or aaorc.
3.17. T"WBaM<> ^TffT^ The facilitiee, machinery, equipment, furniture, leasehold
improvements, fixtures, vehicles, structures! any related rapitaMrird items and other tangible property
material to the business of Manuka, and the Subsidiaries (die "Taxable Property*) considered in the
agfregate are, in all material respects, in good operating condition sad repair, normal wear and tear
eacepted, and none of Marutaka or Subsidiaries has received any notice since June 30, 1990 that any of
them is in violation of any easting law or any building, zoning, health, safety or other ordinance, code or
regulation which violation could have a aaateriai adverse effect on the coodkioo of the Company. During the past three years there has not been any ngatfrant interruption of the operations of any of
Marutaka or Subsidiaries due to inadequate tnamtmanre of the Tangible Property. AO material leases,
conditional sale contracts, franchises or licenses pursuant to which Marutaka or Subsidiary may hold or
use any interest owned or claimed by such Marutaka or Suhsafiary (kdiuSag without limifafion, options)
m or to Tangible Property are m MI force and effect and, with respect to the performance cf Marutaka
or Subsidiary, there is no material defasdt or event of de&uk or event which with notice or lapse of time
or both would constitute a default
3.18. fnf|MflHt Property. Schedule 118 sets forth al patents, trademarks, copyrights,
service marks and trade names, aO applications Cor any of the foregoing, and all permits, grants and
Bceaecs or other rights running to or from any of Manitaka or Subsidiaries relating to any of the faregomg" and there are no other patents, eradeaaarks, copyrights, sendee marks and trade names which are
aaacarial to the business of Manitaka or Subsidiaries as presently ooadaded or aa being developed.
Marutaka and Sdbskfiaries have the right to uee, free and dear of any dams or rights of others, s i
trade secrets, know-how, processes, technology, blue prints and designs utilised m or incident to the
conduct of their business aa presently cotidiirtpd as being developed (Trade Secrets'). Except ss set
forth on Schedule 3J8, Marutaka or Subsidiaries have no notion of any adversely held patent, invention,
trademark, copyright, service mark or trade name cf any other entity or notice of any claim of any other
entity relating to any of the property set forth on Schedule 3.18 or any Trade Secret cf Marutaka or
Sahaidbries, and Marutaka, Subsidiaries or Sellers do not know of any basis for any such charge or
dasrn There is no present or, to the knowledge of Sellers, dareateoed use or encroachment of any
TVade Secret which could have a material adverse effect on the coodkioo of Marutaka or Subsidiaries.
119. Tiifc to Assets. Manitaka and Subsidurks own ontrighl and have good and
marketable title to ail of tbek assets including, without limitation, all of the assets reflected on the
combined balance sheet of Marutaka and Subeidiariea u of Jane 30, 1991 or described in Schedules
3.15,116 and 118, in each case free and dear of any Ben or other encumbrance, eacept in the caae of
assets other than real property for (i) Gens or encumbrances specifically described in the antes to the
Audited Pmanciak; (E) assets disposed of, or subject to purchase or sales orders, in the ordmary coarse
of business since June 30, 1990; or (iii) lens or other encumbrances seeming tarns, assoarmriutt
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goveraffieutnL charges or levies, or die claims of materialmen, carriers, landlords and Kke cootie*, al of
which art act yet due aid payable or are being coatestcd in good faith, ao long as such cosiest does
aot involve any substantial danger of tbe sale,forfeitureor loss of any assets material to die condition of
the Company, or (iv) ia the case of that certaii wnmproved real property owned by Holywood which ia
kascd aader a SO year lease deacribed in Schedule 115 2 hereto.
3JO. ii»htfitw As of June 30, 1991, Marutaka and Subsidiaries <fid not have aay
indebtedness, liability, daim or loss, liquidated or unKqnitiaffri, teemed or unsecured, accrued, absolute,
contingent or otherwise, of a kind required by Japanese generally accepted arctmnfing principles to be
set forth on s financial statement or in the notea thereto (Tiabitics*) that were individually or in the
aggregate material to the condition of either of Marutaka or any Subsidiaries and were not hilly sod adequately reflected or reserved against on the balance sheet aa of June 30, 1991 or deacribed on any
schedule thereto. Eaocept as let forth on Schedule 3.20, none of Marutaka or Subsidiaries has, except in
dm ordinary course of business, incurred any liahffirifn nnee June 30, 1990. At the lit Closing, the
Company will deliver to Hajime Wads, a promissory note executed by the Company payable to Wada, in
form and substance as set forth in Extibit 3 JO.
3.21. Cistomers sod Lessees, Schedule 121 lists, by dolar volume for the last twelve
calendar month* ended March 31,1991, the fifteen largest customers, suppfim and lessees of Marutaka
and Subsidiaries. During nch 12 months ao such supplier, customer or leaace of Marutaka or
Subsidiaries has canceled or otherwise terminated, or threatened in writing to cancel or otherwise
terminate, ha relationship with Marutaka or Subsidiaries or has during such 12 months decreased asatcriaUy, or, to Sellers' knowledge threatened to decrease to Emit materially, its ariMmtion of teaait space,
supples or materials to Marutaka or Subsidiary or its uaage or purchase of the tenant space, services or
products of Marutaka or Subsidiary, as the case may be. Neither Marutaka nor any Seller has any
knowledge that any such supplier, leasee, or customer intends to caned or otfaenrise modify its rotationship with Marutaka or Subsidiary or to decrease materialy or Emit its tenant space, suppBes or sasteriak
to Marutaka or Subsidiary or its uaage or purchase of the tenant space, services or products of
Marutafca or Subsidiary, mid the acquisition of the Purchased Shares by the Buyer wil not, to the
knowledge of the Selers, adversely affect the relationship of Marutaka or Subsidiary with aoch supplier,
customer or lessor..
3.21 FiMhnrr flfflfft P 1 W Schedule 122 sets forth a true and coaaplete list of al
eaapioyec benefit plans of Marutaka or Subsidiaries.
123. laflsTMKE Schedule 323 acta forth a list and brief description (specifying the
insurer, describing each pending claim thereunder of snore than the equivalent of US. S2SJD00 and setting forth tbe aggregate amounts paid out under each such poicy through the dale hereof) of aB poiidea
or binders of fire, liability, productfiabflify,workmen's compensation, vehicular and other insurance held
by or on behalf of Maramka and Subsidiaries. Such potkace and binders are in fill force and effect and
insure against risks and Babilitfos to an extent and m a maner customary in the industries in whack
Marutaka and Subsidiaries operate. Except for claims set forth on Schedule 323, there am ao outstanding unpaid claims under such policy or binder, none of Marutaka or Subsidiaries hasreceivedany notice
of (anflrlHtiqn or oca-renewal of any such policy or binder. There is no inaccuracy m any application
lor sach policies or binders or any failure to pay premiums when due that would cause a lack of insurance coverage. Except as set forth on Schedule 323, none of Marutaka or Subsufiaries has received any
notice from any of its insurance carriers that any mturannr coverage fisted cm Schedule 323 wil not be
available in the future on substantially the same terms (except far the prices or premiums payable thereunder) aa now in effect
3.24. Qffiecrs. Directors and Kffy P^pK^V^ Schedule 324 sets forth the name and
total compensation of each person who ia now or haa been during the last two fiscal yean of Marutaka
or Subsidiaries any employee, consultant, agent or other representative of any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries whose annual rate of compensation (including tonuses and commiasjnus) tmceedi or sirrcrind the
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oqotafaai of US. 560,000. None of Marutaka or Subsidiaries has made a uiiiiuitiiicnt or sgieemeat to
mcreaae che compensation or to acetify the conditions or terms of employment of any such peaon.
None of such person* currently holdiag such a potitua has threatened to cancel or otherwise terminate
snch person* relationship with Mantaka or Subsidiary.
325. Oppntiooi of ^^Bafai Encept as set forth oa Schedule 325, since June 30,
1990y none of Marutaka or Subsidiaries has* crap* in the ordnmry course of business:
(i)
declared or paid say dividends or dedaied or aade say other
dntributkms of any kind to ks shareholders, as the case aiay be (other than distribntioas aade by say
Subsidiary to Marutaka), or made any direct or indirect redemption, retirement, purchase or other s o
quaotioa cf say shares of ks capital stock;
(ii)

incurred any mricbtftriaeasforbonowed money;

(xii)
reduced its cssh or short tern investments or their equivalent,
odaer than to meet cash needs arising in the ordinary coarsetfbianaeas,consistent with past practices;
(W)
waived any material right under any contract or other sgrec
meat of the type required to be setforthin any Schedule hereto;
(v)
made say material change m its srrmmtmg methods or
practices or msde any material change ia depreciation or amortisation policies or rates adopted by it;
(vi)
materially changed say of its business poiciea, including,
without Emifsfinn, advertising, distributing, marketing, pricing, purchasing, personnel, sales, returns,
budget or product acquisition policies;
(vfi)
made say wage or salary increase or bonus (except for annual
bonuses payable in the normal course to employees in m aggregate amount not to eaceedfifteenpercent
(13%)), or increase in sny other (Greet or indirect compensation, or say payment or uasualsrjir to pay
any severance or term marina pay to sny of its officers, dvectors, employees, ronnrtranfi, agents or other
representatives, or any accrual fas or commitment or agreement to make or pay the same, other than to
entities other than its officers, directors or shareholders;
(via) made any ban or advance to any of its shareholders, officers,
directors, employees, consultants, ageats or other represeatattae (other than travel advaaces made in the
ordinary course of business), or made any other bsn or advance;
(a)
incurred or assumed sny debt, ohMgatioa orfiaWUty(whether
absolute or contingent and whether or not currently due and payable);
(z)
acquired any (a) inventory or equipment, aad (b) made any a*
quhation of aO or any part of the assets, properties, capital stock or busmeu of ss^ otfam entity;
(xi)
Paid, directly or inducoly, sny of its TiaNlriee before the laauc
became due in accordance with its terms;
(a)
terminated or failed to renew, or received any written thecal
(that was not subsequently withdrawn) to terminaie or tail to rcaew, sny contract or other sgreeaieat
dmt is or was material to the condition of Marutaka or Subsidiaries or
(xii)

engaged in say other traasactioiL
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12k Pflftrf*1 r>iTTflMif* "* Tiifgf«f. Eacept as set forth on Schedule 126, so officer,
director or affiliate of any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries, ao Seller, so relath* or spoue (or relative of
sack spouse) of say such officer, director or a£Bliate or of a Seller and no entity controlled by oae or
more of tke foregoing:
(i)
owns, directly or indirectly, asy interest in (except for lets than
1% stock boidingi for investment purposes in securities of pib&dy keld sod traded companies), or is m
officer, director, employee or consultant ot» any entity which a, or is engaged in business ss a
competitor, lessor, lessee, supplier or customer of any ofMsrutaka or dm Subsidiaries;
(ii)
owns, directly or bdircctiy, in whole or in part, any tangtte or
intangible property that amy of Marutaka or Subsidiaries ases in tke conduct of business; or
(in)
has any cause of action or ctker claim whatsoever agpunst, or
owes say amount to, any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries, creep! far claims in the ordinary conrse of bunaass sock as for accrued vacation pay, accrued benefits under employee benefit plans sad medical,
deatai aad other similar health benefit plana easting on die date hereof.
127. ^Mltt frfllftrs and Prcuriea. Schedule 3J27 sets forth (i) the name of each bank,
trust company, sfloirkiffs or other broker or other financial insritnlinn with which soy of Marutaka or
Subsidiaries has aa account, credit line or ssfe deposit box or vaults; (ii) the name of each entity
authorised by Marutaka or Subsidiary to draw thereon or to have access to any safe deposit bos or
vault; and (iif) the names of ill entities authorised by proak* powers of attorney or other instruments to
a a on behaff of any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries in matters concerning its business or affairs.
128. Pull Disclosure. AB documents delivered by or on behalf of dm Seflerx, Marutaka
aad Subsidiaries in conned km with this Agreement are true, complete aad siifhrurir. To the Sellers',
Marutaka and Subsidiaries knowledge, no representation or warranty of them contained in this Agreement contains aa untrue statement of a material bet or omits to stale a material fret reqored to be
stated ihertia or necessary to make the sfafftmmts made, ia the contort in which made, not materialy
&ke oi* misleading. There is no face know to the Seders, Marutaka and Subsidiaries that any of them
have not disclosed to dm Buyer in writing that could have a material adverse effect on the condition of
the Company or the ability of the Seflers', Marutaka aad Subsidiaries to perform this Agreement3.29. ReflrfffMioM n^j WffTMfol fflt IB fflfflfflf P*tt» *"» representations and
warranties contained m this Section 3 shall be true m s i outenal respects on the 1st Closing Date.
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represcnta aad warrants, jointly aad severally to the Buyer as (blows:
4.2. Trth? ft fWTihlKti ftrf*- Such Seller owns beneficially and of record, free aad
dear of any lien, option or other encumbrance, or owns of record and has full power sad authority to
convey, free mid clear of any lien or other encumbrance; the Purchased Sham set forth opposite inch
Seller's anme on Schedule 1.2, and, upon delivery of and payment for such Purchased Shares as
provided in Sections 12 and l i , such Seller wil convey to die Buyer gpod and vafid title thereto, free
and dear of any Ken or other encumbrance. Sellers shal cause all necessary procedures to be taken to
obtain the consents of Che Board of Directors of ench of Marutaka and to cause the trsasfcr of Shares
of Marutaka to be recorded in die records of shareholders of each of them.
4.1 tolfcgrilT nflTTTltTTrf *7frrm AWWnWt Such Seller has the foil legal right
and power aad all authority and approval required to enter into, eaecote and deliver this Agreement sad
to perform fully such Seller's ^ t i g ^ n c hereunder. This Agreement has been duly executed aad
deivered by such Seller and is the valid and binding obligation of soch Seller enforceable ta scoordance
with k* terms. Tbe execution aad delivery by nek Seller of this Agreement and the performance by
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inch Setter of this Agreement m accordance with its terms tad onnriitions will tot (i) require the approval or consent of any governmental or regulatory body or the approval or corneal of any ocber entity;
(i) conflict with or result is any breach or violation of any of the tarma and coalitions o£, or constitute
(or with notice or lapee cf time or both constitute) a default under, tay staluaa, repletion, order, judgment or decree applicable to such Selkr or to the Purchased Shires held by such Selec, or any instrmneat, contract or other agreement to which such Sella is a party or by or to which such Seler is or the
Shares held by sich Seller ire bound or subject; or (ia) result in the creation of say lea, or other
©acuaabrance on the Purchased Shares held by such Seler.
43. A/rT>imffff 6* ftrastaent. Soci Selkr is acquiring the Preferred Shires to be
delivered to him parsuaal to this Agreement for investment and not for resale or distribution. Seller
shai execute and deliver aa ixxwttaieat representation letter at the 1st Gosaig ia the ioem attached ss
E*tfb*43.
44. RgmwtriffW ^ WiFintiM « \A <3«Bg Plftr The repraeatations and
warraaties coctaioed in this Section 4 shall be true in ail aisteriai respectt oa the lit Qosing Date.
5.
Renrwntarinus sod Warranties d thn Buyer. The Buyer represents and warrants to
the Sellers as follows:
5.1. Due Incorporation and Authority. Hie Coaapany ia a corporation driy organized,
validly existing and in good standing under the la** of Nevada sad has all requisite corporate power
sari lawful authority to own, lease and operate its aaaeift, properties and basinets and to carry on its
respective business as now being conducted
5.1 ^TfrrtfiirM. T** Company has no snbsidary. The Company does aot direcdy or
indirectly own any interest in any other entity.
53. rfrglifiH*ffH The Company is duly qualified or otherwise authorised as a
corporation, to transact business, and ia in good itaadiag in each jurisdiction set forth on Schedule 5 J
and jurisdictions it is doing business ia; the failure GO obtain such qualification or authorization in any
other jurisdkuan does not have a material adverse effect oa the 'conditio* of the Company* (as defined
b Section 13.U. Qualification Certificates (good standing) are attached as Exhibit 53 hereof for the
Company.
5.4. foffPllrffW Caoitil Stack. The anthemed, issued and outstanding capitalization
and ownership of the Company, together with a shareholder list as of a recent date acting all restricted
shares and die date of acquisitions by the holders thereof, and a list of aB affiliates, is set forth on
Schedule 5.4.
SS Qmmi gr flftr RMftl- There ia no oatstaading right, subscript**, warrant, call,
unsatisfied preemptive right, option or other agreeaaeat of any kind to purchase or odurwise to receive
from Company any of the outstanding, aothorized but unissued, unauthorized or treasvy shirts of the
capital stock or any other security or equity interest of the Company, and there is no outstanding
security of any kind convertible into such capital stock or other equity interest eaoept for die Series A
Preferred Stock which dkuil be converted at the lit Closing, eacept as described on Schedule 5.5.
5.6. ftmifraflf ¥ lncoroor»*ifln Md IMlYfl The Company has heretofore delivered to
the Seller true and complete copies of its Certificate of Incorporation (certified by the Secretary of die
State of Incorportfioo) and iu Bylaws (certified by its Secretary) as m effect on the date hereof, which
are attached as Exhibits 5J6.
5.7. F f t t f r l ^Mnrflf The balance sheets of che Coaapany as of March 31, 1989
sod 1990, and the related combined sutements of income, stockholders' equity and capital and cash
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flow for the years cheo ended, including the footnotes to the foregoing thereto, have beea delivered to
the Sellers and are attached as Exhibit 5.7. The combined balance sheets of the Company u of March
31,1991, and the related combined statement* of income, gockhoiders' equity and espial and cash flows
Cor the years then ended, indnding the footnotes to (he foregoing thereto, sod accompanied by an
aucfted report of BDO Seadman, will be delivered to the Seder it the 2nd Qam^ sod ihall fiurty
present thefinancialposition of the Company as at such dates and the combined results of qpffirinns of
die Company, in each case in accordance with generally accepted accounting prindples connstently sp»
pled for tbe periods covered thereby. (The foregoingfinancialtfatf e a t s of Che Company as of March
31, 1989, 1990 and 1991 and for the years then ended, are anmflimr* herein referred to ss the
"Company financial*1).
5.8. Fft MitPii k*wn QtOKr E«xpt for the items listed in Schedule 5.8 attached
hereto, as of the 2nd Closing Date, to the knowledge of the Buyer, there ha* been no saaterial advene
change in the condition of dm Company, md die Buyer knows of no sneh change which is threatened,
nor hai there beea any damage, destruction or lorn which could have or has had a material advene
e&ct oa the condition of the Company whether or not cowed by insurance.

5.9. T** fcfaflerfr
5.9.L Hie Company has paid all taxes or governmental assriaiinars fmdidhig
esdaaated taxes) ("Taxes') required to be paid by it through the date hereof and through the Oosmp
(other than taxes not material in die aggregate and the liabShy tor which is adequately reserved for in
the Audited Financials), and all deficiencies or other additions to tax, interest and penalties owed by it;
and shall timely pay (oo or before the apiraacn of the appropriate period or any ertensions thereof)
any such Taxes, including additions, interest snd pnaltirs, required to be paid by k on or before the
2ad dosing Date.
5.9.2. Hie Company has timely filed (on or before the expiration of the appropriate period or any exteasions thereof) all tax mums required through the date hereof, and shall
prepare and timely file (on or before the expiration of the appropriate period or any rat en pons thereof),
in a manner consistent with prior yean, all tax returns required on or before the 2nd Closing.
5.93. Schedule 5.9 sets forth the status of federal mo. <oe tax audita of the tax
returns of the Company for each fkcal year for which the statute of limitation* has not expired, including the^ amounts of any deficiencies and addition o tax, assessments, interest and ptnatfrs Jndfcsltrt oo
any notice* of proposed deficiency or statutory .decs of deficiency, and the amounts of any payments
made with respect thereto. Each return fled by the Company far which the income UK audit has not
beea completed accurately reflects the amount of its tax liability for such period. Tie Buyer knows of
no material advene change in the rates or bask of awasmrrt of any lax (other than income tax) effective for the fiscal yean ending 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991, of the Company or of any anasscssrd
tax deficiency proposed or threatened against the Company.
5.10. CncmKancc with Laws. Except for the eurirofMaeatal matters listed in Schedule
510, the Company is not in violation or has received any notice of any alleged violation of any ap*
pticafele law, ordinance, regulation, order, judgment, injunction, award, decree or other requirement of
any gorcnunentai or regulatory body, court or arbitrator, which violation could have a material adverse
effect on the condition of the Company. Hie Company has al Eceuses, permits, orders or approvals of,
and hat made all required registration* with, any governmental or mguLsaocy body that are material to
the conduct of the buriness of the Company (collectively, "Company Penrnta'). Without limiting the
foregoing and except for the environment^ matters Sated in Schedule 110: (i) the Cosapany is not in
violation, or has received any notice of any alleged violation, or has received any aodce of any aDegpd
violation, of any law relating to pollution or protection of ..v.: environment, mrinding, without limitation,
laws reltti* to emissions, discharges, releases or threatened releases of polhtants, contaminants,
cbminh, or industrial, toxic or hazardous sabstaaces or wnstea iato dm environment (including, without
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limitntioo, ambient air, surface water, ground water or land) , or otherwise relating to the rcaasftrflirc,
processing, distribution, we, treatment, storage, disposal, transport or handling of pollutants,
contaminants, chemicals or industrial, toxic or hazardous sabstmces or wastes, cacspt to the extent such
failire to comply could not have a material advene effect on the condition of the Company and
subsidiaries and (ii) to the knowledge of the Buyer, the Coaapauy B in compliance with all terms and
conditions of such required environmental permits, and is also in compfiaace wth all other ftiifations,
restrictions, conditions, standards, prohibitions, requirements, obligations, schedules and timetables
contained in tuck environmental laws or contained in any regulation, code, plan, order, decree, jodgsent, injunction, aotice or demand letter issued, entered, promulgated or approved thereunder except to
the extent failure to comply could not have a material advene effect on the condition of the Company.
All Company Permits are listed on Schedule 5.10 and are in full force and effect Mo material violations
are or have been recorded in respect of any Company Permit; and no proceeding Is pending or, to
Buyer' knowledge, threatened to revoke or hrk any Company Permit Escept u set forth in Schedule
5.10 the Company, is not aware of any correal or proposed legislation which has or may have material
advene effect on the condition of the Company.
5.11. No Breach. Ibt execution, delivery and performance of the Agreement will not
(i) violate, conflict with or result m the breach of any provision of the Certificate of Incorporation or
Bylaws of the Company, (u) violate or result in the breach of any of die material terms o£ result in a
material modification of, or othenuse give any other mnmrting party the right to terminate or declare
(or with notice or lapse of time or both declare) a default under any material contract or other agreement to which the Company, by or to which k or its assets or properties auy be bound or subject; (Ei)
violate any order, writ, judgement, injunction, award cr decree of any court, arbitrator or governmental
or regUatory body binding upon the Company or upon any material part of the assets of the Company;
(tv) violate any statute, law or regulation of any jurisdiction, afeicb violation could have a material
adverse effect on the condition of the Company; (v) violate or result m the revocation or saspension of
any Company Permit
5.12. Aflitrr lid f i y ^ l n B Except aa set forth on Schedule 5.12 involving VS.
1100,000 or more per claim, there are no outstaadfag orders, judgements, injunctions, awards or decrees
of any court, arbitrator or gownmeatul or regulatory body binding upon the Company, Except u set
forth on Schedule 5J2, to the knowledge of the Company, there are no actions, safe or claims or legal,
admfcrfscrative or arbitral proceedings or investigation* (whether or not dm defense thereof or fiabifities
in respect thereof are covered by insurance) pending or threatened against or involving the Company or
aay or its properties or assets which, iacSvidualy or in the aggregate, could hive a material advene
effect tpon the Company. Tie Company has at no time during the last five years had, nor, to the
knowledge of the Company, is there now threatened, a strike, picket, work stoppage, work slowdown, or
other labor trouble that had or may have a material adverse effect on the ennrfrinn of the Company.
The Company is not aware of any pending or threatened anion activity, strike, picket, work stoppage,
work slowdown, or other labor trouble with respect to the employes of any of the sappier* or customers fitted on Schedule 5-21 that may have a material advene effect on the condition of the Company.
All notices required to have been ghen to any insurance company listed aa insuring against any action,
auk or daim set forth oa Schedule 512 have been timely and duly given and no insurance company has
neartcd, orally or in writing, that such daim is not covered by the applicable policy relating to such
dais. Except as set forth in Schedule 5J2, there are no product liability damns against or involving any
the Company involving US. $25,000 or more per daim or per series of d a n s arising from any one
incident and no such claims have been settled, adjudicated or otherwise disposed of since March 31,
1990.
5.13. rdMTKH Mf P f t g AgWlMtt Schedule 113 sett forth aO of the following
contracts and other agreementa to which Company k a party or by or to which it or its assets or
properties are bound or subject (!) contracts and other agreements with any current or Conner officer,
director, shareholder or other affiliate or with aay other current enpbyee or conaakaat or with any
entity in which any of the foregoing is a controlling entity, (a) contracts and other agreements with sny
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labor union oc association representing any employee; (in) contracts or other agreements for die sale of
any of its assets other than ia the ordinary course of business or for the grant to sny entity of any optica or preferential rights to purchase any of ita assets; (tv) joiat venture agreements; (v) contracts or
other agreements under which it agrees lo indemnify sny party or Co share tax liability of sny party; (vi)
coatrac&i and other agreements which can be cancelled withoutfcabflfoy,premium or penalty only on
ninety days' or snore notice; (vii) contracts and other agreements with customers or suppliers Cor the
sharing of fees, the rebating of charges or other similar arrangements; (vii) contracts said other agreements containing covenants of Company not to compete in any liae of busiaess or with sny entity ia any
geographical area or covenants of any other entity not to compete with Company in any ibe of business
or ia any geographical area; (n) contracts and other agreements relating to dm af^risrt^ by Company
of any operating business or the capital stock of any other entity, entered into since March 31, 1990 or
under which Company has easting obligations; (x) contracts and other agreements requiring the paynaeot
Co any entity of an override or similar commHsion or fee; (xi) contracts and other agreements relating to
the borrowing of money; (xii) contracts and other agreements not made ia the ordinary course of bunaaas; or (nii) any other contracts and other agreements pursuant to which payments in esceas of U. S.
SSIUtiO have been or may hereafter be made. Buyer has delivered to the Seller true and complete copies of ail the contracts and other agreements set forth on Schedule 5.12 or on any other Schedule. All
of such contracts and other agreements are valid and binding upon the Company. The Company ia not
in default in any material respect under any such agreements, nor, to the knowledge of Company, k any
other party to any such contract or other agreement in default thereunder in any material respect nor
does aay condition exist that with notice or lapse of time or both would rrmsriftfft a material default
thereunder. Schedule 5.13 also lists afl contracts aad other agreements currently in negotiation or
proposed by Company of a type which if entered into by Company would be required to be fisted on
Schedule 513 or on any other Schedule. The Buyer has delivered to the Seders tme and correct drafts
or summaries of al such contract* and other agreements and copies of all documents relating thereto.
5.14. <7Tfflfltfl IP** Approvals. The execution and defray by the Buyer of this
Apecaent, the performance by the Buyer of its *M»g^**— hereunder, the fonrinnanfr in fail force and
effect of al contracts and agreements set forth on Schedule 5.14 do not require the Buyer to obtain any
consent* approval or action of, or make anyfifingwith or give any notice to, any entity or any governmental or regulatory body, except as set forth in Schedule 5.14 (the "Buyers Required Coaaeats") and at
referred to in Section 3JL4.
5.15. Btll flffBft The Properties owned or leased by the Company are set faith on
Schedule 5.15.1 hereto, with their address and legal description. A true and correct summary of all
fames and other agreements relating to the properties is attached to Schedule 5J5.1
116. Recehnhlca. All accounts, lease ohigatioaa aad antes due and uacoflecrrd as
reflected on the audited combined balance sheets of the Company as of March 31,1990 ("Rcceivablec")
and, all Receivables due and nncofectad vising subtcgomt to March XL 1990: (I) have arisen m the
otdhwry course of business of Company, 0 0 represent valid oWigsrinm due to the Company enforceable
ha accordance with their terms and, (3E) subject only to a reserve tor certain bad debts compntrd in a
runaimr consistent with past practice have been collected or are collectible m the ortinary course of
bnamnm of Company in the aggregate recorded amounts thereof in accordance with the*r terms.
Schedule 5.M lats any obligor which together with all of ita affiliates owed accounts and notes due aad
uncounted reflected on dm balance sheet as of December 31,1990 in an aggregate amount of $50,000
or more.
117. TMBMTf fTPpgfr- The facilities, machinery, equipment, furniture, Leasehold
improvements, fixtures, vehicles, structures, any retated mpitafard kerns and other tangible property
amterial to the business of dbe Compaay (the "Tangible Property) considered in the aggregate are, m al
UHteri.il respects, m good operating condition and repair, normal wear and tear ncepted, aad the
Company has not received aay notice since March 31, 1990 that k is ia violation of sny costing law or
any building, zoning, health, safety or other ordinance, code or regulation which violation could have a
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material advene effect cm the condition of the Company. During the past three yean that hm not
been any tyiifirant interruption of the operations of Company due to inadequate mainfnnaan? or the
Tangible Property. All material leases, conditional sale contract*, franchises or Sceases pursuant to
which the Company may hold or use any interest owned or daimed by it (including without **"»f^q«,
optioai) in or to Tangible Property are In fall force and effect and there ia no material default or event
of default or event which with notice or lapse of time or both would constitute a default
5.18. ^Hfflfr1? pr?rfTfv Schedule 5.18 sets forth at patents, trademarks, copyright
service muJLs and trade names, ill applications for any of the foregoing, and all permit*, pants and
Ikcaaes or other rights n n i n g to or from Company relating to any of the foregoing" and there are no
other patents, trademarks, copyright* service marks and trade tunes which are material to the business
of the Company as presently conducted or as being developed The Company haa the right to use, free
and dear of any claims orrightsof others, all trade secrets, know-how, proceaaee, technology, bine prints
and designs utilized in or incident to the conduct of their business as praently coodnctcd as being
developed ("Company Trade Secrets*)* Eicept as ui forth on Schedule 502, the Company has ao
notice of any adversely held patent, invention, trademark, copyright, service mark or trade name of any
other entity or notice of any claim of any other entity relating to any of die property set forth on
Schedule 5.18 or any Company Trade Secret, and the Company knows of no bams far any snch charge
or daim. There is no present or, to the knowledge of Buyer, threatened use or encroachment of any
Compaay Trade Secret which could haw a material adverse effect on the contBtson of die Company.
5.19. ^Ifr \" iVrti Tto Company owns otfiight and has good and marketable title
to al oi' hs astets, inrinrfing, without HoiUtioii, all of the aaaeta reflected on the balance sheet of the
Company as of March 31,1990 or described in Schedule* 5.14, 5.15, 5.16 and 508, in each caae tree mid
dear of any lien or other encumbrance, except m the case of asaett other than real property (or (i)
Baas or encumbrances specifically described in the notes to the Company Financial*; (2) assets disposed
ot or subject to purchase or sales orders, in the ordinary course of burinem once the March 31,1990;
or (Hi) liens or other encumbrances securing taxes, assessment*, governmental charges or levies, or the
claims of materialmen, carriers, landlords and He entities, all of which are not yet due and payable or
am being contested in good faith, so long as inch conic* docs not iavohc any substantial danger of the
sale, forfeiture or lose of any assets material to the condition of the Coepany.
5J0. r%*ff*ff ** <* MMIK± 31, 1991, die Company did not have any indebtedness,
labiity, claim or loss, liquidated or uniquiriated, secured or unsecured, accrued, absolute, contingent or
otherwise, of a kind required by U-S. generally accepted accounting principle* to be set forth on a
financial statement or m the note* thereto ('Company iiabffitie**) that were individually or ia the aggregate material to the eondtfoa of the Company and wore not fuly and adequately reflected or
reserved against on the balance sheet as of December 31, 1991 or described on any schedule thereto.
Eacept a* set forth on Schedule? 520, the Company has not, eaeept in the ordinary course of businem,
incurred any Cosnpasy liabflkies since December 311991.
5J.L n n m r r n \M TriWIHl Schedule 5J21 lists, by dollar vdume for the last twelve
ri kinder months ended March 31, 1991, the fifteen largest customers, suppleis and lessees of the
Company. Except as disclosed an Schedule 52L, daring snch 12 months ao such sappier, customer or
hsmee of die Company ha* ranrrilfri or otherwise terminated, or dhreatened in writing to cancel or
otharase terminate, its relationship wth the Company or haa during such 12 moods decreased materisly, or, to Buyer's knowledge, threatened to decrease to bail materially, its uriBralion of tenant space,
supplies or material* to the Company or its usage or purchase of the tenant space, services or produou
of the Company. Buyer ha* no knowledge that any such supplier, leasee, or customer intends to cancel
or odKrwise modify its relationship with Company or to decrcuat materially or limit its tenant space,
supplies or material* to Company or hi usage or purchase of the tenant space, aasvices or products of
Company, and the sale cf the Shares by the Buyer wiB not, to the knowledge of the Buyer, adversely
sflbct tie relationship of Company with such supplier, customer or leasee
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523. rnf\)lfi7i
Schedule 523 sett forth a list and brief description (specifying the
insurer, describing each pending daim thereunder of more than VS. $25£00 aad setting forth (he agp e p t e amounts paid out under each cuch policy through the date hereof) of all policies or hinders of
fire, lability, product liability, woctoncn's compensation, vehicular and other insurance held by or on
behalf of the Company. Sack policies and binders are in fail force and effect aad insure apunst risks
and liabilities to ancient and in a manner customary in the industries in which the Company operate.
Bacept far dabas set forth cm Schedule 523, there are no omuwialing unpaid dairas wider such policy
or binder; none of the Company hai received any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal of any such
policy or binder. There is ao inaccuracy in any application for inch policies or binders or any failure to
pay premiums when due that would cause a lad of inaarance coverage. Except aa set forth on Schedule
523, the Company baa aot received sny notice from any of its insurance carriers that any inaarance
coverage listed on Scbcdutr, S23 wiB aot be available in dm future on substantially the same terms
(aacept for the prices or premiums payable thereunder) as now in effect
524. flflfaffi. T i f f i n " * *** B»*w«ga» Schedule 524 seta forth the oatae aad
total compensation of each person who is now or has been during the la* two fiscal years of the
Company any employee, oonanftam, agent or other representative of Company whose usual rate of
compensation (including bonuses and commissions) eaceeda or decoded VS. ttDflto. The Company
has made no commitment or agreement to increase the compensation or to modify the conditions or
terms of employment of any soch person. None of such persons curready holding inch a position baa
threatened to cased or otherwise terminate sueh person's relatfaodup with the Company.
5 2 1 Operations of thaComnaav. Eacept as sat fbaits on Schedule 525, n e t March
31,1991, the Company has not, except in the ordinary course of business:
(i)
declared or paid any dmdeads or declared or made any other
distributions of any kind to ita shareholder*, or made any direct or indtoct redemption, retirement,
pnrthasr or other acquisition of any shares of ita capital tfock;
00 incurred any indebtednemforborrowed aumey;
(m) redaced ha cash or short term iaveatmeata or die* equivalent,
other than to meet cash needs arising in the ordinary conrae of business, ctmsJatrnt with past practices;
(iv) waived any material rigbt under any contract or other agreeaaeot
of the type required to be setforthin any Schedule hereto;
(v) made any material chains in ita armnafing methods or practices
or amde any material change in depreciation or sinottization policim or rates adopted by it;
(vi) materially changed any of ita business policies, mdnriinfc without
Hasttstfen, advertista* distributing, marirrriiifr pricing, purchaamg, personnel, sales, returns, budget or
product acquisition polcies}
(vi) made any wage or talary increase or boons (eacept for annual bonuses
payable in the normal course to eaoploytes in an aggregate aaiouni not to eacced fifteen percent (15%)X
or increase in any other <irect or indirect compensation, or any payment or fomatiafnt to pay any
severance or ternmation pay to any of ita officers, directors, employee*, contultsnts, agents or other
representatives, or any accrual for or oommitrnffii or agreement to make or pay the same, other than co
catties other than its officer*, directors or shareholders;
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(viii) made any loan or advance to any of its shareholders* officers directors,
employees, connikaTUs, agents or other representatives (other than travd advances made in the ordinary
coarse of business), or made any other loan or advance;
(k) incurred or assumed any debt, obligation or liability (whether abaoiute or
contingent and whether or not currently doe and payable);
(z) acqaked any (a) iaveatory or equipment, and (b) made any acquisition of
all or- any part of the assets, properties, capital stock or bonnets of any other entity;
(B) Paid, directly n uhlan" ily iiif >i( njt Company liahfitirn before the same
became dae in accordance with ki terms;
(si) cenninated or faled lo renew, or received aay written threat (that was aot
subsequently withdrawn) to terminate or tail to renew, any contract or other agroontot that is or was
amterial to the condition of the Company or
(xita) engaged in any other tnmaninn
5.26. »HfB*ll r 1T#fl I if IlB****- Bacept as let iorih on Schednk 126, no officer,
cunsafriTit, director or affiliate of Company, ao relative or spouse (or relative of mch spouse) of any
saeh officer, director or affiliate of Company and so entity controlled by one or more of the foregoing:
(i) owns, directly or indirectly, any interest m (eaeept for less than 1% tfnek
hoidiags for kvestmeat purposes in securities of pobfidy held and traded ooaapaaim), or ia an officer,
director, employee or consultant at, any entity which is, or is engaged ia badness as a competitor, temor,
Isaace, luppiier or customer of Company;
(H) owns, directly or mdarectly, in whole or in part, any tangible or intangible
property that Company uses in the conduct of business; or
(in) has any cause of action or other data whatsoever against, or owes any
asnoint to, Company, eaoept for claims in the ordinary coarse of business snch ss for accmod vacation
pay, accraad benefits under employee benefit plans and medical, dental and other similar health benefit
plans cAtsin on (he date hereof.
5.27. ffflliii THftn ITJ fmfal Schedule SJ3 sets forth 0) the name oi each bank,
trust company, securities or other broker or otherfinancialhariftrtinn with which Company has an ao*
count, credit line or safe deposit box or vaults; (5) the name of each parson anthoraed by the Company
to draw thereon or Co have access to any account, credit ine or safe deposit be* or vauks; and (In) the
names of afl persons authorized by probes, powers of attorney or other instruments to act on behalf of
the Company in —art*** iKMKTn'ipa *ti bw"1*— or affisirt
5<2& F l l P i r i a n AU documents delivered by or on behalf of (he Company in
coawadion with this Agreement are true, complete aad authentic To the Company's knowledge, no
lapicicatarioTi or warranty of it contained in thk Agreement contains an uatree statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material bet required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
mads, in the contest m which made, not materially false or miilratlmg There iano fact known to the
Ccmpmy that has aot been disclosed to the Seller in writing that could have a material adverse effect
on the condition of the Cdmpany or the ability of the Coaapany to perform duiAgreemest
5.29. Renorting Obligations. The Company shaE hate fled al reports required to be
Sled under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the 1st Ooeag Date, eaeept for the Beam 1QK for
the year ended March 3L 1991. Copies of suchfilingshave been previously delivered to Se&ers. AD of

such reports dace August h 1990, comply as to form with the 1934 Act to the beat knowledge of
Company.
530. Pfgiffffiltltfr"* ^ ^ Warranties OP lift ftoftf n Tfe The representations and
warranties contained in this Section 5 shall be true in ail material roapects oc the In Closing Date.
6.

r r ^ f f t l IP** Aareementa. The parties covenant and agree aa blows:

6J.
Conduct of Mimlillfll ?lii n TT K e n the date hereof through the 2nd Closing,
the Sellers shall cause Mamtaka and the Subsidiaries to conduct their business in the ordinary coorte
and, without the prior written ooaaeat of the Buyer, agrees not to undertake any of die actions specified
ia Section 3.25.
r
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shaA be entitled, through its employees* repreeeatatto and contractors, mdudmg, without liiaitafinii.
lawyers and accrttintants to investigate die assets, properties, business and iyfV«»¥ of Mantfaka and
Subsidiaries and to eacazaiae the books, records and financial ***Abi*r* of Mamtaka aad Subsidiaries.
Any sudi investigation and examination shall be conducted at icaaonable tines ind under reasonable
ckouaaUnces and Marutakn and Subsidiaries and the Sellers shall cooperate fatty therein. No investigation by Company shall diminish or obviate say of the represeatationa, warranties, covenants or agrecarats of the Sellers under this Agreement la order that the Company any have foil opportunity to
make such physical, business, acemmring and legal review, faamnajWi or investigation * it may wish of
Che business and affairs of Mamtaka aad Subsidiaries, the Setters shnfl make avaiable aad shall cause
Mamtaka aad Subsidiaries to nuke available to the represeatatives of the Company during sach period
al audi information and copies of such cfcximrots concerning the affairs of Mamtaka tnd Subsidiaries
as such representations may reasonably request, shall permit the contractors aad rcpreseatativea of
Company access to the properties of Mamtaka aad Subsidiaries and all parts thereof and shall cause its
officers, employees, consultant!, agents, accountants aad attorneys to cooperate fully with such contractors and representative! in connection with such review and namination The Setters acknowledge (i)
that the Company has received the material pertaining to this Agreement and listed m Schedule &2 (the
'Mamtaka Pre-Eaecutku Due Diligence Materials") and that to the knowledge of the Seller, sach
Mamtaka Pre-Executaon Due Difigpnce Materials does not contain any information which indicates that
there is a breach or inaccuracy in any of the Seders' representations, warraatiea aad covenants nontajafd
in this Agreement and (it) the Sellers have not made any representations or warranties in this Agree*
amt or otherwise with respect to the accuracy or coaapkteaeas of any projections of the earning* of
Mamtaka.

Company acknowledges and agrees that k w31 conikne to receive both written and oral
information from Mamtaka and Subsidiaries which they deem TrfrHrt- 1 Company agrees to hold all
sach coafidenrial information in trust and aiafirWvr for Selers until the earlier to occur of dm 1st
Qosmg hereunder or December, 1991, aad not to disclose say sach confidential information to any third
party during thk period without Mantfaka' prior written coaaeaL Furthermore! prior to dm earler of
the 1st Gosmg hereunder, the rnrpiraricn of dm period of tu»«ti—ir»«w» Qr the information becoming
pnbfidy available through ao fruit of the Company, dm Company agrees not to use such information for
any purpose other than aa set faith herein.
The Company's confidentiality obligation hereunder does not apply to mfinaiioo that
(i) by written record, can be demonstrated to have been previously known by the Company and which
Mamiafca agreed could be disdoeed pnbfidy, (ii) isrightfullyreceivedby the Company from a third
party through no tank of the Company, (Hi) is independently developed by a third party, or (iv) in approved by Marutaka in writingfarrelease.
Upon termination of thk Agreement, the Company will defiver al files* document* and
other media (and all copies and reproductions of any of the faregomg) m its posaeasJoa or under its
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control which contain or pertain to the confidential information. Disclosure by the Company of the confidential information to Company's employees or representatives shall be limited to those employees aad
representatives who require the information for aac in connffclion with Compan/i mvesrigstina
hereunder.
63.
Conduct of Company Business. Pram the dale hereof through the 2nd Closing,
Compaay shall conduct its business in the ordinary course sad, without the prior written consent of the
Sellers agrees act to undertake any of the actions specified m Section 125.
6A fiftmrtift ^""'TlritlBi Ui IPT'ffffT 1 ! ? « * to the 2nd O w n * the Sell*
ers shall be entitled, through their employees, representative and contractors, indicting, without Kmka»
tioa, lawyers aad accountants, to investigate the assets, properties, business and operations of the
Company and to examine the books, records and financial condition of the Company. Any sacb
investigation and nraniinarinn shall be conducted at reasonable times aad under reasonable drcumnancea
and the Company shall cooperate fully therein. No mvesrigation by Che Sellers shall dbaaiah or obviate
any of the representations warranties! covenants or agreements of the Company under this Agreement.
In order that the SeUers may have fall opportunity to make such physical business, srrennririg and legal
review, ranmmatinn or bvrsrignrtoii as they may ussh of the business and affairs of the Company, the
Company shall make available to the representatives of the Sellers daring such period aB inch information and copies of such documents concerning die affairs of the Company u such representatives may
reasonably request, shall permit the contractors and representatives of the Sellers access to the properties of the Company and all parts thereof and shall came its offioers, employees, consiliums, spate, accountants and attorneys to cooperate filly with such contractors and representatives m ctimrnlrn with
such review and examination, The Company acknowledges that the Sellers have received the material
pertaining to this Agreement fisted in Schedule 6.4 (the "Company P?e-Hsecution Due Diligence Materiel") sad that, to the kaowiedge of the Sclera, such Company Pre-Eaecution Due Diligence Material
does not coataui any information which indicates that there is a bread) or inaccuracy in any of the
Company's representations, warranties ssd covenants contained in das Agreement
The Sellers acknowledge and agree that the Sellers have and wiQ continue to receive
both written and oral information from the Company which they deem confidential. The Sellers agree to
hold ail such confidential information in trust and confides rr, for the Company until the earlier to occur
of the 1st dosing hereunder or December, 1991, and not to disclose any inch confidential information to
any third party during this period without the Company's prior written consent. Furthermore, prior to
the earlier of the lrt Closing hereunder, the expiration of the period of nondisclosure or the information
hecomiag publicly available through ao fault of the Sellers, the Seders agrees not to use such informatioa
for any purpose other than as setforthherein.
The Sellers' confidentiality obligation hereunder does not apply to informatioa that (i)
by written record, can be demonstrated to have been previously known by the Sellers and which the
Company agreed could be disclosed poblieiy, (a) isrightfullyreceived by the SeOecs from s third party
through no fault of the Sellers, (ui) is independently developed by a third party, or (iv) is approved by
the Company in writing for release.
Upon termination of this Agreement the Sclers will deltas al Sins, dnmnrnts and
other media (and aU copies and reproductions of any of the foregoing) in the Solera's possession or
under the Sdlers's control which contain or pertam to the mnfidratial information. Disclosure by the
Sellers of the confidential information to the Sellers'* employees or representatives shal be linked to
those employees aad representatives vAo require the information for use in connection with the Selers'
investigation hereunder.
fci.
Consent to Jurisdiction and Scrvicr vi Procrus Any legal action, suit or
proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement may be instituted in the federal courts of the
Central District of California, and each party agrees not lo assert, by way of motion, as a defease, or
.18.
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otherwise, in any soch action, suit or proceeding, my claim thai it is not subject personally to die
jarisdictioa of sach court, chat the action, suk or proceeding k brought in an inconwiicat form, that
the venae of the action, suit or proceeding is improper or that this Agreement or die sibject matter
hereof may act be enforced in or by such court. Each party fiither irrevocably submits to the jiriadio*
lion of $;uch court in any such activity or proceeding Any and all service of process and any other
notice in any such action, suit or proceeding shall be effective again* any party if mven penoealy or by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or by any other means of mail that requires a
signed receipt, postage prepaid, mailed to such party as herein provided. Nothing herein contained shall
be deemed to affect die right of any parly to serve process in any manner permitted by law or to commence legal proceedings or otherwise proceed against any other pasty in any other jurisdiction. If
subject matter jurisdiction does not exist in die Federal courts of die Central District of California widi
respect to any action, suit or proceeding referred to herein! this Section 6,5 wil be deemed to apply
similarly to the Stat e Court of the S tnte of California in Lea Angeles County.
6.6.
Expenses. The Sellers shall pay any and ail stock transfer tax stamps associated
wkh the execution and performance of this Agreement and shad, in addition, pay all legal, anmunring
and transaction expenses of the Buyers incurred in oemmxtion with the preparation, execution and
performance of this Agreement, inrinding,without limitation, fee* and expenses of agones, representatives, legal counsel and accountants. Sellers acknowledge that all expenses of die arranntams and legal
counsel shall be paid by Sellers; to this end. Sellers have previously delivered retainer checks to BDO
Stidman for US. S4QJXQJUQ as partial payment and
respectively. Othenriae, the parties to
this Agreement shall bear thek respective expenses incurred m connection wkh this Agreement
6J.
[mj^n^ii^fy of Brokers, The Sellers jointly and severally represent and
warrant to the Buyer that, except u described on Schedule 6/7, no broker, finder, agent or similar
intermediary, has acted on behalf of any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries or either Seller in connection with
this Agreement and that there are no brokerage commissions, finder's fees or similar fees or
skms payable in connection therewith based on any agreement, arrangement or understating with any
of Marotaka, Subsidiaries or either Seller, or any action taken by any of Marutaka, Subsidiaries or either
Seller. The Sellers agree to indemnify and save the Bayer harmless from any claim or demand foe
commission or other compensation by any broker, finder, agpu or similar intermediary claiming to have
been employed by or on behalf of any Sellers, Marutaka or Subsidiaries and to bear the cost of legal
expenses incurred in defending against any such claim The Sailers agree to pay any such fee and to
indemnify and safe the Buyers harmlras from any chum or demand for rrrnirrrissim or other compensation by any broker,finder,agent or similar intermediary claiming to haw been employed by or oa behalf
of the Seller and to bear the cost of legal expenses incurred in firfenriing against any Each claim. The
Buyer shall indemnify Sellers fax any chum or demand for a rnraimtricw or other compensation by any
broker, finder, agent or similar intermediary claiming to hive been employed by or on behalf of the
Seller and to bear the cost <tf legal expenses iacu^
&& ftrigfli fifties. The Sellers shall, prior to the 2nd Closing, pay or cause to be
psad to each of Marutaka and Sumidisries all amounts owed to Marutaka or Subsidiary and reflected oa
the Andked Financials or borrowed from or owed to Marutaka or Subsidiary since June 30,1990 by any
of the Selkrs or any affilate of any of the Sellers. At and as of the 2nd Hosing, any debts of any of
Marutaka or Subsidiaries owed to any of the Sellers or to any aJBHaLe of any of the Sellers shall be
canceled.
6.9.
Ptoher Assurance. Each of the parties AaU accuse such donwimts and other
papers and take such further actions u may be reasonable required or desirable to carry out the provisions thereof. Each such party shall use its best efforts to fulfil] or obtain dm fuHDmem of the couditkas of the 1st and 2nd Closing,
7.
^iflMlffi »»r*«fatt to me Ohmrarirm of rhr B u w tn Clem The obligation of the
Buyer to enter into and complete the 1st Oora^ k subject, at its option, acting m accordance with the
-1*
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provisions of this Agreement with raped to tcnmnaooc hereof, to the fhtfUnwit, on or prior to the In
Cbsiag, of the foUowing conditio
/.L
Representations and r^Myj^r| The rcprcaraiUtions and warranties oi iht
Sellers and Marutaka contained in this Agreement (as modified or augmented by the information
reflected on the Schedules hereto, ill of which the Buyer acknowledges) shall be true m all miterial
respects oo the lit Closing Date. Each of the Sella* sod Marutaka thaO have performed sad complied
in ill material respects with all covenants sad agreements required by this Agreement to be performed
or compiled with by such Sellers or Marutaka OA or prior to the 1st Closing. Each Seller shall hare
delivered to the Buyer a certificate, dated the 1st Qcsmg, and signed by sudi Seller, to the foregoing
effect, in theformattached as Edribi 7JL
J J.
QnWT"*l V* Approvals. All Sclera Reqiired Consents shall hive been
obtained and be in full force and effect, and the Buyer shall have been furnished with appropriate
evidence of die granting of such approvals, authorizations and corneals.
73.
Qpmv^ nf c**«**\ r* v r ^ i ^ ^ ^ i f f f f i i H the Seiart. The Buyer shaB
have received the opinioas of legal counsel to Marutaka,, SuMkiiafies and Setters, dated the I t Goibg,
addressed to the Buyer in die form of Eshibit 73.
/,4
(^ifti^g Agreement. On or prior to die lit Qoamgi the Company aad
Mamtaka shall enter into a Consulting Agreement with TranaPac Corporatioa or its assigns and Seiko
in the form of Exhibit 7,4 hereto.
7S
Capital F ^ y p g P1T1 Wt* to the 2nd Closing, the parties shall prepare a
piaa of financing to facifitate the development of diat certain unimproved real estate owned by Hal*
lywood into an entertainmeat park. Company shall use its best efforts to arraage for t pnblc or private
financing to raise no kss than S2DflBOjXKiJ0OforMarutaka' business plan,
JA
Sadfit Sellers hereby approve the operating budget (the "Budget") attached as
Exhibit 7.6 to operate the Company in Los Angeles and perform and cany oat the actions coniemplated
hereby. These costs in the Budget wiO be Company obligations and paid from the Company's assets
including those of Mamtaka.
7.7.
Preferred ^fflflffotm^ No disftiluiticm, dividend or liquidation preference shall
apply as to the Series B Preferred Shares until alter the first day of the twelfth orrightrratb month,
wtachew the case may be*fallowingthe date on which all information from architects and other thkd
party consultants relating to the business and development of the Holywood real estate has been
oefivcrcd to the consultants draffiheri in Section 7.4, as more fully described a the Certificate of
Datnainaf ion and the Coranlting Agreement

^wtifau Frxrhf n Tk fflrtnriin if iht Mfrn tft Qm *"* obfigatioo of the
Seian to cater into and complete the 1st Closing is subject, * the SeOen' option acting in accordant
with da pronsioa* of this Agreement with respect to termination hereof, to the fulfillment en or prior
to 1st dosing, of the following conditions, any one or inore of which nay be watod:
11.
Representations and Cnwanii The representations and warranties of the
Buyer contained in this Agreement (as modified or augmented by the afarmation reflected oa the
Schedules hereto, all of which the Sellers acknowledge) shal be true m all material respects on the 1st
Closing Date. The Bayer shal have performed and complied ia all material respects with all coveaaata
and agreements required by this Agreement to be performed or complied with by it poor to the in
Ckmag. Buyer shall have delivered to Seller a certificate, dated the lit Closing, and aigned by Buyer, to
the foregoing effect

jfa212/22632/00QAQQ^paxhaae.o

82.
friflT^li
H^ Approvals. All Buyers' Required Contents shall have been
obtained and be in full force and effect and the Company by its Secretary thai! inuie Sellers a
Ccrtiicatc which states this fact, and evidence of the granting of such approvals, authorizations and
rnaanfi
8.3.
Omaioo of Counsel to the Buver. The Sellers shall have received the opinion
of legal counsel to Buyer, addressed to the Seiko, in the form of Exhibit 8J hereto.
8.4.
FfolT ftf ReWT The Company dull have begun its audit for the year ended
March 31, 1991 and shall have Sled all reports required to be filed by it under the Securities Eachanp
Act of 1934, on or before the Second dosing.
9.
rrcWT<Y fff Manmla. 1™J *fr frltafifln» All memoranda, notes, Hsfc, records and
other documents or papers (and all copies thereof), mriading such kerns stored m computer licincrica,
on ancrofiche or by any other means, made or oompird by or on behalf of either of the Sellers, or
made available to either of the Sellers relating to any of Marataka or Subsidiaries, are and thai be such
company's property until the 1st Closing. In the event any agnificant employee of Marataka leaves prior
Co the 1st dosing, Sellers shall give Buyer written notice thereof,

io.
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Qbtotia tf tte IWfri to Inritfflnifr.

1D.1.L The Sellers, Marataka and SribakSaries jointly and severally agree to
indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Buyer (and its directors, officers, employees, affiliates, successors and assigns) from and against al losses, ImbiBHm, damages, deficiencies, costs or expenses (bdndiag interest, penalties and reasonable attorneys' lees and disbursements) (collectively the •Losses*) based
upon, arising out of or otherwise in respect of any material inaccuracy in or any material breach of any
representation, warranty, covenant or agreement of the Sellers, Marataka or Subsidiaries contained in
this Agreement or in any document or other papers delivered pursuant to the Agreement. This obKga*
tion shall require the current payment of all costs, mriuding legal fees.
10.L2. Each Seller agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Buyer
(and its directors, officers, employees, affilates, successors and assigns) from and against all Losses
based upon, arising out of or otherwise in respect of say material inaccuracy in any representation or
warranty of such Seller herein or any donunfat called tor hereunder.

lOl flWJgf ™ rfft« I h f

m
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102.1. l i e Buyer agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless tfae Sellers
(and their dbecton, officers, employees, affiliates, successors sad assigns) Cram and against ail losses,
KsMttka, damages, deficiencies, costs or expenses (mchidmg Interest, penalties and reasonable attorneys'
fata and disbursements) (colectively, the Tosses^ based upon, arising oat of or otherwise In respect of
any material inaccuracy in or any material breach of any representation, warranty, covenant or apeeaaeni
cf fe Bayer rontaauvl in this Agreement or in any dnnnanut or other papers delivered parsaant to the
AgroemeaL This dtfgution shafl require the current payment of sfi costs, iactndh| legal fa*

103.

r^Tf ladftniwrfflmnrto Pftftail

103.L HBtiW fff hKffi
lllltiftT Prompdy alter receipt by any party hereto
(the "Indemnitee*) of aotke of any demand, daim or drcamstances which, with the lapse of time, would
or might give rise Co a daim or the commencement (or threatened coaaneaccment) of any action,
proceeding or investigation (an •Asserted Liability1) that may result in s Loss* the lad—mime shall give
notice thereof (the 1daims Notice") to any other party (or parties) obligated to provide indemnification
-21jfc2UOarl32ft0an02Vpivchaae.6

pnrsuaot to Section 11 1 m ! 1. 2 (the Indemnifying Party). T i e Claims Notice dull describe the Asserted Liability in reasonable detail* and shall indicate the amount (estimated, if necessary s s d to the
a i t n l feasible) of the Loss tlwt has been or aiay be suffered by the Indemnitee,
1 0 3 2 . QgpgfW ni tY tQ Defend U s Indemnifying P u t y may elect to
compromise or defend, at Us own expense and by its own counsel, any Asserted liability. If tbe
Indemnifying Party elects to compromise or defend such Asserted Liability, it shaR wkhm 30 days (or
sooner, If the nature of the Asserted Liability so requires) notify the ImVrnnitn* of its intent to do to,
and the Indemnitee shall cooperate, at the expense of the Indemnifying Party, in the compromise of, or
defense against, such Asserted liability. If the Indemnifying Party tails to notify the Indrmrmrr of its
election as herein provided or contests its obligation to indemnify under this Agreement, the Indemnitee
may pay, compromise or defend such Asserted Liability. Notwithstanding the foregoing, neither the
iadaffmitying Party nor the Indemnitee may settle or compromise any darns over the objection of the
other, provided, however, that consent to settlement or compromise shall not be unreasonably withheld
In any event, the Indemnitee and the Indemnifying Party may participate, at their own expense, in tbe
defense of such Asserted liability. If the Indeamifyiog Party chooses to defend aay daim, the Indemnitee shall make available to the Indemnifying Party any books, records or other documents within
its control that are necessary or appropriate for such defense

10.33. y m y r rfiffi Urnm r * H « n r $«mBm Anything m sect**
113.2 to the contrary notwithstanding, in the case of any Asserted liability by any leasee, supplier or
customer of any of Marutaka or Subsidiaries with respect to the business conducted by Marutaka or
Subsidiary prior to the Closing in coooectioo with which tbe Indemnified Party may make a daim agahaU
the Indemnifying Party for indemnification pursuant to Section 11, the Indemnified Party shall give a
d a i m s Notice with respect thereto bat, unless the Indemnified Party and the Indemnifying Party
otherwise agree, the Inriwrmifad Party shall hare the eadusive right i t its option to defend, at Seller's
own expense, any such matter, subject t o the daty of the Indemnified Party t o consult with the
Indiana fyiqg Party and their attorneys in connection with such defense and provided that no sach matte?
shall be compromised or settled by the Indemnified Party itfdiout the prior consent of tbe Indemnifying
Party, which consent shall not b e unreasonably withheld. The Indemnifying Party shall have the right to
recommend in good £akh to the FarlmrnifWI Party proposals to compromise or settle claims brought by
a supplier, lessee or customer, and the Indemnified Party agrees lo present sach proposed compromises
or settlements to such supplier, lessee or customer. All amounts required to b e paid in connection with
any such Asserted Liability pursuant to the determination of any canity governmental or regulatory body
or arbitrator, all amounts required to b e paid m comtrfion with aay n c h compromise or settlement
consented to by dm Indemnifying Party, shaD be borne and paid by the Indemnifying Party. The parties
agree to cooperate fully with one another in the defense, compromise or setdfineat of any Asserted
liability.
103.4. Reodyables. If a Loss is based open the lacdfcctftafcy of a Receivable,
upon satisfaction of the Indemnifying Party obligation under das Section 11 with respect to such Loss,
such Receivable wffl be assigned to the Indemnifying Party.
TffEWMIfrfln 1* A f r » gH fflff^
1 11 1

TpfypaiipiL I In li i i i p II i!» i cat 11:1 ] * l:::ie terminated prior i:i: t:k I if: CI1: -

iag as follows:

ll.LL M the election of the Solera, "£ any one or more CM i k i«lidoes to the obligation of the Buyers to dose has not been fuBHlcd m of dm 1st Oonag Date;
111.2, at die election of Che Buyers, if nay oae or more CM tali i > •
dons to the obligation of the Sclera to d o s e has not been fulfilled u of the 1st Oosing Date;
.22^
jh215Q2632«0tWaVpurehasc e

1 U 3 . at the election of the Sellers, if the Bayer has breached any
arterial representation, warranty, covenant or agreement aiaramriri m this Agreement, which breach
camotbeoruaoecurt^bythclitf
11.1.4. at the election of the Bayer*, if the Sellers hive breached soy
material representation, warranty, covenant or agreement conlamod a this Agreeanent, which breach
cannot be or is not cured by the 1st Closing Date;
If this Agreement so terminate*, it shall become null and raid and ham no farther force or effect,
except as provided in Section 121
111
Survival. If this Agreement is terminated and the transactions
contemplated hereby axe not consummated as described above, this Agreement ahall become void and of
no farther force and effect, except lor the provisions of Section 62 relating to the obligation of (he
Bnytr to keep confidential and not to use certain information and data obtained by it from Marutaka
and Subsidiaries, Section 6.4 relating to the obligation of the Seiers to keep omfirtnttnl and aot to use
certain mfonnatioo and data obtained by diem from the Company tad except Cor Che provisions of Section 6-5 and 6.6. No party hereto ihnll have anyfiabffityto any other party in respect of a termination of
the Agreement except pursuant to the above Sections £2,6.4,63 or 46.
12.

Ml^hlTT? 1 ^

12L faf fil l?'rfilTtfowfl As used in das Agreement, the following areas
have the following meanings unless the coatee otherwise requires:
12.1.L 'Affifiltti' with respect to any person means any other person
controlling, controled by or under common control with, or the parents, spouse, Inenl dmceidcnts or
beneficiaries of such person.
1 1 1 1 "Collateral *fntWt\to* ***** aS of the agreements relased to
or ssiociatod with the front km of this Agreement and the performance of the Contemplated Transactions which arc specified on Schedule 13X3,

tarn business, prospects, rtsuto of operation* andfinancialnnrftion of Mnrntatn and Snbskfiarics.
1ZL4 TrmfrMI lid fltttT MmtmC
***** * contracts, agreements, indentures, notes, bonds, loans, instrument* leases, mortgages, Kennies, co—wifmfsifn or other
binding arrangements.
1ZL5. TtaWfllt 9f fltar WW' «*«*« *W doaaamnt, agreement,
iaaWMttat, certificate, notice, consent, affidavit, letter, telegram, telex, fax» staffmmf, schednk (indnding
any Schedule to this Agreesnent), eihibic (iatttading any Eatint to this Agreement), or any other paper
whatsoever.
12.L6. 2 a t i a l aeaas any mdivirhial, person, corporation, partnership,
firm, joint venture, msoriation, joint*stocl company, trust, wsmcorporated organisation, governmental or
regulatory body or other entity.

political subdivision thereof, whether federal, state, local or fioreip, or any agency or instrumentality of
any such government or political subdivision.

-23jh215^2O2A)0CWa2Drpurthaiei)

^Ui. ,Knou4^dflc' means the knowledge of aay of the officers, direct s or cantroiiiiig shareholders of the Cooptay, Marataka or Subsidiaries.
1-2.1.9. 'liens or odjgu ^mppw^w^f means asy lea, pledge, mortgage,
security uMcrest, daim, lease, charge, option, right of first refusal, casement, servitude, tnnrfer reaCricdoa
under any shareholder or similar agreement, eacumbraoce or any odier restriction or fiinifarinn
whatsoever.
HIIC. ^Material*, whea measurable in monetary amount shall
$25,000 or aaore; provided, howew, thai such measareaaeat iachide the aggregate amount of all items
related to a single occarreace or arising from the same cause or even].
12.1 J l . 'Property means real, personal or nused ptoperty, tangible or
iotaapble.
122.
P^ibldtY. No pubEciy releaae or amMimfmifflil ooaoeraiag this Agreement
shaft be awde without advance approval thereof by the Sellers sod the Buyer.
123. Najjar Any notice or other commwaanaa nsqiared or permitted acrcuodcx
to a party shaD be in writing aad shall be delivered peraasally, telegraphed, telexed, seat by facsimile
traaakakm or sent by certified, registered or exprm mail! postage prepaid. Any sach notice shall be
deemed given if originating aad ending is the same country when so delivered peisooaBy, telegraphed
tokaad or sent by facsimile transmission, or if mailed, fire (5) days after the date of deposit ta the mail,
or, if mailed to aaother country, tea (10) days after deposit into the mail addressed to a fcrap country
as blows:
(i)
if to the Buyer, to:
LA. Entertaiaa&eat, lac
U7S Cenovy Park East, #2679
Los AagBies,CA 90067
Atteation: Lisa Beaver, Assistant Secretary
with a cx>py to:
McBorici, jacfcsoa, DeMareo & Feckeapough
Rowiaod W. Day H Eaq.
4041 MaeArthur Boclavard
Newport Beach, Cafifornai 92660
(7M)75MSB5
(714) 7574649 (frcaaub)
00

iftotheScBert^to:
Marataka, Inc.

1*20-13 d e h o r n K*t»Ku Osaka
Japan T550
with a copy to:

•24pai5^26J2AJQl^W2Grpurxiis>cr

Any party may by notice given ia accordance with this Sectioa to the other parties designate another
address or person for receipt of aotices hereunder.
12.4.
P.^r^ faftfflru;^ This Agreement (indadbg die Schrriiilra tad Exhibits) and
the collateral agreements exported in connection with the consummation of the transactions contemplated
hereby contain the entire agreement among the parties with respect to the purchase of the Purchased
Shares and supersedes all prior agreements, written or oral, with respect thereto.

PiMKlftT This Agreeznent may be amended, supersede, cancelled, renewed or eitcintorl, and the terms
hereof may be waived, but only by a written instrument signed by the Buyer and the Sellers or, in the
case of a waiver, by the party waiving corapfiance. No delay on the part of any party in mnrcisiag any
rigjbt, power or privilege hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any waiver on the part of
any party in of aay such right, power or privilege, nor any single or partial exercise of any such right,
power or privilege, preclude any farther exercise thereof or die exercise of any other such right, power
or privilege. The rights and remedies herein provided are cumulative and are not exclusive of aay rights
or rcottdies that any party may odasrwne leave at law or in equity. The rights and remedies of aay
party based upon, arising out of or otherwise m respect of any inaccuracy m or aay breach of aay
representation, warranty, covenant or agreement contained in this Agreement shall is ao way be limited
by die fact that the act, omission, occurrence or other state of facts upon itich any daim of any such
inaccuracy or breach is based may also be the subject matter of any other representation, warranty,
covenant or agreement contained in this Agreement (or in any other agreement between the parties) as
to which there is no inaccuracy or breach.
126. fr^OTTi Trf Notwithstanding the execution of this document in Japan, this
Agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with the internal laws of the Stale ol
Qstifcraia iachirtiag its laws governing conflicts of laws,
12.7.
ffflfffifffM T]wHBlBtt T** EagSsh version of due Agreement shall be the
operative and controlling donmrmt between ail parties, notwithstanding any translations ; the
documents and collateral agreements to the contrary.
12& ffff^nff IRftrffi Pft i ^ r i w f t This Agreement shall be binding upon and
iaare to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective successors and legal representatives. No
other person or entity shal be deemed to be a beneficiary, directly or indirectly oftinsAgreement
129.
YsriUftM T f^Timnf A l pronouns and any variations thereof refer to the
aasculue,feminineor neuter, smgabr or plural, aa dm contest may require.
1210. frfflntrftir*1- ?** Agreement may be executed by die parties hereto ia
separate counterparts, each of which when so executed and defeated shafl be an original, but all such
counterparts shal together constitute one and the same instrument Each counterpart may consist of a
number of copies hereof each signed by leas than al, hut together signed by all of the parties hereto
1211. Ejfcb&t The Exhibits and Schedules hereto are a part of this Afpcemeut as if
M y sat forth and incorporated herein. A l references herein to Sections, subsections, clause* Eadnbu
and Schedules shal be deemed references to such parts of this Agreement, unless the come* shal
otherwise require.
1212 flfaflm The headings in this Agreement are far reference only, and shall not
jflect the interpretation cf this Agreement
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m WITNESS WHEREOF, the partes have atoned, tfc* Agreeaeat on the dale fir* above
wnttea.
[corporate seal]

L A Entertainment, Inc.

Ml
SELLERS

Ml

By:.

By:.

By:.

By:.

MARUTAKACO^LTD.

By:

jh21322Q2fl00flQ»Vpurdiur

EXHIBIT 10.12

CQNSULIIKfi M f i m P I

ixl^THZS CONSULTING AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is sntsrad into this
P day of January, 1991 at Los Angolas, California, by and between
L A . Entertainment, a Nevada corporation "LAST" and DAVIS EHZ3R, an
individual, hereiiiaiTU* rafarrsd to as "Consultant" or "Enjer*.
WHEREAS, Lr.1T 1* actively engaged in the business of video
rentals and sales to the general public through outlets located
within markets, as veil as through free standing retain stores
vhich are typically leased to LAST;
WHEREAS, Consultant has a great deal of experience and i*
extremely knowledgeable in various real estate markets, real
property leasing, construction, financial and other business
setters; and
WHEREAS, Consultant currently also serves as ths sole directo,
of LAET and as such shall be held harmless of liability by LASS in
acting in such capacity or as a Consultant as described herein; ami
WHEREAS, LAET and Consultant agree that it would be desirou*
and advantageous to LAST to retain consultant on a monthly basis t.>
advise LAST in connection with its real estate opportunities
sales, and financing.
HOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises
covenants and agreements herein contained, and other good ar..i
valuable consideration, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.
Commencing January 1, 1991, LAST does hereby hire
Consultant as a Consultant to LAET and Consultant does here) ,
accept said employment.
2.
LAET shall pay Consultant the sum of $200.00 per month on
.he first day of each month, commencing December 1, 1991.
3. Consultant shall receive, at its choice, cash or LAET
common stock as a bonus in the following percentages for
transactions engaged by Consultant and closed by LAST in the
following "booked" asset amounts: 5% of the first $100 M^V.-n, A\
*f the next $100 Million, 3% of the next $100 Millior ?% of ths
next $100 Million, 1% of each $10r Million thereafter. LAET stock
shall be valued on the closing day or the prior business day.
4.
Consultant shall be available to LAST on an "as needed
basis" to review real property locations, sitss, leasee,
construction plans, if necessary, and the financial condition aru
business operations of LAET, including salss and projections.

3.
This Agraauant. nay be terminated by either party upon
thirty (30) days written not let to tha other at vhich time all
obligations hereunder shall ba brought up to data.
6.
It is specifically agreed, acknowledged and understood
that Consultant is nc£ an employee of LAST, but an indapandsnt.
contractor who is and will ba responsible for all taxes, of any
nature, arising our of or occurring in connection with any
compensation ^nn«uitant receives from LAST.
In this regard, Consultant does hereby indemnify and hold LAJ:i
harmless of and frca any and all tax liability of any kind, aria in i
out of or in connection with any compensation received b;
Consultant•
7,
LAST shall reimburse Conaultant for any and all •out-of
pocket" costs or expenses reasonably incurred by Consultant/Snter
in connection with M s duties as a consultant to or director ut
IAK.
Consultant agrees that during tha term of this Agreement
8
and for a period of six (6) months after termination of to] .
Agreement by either party and for any reason, Consultant shall n<
consult with or ba employed by any other corporation! partnershij
association or Individual engaged in the video sales and rent&i
business.
Further, for the term of this Agreement and for a period of
six (€) months after termination of this Agreement by each party
and for any reason, Consultant shall and will keep all information
learned from or through LAIT strictly confidential and shall not
disclose same to any third party without tha express consent of
LAIT.
9.
LAST holds Consultant harmless and not liable, and shall
indemnify Consultant, for any act or inaction of Consultant in
conducting his responsibilitlss hsreundar vhich causa Injury to
LAST, except acts or Inactions vhich are ultimately and finally
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction to constitute
wilful misconduct by Consultant.
19. IAET bolds Enaer harmless and not liable, and shall
indemnify Ensar, for any act or inaction of Snaer in carrying out
bis responsibilities as director of LAET vhich causes injury U
1AET except act or inactions vhich are finally aa^uv^cated by a
oourt of competent jurisdiction to constituts vllful misconduct b,
Inzer* This provision shall apply retroactively to tha date April
1, 1*90- the time truer first became a director or LAST.
11. No party hereto may assign its rights or obligation*
hsreunder (whether voluntarily, involuntarily , or by operation or
lav) vithout the prior written consent of the other party hereto.

12. This Agreeiaent is made pursuant to, will be conatru .d
under, and will be conclusively deemed for all purposes to ha a
been executed and delivered under the laws of the State ->r
California,
13. All notices or other communications to be given hereunder
shall be in writing and shall be deemed received when personal./
delivered by commercial courier or otherwise, or three (3) busin#?.s
days after deposit in the United States mail, registered *,r
certiriec, return receipt requested, addressed as follows:
If to LAET:
L.A. Entertainment
1875 Century Park East, #2679
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Attention: James S. Kolitz
If to Consultant:
DAVID ENZER
1875 Century Park East, #2679
Los Angeles, CA 90067
14. This Agreement may be executed in two or mot n
counterparts, each of which will be deemed an original and all ci
which together will constitute one instrument.
15. If any provision of this Agreement is held to be illegal ,
Invalid or unenforceable under present or future laws effecti^
during the term hereof, the legality, validity, and enforceabilit ,
of the remaining provisions of this Agreement shall not be affect. ,
thereby, and in lieu of such illegal, invalid, or unenforceable
provision, there shall be added automatically as a part of th, .
Agreement a provision as similar in terms to such illegal, invalid
or unenforceable provision as say be legal, valid, and enforceable.
16. This Agreement may be amended or modified only by i
written instrument executed by LAET and Consultant.
17. No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreeme:.
shall be valid and enforceable unless such waiver is in writing ai\ i
signed by the party to be charged, and, unless otherwise stats
therein, not such waiver shall constitute a waiver of any oth.-.i
provision thereof (whether or not similar) or continuing a waiver
18. The prevailing party m any legal proceeding based upc.
this Agreement shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys• fees an
court costs.
19. The
representations
herein or made
deemed material

parties
acknowledge
and
agree
that
aii
and warranties by the respective parties containeo
in writing pursuant to this Agreement shall be
and shall survive the execution and delivery or

this Agreement.

IH WITNESS WHEREOF, tha parties hereto have executed tn.s
Agreeaent as of the data first set forth abo^e.
DAVID INZER (

DAVID 2K22RV
L.A. ENTSRTAlllKEirr

7K0L1T2
102217
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1400,000.00
a n » la. i - i
to* fhtfJV M C C H V I O , the undersigned prnalaos to pay to Lesax Group,
Zae. at M B O I cilabaaaa load, Calabaeaa, California tl300 or such
ether placo designated thereby, by January 14, I M S , the principal
jam of Poor Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000*00), with interest
tram July if, litl at the rata of twelve par oast (12%) par
en taa unpaid balance until paid or until dafault, principal and
interest payabla in lavful sonay of taa United Itatas of haarloa.
If not aoeaar paid, taa antira raeaining JTVlahtodnoee plus iataraat
•nail be due and payable January IS, !St3. Unleee otherwiae
provided, thia Vota nay ba prepaid la full or in part at any tin*
without paaalty or preaiau. Taa iataraat on ths unpaid balance 1*
payable nonthly vita taa first payment being dua en august 14, Iff)
and continuing until all principal baa baan repaid.
Za taa avast of dafault in paynaat of any principal or iataraat
hereof as taa aaaa biursna dua and auch dafault is not curad within
tan (10) days aftar vrittan notioa to aakar, than in either sueh
•vast taa hollar nay without furthar notioo, daclara taa rasmindar
of taa principal sua, tngothoT with all iataraat accrued tharaon at
ansa dua and payabla. failure to aaarolso this option by
baaafleiary or holdar haraof ahall not constitute a waiver of taa
right to exercise taa aana at any othar time. Taa unpaid principal
of this iota and any part aaraof, aoeruad iataraat an all othar
sums dua undar this Xota shall baar iataraat at ths aexiaua legal
rate aftar dafault until paid. Za no event say iataraat acerua at
nora than taa maxiaua rata allovad by lav.
All partiaa to thia Vota, including aakar and any suratias,
andoraara, or guarantors haraby waive protost, praaantaant, notioa
•f diahonor, and notioa of aoealaration of aetarity and agree to
aoatinua to rasa In bound for taa payaaat of principal, iataraat and
all othar suaa dua undar thia Vota, notwithstanding any change o*
shantaa by way of release, surrender, exchange, modification or
substitution of any aeeurlty for th*s Vota or by way of any
•"tension or extensions of tins for ths payaaat of prinoipal and
iataraat; and all such partiaa waive all and ovary hind of notlca
of suoh change or ehangee and agree that taa saaa any .*»c aada
wltLout notlea or oonaant of any of than.
upon dafault taa holdar of this Vota any aaaloy attorneys to
enforce taa holdar 'a righta and taaadlas, and taa aakar, principal,
**raty, guarantor and andoraara of thia Vota haraby agree to pay to
the attorneys* fees plus all other
expenses incurred by the holde*
in exeroiaing any of taa bolder1 a rights and reaadJae upon default.

tta rlffeU tad raaadiaa of tha holdar aa provldad in thia Data
all aa evjnlatlva and any ba porauad alafly or acteoaaaivaly in
taa aala dlaaratiaa of tha holdar. tha failura to aaarolaa aay
aaaa riant or raaady ahall aet ba a valvar, or ralaaaad of anon
riaata ar raaadiaa or tha right to aaareiaa any of thorn at anothar
tiaa.
A l a fata ia to ba oovamad and conatzuad in aeeordanoa vith tha
lava af tna atata of California.
Shia nata ia a Maatar ffota and principal advaneaa will ba aado by
uaan araup, Inc.
from tiaa to tiaa op to tha aaalaaa of
MOO # 000.00. Tha intaraat duo will ba calculated upon only tha
aataal advaaoaa aada.
ar 'iMTaorif m o o r , aahar haa oauaad thia inatzunaat' to ba
aaaaotad ia ita corporata aaaa by ita board of Diraetora duly
fivan, an tha day and yaar firat abova vrittaa. tha undaraifnad
aaa raad and agraoa to tha t a n a of thia Vota and aoknovladgaa
raaaipt af a copy of aaaa.

t

EXHIBIT 24.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

L.A. Entertainment, Inc.
Los Angeles, California

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Prospectus
constituting a part of the Registration Statement nunbered 33-41205
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission en June 14, 1991, u
our report dated July 10! 1991, relating to the financial statements
and schedules of L.A. Entertainment, Inc., appearing in the Company*a
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended March 31, 1991•

?>vo
BDO SEIDKAN

Los Angeles, California
July 10, 1991

Tab 7

McKITTRICK, JACKSON, DeMARCO & PECKENPAUGH
A LAW CORPORATION
4041 MacArthur Boulevard, Fifth Floor
Post Office Box 2710
Newport Beach, California 92658-8995
(714) 752-8585

DATE:

August 2, 1991

TO:

Dan Lezak

FROM:

Jehu Hand

SUBJECT:

Schedule 13-D

EXWWT

LSI

rat iff

cox iHGSsmrr. «p, ess, R ^

ENCLOSED PLEASE FIND:

Enclosed please find the Schedule 13D for L.A.
Entertainment, Inc.. Please review and sign. Should you have
any questions, please contact Jehu Hand at (714) 851-7428.
Thank you.
]
X]

FOR YOUR FILES
FOR YOUR INFORMATION

]

AS REQUESTED

]

PLEASE COMMENT

X]
J

PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN
PLEASE TELEPHONE ME

( ] PLEASE ADVISE MB HOW TO REPLY
[ ] PLEASE HANDLE

mUBIBIT

/?/

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C.
SCHEDULE 13D
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Amendment No.
)*
L.A. Entertainment, Inc.
(Name of Issuer)
Common Stock
(Title of Class of Securities)
501699 10 2
(CUSIP Number)
Jehu Hand
McKittrick, Jackson, DeMarco & Peckenpaugh
4041 MacArthur Blvd., Newport Beach, California 92660
f714) 752-8585
(Name, Address, and Telephone Number of Person
Authorized to Receive Notice and Communications)
January 22, 1991
(Date of Event Which Requires Piling of this Statement)
If the filing person has previously filed a statement on Schedule 13G to report the acquisition which is the subject of this
Schedule 13D, and is filing this schedule because of Rule 13d1(b)(3) or (4), check the following box [ ].
Check the following box if a fee is being paid with the Statement [X]. ( A fee is not required only if the reporting person:
(1) has a previous statement of file reporting beneficial ownership of more than five percent of the class of securities described in Item 1; and (2) has filed no amendment subsequent
thereto reporting beneficial ownership of five percent of less
of such class.) (See Rule 13d-7).
Note; Six copies of this statement, including all exhibits,
should be filed with the Commission. See Rule 13d-l(a) for
other parties to whom copies are to be sent.
*The nasMiinder of this cover page shall be filled out for a reporting person's initial filing on this form with respect to the
subject class of securities, and for any subsequent amendment
containing information which would later disclosures provided in
a prior cover page.
The information required on the remainder of this cover page
shall not be deemed to be "filed- for the purpose of Section 18
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 C A c f ) or
therwise
subject to the liabilities of that section of the Act £ut shall
-1JhttS/2M»/00Q/050i/l34

LAET00813

CUSIP NO.

be subject to all other provisions of the Act (however, see
Notes).
I.

Names
of
Reporting
Persons
S.S.
Identification Nos. of above persons:

or

the

I.R.S.

Daniel Lezak
II.

Check the Appropriate Box if a Member of a Group
Instructions)

(See

A.
B.
III.

SEC Use Only

IV.

Source of Funds (See Instructions)

V.

Check if Disclosure of Legal Proceedings is Required
Pursuant to Items 2(d) or 2(e)

VI.

Citizenship or Place of Organization

Number of
Shares Beneficially
Owned by
Each Reporting Person
With

VII. Sole Voting Power
VIII.

PF

U.S.

1,450,000

Shared Voting Power

IX.

Sole Dispositive Power

X*

Shared Dispositive Power

800,000
1,450,000
800,000

XI.

Aggregate Amount Beneficially Owned by Each
Person
2,250,000

XII.

Check if the Aggregate Amount in Row (11) Excludes
Certain Shares (See Instructions)

XIII.

Percent of Class Represented

by

Reporting

Amount

in

Row

(11) J J
XIV. Type of Reporting Person (see Instructions)

IN

-2JH215/22632/00/0501/134

LAET00814

ITEM 1.

Security and Issuer.
Common Stock, $.001 par value, of L.A. Entertainment,
Inc., 401 E. Pine Street, Seattle, Washington 98122.

ITEM 2.

Identity and Background.
This statement is filed on behalf of:
(a)

Name:

Daniel Lezak

(b)

Business Address:

(c)

Present principal occupation or employment and
the name, principal address of any corporation or
other organization in which such employment is
conducted:

4743 Barcelona Court
Calabasa, California 91302

President, The Lezak Group, 4743 Barcelona Court,
Calabasa, California 91302

ITEM 3.

(d)

During the last five years, Daniel Lezak has not
been convicted in a criminal proceeding (excluding traffic violations or similar misdemeanors).

(e)

During the last five years, Daniel Lezak has not
been a party to a civil proceeding of a judicial
or administrative proceeding, the result of which
was to make him subject to a judgment, decree or
final order enjoining future violations of or
prohibiting or mandatory activities subject to,
federal or state securities laws or funding any
violations with respect to such laws.

Source and Amount of Funds or Other Consideration.
Daniel Lezak acquired 1,250,000 shares (which are
owned through CD Management, Inc.)
as
director
compensation on January 22, 1991. The Lezak Group,
Inc., a public corporation controlled by Mr. Lezak,
holds 800,000 shares and Mr. Lezak holds 200,000
shares in his own name. These shares were acquired
several years ago from personal funds.

ITEM 4.

Purpose of Transaction.
See Item 3.

ITEM 5,

The shares are held for investment.

Interest In Securities of the Issuer
Of the 40,050,000 shares of L.A. Entertainment, Inc.
Common Stock outstanding, Daniel Lezak has
sole
dispositive and voting power over 1,450,000 shares or
3.6% of the total outstanding shares, and shared
-3jh215/22632/0O/05Ol/13d
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dispositive and voting power over 2,250,000 shares, or
5.6%.
ITEM 6.

Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings or Relationships with Respect to Securities of the Issuer.
None.

ITEM 7.

Materials to be Filed as Exhibits.
None.
SIGNATURE

After reasonable inquiry and to the best of my knowledge and belief, I certify that the information set forth in
this statement is true, complete and correct.
Dated:

July

, 1991
Daniel Lezak

-4JH215/«632/00/0801/13d
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Tab 8

i^f\irTRICKt

JACKSON, DeMARCO & PECrvENPAUGl
A LAW C O M P O I U T I O N
40<M M«CA«TMgN tOUlCVAftO

•OST o r n c c l o i t?to
MCWfCKT 9CACM. CAUrOMMIA • * « • « - « • • •
M

-—

<7Mk) 7 1 l - « | | l

August 26, 1991

I •

C'MMi

w i r c w e««ccT ouu. i

(714) 851-7428
22632

7IA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Filing Daak
Sacuritiaa and Kxchanga Commission
450 Fifth Straat, M.W.
Waahington, D.C. 20S49

Rat ii,At Bnttrmniwn^r lasL,
Daar Six/Madam*
Bncloaad ara Forma 3 and 4 for David Bnsar and a
Form 3 for Bolmby Capital Partnars, L.V., including ona manually
signad and two conformad copiaa of aach.
So that ua may know that you hava racaivad tha
ancloaad, plaaaa data atamp tha ancloaad copy of thia lattar and
raturn it to ua in tha ancloaad salf~addraaaad, atampad
anvalopa*

JHi jab
Bncloauraa

i
EWWT
RMMMff.ir.eM.VR

1 t-UHI\ff 4
O

Washinflon, D.C. 20549

STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP

Ctwc* tfcfa t»«ft*« • I f f e r
w t l t r t i« StcUaa I * * • « • • 4
or form 5 • M f f t o w t may

Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1994. Section 17(a) of the Public Utility
Holdini Company Act of 1999 or Section 90(0 of the Investment Company Act of 1940

rtMVftufJf. SfV IfMlrVffMM I(%T-

1 1 Name and Address of Reporting Person
J
[

Enzer

David

<IJ"0
1875

L.A.

(first)
Century

|

Park

(Middle)

Entertainment,

Angeles,

East

(City)

California
(Stale)

Y

s

>l

Inc.

LAET

9. IRS w Social Security 4. Statement for
Month/Year
Person (Voluntary)
January 1991

(Street)
Los

1

1 2. Issuer Name and Ticker or Trading s

1
6. Relationship of Reporting Person to Issuer
(Check all applicable)
XXJL. Director
_XXJt 10% Owner 1
Other (specify 1
Officer (give
below)
1
title
ociowy

9. If Amendment,
Date of Original
:
(Month/Year)

90067
(Zip)

I 1. Title of Security
(Instr. 3)

4. Securities AcQuired (A)
9. Traritactkm
or Disposed of (D)
Code
(Instr. 9, 4 and 5)
(Instr. 1)

2. Tramaction
Date

(Month/
Day/
Year) Code

1 Common

1/22/9

V

1

Amount

3,500,000

P

1(A) or
(D)

A

7. Nature
6. Owner*
i 9. Amount of
of In•hip
1
Securities
oireci
Form:
Beneficially
Dene*
Direct
Owned at
flrial
End of
Ownern^ontn
Indirect
<lmtr. J and 4}
(Instr. 4)
(i>
(Inttr. 4)

Pt".'

Price

1.03

3,500,000
16,450,000

i
1
1
j

D
I

rrealdent
pt General]
p a r t n e r of]
Holaby
Capital
1
Partnera, 1
L.P.

1

1III i~1 1
•

•

J

.

.,•

•

I.

Reminder. Rrpoii on a Mpm.-iic line for caih class of securities beneficially owned directly or indirectly.
(Prinl or Type Responses)

(Over)
SEC 1474 IV9I)

1AET00650

, r . . v < . * , «» v«« v«.-i-trvr 9VXWfllieSF

jlliOr
/

1 2. Conversion or
F set rise
Price of
Derivative
Security

of (Vrivaiivf Security

(Imtr 1)

I J. Trim [4 Transac- 1 5. Number of Derivtkm Codf I
ative Securities AcI
action
quired (A) or Div
1 Date
(Imtr. 8) I
poted of (D)
1 (Month/
(Imtr 3. 4. and 3)
Diy/
Year)

Code

I

1
L
r
I iptanafion of Responses:

V

<A>

(0)

16. Date FuercisaMe and F i
piration Date
(Month/Day/
Year)

Date
E«erctsawe

Expira
tkm
Date

10. Owner 1 I I .
18. Price ^. Number
of DerivsNp
of
ative
Form
DerivSecurof De
1 ative
ities
rivative
SecurBene*
Secuity
totally
rity:
(Imtr
Owned
Direct
31
at End
1 (D)or
of
Indi
Month
Amount or
recKU
riurnoer 0*
(Imtr 4)
(Imtr. 4)
Shares

1 7. Tale and Amount of Underlying Securities
(Imtr. 3 »nd 4)

Title

1
1
1

1

(Imtr. 4)

-—

1

^mmmmmmmmmmmmmmi

Inf David Enter
* Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal VI
W l« U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
^nie:

Nature
of In
direct
Bene
Ticial
Ownership

•Signature of Reporting Person

June 26,

mi

Date

File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed.
If space provided is insufficient* see Instruction 6 for procedure.
SEC 1474

Page 2
0/9U
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1 FORM 3

Washington, D.C. 2054*

t2SMI04
1, tat*
EaHmalad auaraaja burdan

INITIAL STATEMENT OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF SECURITIES
Filed pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 17(a) of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 or Section 30(0 of the Investment Company Act of 1940

Enzer
(Last)

1

1 2. Date of Brent Remurine Statement
(Month/Day/Year)

David
(Firsi)

1875 C e n t u r y P a r k

{Middle)

East

(Street)

f

Los A n g e l e s ,
(City)

California
(State)

4. Issuer Name and Tkfcn or Trading Symbol

L.A.

Entertainment,

Inc.

LAET

•• If Amendment, Dote of
A u g u s t 1 , 1 9 9 0 5. Reletionthip of Reporting Person to liauer
OritmaJ
(Checu all 8f>c4lcnble)
3. IRS or Soda! Se(Month/Day/Year)
J ! ^ Director
X X X _ 10% Owner
curity Number of
Officer ( j h *
r Nner (specify j
below) !
(Voluntary)
tHk below)

1
1

90067
WP)

T•aajBf
^^U a
M a ^ j ^ i ^ i M anjeujianje
aw^aaaw a
^ i y b VWVJM
n > ^
i — r^aai^aajffajBjfv
an?enjfifsnaR/
3. OwtssfsMa)
FonsK Dvejct

1 2* Aaaount or Securities
(Instr. 4)
(Imtr. 4)

Common S t o c k

1

16,450,000

|

(D) o? Indued
(1) (bMr. 5)

I

1I

4. Nature of Ittdwect BeneftcieJ Ownership
(Imtr. 5)

P r e s i d e n t o f T r a n s Pac
j Corporation, General
j P a r t n e r o f Holmby
j Partners, L.P.
direct

NMMMMMaMi^aMrtM^I

h iHi.11111

mi

i

]

Capitalj

which i s

holder

i

i j

r

•••i

- . - -

UJtobi

1

Reminder: Report on a separate line for each class of securities beneficially owned directly w indirectly.
(Print or Type Responses)

|

1

1

(Over)
SEC 1473(3/91)

LAET00652

fl
/

I n t r o ! i>ff»vaiivf SfiiMify
Jfn<fr 4)

1 2 Date F Her- 1 3. Title and Amount of Securities Underlying 4.
itable and 1
Derivative Security
1
Expintion
1 (Insfr. 4)
Date
tMonth/Day/
Year)

uii

"planation of Responses-

Expiration
Date

Title

Amount
or
Number
of
Shares

Conversion or
Eaercisc
Price of
Derivative
Security

5. Owner- 6. Nature of Indirect
Beneficial Ownership
ship
Form of
tlnstr. 5)
Derivative
Security:
Direct
<D|or
Indirect
1

1
1

W

(Instr. 5)

1

In I David Enzer
Intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations.
V r I R U S C 1001 and 15 U S C. 7*.ff(a).

••Signature of Reporting Person

J u n e 26, 1991
Date

»te: Tile three copies of this Form, on^ of which must be manually signed. If space provided Is Insufficient,
Ser Instruction 6 for procedure.
Page 2
SEC 1473 (.1/91)
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1J.S, S E C U R I T I E S A N D E X C H A N G E C O M M I S S I O N
Washington. D . C . 20549

FORM 3

INITIAL STATEMENT OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF SECURITIES

OMB APPROVAL
32354104
Exp***:
February 1. 1994
lEeHmated ataieoe burden
. . . 0.8

Filed pursuant to Section 16(e) of the Securities Exchange A d of 1934, Sedlon 17(a) of the Public Utility
Holding Company A d of 1935 or Sedlon 30(0 of the Investment Company A d of 1940
2. Date of Event Requiring Statement
(Month/Day/Year)

( 1. Name and Address of Reporting Person
1

Bolsaby C a p i t a l
(Last)

Partners,

L.P.

(First)

(Middle)

J 1875 C e n t u r y Park East
(Stred)

j Los Angeles, C a l i f o r n i a
(City)

(State)

4. Issuer Name and Tkker or Trading Symbol

L.A. Entertainment, I n c .

* . If Amendment, Date of
1 , 1 9 9 0 3~ Relationship of Reponlwgjherfos to Issuer
Original
(Check all applicable)
I
(Month/Day/Year)
3. IRS or Sodal Se- 1
Dkedor
* * * _ W H% Owner
ciarlty Number of
Nher
(specify
Reporting Person
.
illitcer tgnre
.
^
below) !
(Voluntary)
tHIe below)

August

90067
<Z*P)

TaUt 1 -

Nas Pasltaim fcesHigg liaiRilaRj Owstd
i •

1. Title of Security
(Instr. 4)

I

seseflclally Owned
(InMr. 4)

^ . . —>-•—

1 J , l/waafsjpjp

Form: M e d
(D) or Indwcd
(1) (Instr. 3)

1
Common

Stock

LAET

16,450,000

14. Nature of Indited Beneficial Ownership
(Instr. 3)

P

1
1

• ! . . . r-.„

- r . „ . . . _ : . : . „ ».«.«fT«.l«lf«* #%,««>«»#f ##!»*«-•••• r*

ImlJeivilw

ii
•

•

•

•

t

1

(Over)

LAET00654

I O H M J 'continued)
1f

liiIf of Derivative Security
(hutr 4)

Table I I — Derivative Securities Beneficially Owned (e.f., put*, calls, warrants, options, convertible securities)
1 2. Date E*cr- j 3. Title and Amount of Securities Underlying
Derivative Security
1 cisable and 1
1
Expiration
(Inslr. 4)
Date
(Month/Day/
Year)

Hi

planation o f Responses:

Expiration
Dale

Tkle

Amount
or
Number
of
Shares

I 4. Conversion or
Exercise
Price of
Derivative
Security

5. Owner- 6. Nature of Indirect
Beneficial Ownership
ship
Form of
(Instr. 5)
Derivative
Security:
Direct
<D)or
Indirect
(0
(Instr. 5)

1
HOLH0Y CAPITAL FMnORS, L . P .
BT: Trans m c OQRF0MTI0N, i t s General partner
/&/

intentional misstatements or omissions of facts constitute Federal Criminal Violations.
5<T 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 7«ff<a).

D a v i d Enzer* president J u n e 2 6 ,
'Signature of Reporting Person

1991

Date

te: File three copies of this Form, one of which must be manually signed. If space provided h Insufficient,
See Instruction 6 for procedure.
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BAKKE v. BUCK

Wash. 575

Cite as, WisluApp^ 587 P.2d 575

would be so unusual and so unlikely that
we would require it to be spelled out with Marian P. BAKKE and John L Bakke,
particularity. Typically the loan proceeds
Co-Executors of the Estate of Herbert
are to be used for purposes which will
Noel Bakke, Deceased, Appellants,
promote the mutual enterprise and which
will either enhance the vendor's equity in
case he must foreclose his lien, or will Parker J. BUCK and Helen D. Buck, his
provide funds from which he will be paid.
wife, Respondents and
A subordination agreement should be
Cross-Appellants,
construed, unless it expressly provides
otherwise, as permitting the loan proceeds to be used only for such purposes. William E. Sander and Marie Sander, his
wife, Lawrence Warehouse Company, a
(Footnotes omitted.) Accord, Pollock v. 17California Corporation, Crow Roofing
anoy 253 Cal.App.2d 183, 61 Cal.Rptr. 235,
and
Sheet Metal, Inc., a Washington
238 (1967); Ruth v. Lytton Savings & Loan
Corporation, Franklin Savings and Loan
Ass'n, 266 Cal.App.2d 831, 72 Cal.Rptr. 521,
Association, a Washington Corporation,
527-28 (1968).
and Washington Mutual Savings Bank,
[10,11] In view of the facts found, and
a
Washington Corporation, Defendants.
the wording of the subordination agreement and the financing documents connectNo. 3401-IL
ed therewith, we cannot say that the trial
court erred in construing the agreements as
Court of Appeals of Washington,
it did. Nor was the alternative judgment
Division 2.
otherwise erroneous. An action for specific
performance of a contract, such as the case
Nov. 7, 1978.
before us, is an equitable proceeding and
Reconsideration Denied Dec. 4,1978.
when the equitable jurisdiction of the court
is invoked by the parties, whatever relief
Estate of decedent creditor brought acthe facts warrant will be granted. Kreger
tion against debtors on promissory note,
v. Hall 70 Wash.2d 1002, 1007-08, 425 P.2d
and debtors counterclaimed under usury
638 (1967).
statute seeking penalties and attorney fees.
[12] The developers' assignments of er- The Superior Court, King County, No.
ror addressed to the trial court's award of 798941, W. R. Cole, J., granted summary
attorneys' fees to the owners is unaccompa- judgment in favor of debtors for usury
nied by citation of authority and does not penalties and attorney fees, and estate apappear on its face to be meritorious. It is
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Pearson, C.
therefore denied. State v. Young, 89
J., held that: (1) original note which was
Wash.2d 613, 625, 574 P.2d 1171 (1978);
Krause v. Mcintosh, 17 Wash.App. 297, 303, not usurious and extension agreement
562 P.2d 662 (1977). The owners' request which was usurious were subject to usury
for attorneys' fees on appeal does not com- penalty in that two agreements could not
ply with RAP 18.1(c), therefore, it, too, is be separated; (2) notwithstanding debtors'
failure to file claim against creditor's esdenied.
tate, debtors could use usury penalties they
Affirmed.
were awarded as setoff against claim of
McINTURFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., con- estate on promissory note; (3) where all
claims of estate on promissory note were
cur.
extinguished by setoff of usury penalties in
favor of debtors, excess judgment in favor
( O in
^ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^
of debtors was claim against general assets
of estate, and thus was barred by failure to
file claim against estate; (4) where defense
2

I—Kl II fill I ,l^(

\f
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Wash.

587 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

by debtors established usurious nature of
debt and extinguished such debt by means
of setoff, debtors were entitled to award of
attorney fees pursuant to statute governing
such awards where debtor establishes usurious nature of debt, and (5) where it was not
clear whether attorney fees awarded to
debtors were for defense of action on promissory note only, remand was necessary to
determine amount of attorney fees to be
awarded to debtors for trial court defense.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded.
1. Contracts <*=> 245(3)
Void contract cannot legally modify or
extinguish earlier valid contract, thus original agreement remains in effect and can be
sued upon.
2. Usury <*=»137
Original promissory note which was not
usurious and extension agreement which
was usurious were subject to usury penalty
in that two agreements could not be separated. RCWA 19.52.030.
3. Executors and Administrators to 231,
434(5)
Failure to file creditor's claim does not
preclude using claim as setoff against demand made by estate of decedent; however, effect of such claim is limited to extinguishment of the debt setoff.
4. Executors and Administrators «=>434(5)
Notwithstanding failure to file claim
against estate of decedent, debtors could
setoff usury penalties they were awarded
against claim of estate on promissory note
and extension agreement found to be usurious.
5. Executors and Administrators <*=»231
Where all claims of estate of decedent
creditor on promissory note and extension
agreement transaction were extinguished
by setoff in favor of debtors for usury
penalties awarded to them, excess judgment in favor of debtors was claim against
genera] assets of estate as opposed to setoff
against specific obligation, and thus such
excess judgment was barred by failure to

file timely claim against estate of decedent.
RCWA 11.40.010, 11.40.080.
6. Executors and Administrators <s=>231
Relief in excess of amount of setoff in
favor of debtors needed to extinguish claim
by estate of decedent creditor remained
subject to requirement of statutes governing claims against decedent's estates which
are in essence statutes of limitations which
mandate that if claim is not timely filed,
claim against estate is barred. RCWA 11.40.010, 11.40.080.
7. Usury <*=>125
Notwithstanding that because of failure to file creditor's claim, no affirmative
relief in favor of debtors on promissory
note was obtained against estate of decedent creditor, defense in action by estate on
promissory note resulted in establishment
of usurious nature of debt sued on by estate
and extinguishment of such debt by means
of setoff in favor of debtors, and thus debtors were entitled to recover cost and reasonable attorney fees occurred in defense of
action on promissory note under statute
providing that debtor who establishes that
obligation is usurious shall be entitled to
costs and reasonable attorney fees. RCWA
19.52.030.
8. Appeal and Error «=» 1106(4)
Where it was not clear in action by
estate of decedent creditor against debtors
whether attorney fees awarded to debtors
who established that promissory note and
extension agreement were usurious were
awarded only for defense of action on
promissory note or whether court also
awarded attorney fees for other legal work
associated with claims of estate against
debtors, remand was required for determination of amount of attorney fees to be
awarded to debtors for trial court defense
of claim on promissory note and extension
agreement.
9. Bills and Notes «=>126
Where promissory note and extension
agreement sued upon by estate of decedent
creditor were found to be usurious, and
usury penalties awarded to debtors extin-
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guished obligation on note and agreement
by setoff, there was no recovery of underlying obligation, and thus estate was not entitled to payment of reasonable attorney fees
from debtors, notwithstanding that note
provided for payment of such fees incurred
in connection with collection of note.
J. Vernon Williams, Seattle, for appellants.
Joseph C. Finley, Seattle, for respondents
and cross-appellants.
PEARSON, Chief Judge.
The estate of Herbert Bakke appeals
from a summary judgment in favor of the
Bucks for $26,122.89 in usury penalties and
$5,000 attorney's fees against the estate.
We reverse in part and affirm in part.
During the period from 1966 to 1973,
Herbert Bakke loaned the Bucks $109,000.
The Bucks signed promissory notes of $35,000, $25,000, $24,000, and $25,000. Shortly
before Bakke's death in 1975, the Bucks still
owed approximately $92,000 on the notes
and had defaulted on their payments. The
personal representatives of Bakke's estate
elected to accelerate the debt and sued to
collect. They obtained summary judgments
on the second, third, and fourth notes. The
validity of those judgments has not been
challenged. Rather, the issues in this appeal concern the status of the first note
(Note I).
Note I was originally due in 1968, but had
been extended three times, the last extension continuing until 1982. The estate
claimed that the Bucks owed $26,128.85,
plus 12 percent interest and $2,000 attorney's fees on this note. The Bucks counterclaimed under the usury statute for more
than $52,000 in penalties and $5,000 attorney's fees. See RCW 19.52.030. The Bucks
contended that Note I was usurious because
they had paid $2,500 for the first extension
agreement on the note, in addition to the
note's interest rate of 12 percent, which is
the legal maximum. See RCW 19.52.020.
The estate conceded that the extension
agreement was usurious, but argued that
587 P2&-13

Note I was not tainted by usury because
the extension agreement was separate from
the note. The trial court found that Note I
and the extension agreement were a single
contract, tainted by usury, and granted the
Bucks' counterclaim for setoff of the usury
penalties against the entire amount due on
Note I, plus an excess judgment of $26,122.89, and attorney's fees.
On appeal, Bakke's estate raises two issues: (1) whether a suit brought on a promissory note which was not itself usurious,
but was later extended by a usurious agreement, is subject to a counterclaim for usury
on the entire note; and (2) whether an
excess judgment may be had on a counterclaim for usury against an estate when a
creditor's claim was not timely filed.
Repeating the argument made at trial,
the estate contends that the usurious forbearance agreement is a separate agreement. Thus, it argues that suit can be had
on the original debt, thereby avoiding application of the usury statute. In support of
its argument, the estate relies on the general rule that a contract originally valid is not
affected by a subsequent usurious transaction. This rule has been noted, in dictum,
in Weitzman v. Bergstrom, 75 Wash.2d 693,
453 P.2d 860 (1969), Baske v. Russell, 67
Wash.2d 268, 407 P.2d 434 (1965), and Hafer
v. Spaeth, 22 Wash.2d 378, 156 P.2d 408
(1945). We are convinced, however, that
the general rule is not appropriate in Washington.
[1] A close reading of the cases from
jurisdictions which support the general rule
shows that they depend for their rationale
on statutes that make usurious contracts
void. See, e. g, In re Spiro's Will, 280
App.Div. 982, 116 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1952). A
void contract cannot legally modify or extinguish an earlier valid contract, thus the
original agreement remains in effect and
can be sued upon. See, e. g, 45 Am.Jur.2d
Interest & Usury § 247 (1969) ("An obligation that is not usurious in its inception will
not be vitiated by a subsequent usurious
transaction with respect thereto, for the
subsequent transaction, being entirely void,
cannot extinguish or affect the original val-
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id contract." Footnotes omitted.); 91 C.J.S.
Usury § 62a (1956) ("When the statute
renders the usurious renewal void, action
may be brought on the original valid obligation, which is not extinguished
Footnote omitted.)
[2] RCW 19.52.030 does not void usurious contracts, or even make them voidable.
Instead, it subjects the creditor to certain
penalties should he attempt to enforce the
contract. As a result, courts examining
modern statutes such as Washington's no
longer separate a usurious extension agreement from the original note. The entire
transaction is considered one contract and is
usurious. Maze v. Sycamore Homes, Inc.,
230 Cal.App.2d 746, 41 Cal.Rptr. 338, 16
A.L.R.3d 464 (1964). In applying this rule
to the case before us, we agree with the
trial court's conclusion that Note I, original
debt and extension, is subject to the usury
penalty and that the two agreements cannot be separated. We do not undermine
the reasoning or results in Weitzman,
Baske, and Hafer, supra. Although the
court in those cases stated that the original
debt could be separated from a subsequent
usurious transaction on the same debt, this
statement was dictum and not part of the
holding, since in each case the suit was on
the second agreement.
Having determined that the trial court
was correct in deciding that the entire Note
I transaction was infected by usury, the
question becomes: What, if any, affirmative relief are respondents entitled to receive because of this usury? Respondents,
as noted above, failed to file any timely
creditor's claim in the estate. As we will
discuss below, this failure to file a creditor's
claim requires reversal of part, but not all,
of the judgment appealed from.

lants in the Note I transaction. It has, of
course, long been the rule that the failure
to file a creditor's claim does not preclude
using the claim as a setoff against a demand made by the estate. The effect of
such a claim is limited, however, to extinguishment of the debt setoff. Peoples National Bank v. National Bank of Commerce,
69 Wash.2d 682, 420 P.2d 208 (1966). This
rule is the same as that which has long been
applied in cases of the defensive use of
claims otherwise barred by the statute of
limitations. E. g, Ennis v. Ring, 56
Wash.2d 465, 341 P.2d 885 (1959).
[4] Applying this rule to the present
case means that, without regard to the failure to file a creditor's claim, the respondents may set off the usury penalties they
were awarded against the claims of the
estate on the Note I transaction. To the
degree that the respondents' judgment constitutes a setoff against a debt owed to the
estate, it must thus be affirmed.
[5] We now move to consideration of
the $26,122.89 excess judgment awarded to
respondents and the attorney's fees awarded to respondents as a result of usury by
the appellant in the Note I transaction.
Unlike the sums discussed above, this portion of the judgment does not constitute a
setoff against a claim made by the estate
on the usurious transaction. Note I was
the only transaction between the parties
which was infected by usury. All claims of
the estate in that transaction have already
been extinguished by the setoff of usury
penalties against them. The excess judgment is thus a claim against the general
assets of the estate as opposed to a setoff
against a specific obligation.

[3] We will first discuss that portion of
tne judgment which can be used as setoff
against respondents' obligation to appel-

[6] Since the excess judgment is a claim
against the general assets of the estate, and
since no timely creditor's claim was filed by
respondents, the excess judgment runs
afoul of the provisions of Ch. 11.40 RCW.1
An exception to the working of the credi-

1. In particular, we are discussing RCW 11.40.010 and RCW 11.40.080. These statutes read:
"Every personal representative shall, immediately after his appointment, cause to be published in a legal newspaper published in the
county in which the estate is being admsnis-

tered, a notice that he has been appointed and
has qualified as such personal representauve,
and therewith a notice to the creditors of the
deceased, requiring all persons having claims
against the deceased to serve the same on the
personal representative or his attorney of rec-

BAKKE v. BUCK
Cite as, Wash.App., 587 P.2d 575
tor's claim statute has been carved out in
those cases involving setoff, but this exception is limited to extinguishment of the
estate's claim. Peoples National Bank v.
National Bank of Commerce, supra. Relief
in excess of the amount of setoff needed to
extinguish the estate's claim remains subject to the requirements of the creditor's
claim statutes. Those statutes are, in essence, statutes of limitation. In re Estate
of Wilson, 8 Wash.App. 519, 507 P.2d 902
(1973). They mandate that if a creditor's
claim is not timely filed, the claim against
the estate is barred. RCW 11.40.010; Ruth
v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660, 453 P.2d 631
(1969). Because no timely creditor's claim
was filed in this case, the excess judgment
entered against the estate for $26,122.89
must be reversed since it is barred by Ch.
11.40 RCW.
[7,8] The matter of the attorney fees
awarded to respondents requires some furord, and file an executed copy thereof with the
clerk of the court, within four months after the
date of the first publication of such notice or
within four months after the date of the filing
of the copy of said notice to creditors with the
clerk of the court, whichever is the later Such
notice shall be published once in each week for
three successive weeks and a copy of said notice shall be filed with the clerk of the court. If
a claim be not filed within the time aforesaid, it
shall be barred, except under those provisions
included in RCW 11 40 011 Proof by affidavit
of the publication of such notice shall be filed
with the court by the personal representative.
In cases where all the property is awarded to
the widow, husband, or children as m this title
provided, the notice to creditors herein provided for may be omitted" (RCW 1140.010)
"No holder of any claim against a decedent
shall maintain an action thereon, unless the
claim shall have been first presented as herein
provided." (RCW 11 40 080)
2. RCW 19 52.030 provides:
"(1) If a greater rate of interest than is allowed by statute shall be contracted for or
received or reserved, the contract shall be usurious, but shall not, therefore, be void. If m
any action on such contract proof be made that
greater rate of interest has been directly or
indirectly contracted for or taken or reserved,
the creditor shall only be entitled to the principal, less the amount of interest accruing thereon at the rate contracted for; and if interest
shall have been paid, the creditor shall only be
entitled to the principal less twice the amount
of the interest paid, and less the amount of all
accrued and unpaid interest; and the debtor
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ther discussion since it, unlike the excess
judgment, is not barred by RCW 11.40.010
and 11.40.080. Under RCW 19.52.030,2 the
debtor is entitled to recover penalties and,
additionally, is entitled to recover costs and
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defense of a claim on a usurious transaction.
In the present case, the respondents were
put to the cost of defending against a claim
on a usurious note. Though, because of the
failure to file a creditor's claim, no affirmative relief against the creditor was obtained, this defense did result in establishment
of the usurious nature of the debt sued on
and the extinguishment of that debt by
means of a setoff. In such a circumstance,
respondents should recover their costs and
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defense of the Note I obligation only. It is
not clear from the record whether the attorney's fees awarded by the trial court
were only for the defense of the Note I
shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees plus the amount by which the
amount he has paid under the contract exceeds
the amount to which the creditor is entitled:
Provided, That the debtor may not commence
an action on the contract to apply the provisions of this section if a loan or forbearance is
made to a corporation engaged in a trade or
business for the purposes of carrying on said
trade or business unless there is also, in connection with such loan or forbearance, the creation of liability on the part of a natural person
or his property for an amount in excess of the
principal plus interest allowed pursuant to
RCW 19 52 020. The reduction in principal
shall be applied to diminish pro rata each future installment of principal payable under the
terms of the contract.
"(2) The acts and dealings of an agent in
loaning money shall bind the principal, and in
all cases where there is usunous interest contracted for by the transaction of any agent the
principal shall be held thereby to the same
extent as though he had acted in person. And
where the same person acts as agent of the
borrower and lender, he shall be deemed the
agent of the lender for the purposes of this act.
If the agent of both the borrower and lender, or
of the lender only, transacts a usurious loan for
a commission or fee, such agent shall be liable
to his pnncipal for the amount of the commission or fee received or reserved by the agent,
and liable to the lender for the loss suffered by
the lender as a result of the application of this
act." (Footnotes omitted.)
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case, or whether the trial court also awarded reasonable attorney's fees for other legal
work associated with the related claims of
appellants against respondents. It is,
therefore, necessary to remand this matter
solely for a determination of the amount of
attorney's fees to be awarded to respondents for the trial court defense of the Note
I claim. Respondents shall not be entitled
to reasonable attorney's fees on appeal.
[9] Appellants also point out that the
note they sued upon provided for payment
of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in
connection with collection of it. They thus
ask this court to fix reasonable attorney's
fees for the Note I collection. Appellants
are not entitled to this relief. While the
estate has achieved a partial reversal of the
affirmative relief entered against it, it has
not achieved any recovery on the underlying obligation. Quite the contrary, only the
working of the bar of the creditor's claim
statute saved appellants from having affirmative relief entered against them. In
these circumstances, attorney's fees will not
be awarded to appellants. Appellants shall,
however, be entitled to their costs on appeal, including statutory attorney's fees.
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part
and remanded for further proceedings, in
accordance with this opinion, in the matter
of attorney's fees for respondents.
PETRIE and SOULE, JJ., concur.
-/w\
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STATE of Washington, Respondent,
v.
Claudia M. BQJNNER, Appellant
No/2572-II.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 2.
Nov. 8, 1978.
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Thurston County, Frank E. Baker,

J., of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver and unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, and
he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Dore,
J., held that: (1) trial court did not err in
failing to grant defendant's motion for
change of venue based on claimed prejudicial pretrial publicity; (2) defendant was
not denied fair trial because she was handcuffed in hallway outside courtroom; (3)
trial court did not err in admitting testimony of police officer outlining history of drug
problem and drug enforcement in county;
(4) trial court properly found that informant was not an "absent witness," and (5)
trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to consecutive rather than concurrent
terms of imprisonment.
Affirmed.
1. Constitutional Law <s=>259
Due process requires a change of venue
when probability of prejudice is shown; actual prejudice is not required. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amends. 5,14.
2. Criminal Law *=>1150
Trial court's decision upon a motion for
change of venue will only be disturbed on a
showing of an abuse of discretion.
3. Criminal Law <*=* 1166(4)
Defendant could not complaint she was
prejudiced by pretrial publicity where she
could have removed two jurors who admitting reading articles about trial with use of
peremptory challenges, but did not.
4. Criminal Law <*=»121
Trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in denying defendant's motion for change
of venue, based on claimed prejudicial pretrial publicity.
5. Attorney and Client <*=>32
Deputy prosecutor did not deliberately
violate Canons of Legal Ethics by commenting on case to reporter where he apparently
thought he was speaking to reporter off the
record. CPR DR7-107(BX6).
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(1) A person is guilty of bigamy when,
Rowing he has a husband or wife or
Rowing the other person has a husband
o r wife, he purports to marry another
person or cohabits with another person.
(2) Bigamy is a felony of the third
degree.
Utah's constitution also prohibits plural
marriages. Article III provides:
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United
States and the people of this State:
First:—Perfect toleration of religious
sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant
of this State shall ever be molested in
person or property on account of his or
her mode of religious worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever
prohibited.
Petitioner Vaughn Fischer was already
married to the other petitioner, Sharane
Fischer, when he purported to marry Katrina Stubbs. The three of them live in the
same household together with children of
Mr. Fischer born by both Sharane and Katrina. If the adoption were granted, the
six Thornton children would be permanently added to this family, where on a daily
basis they would be exposed to the teachings and practice of plural marriage. It
would be difficult to conceive of a factor
which works more against the "interests of
the child[ren]" than ongoing criminal conduct by the adoptive parents in the home
where the children are being nurtured and
raised. I cannot conceive of any factor or
combination of factors favorable to an
adoption or qualities which proposed adopting parents could offer which would outweigh the detrimental effect of felonious
conduct engaged in by them. Teaching
and demonstrating to children on a daily
basis that the statute proscribing bigamy
may be ignored and flaunted may well
breed in the children a disrespect for observance of other laws. Since the children
will probably spend their lives in this nation
where the voluntary observance of all laws
by its citizens is necessary, these six children may never be taught that valuable
lesson of citizenship. The state in its role

as parens patriae of the children owes a
high duty to them in approving whoever
shall adopt them. In re Simaner's Petition, 15 I11.2d 568, 155 N.E.2d 555 (1959);
Eggleston v. Landrum, 210 Miss. 645, 50
So.2d 364 (1951). That duty would not be
met in granting the privilege to adopt to
the petitioners, who live on a daily basis
outside the law.
The majority now orders an evidentiary
hearing which will be fruitless because the
trial judge has already made an assumption
which is as favorable to the petitioners as
can be had. The fact remains, and they
have not attempted to deny it, that polygamy is taught and practiced in the home in
which these children will be raised. That
fact will not change on remand. We have
previously held in Wilson v. Family Services Division, 572 P.2d 682 (Utah 1977),
that we will not interfere with a trial
court's judgment in an adoption unless the
action was clearly arbitrary or capricious
or was not based on the evidence. No such
showing has been made. I would affirm
the dismissal.
HALL, C.J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of HOWE, A.CJ.
FttTfttYNUHBE* SYSTEM!

Arvin L. BELLON, Maurine G. Bellon, B.
Curtis Dastrup, Lanis B. Dastrup, and
A. Labrum & Sons, Inc., Plaintiffs and
Appellees,
v.
Marvel L. MALNAR, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 880226.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 29, 1991.
Assignees of defaulting vendee sued
vendor for restitution of payments made
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prior to default and forfeiture. The Eighth
District Court, Duchesne County, Boyd
Bunnell, J., awarded judgment against vendor and in favor of assignees in amount of
$71,173.33. Vendor appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held
that: (1) vendor was entitled to proceeds
from condemnation award as payment of
damages to lands he repossessed inasmuch
as vendee's equitable title was forfeited
before award was made; (2) assignees
were not entitled to appreciated value of
property on which vendee defaulted; (3)
vendor was not entitled to loss of bargain
damages when property had appreciated in
value; (4) court would not enforce forfeiture clause inasmuch as enforcement
would allow unconscionable recovery to
vendor; and (5) assignees were not entitled
to prejudgment interest on award.
Remanded for purpose of amending
judgment.
1. Vendor and Purchaser e»44
Trial court's finding that vendor intended to convey title to 6-acre tract of
land to vendee at time of closing of real
estate contract for 76 acres, rather than
upon payment of $3,000 per acre over and
above specified annual payments in contract, so as to require exclusion of 6 acres
from legal description in quitclaim deed by
vendee to vendor was not clearly erroneous. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a).
2. Quieting Title e»10(l)
Trial court was not authorized to quiet
title to 6-acre tract against vendor in suit
by vendee's assignees for restitution of
payments made by vendee prior to his default on contract for sale of 76 acres,
where assignees of vendee never owned
6-acre tract and made no claim to it, and
appropriate parties to quiet title action
were not before court.
3. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>341(5)
In restitution suit by vendee for payments made prior to default on real estate
contract, fair market value of property was
to be calculated at time of default, rather
than at later date based upon assertion
that vendee refused to acquiesce in forfei-

ture after default and interfered with marketable title, where vendor failed to plead
interference with marketable title, and testified that between time of retaking proper,
ty and obtaining stipulation from vendee
acquiescing in forfeiture, vendor made no
attempt to resell property or to list it with
real estate broker.
4. Vendor and Purchaser e»341(3)
Trial court's factual finding that value
of real property subject to real estate contract on which vendee defaulted was $180 000 was not clearly erroneous in view of
uncontroverted expert testimony that land
was worth $180,000 at time of default.
5. Eminent Domain e=>153
Vendor was entitled to proceeds from
condemnation award in payment of damages to lands she repossessed, where equitable title was forfeited by vendee before
award of compensation was made, and
vendee and his assignees stipulated that
any proceeds would go to vendor. U.C.A.
1953, 78-34-9.
6. Vendor and Purchaser <*=»341(5)
Vendee, who defaulted on property
which had appreciated in value, was not
entitled to appreciated value in suit for
restitution of payments made by vendee
before default.
7. Vendor and Purchaser <s=»341(5)
Appreciated value of property, on
which vendee defaulted, negated vendor's
entitlement to damages for loss of advantageous bargain in vendee's restitution suit
for payments made before default
8. Vendor and Purchaser «=»341(5)
Attorney fees expended by vendor in
eminent domain action were not damages
which vendor could deduct in restitution
suit by vendee for payments made prior to
vendee's default, where vendor would have
been required to pay fees in absence of
contract with vendee.
9. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>341(5)
Vendee's failure to return 6-acre tract,
title to which was conveyed at time of
closing, upon vendee's default constituted
item of vendor's damages in vendee's suit
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for restitution of payments made prior to
default.
10. Vendor and Purchaser e=>341(5)
Vendor's damages for vendee's nonreturn of 6-acre tract, title of which was
conveyed at closing, represented 6 times
contract price of $2,000 per acre, not value
of tract when buyer defaulted on land contract in vendee's restitution action for payments made prior to default, where vendor
intended to convey title to 6-acre tract at
closing.
11. Interest <s=>13
Trial court properly allowed vendor interest on contract after default as alternative to fair rental value in vendee's restitution suit for payments made prior to default on land contract.
12. Vendor and Purchaser <s=»79
Court would not enforce forfeiture
clause in real estate contract, where recovery by vendor of over $26,000 in excess of
actual damages indicated that liquidated
damages bore no reasonable relationship to
actual damages upon vendee's default.
13. Contracts <®=»318
Supreme Court will enforce forfeiture
clause in contract unless it finds that forfeiture would be so grossly excessive in
relation to any realistic view of loss that
might have been contemplated by parties
that it would so shock the conscience that
court of equity would refuse such forfeiture.
14. Interest <^>39(2.30)
Vendees were not entitled to prejudgment interest on award in vendee's favor in
suit for restitution of payments made on
land contract prior to vendee's default and
forfeiture, given highly equitable nature of
action.

Gordon A. Madsen, Robert C. Cummings,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Robert F. Orton, Virginia Curtis Lee,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellees.

HOWE, Associate Chief Justice.
Defendant Marvel L. Malnar appeals
from a judgment entered against her and
in favor of plaintiffs, who are assignees of
the buyer in a real estate contract with
Malnar as seller. The action was brought
by plaintiffs for restitution of the payments made by the buyer before he defaulted and Malnar forfeited his interest in
the contract and the property.
I. FACTS
On December 19, 1980, plaintiffs' assignor, Ferron Elder, entered into a real estate
contract to purchase from Malnar 76 acres
of land in Duchesne County, together with
twelve shares of water stock, for $152,000.
The contract provided for a down payment
of $23,500 and for annual installment payments of $26,345.18 beginning in December
1981. A warranty deed to the full acreage
was executed by Malnar and placed in escrow, with delivery conditioned upon complete performance of the contract. A quitclaim deed from Elder to Malnar was also
placed in escrow with instructions that it be
delivered to Malnar in the event of Elder's
default. At the closing of the sale, Malnar
executed a separate warranty deed to Elder for 6 acres of the land. This deed was
then recorded, which Malnar now asserts
was due to a mistake.
Elder made the down payment and the
1981 and 1982 annual installments. Early
in 1984, when the 1983 payment was past
due, Malnar served a notice of default upon
Elder. The default was not cured, and
subsequently, the quitclaim deed to the 76
acres from Elder to Malnar was delivered
by the escrow agent to Malnar, who recorded it on February 3, 1984. Malnar asserts
that at that time approximately one year's
interest had accrued in the amount of $J.0,247.80 and there were delinquent real estate taxes and water assessments.
Shortly after default, Elder assigned his
title and interest in the property and contract to Eastern Utah Resources, which
recorded a notice of interest against the
entire 76 acres. One year after default,
Elder conveyed the 6 acres to one Darrell
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Didericksen, who thereafter encumbered it
with a mortgage.
On October 18, 1982, while the contract
was in force, Deseret Transmission commenced an action to condemn a right-ofway across the 76-acre tract to erect hightension power lines. On March 7, 1985,
Malnar, Elder, and his assignees entered
into a stipulation in that action that (1)
Malnar was the owner of all the property,
(2) Malnar was to receive the entire condemnation proceeds, and (3) Elder and his
assignees retained the right to assert a
claim to equitable restitution of the monies
forfeited under the installment contract of
December 19, 1980.
The condemnation action was tried and
resulted in a taking by Deseret Transmission of a right-of-way over 5.21 acres.
Malnar received compensation for the taking totalling $41,075. She expended $6,000
for attorney fees in connection with the
condemnation action, leaving her with $35,075.
Eastern Utah Resources commenced the
instant action for "equitable restitution" of
the down payment and 1981 and 1982 annual installments which were forfeited to Malnar when Elder defaulted. Perkins v.
Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952).
Before trial, Eastern assigned its interests
to plaintiffs. A bench trial was held at
which the value of the 76 acres when the
default occurred was in dispute. Plaintiffs
presented testimony that the 76 acres, including the 5.21 acres over which the rightof-way was taken, were worth $180,000.
Malnar testified that the tract was worth
$101,000 at most, not including the 5.21acre tract, but that in any event it was not
worth more than $700 to $800 per acre. In
addition, Malnar's appraiser testified that
the value of the 70 acres (excluding the 6
acres conveyed at closing) in 1985, at the
time the stipulation between the parties
was made, was $1,400 per acre, totalling
$98,000. Testimony was also adduced that
by the date of trial the value of the tract
had decreased substantially due to economic decline in the Duchesne region.
The trial court found that at the time
Malner recorded the quitclaim deed to the

76 acres, their value was $180,000. The
court further found that the 6 acres conveyed at closing were mistakenly included
in the description in the quitclaim deed and
that Malnar had no interest in that tract.
The court valued the 6-acre tract at $30,000 and subtracted that amount from the
$180,000 total value to arrive at $150,000
value for the 70 acres. To that amount it
added the $35,075 net recovery in the condemnation action, for a total of $185,075.
The trial court computed Malnar's damages by first subtracting the total amount
paid in principal, $50,080.65, from $152,000,
the contract price, leaving $101,919.35.
The court then added $10,247.80 for the
accrued interest due when the default occurred and $1,774.52 for delinquent real
property taxes and water assessments, for
a balance owing to Malnar under the contract of $113,941.67.
The court subtracted that balance, $113,941.67, from the total amount she had received, $185,075, and awarded judgment
against her and in favor of plaintiffs in the
amount of $71,133.33. Malnar appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We first enunciate the standard of review for legal conclusions and factual findings, as both are assigned as error in the
instant case. "A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference;
we review them for correctness/' Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467,
470 (Utah 1989). However, a trial court's
findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, will not be set aside
on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id.;
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). This "clearly erroneous" standard is applicable in equity cases
such as the instant case. Bountiful v.
Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989);
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 n. 1
(Utah 1987).
III. THE DISPUTED 6-ACRE TRACT
[1] Malnar assigns as error the court's
finding that she intended to convey the
6-acre tract of land to Elder at the time of
closing. This finding is reviewed under the
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clearly erroneous standard. On the day of
closing, December 19, 1980, four separate
documents were signed which bear upon
the disposition of the 6 acres: (1) an earnest money receipt and agreement dated
December 18, 1980, and signed either that
day or the next day, providing for a sale
price of $152,000 for 76 acres; (2) the real
estate contract dated and signed on December 19; (3) a warranty deed conveying 6 of
the 76 acres to Elder; (4) a quitclaim deed
executed by Elder conveying 76 acres back
to Malnar in the event of Elder's default.
The real estate contract provides in paragraph 17:
Upon payment of the sum of $3,000 in
addition to the annual payments herein required, Seller agrees to release 1
acre lots. The releases will be upon approval of Bow Valley Resources of Denver, Colorado. Buyer shall receive credit
for all sums paid for lot releases on the
last payments to become due. It is not
intended that said $3,000 per acre should
be extra consideration, but merely early
payment for early release of the lot.
(Emphasis added.) Malnar argues that this
language in the contract indicates her intention to release the 6-acre parcel only
upon payment of $3,000 per acre "over and
above the specified annual payments."
Plaintiffs counter with language in the
"earnest money receipt and offer to purchase," which provides:
Seller to carry balance over a five year
period with 5 annual payments, first annual payment 1 year from closing. Interest on the balance will be 10%. Seller
to release 6 acres at closing and will
release 10 acre parcels upon payment of
$3,000.00 per acre all releases must be
approved by Bow Valley of Denver Colorado. Released parcel will start on the
northern boundary line and move in a
southerly direction.
Plaintiffs argue that the 6-acre parcel was
deeded "free and clear" and that the property earmarked for early release upon payment of $3,000 per acre was one or more
10-acre parcels separate from the 6 acres.
The trial court heard testimony on the
intent of the parties when they signed the

conflicting documents. Elder testified that
he was being given title to 6 acres for
paying $2,000 per acre for the 76 acres
instead of $1,500 per acre, the original asking price. He paid for the 6 acres "at the
time of the agreement" and testified that
he "was given clear, free title." Malnar
testified that she thought the deed to the 6
acres was going into escrow and that she
would not have signed the deed had she
known the 6 acres were to be immediately
conveyed to Elder. Another witness
present at the closing testified that there
was a lot of confusion at that time. The
prices on the real estate contract had to be
amended and the warranty deed signed.
Due to the confusion, the parties did not
make the change "on the Quit-Claim Deed
nor the Warranty Deed to match what actually happened that day."
The trial court found:
It was the intent of Elder and Malnar
that [Elder] receive title to the said six
(6) acre parcel at closing on December
19, 1980, as is more particularly evidenced by the following: the delivery to
Elder on December 19, 1980, of the warranty deed covering the six (6) acres and
the recording by Elder of said deed; the
earnest money agreement dated December 18, 1980, which provided that the said
six (6) acres tract be conveyed to Elder;
and the treatment by Elder after closing
on December 19, 1980, of the said six (6)
acres as his sole property by making
conveyances and assignments with respect thereto.
In view of the intended immediate conveyance of the 6 acres, the court further found
that the failure to exclude the 6 acres from
the legal description in the quitclaim deed
to Malnar was a mistake by Elder, Malnar,
and the drafter of the instruments.
While Malnar disputes the finding that
she intended to immediately convey the 6
acres, the intent of the parties is a question
of fact. We will not disturb the trial
court's finding unless it is clearly erroneous. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Sacramento
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great Northern
Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Utah
1987). The findings are not "against the
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great weight of evidence," Bountiful v.
Riley, 784 P.2d at 1175, and are not clearly
erroneous.

Malnar was not prevented from selling the
property by any action of Elder or his
assignees.

[2] We do, however, agree with Malnar
that it was error for the court to quiet title
to the 6 acres against her. Neither plaintiffs nor Malnar sought to quiet title. Indeed, plaintiffs never owned the tract and
made no claim to it. Malnar could not have
sought to quiet title in this action since
neither Elder, Didericksen, nor his mortgagee was a party. It was therefore error
for the court to decree that Malnar had no
right, title, or interest in the tract. That
part of the judgment is reversed.

[4] Malnar further asserts that the trial
court's factual finding valuing the property
at $180,000 is error. An expert witness for
plaintiffs testified that the land was worth
$180,000. Malnar's appraiser affixed a
lesser value to the land in 1985 but was
unable to give an opinion on the value of
the property in 1984. The valuation finding is therefore not clearly erroneous.

IV. VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY
[3] Malnar contends that the trial court
erred in finding the value of the property
to be $180,000 in February 1984 when the
default occurred. She first asserts that the
date of valuation should be March 7, 1985,
because Elder's assignees refused to acquiesce in the forfeiture and claimed ownership in the property until that date. The
trial court properly concluded as a matter
of law that fair market value should be
determined as of the time of breach, which
was February 3, 1984. This is the general
rule in real estate contracts. See Webster
v. DiTrapano, 114 A.D.2d 698, 494 N.Y.
S.2d 550 (1985); Quigley v. Jones, 174 Ga.
App. 787, 332 S.E.2d 7, affd, 255 Ga. 33,
334 S.E.2d 664 (1985); Lake Shore Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 55 Md.App. 171, 461
A.2d 725, affd, 298 Md. 611, 471 A.2d 735
(1983); American Mechanical Corp. v.
Union Mach. Co. of Lynn, Inc., 21 Mass.
App. 97, 485 N.E.2d 680 (1985). As the
trial judge stated from the bench, Malnar's
assertion appears to be a claim for interference with marketable title, which would
have to be affirmatively pleaded. No such
pleading was made, and the trial judge
correctly confined his valuation to the time
of default wh$n Malnar exercised her option to retake the property. In addition,
Malnar testified that between the time of
retaking the property and obtaining a stipulation removing the cloud on the title, she
made no attempt to resell the property or
to list it with a real estate broker. Thus

V. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDS
[5] Malnar next contends that the trial
court erred in charging her with the $35,075 net condemnation award as if it had
been paid by the buyer as principal on the
contract. When the condemnation action
was filed, Elder held equitable title to the
land. That title was forfeited before the
award of compensation was made. After
forfeiture and before the award, Elder and
his assignees stipulated that any proceeds
should go to Malnar. Malnar argues that
where forfeiture occurs before a condemnation award is made, the vendor takes the
land back burdened by the condemnation
and is therefore entitled to the proceeds
since they are in payment of damages to
the lands he repossesses. We agree.
The trial judge found that "on October
18, 1982, an order of immediate occupancy
was entered and a required cash deposit
paid into the court by [condemnor] for the
landowner." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9
provides in pertinent part:
The rights of the just compensation for
the land so taken or damaged shall vest
in the parties entitled thereto . . . and
the said judgment shall include . . . interest . . . from the date of taking actual
possession thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earner—
(Emphasis added.)
The court's authority in protecting the
vested interests of both parties was explained in Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial
District Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 475-76,
511 P.2d 739, 742 (1973). The condemnor
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deposits money in court. Upon proper application, the court orders it paid to the
parties in interest. However, the vendee is
normally entitled to the condemnation
award as he is the equitable owner. The
court can therefore make orders with respect to encumbrances and liens to safeguard the security interest of the vendor.
Justice, equity, and practicality are considered by the court in protecting the interests of the parties.
In the instant case, however, before any
disbursements were ordered from the
funds deposited by the condemnor, default
occurred. Both equitable and legal title
vested in Malnar, with the concomitant
right to receive the eminent domain proceeds. It was a practical solution for the
parties to stipulate that the proceeds would
go to Malnar. The proceeds stood in lieu
of the right-of-way taken. The defaulting
vendee is thus credited with returning the
condemned land undamaged. It follows
that the proceeds are not also payments
toward the contract price; to so regard
them would be double-counting.
VI. CALCULATION OF DAMAGES
[6] Malnar contends that the trial court
erred in departing from the method of calculating damages formulated in Perkins v.
Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 478-79, 243 P.2d
446, 451-52 (1952) (this method is set out
below). We have previously held that the
factors used in the Perkins test need not
be rigidly adhered to:
Although these are reasonable factors
to determine damages, they were not
meant to be a rigid formula to be applied
mechanically in every case. In determining equitable damages, the trial court
may use whatever factors it finds most
appropriate to achieve justice.
Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 374
(Utah 1977). However, in reviewing the
method used by the trial judge to arrive at
a judgment for plaintiffs of $71,183.14, we
are left with "a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.,, State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
The trial judge in effect returned to the
defaulting vendee the appreciated value of
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the property This was error. We stated
in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244,
1256 (Utah 1987), that a vendee "is entitled
to the appreciated value of the property
over the contract purchase price as long as
his or her interest has not been forfeited."
(Emphasis added.) However, when the
vendee defaults on property which has appreciated in value, he is not entitled to the
appreciated value. The appreciated value,
however, negates the vendor's entitlement
to damages for "loss of advantageous bargain," the first factor in the Perkins test.
See Harris v. Shell Dev. Corp. Nev., Inc.,
95 Nev. 348, 594 P.2d 731, 734 (1979)
("Where ... the market value of the land
at the time of breach is higher than the
purchase price, the vendor is entitled to
only nominal damages plus proved consequential damages."); Zareas v. Smith, 404
A.2d 599, 600-01 (N.H.1979) (if the value at
the time of breach is greater than the contract price, the vendor can recover only
nominal damages and not loss of bargain);
accord Spurgeon v. Drumheller, 174 Cal.
App.3d 659, 665, 220 Cal.Rptr. 195, 198
(Ct.App.1985); Island-Gentry Joint Venture v. State, 57 Haw. 259, 554 P.2d 761,
767 (1976); see also Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d
1082, 1085 (Utah 1983) (defaulting purchaser testified that when he vacated the property, it "was worth a substantial amount
more than the contract price"; therefore,
vendor was not entitled to loss of bargain
damages).
We recalculate the damages using the
Perkins formula, which takes into consideration the following elements:
(1) Loss of an advantageous bargain;
(2) Any damage to or depreciation of the
property;
(3) Any decline in value due to change in
market value of the property not allowed in items Nos. 1 and 2;
(4) For the fair rental value during the
period of occupancy.
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah at 478-79,
243 P.2d at 451-52; Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah
2d 263, 267, 300 P.2d 623, 627 (1956).
[7] Loss of advantageous bargain:
The contract price of the property was
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$152,000. The value of the property, including the disputed 6 acres, at forfeiture
was $180,000. Malnar is not entitled to
loss of bargain damages when the property
has appreciated in value. Soffe v. Ridd,
659 P.2d at 1085.
[8] Damage to or depreciation of the
property: The $6,000 attorney fees expended in the eminent domain action are
not damages. Malnar would have been
required to pay them in the absence of the
contract with Elder. Taxes and water assessments are owed in the amount of
$1,774.52.
[9,10] The nonreturn of the 6-acre
tract constitutes an item of damage. Inasmuch as the trial court found that Malnar
intended to convey that tract at closing and
we have affirmed that finding, her damages are $12,000, representing six times
the contract price of $2,000 per acre, not
the value of the tract when the buyer defaulted ($30,000).
Decline in value due to change in market value not allowed above: None.
[11] Fair rental value during the period of occupancy: The trial court properly allowed Malnar interest on the contract
as an alternative to fair rental value. See
Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah
1976). The total amount paid was $26,109.71. Another $10,247.80 accrued to the
date of forfeiture.
In summary, damages suffered by Malnar are as follows:
$ 1,774 52
12,000.00
26,109 71
10,247.80

delinquent taxes and water assessments
value of 6 acres conveyed
interest paid on contract
accrued interest owing

$50,132.03

Malnar received the down payment on
the contract of $28,500 and the 1981 and
1982 annual installments of $26,345.18
each, making a total of $76,190.36.
[12,13] Th* contract provides that thirty days after the default of the buyer and
his failure to remedy the same within five
days after written notice, the seller may
"be released from all obligations in law and
in equity to convey said property, and all
payments which have been made thereto-

fore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be
forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for the nonperformance of the cont r a c t — " If this forfeiture clause is enforced, Malnar keeps all payments made,
including the excess of payment made over
damages, which is $26,058.33, approximately 17 percent of the contract price of $152,000. We will enforce a forfeiture clause
unless we find that the forfeiture would be
so "grossly excessive in relation to any
realistic view of loss that might have been
contemplated by the parties that it would
so shock the conscience that a court of
equity would refuse such forfeiture." Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 97, 485 P.2d
673, 674 (1971); accord Strand v. Mayne,
14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963); Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294
(1954). Examination of our case law indicates that this court will enforce the forfeiture clause when the amount of forfeiture
does not greatly exceed, or is less than, the
amount of damages. In Cole v. Parker, 5
Utah 2d at 264, 300 P.2d at 624, the vendee
had paid $11,600 toward a contract price of
$40,000. However, the difference between
the purchase price and the value of the
property at the time of default exceeded
$11,600, and this closed further inquiry. A
similar result was reached in Weyher v.
Peterson, 16 Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438
(1965). In Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d
272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958), the vendee paid
$6,680 principal and interest toward a $22,000 contract price. The excess of payment
over damages, which included rental value,
was $2,119.94. The amount "was but 9V2
percent of the purchase price, an amount
that would exceed but little the real estate
commission that would have to be paid on
resale of the property
" 8 Utah 2d at
274, 332 P.2d at 990. In Strand v. Mayne,
14 Utah 2d at 35G-57, 384 P.2d at 396, the
vendees forfeited almost half the contract
price because payments credited and rental
value exceeded what they had paid. Similarly, the vendee in Fullmer v. Blood, 546
P.2d at 609-10, forfeited $12,150 paid to
the vendor, but this amount was only
$1,156 more than the interest payable on
the contract during the period of occupancy
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In these cases, and in the cases cited in
Perkins v. Spencer,
[i]t will be observed that in all cases
where the stipulation for liquidated damages was enforced it bore some reasonable relation to the actual damages
which could reasonably be anticipated at
the time the contract was made and was
not a forfeiture which would allow an
unconscionable and exhorbitant recovery.
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah at 474, 243
P.2d at 449. In the instant case, a recovery
of over $26,000 in excess of actual damages
shows that liquidated damages bear no reasonable relationship to actual damages. A
forfeiture here would allow an unconscionable recovery. We therefore award plaintiffs the $26,058.33 that was paid in excess
of Malnar's damages. See Perkins, 121
Utah at 478-79, 243 P.2d at 451-52.
[14] Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest to
them. A survey of our cases where prejudgment interest was awarded indicates
that interest has been allowed in actions
for damage to personal property, Fell v.
Union Pac. Ry., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003
(1907); Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976); in
actions brought on a written contract, Jack
B. Parson Constr. Co. v. State, 552 P.2d
107 (Utah 1976); Bjork v. April Indus.,
Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977); Jorgensen
v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah
1983); Anderson v. State Farm Cos. &
Fire Co., 583 P.2d 101 (Utah 1978); and in
an action to recover a liquidated overpayment of water subscription charges,
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co.,
664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983). In many of
these cases, we stressed that the loss had
been fixed as of a definite time and the
amount of the loss can be calculated with
mathematical accuracy in accordance with
well-established rules of damages. No
case has been cited to us where we have
allowed prejudgment interest in an action
such as the instant case, which is for equitable relief. "A suit of this nature involving the invocation of a forfeiture
and/or the enforcement of a purchase contract invokes consideration of the principles
of equity which address themselves to the
808 P 2(1—26

conscience and discretion of the trial
court." Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d at 610.
In view of the highly equitable nature of
this action where the court has discretion in
determining the amount, if any, to be returned to the defaulting vendee, we find no
error in the denial of prejudgment interest.
Remanded for the purpose of amending
the judgment in accordance with this opinion. Costs awarded to defendant.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART,
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Bruce ELM, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890272.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 29, 1991.
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth
District Court, Utah County, Cullen Y.
Christensen, J., of aggravated sexual abuse
of child. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held
that trial court could impose sentence of
middle severity.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law e=*986.2(l)
Sentencing court could conclude that
mitigating circumstances of defendant's
amenability to supervision, good employment, and support by parents did not outweigh aggravating circumstances of persistence of conduct over considerable number of years, number of victims in addition
to defendant's daughters, and vulnerability
of victims, and, thus, court could impose
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OPINION:
[*398]
Procedural History

[***782] Introduction and

This action was commenced by plaintiff and respondent Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental), in the Los
Angeles [**2] Superior Court on December 3, 1979,
and alleged, against defendant and appellant McDonnell
Douglas Corporation (Douglas), causes of action for

negligence, strict liability, deceit, breach of warranty
and breach of contract.
In 1980, Douglasfileda complaint in the federal court
seeking a declaration that the exculpatory provision of
Article 12 of its Purchase Agreement with Continental
was valid and barred Continental's action. Continental
counterclaimed, raising essentially the same claims presented in its state court lawsuit.
In early 1985, the federal court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of Douglas, confirming the validity of the contract's exculpatory clause. The court's
ruling, which was made final, foreclosed Continental's
state claims based on negligence, strict liability and
implied warranty under principles of res judicata, nl
However, the federal court stated it made no ruling with
regard to Continental's claims for breach of the contract's Warranty nor its Service Life Policy, since they
were not properly presented in the motion.
nl On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on these issues. (See Continental
Airlines v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (9th Cir.
1987) 819 F.2d 1519.)
[**3]

The trial in the superior court began on September 26,
1985, on Continental's fraud, breach of express warranty and breach of contract (the Service Life Policy)
claims. At the conclusion of plaintiffs case, a nonsuit
motion was made by Douglas; it was later granted only
with respect to the breach of warranty cause of action.
The case was submitted to the jury on five different fraud theories and one breach of contract theory,
based on the Service Life Policy. On January 30, 1986,
the jury returned verdicts in favor of Continental for $
17 million on its claims for (1) fraud by misrepresentation, (2) fraud by nondisclosure of known facts and
(3) negligent misrepresentation. The jury returned ver-

216 Cal. App. 3d 388, *398; 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1253, **3;
264 Cal. Rptr. 779, ***782
diets in favor of Douglas on Continental's claims for (1)
fraud by concealment [***783] and, (2) fraud by making a promise without intent to perform. On the [*399]
breach of the Service Life Policy claim, the jury awarded
Continental damages of $ 13.4 million.
On March 19, 1986, the trial court denied Douglas's
motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. In response to the jury's determination that
prejudgment interest was appropriate, the trial court
awarded Continental [**4] interest at the rate of 7 percent from March 1, 1978, to January 1, 1983, and
at 10 percent thereafter, on the fraud and breach of
contract awards. Judgment was granted on the higher
fraud award and, alternatively, on the breach of contract
award, in the event the fraud verdicts did not withstand
an appeal.
This appeal is from that judgment. n2 We affirm the
judgment as modified.
n2 Continental's purported "cross-appeal" from
the judgment was dismissed since it was not a party
"aggrieved" by the judgment. (Cicinelli v. Iwasaki
(1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 55, 64 [338 R2d 1005]; 9
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, §
142, pp. 151-152.)
Statement of Facts
On March 1, 1978, a Continental DC-10 aircraft,
which had been delivered to Continental by Douglas in
1972, was in its takeoff roll at Los Angeles International
Airport when two tires burst on the left landing gear.
The captain elected to try to stop the plane, but it ran off
the end of the runway at 85 miles per hour. The [**5]
landing gear broke through the tarmac, burrowed into
the ground, and was ripped from the wing, making a 3.7
foot hole which allowed fuel to pour from the wing fuel
tanks. The plane was severely damaged by the resulting
fire and rendered unrepairable.
Douglas had approached Continental in 1968 to sell
Continental DC-10 aircraft. Douglas used a series of
briefings and sales brochures in its sales campaign.
The sales brochures given to Continental consisted of
hundreds of pages of technical information drafted by
Douglas's engineers, and reviewed by its top management, for the express purpose of explaining the DC10 design and a "Detail Type Specification" (Detail
Specification or Specification) to potential aircraft purchasers. That Specification, as its name implies, described the technical details of the DC-10. The briefings, the question and answer period following, and
the brochures, were intended by Douglas to constitute
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Continental's review of the DC-10 specifications.
The Douglas briefings covered the landing gear and
wing design, as did many of its brochures. Continental
personnel used the brochures to write portions of
Continental's "Tri-Jet Evaluation," a comparison between [**6] the [*400] DC-10 and Lockheed's L-1011,
which became a basis for Continental's decision to purchase the DC-10.
The brochures contained statements that "[t]he fuel
tank will not rupture under crash load conditions"; that
the landing gear "are designed for wipe-off without rupturing the wing fuel tank"; that "the support structure
is designed to a higher strength than the gear to prevent fuel tank rupture due to an accidental landing gear
overload"; that the DC-10 "is designed and tested for
crashworthiness"; that the "landing gear will be tested"
to demonstrate the fail safe integrity and wipe-off characteristics of the gear design; and that "good reliability" for the DC-10 landing gear could be predicted with
an "unusually high degree of confidence" because of its
close similarity to the successful design on the DC-8 and
DC-9 aircraft.
When Continental decided to purchase the DC-10,
instead of the L-1011 aircraft, it finalized a Purchase
Agreement with Douglas which contained an integration clause and incorporated by reference the Detail
Specification for the DC-10. In contrast to the absolute guarantees of the brochures, the Detail Specification
used qualified language on the [**7] subject of the landing gear breakaway characteristic. It recited, in relevant
part, that the landing gear "shall be designed" so that,
under certain specified load conditions, failure of the
landing gear "is not likely" to rupture the wing fuel tanks
or fuel lines. That clause, its interpretation, and the precontract representations which varied the [***784] terms
of the Specification, became the focus of the instant trial.
Contentions
I. Douglas contends with respect to Continental's fraud
claims that:
A. Continental's negligent misrepresentation claim
was barred by the exculpatory clause of the Purchase
Agreement.
B. The jury instruction on fraud by "failure to disclose" was incomplete in two vital particulars.
C. The trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to
admit the "Six Bulletin."
D. The trial court prejudicially erred in admitting the
"Starlof Letter" and the evidence associated with it.
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E. The trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to permit Douglas's expert witness McCarthy to testify from
documents prepared by his subordinates.
[*401] F. The trial court prejudicially erred in permitting the contractual term of the Detail Specification to
be varied, amplified and [**8] supplemented by parol
evidence.
G. There was no substantial evidence of fraud: (1)
the Detail Specification was not false, and (2) precontract promotional materials cannot form the basis of a
fraud claim.
H. There was no substantial evidence that Douglas's
misrepresentations were material or that Continental reasonably relied on them in deciding to purchase the DC10.
I. The trial court's treatment of the Service Life Policy
issues prejudiced the entire case.
J. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury on
the measure of damages for fraud.
K. The trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest at 10 percent.
II. Douglas contends Continental's claim for breach of
contract under the Service Life Policy was submitted to
the jury in error because:
A. The value of the aircraft cannot be recovered under
the Service Life Policy.
B. Continental never "triggered" the policy by giving
the required notice.
C. Continental's insurer had no standing to make a
claim under the policy since it is nonassignable.
Discussion
I. The Fraud Claims
A. Continental's Cause of Action For Negligent
Misrepresentation Was Not Barred by the Exculpatory
Clause of the Contract.
Douglas contends Continental's [**9] claim for negligent misrepresentation was barred by Article 12 of
the Purchase Agreement wherein Continental expressly
agreed to waive all claims for negligence. Although
the cause of action was submitted in accordance with
BAJI No. 12.45, which is [*402] entitled "Fraud and
Deceit ~ Negligent Misrepresentation," on the instruction given to the jury, the court changed the name of
the tort to "fraud and deceit by representation without
reasonable grounds."
While Douglas makes much ado about this name
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change, the real question presented is whether negligent
misrepresentation is a species of fraud which, pursuant
to California statutory and case law, may not be waived
by an exculpatory clause.
The elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation are: "1. The defendant must have made
a representation as to a past or existing material fact,
[para.] 2. The representation must have been untrue;
[para.] 3. Regardless of his actual belief the defendant
must have made the representation without any reasonable ground for believing it to be true; [para.] 4. The
representation must have been made with the intent to
induce plaintiff to rely upon it; [para.] 5. The plaintiff [**10] must have been unaware of the falsity of the
representation; he must have acted in reliance upon the
truth of the representation and he must have been justified in relying upon the representation, [para.] 6.
And, finally, as a result of his reliance upon the truth
of the representation, the plaintiff must have sustained
damage." (BAJI No. 12.45, italics added; see Wzlters
v. [***785] Marler (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 1, 17 [147
Cal.Rptr. 655], overruled on another ground in Gray
v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal. 3d
498, 505-507 [198 Cal.Rptr. 551, 674 R2d 253, 44
A.L.RAth 763].)
Section 1668 of the Civil Code declares unlawful as
against public policy "[a] 11 contracts which have for their
object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from
responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to
the person or property of another, or violation of law,
whether willful or negligent . . . ." (Italics added.)
Section 1710, subdivision 2, defines one form of deceit as: "The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not
true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing
it [**11] to be true." (Italics added.)
Section 1572, subdivision 2, provides that actual fraud
includes the following act: "The positive assertion, in a
manner not warranted by the information of the person
making it, of that which is not true, though he believes
it to be true." (Italics added.)
Douglas argues that since section 1668 does not list
"misrepresentation" among the kinds of conduct for
which a party may not exculpate itself, coupled with the
fact that the word "fraud" is not modified, whereas the
modifier "willful or negligent" expressly applies only to
the phrase [*403] "violation of law," that confirms that
"fraud" is used in section 1668 in its traditional sense as
an intentional tort.
Douglas's argument is disingenuous. However,
Douglas's assertion, that Continental's claim for negligent misrepresentation was barred by the exculpatory
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clause of the contract, is bolstered by the erroneous holding of Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. (2d Cir. 1980) 617 F. 2d 936, in which the federal court, construing an almost identical exculpatory
clause, declared that "[w]here there has been no violation of law, negligent misrepresentations [**12] in a
commercial transaction such as that involved herein do
not fall within the provisions of § 1668." {Id. at p.
940.) The cases on which the Tokio Marine court relied for that incorrect statement of California law {Delta
Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co. (1965) 238
Cal.App.2d 95, 105-106 [47 Cal.Rptr. 518]; Werner
v. Knoll (1948) 89 Cal.App.2d 474, 475-477[201 R2d
45J) do not support its conclusion.
The Werner case involved a wrongful death action.
The court held that lawsuit was barred by the exculpatory clause of the parties' agreement, since contracts
relieving individuals from the results of their own ordinary negligence are not invalid under section 1668 for
contravening public policy. (89 Cal. App. 2d at pp. 475476.) The Delta Air Lines case concerned an action for
breach of warranty. The court determined the exculpatory clause was valid and covered not only contractual
warranty liability but also tort liability. (238 Cal.App. 2d
at p. 101.) It further held the clause was not void
as an attempt to [**13] exempt defendant from liability for an express violation of law because defendant's
complained-of acts did not constitute such violation. {Id.
at pp. 105-106.) Neither of these cases involved a cause
of action for negligent misrepresentation.
We have found no other case which interprets the relationship amongst sections 1668, 1710, subdivision 2,
and 1572, subdivision 2, in this context, although all
of these sections were enacted in 1872 as part of the
original Civil Code. n3
n3 None of the sections has ever been amended.
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1572, subd. 2, 1710, subd. 2; Gagne v. Bertran (1954)
43 Cal. 2d 481, 487, fn. 4 []; Clar v. Board of Trade
(1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 636, 644 [] . . . .)" In In re
Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d587, at page 599 [207
Cal.Rptr. 728], the court stated: "[N]o actual intent to
defraud . . . need be shown, as fraud includes not only
intentional misrepresentations but also negligent misrepresentations. {Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Hansen (1964)
227 Cal.App.2d 173, 192 [].) Thus, 'scienter' is not an
element of every cause of action for deceit. {Hale v.
George A. Hormel & Co. (1975) 48 Cal.App. 3d 73, 84
[].)" In Chavez v. Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor Law
(1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 77, at page 80, footnote [**15] 4
[148 Cal.Rptr. 278], the court noted that "[i]n order to
state a cause of action for fraud, a plaintiff must allege
(1) a false representation of a material fact, (2) made
recklessly or without reasonable ground for believing
its truth . . . . (Gonsalves v. Hodgson [1951] 38
Cal.2d91, 100-101 [].)" (See also 5 Witkin, Summary
of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 722, p. 821; 5
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 676,
pp. 126-127.)
Under the weight of these authorities, we hold that
a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation is included within the meaning of the word "fraud" in section 1668. Therefore, the exculpatory clause of the parties' contract in Article 12, wherein Continental agreed
to waive all claims for negligence, was not a bar to
Continental's claim for negligent misrepresentation.
B. The Court's Instruction on Fraud by Nondisclosure
Constituted Prejudicial Error.
Douglas contends the court's instruction on fraud by
nondisclosure constituted prejudicial error. Specifically,
it argues the two instructions relating to nondisclosure
erroneously omitted any reference to the necessary intent
and reliance elements [**16] of that claim.

In Lingsch v. Savage (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 729
[29 Cal.Rptr. 201], the court set forth the compoThe case law, however, is clear that in California negnents of a nondisclosure cause of action as follows: "(1)
ligent misrepresentation is a form of fraud and deceit
Nondisclosure by the defendant of facts materially afunder sections 1710, subdivision 2, and 1572, subdifecting the value or desirability of the property; (2)
vision 2. Thus, in Andrepont v. Meeker (1984) 158 Defendant's knowledge of such facts and of their beCal.App. 3d 878, at page 884 [204 Cal.Rptr. 887],
ing unknown to or beyond the reach of the plaintiff; (3)
the court observed: "Since Gagne v. Bertran (1954)
Defendant's intention to induce action by the plaintiff;
43 Cal.2d 481, 487-488 [], was decided, California
(4) Inducement of the plaintiff to act by reason of the
courts have recognized that a negligent misrepresentanondisclosure and (5) Resulting damages." (Id. at p.
tion [**14] is actionable as a form of deceit. [Citing to
738, italics added; see County of Mariposa v. Yosemite
and quoting §§ 1710, subd. 2, and 1572, subd. 2.]" In
West [*405] Associates (1988) 202 Cal.App. 3d 791,
Gold [*404] v. Los Angeles Democratic League (1975) 812 [248 Cal.Rptr. 778]; Barnhouse v. City of Pinole
49 Cal.App.3d 365, at pages 373-374 [122 Cal.Rptr.
(1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 171, 190, fn. 7 [183 Cal.Rptr.
732], the court declared: "Negligent [***786] misrep881].)
resentation is a form of 'actual fraud.' (Civ. Code, §§
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In the instant case, the court instructed the jury on
five kinds of fraud - intentional, concealment, nondisclosure, false promise, and negligence -- all derived
from essentially the same operative facts. It actually
instructed the jury twice, the first time when it informed
[**17] the jury on the issues on which Continental had
the burden of proof and a second time when it formally
listed the elements of each theory. None of the instructions purported to cover more than one species of fraud.
In other words, none can be interpreted to apply to any
cause of action other than the specific one for which it
was given. (Seefn. 4.) Eight of the ten instructions correctly informed the jury that fraudulent intent as well as
reliance are elements of the cause of action to which the
instruction referred. n4 However, the two instructions
relating to nondisclosure omitted any reference whatever
to intent and reliance.
n4 In the instruction for negligent misrepresentation, the necessary intent was properly defined as the
intent to induce plaintiff to rely on a representation
made without reasonable ground for believing it to be
true. (See Walters v. Marler, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d
at p. 17.)
The first instruction, which relates to burden of proof,
reads as follows: [**18] "As to fraud and deceit by
nondisclosure of known facts: [para.] 1. That the defendant failed to disclose to Continental a material fact
[***787] known to McDonnell Douglas and not known
to Continental; and [para.] 2. That McDonnell Douglas
knew of material facts and also knew that such facts
were neither known nor readily accessible to the other
party; [para.] 3. That as a legal cause of the fraud and
deceit Continental sustained damages; [para.] 4. The
nature and extent of plaintiff's damages and the amount
thereof."
The second instruction, which defines the elements of
the tort, was similarly defective. It reads: "The essential elements of fraud and deceit by failing to disclose
known facts, each of which must be proved to recover
damages under this theory are: [para.] Except as you
may otherwise be instructed, where material facts are
known to one party and not to the other, failure to disclose them is not actionable fraud unless there is some
relationship between the parties which gives rise to a
duty to disclose such known facts, [para.] A duty to
disclose known facts arises where one party knows of
material facts and also knows that such facts are neither
known nor readily accessible [**19] to the other party."
In his closing argument, when explaining intentional
fraud and fraud by concealment to the jury, Continental's
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counsel used the court's proposed instructions for guidance and covered all the elements of the claims, including [*406] intent and reliance. But when he turned
to nondisclosure, apparently still using the court's instructions, he failed even then to inform the jury of the
elements of that cause of action. n5 Thus, the jury's
findings against Douglas on the issue of nondisclosure
did not include a finding of fraudulent intent nor of reliance.
n5 Counsel argued to the jury: "In order to recover
under that theory, we need to prove that McDonnell
Douglas failed to disclose to Continental a material
fact, always has to be a material fact. Can't be
'tomorrow it is going to rain.' It has to be something more important that we would rely on, and
we have to prove that Douglas knew that there were
material facts, and knew that we didn't know about
them, that Continental didn't know the facts, and
that Continental did not have ready access to those
facts, so if we can prove that Douglas knew that
Continental didn't have all the facts and that Douglas
had all the facts and they didn't tell us, and that
[were] material, something that we did, then they're
guilty of fraud and deceit by reason of nondisclosure
of known facts, and again, obviously, we have to
prove that that resulted in damages."
[**20]

Moreover, Continental can find no assistance in the
jury's answers to the special interrogatories on the
nondisclosure cause of action, since the jury simply
found that "each of the elements of fraud and deceit by
nondisclosure of known facts, as defined in the court's
instruction" had been proved. (Italics added.) And,
because each instruction specifically covered only one
species of fraud, even when we consider the instructions
as a whole, the error is not cured. (Compare, PacificSouthern Mortgage Trust Co. v. Insurance Co. of
North America (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 703, 714-715
[212 Cal.Rptr. 754]; Little v. Stuyvesant Life Ins.
Co. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 451, 464-465 [136 Cal.Rptr.
653].)
Continental, relying on Spahn v. Guild Industries
Corp. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 143, 160 [156 Cal.Rptr.
375], argues that, inasmuch as Douglas did not request a
"specific proper" instruction, it cannot complain on appeal that the instruction was defective. Continental's argument embodies a once common misapprehension concerning the impact of Code of Civil Procedure section
647, which obviates [**21] the need to object to an
order "giving an instruction, refusing to give an instruc-
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tion, or modifying an instruction requested . . . ." The
matter was clarified by the Supreme Court in Agarwal v.
Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 948-949 [160 Cal.Rptr.
141, 603 R2d 58], decided six months after Spahn. The
court, reconciling apparently divergent cases, ultimately
quoted with approval from Rivera v. Parma (1960) 54
Cal.2d 313, at page 316 [5 Cal.Rptr. 665, 353 P.2d
273], as follows: ""'To hold that it is the duty of a
party to correct the errors of his adversary's instructions . . . would be in contravention of section 647,
Code of Civil Procedure, which gives a party an exception to instructions that are given . . . . While
the exception will be of no avail where an instruction
states the law correctly but is 'deficient merely by reason of [*407] generality,' in other [***788] cases he
will not be foreclosed from claiming error and prejudice.'"" (Agarwal, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 949; see
Enis v. Specialty Auto Sales (1978) 83 Cal. App. 3d 928,
939-940 [148 Cal.Rptr. 255]; [**22] see also Tannehill
v. Finch (1986) 188 Cal.App. 3d 224, 227, fn. 3 [232
Cal.Rptr. 749]; Puppert v. San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 205, 212 [186 Cal.Rptr.
847].)
Continental also relies on Spahn v. Guild Industries
Corp., supra, 94 Cal.App.3d 143, for the proposition
that the omission of the reliance element from the instruction was not prejudicial. In Spahn, the verdict was
saved because the evidence of reliance was so compelling
the court found that "even if the jury had been specifically instructed as to reliance, they could only have
found that the franchisees relied on the misrepresentations . . . ." (Id. at p. 159.) Further, the court
observed that "[g]iven the record . . . and assuming
the most comprehensive instruction on reliance, there is
no possibility that the jury could have returned a verdict
favorable to the franchisors." (Id. at p. 160.)
Spahn is distinguishable. In Spahn, only one element
necessary to be proved - reliance ~ was omitted from
the instruction, whereas [**23] here, the intent element
was also omitted. Moreover, we cannot say in this case,
as did the court in Spahn, that there "is no possibility"
(94 Cal.App.3d at p. 160) the jury would have returned
a verdict more favorable to Douglas on Continental's
nondisclosure claim absent these errors.
On the contrary, it appears probable the defect in the
nondisclosure instructions did affect the verdict. We
reach this conclusion because, when the jury was correctly instructed as to all the elements of fraud by concealment, it found in favor of Douglas. It did so although none of the instructions were specific as to the
facts and Continental's counsel made no attempt in his
argument to distinguish the facts upon which Continental

based its claims, instead discussing the same matters purportedly concealed, or not disclosed, interchangeably
without reference to specific instructions or theories.
In making our determination whether the defective instructions constituted reversible error, we are guided
by the language of our Supreme Court in Henderson
v. Hamischfeger Corp. (1974) 12 CaUd 663 [117
Cal.Rptr. 1, 527 P.2d 353], [**24] wherein the court
stated: "Generally speaking if it appears that error in
giving an improper instruction was likely to mislead the
jury and thus to become a factor in its verdict, it is prejudicial and ground for reversal. [Citation.] To put it
another way, '[w]here it seems probable that the jury's
verdict may have been based on the erroneous [*408]
instruction prejudice appears and this court "should not
speculate upon the basis of the verdict."'[Citations.] . .
. 'The determination whether, in a specific instance, the
probable effect of the instruction has been to mislead the
jury and whether the error has been prejudicial so as to
require reversal depends on all the circumstances of the
case, including the evidence and the other instructions
given. No precise formula can be drawn.' [Citations.]"
(Id. at pp. 670-671; Frantz v. San Luis Medical Clinic
(1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 34, 47 [146 Cal.Rptr. 146].)
From our examination of the entire record, including
the evidence and the other instructions, we can only conclude the court's error in instructing the jury on fraud
by nondisclosure misled [**25] the jury, was prejudicial and resulted in a miscarriage of justice; therefore,
the judgment cannot stand to the extent it is based on
the fraud by nondisclosure verdict. (Cal. Const., art.
VI, § 13; Henderson v. Hamischfeger Corp., supra, 12
Cal.3d at pp. 670, 674; see Seaman's Direct Buying
Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1984) 36 Cal. 3d
752, 771, 774 [206 Cal.Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 1158].)
However, as we discuss later in this opinion, the judgment can be upheld based on the intentional fraud and
negligent misrepresentation verdicts.
[***789] C. The Robert Six Bulletin Was Properly
Excluded.
Douglas made numerous unsuccessful attempts at trial
to introduce into evidence a December 1979 written
statement which was issued to all Continental employees by Robert F. Six, then chairman of the board and
chief executive officer of Continental. The statement
informed them that a group of insurance companies retained by Continental had filed a lawsuit against Douglas
and others; that insurance companies customarily file
such suits in the name of the client to whom they have
paid benefits; that Continental [**26] was in fact not
suing Douglas and had not been asked to participate in
the preparation of the lawsuit.
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The bulletin concluded with the following sentence:
"We continue to feel that the DC-10, which we have been
flying throughout our system since 1972, is an excellent
airplane -- safe, efficient, hardy and responsive."
Douglas contends the bulletin should have been admitted into evidence because of "its obvious status as an
admission" (Evid. Code, § 1220) n6 and points out that
it was originally rejected in its entirety only because
it [*409] mentioned insurance. In support of its argument, Douglas urges the court erred in excluding the
evidence because Evidence Code section 1155, n7 which
proscribes the admission of evidence that a person was
insured "to prove negligence or other wrongdoing," is
not applicable in the instant case. Citing North v. Vinton
(1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 214 [61 P.2d 950], Douglas argues that where an admission makes only incidental reference to insurance, "the entire statement is admissible,
not to prove the fact of insurance, but solely because the
reference to the insurance is part of the admission." (Id.
at p. 219, [**27] italics added.)
n6 Evidence Code section 1220 provides:
"Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by
the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in
an action to which he is a party in either his individual or representative capacity, regardless of whether
the statement was made in his individual or representative capacity."
n7 Evidence Code section 1155 provides:
"Evidence that a person was, at the time a harm
was suffered by another, insured wholly or partially
against loss arising from liability for that harm is
inadmissible to prove negligence or other wrongdoing."
While we have no argument with that principle, the
exception set forth in North, and relied on by Douglas, is
not here applicable. To the contrary, what Douglas was
attempting to do in the court below is that which North
forbids, namely, "to prove the fact of insurance." (17
Cal. App.2d at p. 219.) Douglas wanted to show the jury
that Continental's insurance company, not Continental,
is the real [**28] party in interest in this lawsuit and
that, in fact, Continental disavowed any participation in
its insurer's allegations of fraud or lack of safety.
The trial court correctly perceived that bringing that
information before the jurors would be highly prejudicial
and misleading. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The same considerations which underlie Evidence Code section 1155
require exclusion of the evidence. (See 1 Witkin, Cal.
Evidence (3d ed. 1986) § 417, p. 391 ["[t]he evidence
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is regarded as both irrelevant and prejudicial"].)
Further, the instant lawsuit was brought only in the
name of Continental; Continental's status as the real
party in interesl was not challenged by Douglas, although such challenge was appropriate if the insurer had
paid Continental in full for its loss. (See 4 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 112, pp. 147-148.)
Although the trial court excluded the entire Robert Six
bulletin, it ruled the last sentence of the bulletin (quoted
above) would be received in evidence if Douglas could
show its relevance: It could do so by producing evidence
it was issued before Continental made the postaccident
design change to remedy the landing gear defect, as
[**29] recommended by Douglas in its safety bulletin.
Douglas, however, failed to carry its burden and now,
on appeal, contends the court by its ruling improperly
reversed the burden of the parties, [*410] confusing
admissibility [***790] with weight. n8 That contention
is devoid of merit. The last sentence of the Robert Six
bulletin was not relevant to impeach Continental's claim
it was defrauded by Douglas, regarding the safety of the
aircraft, if Continental only "continued" to believe the
DC-10 was safe after the landing gear defect was remedied. n9 Therefore, the sentence was properly excluded
absent a proper foundation.
n8 In urging that Continental had the burden of proof on the question when the defect
on Continental's fleet of DC-10's was remedied,
Douglas asserts that information was particularly
within the knowledge of Continental, pointing to the
off-hand remark of Continental's counsel at bench
that "nobody knows" when the changes to the aircraft were made. While it may be true that counsel
was unable to elicit that information at trial, certainly appropriate pretrial discovery directed to that
question would have produced it.
[**30]
n9 We do not subscribe to Douglas's view that the
last sentence of the Robert Six Bulletin characterized
the DC-10 as safe "during the entire time Continental
operated them." (Italics added.)
D. The Starlof Letter Was Properly Admitted in
Evidence.
We find Douglas's argument that the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting the "Starlof letter," and the
evidence associated with it, lacking in merit.
William C. Starlof, the manager of Douglas's Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Liaison Office, sent a
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letter on June 4, 1971 (the Starlof letter or letter), to the
Aircraft Engineering Division of the FAA. The letter
was sent for the specific purpose of demonstrating to the
FAA that the DC-10 was in compliance with its special
condition A-4. That condition related to protection of
the fuel lines in the fuselage in the event of an accident.
Condition A-4 had to be met before the FAA would issue
a "type certificate" showing the aircraft met federal air
regulation standards.
In his letter, Starlof also made an evaluation of the
breakaway characteristics of the aircraft's main landing
[**31] gear with respect to the fuel lines and fuel tanks
in the wings. On page two of the letter, Starlof made
the following statement: "The overall effect of the failure modes described is that the landing gear will break
cleanly without r[u]pturing the fuel tanks or fuel lines.
In addition to the above, it should be noted that the
DC-10 main landing gear and its carry-through structure is similar in design to both the DC-8 and DC-9.
Laboratory failure tests on the DC-8 gear and service
failures which have been experienced on the DC-8 and
DC-9, in most cases, confirm that the gear will sever
cleanly from the wing without failing surrounding primary wing structure." (Italics added.)
Representations similar to that quoted above were
made to Continental in the Douglas sales brochures
and at the precontract briefings. However, [*411]
Continental never saw the Starlof letter until after the
accident, so there was no question that Continental could
not have relied on a misrepresentation in the letter when
purchasing the DC-10.
Douglas claims the court prejudicially erred in admitting the letter in evidence because it enabled Continental
to present to the jury the distorted picture [**32] that
misrepresentations in the letter, regarding the breakaway
characteristics of the landing gear and wing structure,
were relied upon by the FAA in issuing its type certification for the DC-10. As Douglas correctly points out,
the FAA did not have a requirement that applied to protection of the wing fuel tank and lines. nlO However, the
FAA did have a proposed rule which covered that very
subject, although it was not in effect when the Starlof
letter was sent to the FAA. Nevertheless, Douglas's engineers testified that the challenged paragraph was inserted in the letter in an attempt by Douglas to avoid
imposition by the FAA of the proposed rule because it
[***791] would have imposed more rigorous fuel tank
protection requirements on Douglas.
nlO The only evidence on this issue came from
Leonard Williamson, a retired FAA official whose
job for 35 years had been to review aircraft, includ-

Page 10
LEXSEE

ing the DC-10, to see if they met FAA standards
and regulations prior to the issuance of type certification. He testified the FAA would have ignored the
challenged part of the letter in issuing the certificate
inasmuch as federal aviation regulations in effect at
the time did not require protection of the wing fuel
tanks.
[**33]

Douglas argues the trial court erroneously failed to require Continental to prove all the elements of Douglas's
alleged fraud on the FAA - especially reliance - as preliminary facts (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(1)) prior
to admitting the Starlof letter into evidence. Douglas
maintains the letter was only admissible on the fraud or
breach of contract issues if the court first determined the
FAA relied on the alleged misrepresentations in issuing
the type certificate for the DC-10. The type certificate
was, of course, Continental's assurance the FAA determined the aircraft was safe.
Douglas's argument, however, overlooks the fact that
the trial court stated one reason it received the letter
was as circumstantial evidence of Douglas's fraudulent
intent with respect to Continental. Under that theory,
evidence of even an unsuccessful attempt by Douglas
to avoid imposition by the FAA of the proposed rule is
relevant circumstantial evidence of Douglas's intent to
defraud Continental. And, under that theory, the FAA's
reliance or lack thereof was not material to the question
whether the letter was admissible.
It is well established California law that "'[s]ince direct proof of [**34] fraudulent intent is often impossible, the intent may be established by [inference [*412]
from acts of the parties.' [Citation.]" nil (Delos v.
Farmers Insurance Group (1979) 93 Cal.App. 3d 642,
658 [155 Cal.Rptr. 843]; Miller v. National American
Life Ins. Co. (1976) 54 Cal.App. 3d 331, 338 [126
Cal.Rptr. 731]; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts,
op. cit. supra, at § 686, p. 787.) It is also settled law
that if evidence is admissible for any purpose it must be
received, even though it may be highly improper for another purpose. (Daggett v. Atchison T. & S. F Ry. Co.
(1957) 48 Cal.2d 655, 665 [313 R2d 557, 64 A.L.R.2d
1283].)
nil The Starlof letter was not inadmissible "other
acts" evidence under the authority of People v. Holt
(1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 451 [208 Cal.Rptr. 547, 690
P.2d 1207], as Douglas contends. It was admissible under the exception of Evidence Code section
1101, subdivision (b). (See The Atkins Corporation
v. Tourny (1936) 6 Cal.2d 206, 215 [57 P.2d 480];

216 Cal. App. 3d 388, *412; 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1253, **34;
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1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, at § 385, p. 359.)
[**35]
However, the party against whom the evidence is offered is entitled, upon request, to a proper instruction
limiting the purposes for which the evidence may be
considered. (Daggett v. Atchison. T. & S. E Ry. Co.,
supra, 48 CaHdatpp.
665-666; Evid. Code, § 355.)
Here, the trial court properly refused the limiting instruction proffered by Douglas; it was too narrow and
did not correctly inform the jury of the purposes for
which they could consider the Starlof letter. nl2 (See
Agarwal v. Johnson, supra, 25 Cal. 3d at pp. 950951; Downing v. Barrett Mobile Home Transport, Inc.
(1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 519, 523 [113 Cal.Rptr. 277].)
And, contrary to Douglas's assertion, the instructions
the trial court gave the jury covered the material issues and controlling legal principles of the case. (See
Agarwal, supra, at p. 951.)
nl2 Douglas's proposed instruction reads as follows: "The letter from William Starloff to the
Federal Aviation Administration concerning the failure mode of the landing gear was admitted into evidence solely because witness Dennis Parks received
a copy of it after the accident and used it in his
report. It is not evidence of a representation by
McDonnell Douglas Corporation to Continental Air
Lines concerning landing gear breakaway design because Continental Air Lines had not received it before it purchased the DC-10 aircraft."
[**36]
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the evidence. (Evid. Code, §§ 352, 353;
Kessler v. Gray (1978) 77 Cal.App. 3d 284, 291-292
[143 Cal.Rptr. 496].) The court's exercise of discretion
will be upheld on appeal absent a clear error of law or
manifest abuse (Michail v. Fluor Mining & Metals, Inc.
(1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 284, 286-287 [225 Cal.Rptr.
403]) and there was neither. The record shows the judge
weighed the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its
probative value. (Id. at p. 287.) A full expression of
the court's basis for excluding or refusing to exclude evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is not required.
(Ibid.; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, op. cit. supra, at §
303, pp. 273-274.)
[*413] [***792] E. The Trial Court Did Not
Prejudicially Err in Limiting the Testimony of Douglas's
Expert Witness McCarthy.
Douglas contends the trial court prejudicially erred in
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refusing to permit their expert witness, John McCarthy,
"to testify from documents prepared by his subordinates"
or even to mention he relied on those documents in forming his [**37] opinion as to the amount of damage the
aircraft would have sustained had there been no fire.
McCarthy was a Douglas employee who, for the last
25 years, worked in a department known as "Recovery
and Modification Services, Product Support" (RAMS).
He was the manager of the unit for 15 years. His job
in RAMS was to make aircraft repair estimates based on
data furnished by subordinates. McCarthy was involved
in at least a dozen such estimates per year for a quarter
of a century: these estimates ran into the millions of
dollars.
McCarthy personally inspected the DC-10 at the site of
the crash and, from his observations, determined which
parts of the aircraft would have needed repair or replacement even if there had been no fire. Eventually, an
attorney for Douglas asked him to estimate the cost of
the impact damage had there been no fire as a result of
the alleged fraud. McCarthy then requested two regular
members of his staff, House and Rich, each to prepare
an analysis. House's function was to identify and price
the parts needed for the hypothetical job, while Rich
developed the manpower figures and labor costs.
According to McCarthy, the project was a "joint effort." However, [**38] although McCarthy was shown
the numbers produced by House and Rich, he testified
he did not verify them nor did he "review them hard"
because "[t]hey looked like they were in the ballpark."
McCarthy's cost estimate was developed from the information and work sheets they gave him and it was
embodied in a report, Exhibit 11,000.
Continental's counsel objected to McCarthy testifying
on the basis of Exhibit 11,000, arguing that McCarthy
had no personal knowledge of the facts in that report
because he had not personally performed the underlying
work. The trial court sustained the objection and ruled
that McCarthy could not testify that he relied on the analyses by House and Rich or as to the details of Exhibit
11,000. Thus, Douglas argues McCarthy's testimony
was eviscerated and rendered unpersuasive because, in
the eyes of the jury, [*414] it was based on nothing
more than his viewing of the aircraft after the accident
and his general experience. nl3
nl3 Douglas concedes "the evidence suppressed $ 9,825,000 -- and the evidence given - 'at least $
10 million' - were consistent as to amount."
[**39]

216 Cal. App. 3d 388, *414; 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1253, **39;
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The questions presented here are whether McCarthy
should have been allowed to testify (1) that he relied on
the House-Rich cost and price data in forming his opinion on the cost of repairing the aircraft had there been
no fire and (2) regarding the details of Exhibit 11,000.
Under Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b),
an expert's opinion may be M[b]ased on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training,
and education) perceived by or personally known to the
witness or made known to him at or before the hearing,
whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an
opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates
On direct examination the expert may state the reasons
for the opinion and the matter upon which the opinion
is based, unless he is precluded by law from using such
reasons or matter. (Evid. Code, § 802.) The portions
of an opinion based in whole or significant part on matter that is not a proper basis therefor must be excluded
upon objection, although the expert may testify to that
portion of the opinion which is based on proper matter.
(Evid. Code, § 803.)
Here, the analyses [**40] House and Rich compiled for McCarthy were themselves expert opinions.
McCarthy based his final cost estimate for trial on those
analyses, in the report designated Exhibit 11,000. Since
[***793] House and Rich were not present in court to
testify, however, their opinions, embodied in the report,
were hearsay.
In People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 69, at page
92 [211 Cal.Rptr. 102, 695 R2d 189], the Supreme
Court observed that in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.
(1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 788-789 [174 Cal.Rptr.
348], the Court of Appeal explained the current state of
the law, nl4 quoting from Grimshaw with approval as
follows: "'While an expert may state on direct examination the matters on which he relied in forming his
opinion, he may not testify as to the details of such matters if they are otherwise inadmissible. [Citations.] The
rule rests on the rationale that while an expert may give
[*415] reasons on direct examination for his opinions,
including the matters he considered in forming them,
he may not under the guise of reasons bring before the
jury incompetent hearsay evidence. [Citation.] [**41]
Ordinarily, the use of a limiting instruction!,] that matters on which an expert based his opinion are admitted
only to show the basis of the opinion and not for the truth
of the matter[,] cures any hearsay problem involved, but
in aggravated situations, where hearsay evidence is recited in detail, a limiting instruction may not remedy the
problem. [Citations.]'" (Italics added.)
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nl4 Douglas's reliance on Appel v. Burman (1984)
159 Cal App. 3d 1209 [206 Cal.Rptr. 259], is misplaced. Appel predates People v. Coleman, supra,
38 Cal. 3d 69, and to the extent its holding conflicts
with Coleman, it is simply not California law.
In other words, as relevant here, while an expert may
rely on inadmissible hearsay in forming his or her opinion (see People v. Coleman, supra, 38 Cal. 3d at p.
90), and may state on direct examination the matters on
which he or she relied, the expert may [**42] not testify
as to the details of those matters if they are otherwise
inadmissible (38 Cal.3datp. 92).
For example, in Whitfield v. Roth (1974) 10 Cal. 3d
874 [112 Cal.Rptr. 540, 519 P.2d 588], the expert witness neurosurgeon testified that he saw no abnormality
in certain x-ray films. He then testified, over objection, that he presented the films at "'grand rounds at
Stanford"' to about 50 students, residents and faculty
doctors and not one of them could see an abnormality
or detect any pathology. {Id. at p. 894.) The Supreme
Court held the testimony concerning the opinion of the
other doctors who were not present in court was hearsay.
(Ibid.) The reason was obvious. The opportunity to
cross-examine the other doctors as to the basis for their
opinions was denied to the adverse party. nl5 (Ibid.)
nl5 This rule is not to be confused with the limited admissibility rule of Kelley v. Bailey (1961)
189 Cal.App.2d 728, 737-738 [11 Cal.Rptr. 448].
Kelley held that physicians could rely on the reports
of other physicians when testifying, not as independent proof of facts, but as part of the information on
which the testifying physician based his own treatment or diagnosis. The court explained that, upon
request, the jurors should be told that the evidence
was to be considered only for that narrow and limited
purpose.
[**43]

The Whitfield court cited to and relied on Frampton v.
Hartzell (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 771 [4 Cal.Rptr. 427].
In Frampton, the court held the testimony of an expert
witness psychiatrist as to the opinion of the medical staff
at the hospital, where he was a supervisor-psychiatrist,
was inadmissible hearsay. (Id. at p. 773.) The rationale for the holding was that the party to whom the testimony is adverse is denied the right of cross-examination.
(Ibid.)
And, in People v. Young (1987) 189 Cal.App. 3d 891

216 Cal. App. 3d 388, *415; 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1253, **43;
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[234 Cal.Rptr. 819], the Court of Appeal held that psychiatric records relied on by two psychiatrist experts
were inadmissible except to explain that the doctors relied on [*416] the reports in reaching their conclusions
regarding appellant's sanity. (Id. at p. 913.) The court
stated the reports were hearsay and observed that "[t]he
rule which allows an expert to state the reasons upon
which his opinion is based may not be used as a vehicle
to bring before the jury incompetent evidence." (Ibid.)
As the court noted in Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp.
(1987) 191 Qd.App.3d 851f at page 860 [236 Cal.Rptr.
778]: [**44] "Experts may [***794] rely upon hearsay
in forming opinions. They may not relate an out-ofcourt opinion by another expert as independent proof of
fact. [Citation.] It is proper to solicit the fact that another expert was consulted to show the foundation of the
testifying expert's opinion, but not to reveal the content
of the hearsay opinion."
Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing authorities, the trial court correctly ruled that McCarthy could
not testify regarding the contents of the report, Exhibit
11,000, even though it was, in McCarthy's words, a
"joint effort." However, the trial court erred in precluding McCarthy from testifying he relied on the cost and
price figures submitted to him by House and Rich in
forming his expert opinion on the cost of repairing the
aircraft had there been no fire. Douglas was not prejudiced by the trial court's partially erroneous ruling.
F. The Trial Court Did Not Prejudicially Err
in Admitting the Parol Evidence Under the Fraud
Exception to the Parol Evidence Rule.
Douglas next argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence, over its strong objections, testimonial
evidence and promotional brochures which varied and
contradicted [**45] the negotiated terms of the parties'
contract. Douglas urges the admission of this evidence
violated the parol evidence rule, vitiated the integration
clause of the parties' contract, and was unquestionably
prejudicial to Douglas's cause.
The contract negotiated by the parties, by which
Continental acquired its fleet of DC-10's, consists of
the Purchase Agreement and letter agreements, which
are two inches thick, and incorporates by precise reference the Detail Specification which contains almost
another four hundred pages.
The Specification depicts, in detail, the features and
configuration of the aircraft, and describes the performance characteristics of its various components. Prior
to finalization of the Purchase Agreement, the Detail
Specification was provided to Continental, whose engineering department reviewed it and negotiated numer-
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ous changes. In Section 32-10.03.00 of the [*417]
Specification, the parties agreed: "The main landing
gear system shall be designed so that if it fails due to
overloads during takeoff and landing (assuming the overloads are in the vertical plane parallel to the longitudinal
axis of the aircraft), the failure mode is not likely to
rupture [**46] the integral wing fuel tank or fuel lines."
(Italics added.)
Continental never asked for any change in the carefully
drawn wording of the above-quoted section.
The parties articulated their intention that the extensive, detailed contract would constitute the entirety of
their agreement and would not be subject to informal
alterations, waivers or embellishments in the following
integration clause:
"A. This Agreement is the complete and exclusive
statement of the terms and conditions of the entire agreement between the parties hereto. . . .
"B. This Agreement, and any term or condition
thereof, shall not be varied, contradicted, explained or
supplemented by an oral agreement or representation, by
course [of] dealing or performance or by usage of trade,
nor amended or changed in any other manner except
by an instrument in writing of even or subsequent date
hereto, executed by both parties by their duly authorized
representatives."
At the beginning of the trial, Douglas moved in limine to preclude Continental from introducing in evidence
precontract promotional sales brochures Continental received from Douglas and oral statements made by
Douglas engineers and other personnel at [**47] precontract briefings on the DC-10. The court denied the
motion and, based on the "fraud exception" to the parol
evidence rule, held the evidence was not barred.
As a result of this ruling, at least nine sales brochures,
two or three inches thick apiece, were placed before the
jury. Portions of the brochures were blown up for emphasis. (See fh. 16.) Witnesses were questioned at
length about the contents and about [***795] representations made by Douglas's representatives at briefings
which antedated finalization of the contract. nl6
nl6 Douglas also maintains (in a footnote to its
brief) that the brochures were erroneously admitted because Continental did not lay an adequate
foundation for their receipt into evidence. That
is not true. James Colbura, Continental's former
vice-president of Engineering, who was originally
in charge of the evaluation process for the DC-10,
testified that he collected one of every engineering
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technical brochure submitted to Continental during
the Douglas engineering presentations (a volume exceeding one file drawer in his office) and that he
read "every one" of them. Two of the brochures
were found in Continental's files in the structural
engineering department; key Continental personnel
recognized certain brochures; others believed they
read and relied on a particular brochure in evaluating the aircraft; still others recalled receiving information similar to that which appeared in a brochure
or recalled a representation made in a brochure; numerous Douglas witnesses testified that they used
the brochures for sales campaigns and briefings and
that they routinely gave them to prospective purchasers of Douglas aircraft; and, finally, portions of
Continental's Tri-Jet Evaluation paraphrased representations in several of the brochures. The fact that
Continental personnel received, read and relied on
the brochures to evaluate and reach a decision with
respect to purchasing the DC-10 may be inferred circumstantially from the totality of the evidence. (See
1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) § 284,
pp. 253-254; § 285, pp. 254-255.) At the time
of trial, approximately 15 or 16 years had passed
since the DC-10 was evaluated and the contract finalized. Under these circumstances, there was more
than adequate direct and circumstantial evidence that
the brochures admitted in evidence were relied upon
by Continental personnel in deciding to purchase the
DC-10. It cannot be gainsaid that "[t]rial judges
should be sensitive to the fact that a trial is a search
for the truth and because of the nature of a fraud
action liberality in the receipt of evidence should be
indulged to a degree commensurate with the difficulties of the proof." (Peskin v. Squires (1957) 156
Cal.App.2d 240, 249 [319 P.2d 405].)
[**48]
[*418] In its opening brief, Douglas complains specifically about the admission of a single sentence appearing
in small print in several of the brochures, which made
this promise for the DC-10: "The fuel tank will not
rupture under crash load conditions." (Italics added.)
As we will explain, under California law, the admission of this particular sentence in the brochures, and
testimony of like oral promises Douglas made, was error.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1856 sets forth the
parol evidence rule. Subdivision (a) of that section provides: "Terms set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
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contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement." nl7 (Italics added.)
nl 7 Section 2202 of the California Uniform
Commercial Code is identical to this provision in
all material respects.
Subdivision (b) of section 1856 provides that terms set
forth in a writing "may [**49] be explained or supplemented by evidence of consistent additional terms unless
the writing is intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement." nl8 (Italics
added.) Here, the parties did so intend. They apparently
had this particular provision in mind when, in Article
20 of the Purchase Agreement, they expressly stipulated,
inter alia, that the terms of the agreement could not be
"varied, contradicted, explained or supplemented by an
oral agreement or representation" and that the agreement
was "the complete and exclusive statement of the terms
and conditions of the entire agreement. . . . " (Italics
added.)
nl8 Subsection (b) of section 2202 of the
California Uniform Commercial Code contains essentially the same provision.
[*419] The justification for the admission of the parol
evidence was the "fraud exception" to the parol evidence
rule contained in subdivision (g) of section 1856, which
provides in relevant part: "This section does not exclude
other [**50] evidence . . . to establish illegality or
fraud." nl9 (Italics added.)
nl9 In making its ruling, the court stated: "The
law in California is [that] fraudulent representations
inducing the execution of a contract [are] generally
admissible as an exception to the parol evidence rule,
and that a party cannot contract against the effect of
his own fraud."
But the fraud exception is not applicable where
"promissory fraud" n20 is alleged, unless the false
promise is independent of or consistent with the written instrument. [***796] (Simmons v. Cal. Institute
of Technology (1949) 34 Cal. 2d 264, 274-275 [209 P.2d
581]; Newmark v. H and H Products Mfg. Co. (1954)
128 Cal.App.2d 35, 37-38 [274 P.2d 702]; Cobbs v.
Cobbs (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 780, 784-786 [128 P.2d
373].) It does not apply where, as here, parol evidence
is offered to show a fraudulent promise directly at variance with the terms of the written agreement. (Bank of
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America etc. Assn. v. Pendergrass (1935) 4 Cal. 2d 258,
263 [48 P.2d 659]; [**51] see Simmons v. Cal. Institute
of Technology, supra, 34 Cal.2datpp. 274-275; Green
v. Del-Camp Investments. Inc. (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d
479, 482 [14 Cal.Rptr. 420].)
n20 '"A promise made without any intention of
performing it' constitutes actual fraud." (Coast Bank
v. Holmes (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 581, 591 [97
Cal.Rptr. 30]; Civ. Code, § 1572, subd. 4.)
Douglas's representation that the fuel tank "will not
rupture" is properly analyzed as a form of promissory fraud. (See Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the
Parol Evidence Rule (1961) 49 Cal.L.Rev. 877, 881,
882, 886.)
In Pendergrass, supra, 4 Cal. 2d 258, at page 263, the
Supreme Court announced the law of California as it applies to this question: "Our conception of the rule which
permits parol evidence of fraud to establish the invalidity
of the instrument is that it must tend to establish some
independent fact [**52] or representation, some fraud
in the procurement of the instrument or some breach of
confidence concerning its use, and not a promise directly
at variance with the promise of the writing." (Italics
added.)
Here, the Detail Specification recited that (1) the landing gear "shall be designed" so that (2) under certain
specified load conditions (i.e., up and aft loads), (3)
failure of the landing gear "is not likely" to rupture the
wing fuel tanks or fuel lines.
Therefore, the unequivocal promise in the brochures,
elicited in testimony, that the wing fuel tank and
fuel lines "will not rupture," varied and contradicted
the qualified language of the Detail Specification.
Continental's argument that the evidence of that absolute guarantee was properly admitted fails to acknowledge the existence and viability of Pendergrass. [*420]
(See Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Marina View
Heights Dev. Co. (1977) 66 Cal.App. 3d 101, 161 [135
Cal.Rptr. 802]; Davis v. Gulf Oil Corp. (CD. Cal.
1983) 572 F.Supp. 1393, 1400-1401.) The cases on
which Continental relies do not limit or vitiate its applicability; several predate it; [**53] n21 others acknowledge its limitation on the fraud exception; n22 while in
still others, the parol evidence in question was not offered to prove misrepresentations about subjects covered
by the agreement. n23
n21 Simmons v. Ratterree Land Co. (1932) 217
Cal. 201, 203-204 [17P.2d 727]; Ferguson v. Koch
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(1928) 204 Cal. 342, 347 [268 P. 342, 58 A.L.R.
1176]; Hunt v. L. M. Field, Inc. (1927) 202 Cal.
701, 703-704 [262 P. 730]; Mooney v. Cyriacks
(1921) 185 Cal. 70, 81-82 [195 P. 922].
n22 Hartman v. Shell Oil Co.
(1977) 68
Cal.App.3d 240, 251 [137 Cal.Rptr. 244]; Oak
Industries. Inc. v. Foxboro Co. (S.D.Cal. 1984)
596 F.Supp. 601, 607-608.
n23 Richard v. Baker (1956) 141 Cal. App. 2d 857,
863 [297 P.2d 674]; File v. U.S. Machinery Supply
Co. (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 176, 179 [274 P2d
913]; Morris v. Harbor Boat Building Co. (1952)
112 Cal.App.2d 882, 888 [247P2d 589].
[**54]
Continental's reliance on Munchow v. Kraszewski
(1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 831 [128 Cal.Rptr. 762] is likewise unavailing. First, its incorrect pronouncement that
"parol evidence is always admissible to prove fraud" (id.
at p. 836, italics added) is dictum and, secondly, it relies on a "line of cases" (ibid.) which consist of (1)
decisions antedating Pendergrass, and (2) court of appeal decisions in which the parol evidence offered was
not at variance with the instruments in question (id. at
p. 836, fn. 5).
Finally, Continental's reliance on Cobbledick-Kibbe
Glass Co. v. Pugh (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 123 [326
P.2d 197] is misplaced. The holding in CobbledickKibbe is contrary to established California law and is
factually distinguishable. The nub of the court's holding was that, inasmuch as the seller deceived the buyer
by tendering a contract without warning him it contained
language on the back contrary to the seller's oral representations, the seller could not use that provision to
bar the buyer's fraud action in which he claimed reliance [**55] on the inconsistent oral representations.
[***797] Here, unlike the buyer in Cobbledick-Kibbe,
Continental cannot claim it was unaware of the terms of
the Detail Specification or of the integration clause in
the contract.
Although neither party has raised the issue, we note
the Pendergrass rule, which precludes the admission of
evidence of a false promise inconsistent with the terms
of a written agreement to prove fraud, has been criticized in at least one court of appeal decision (Coast
Bank v. Holmes, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at pp. 591592; see Glendale Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v.
Marina View Heights Dev. Co., supra, 66 Cal.App.3d
at p. 161) and in early [*421] law review articles
of this state (Note (1950) 38 Cal.L.Rev. 535; Sweet,
Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, supra,
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49 Cal.L.Rev. 877).
More recently, the eminent Bernard E. Witkin opined
in his treatise on evidence (2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence
(3d ed. 1986) § 1000, pp. 946-947) that the rule may
be questioned today where a party seeks fraud damages,
rather than merely attempting to avoid or nullify the main
agreement. Mr. [**56] Witkin expressed that view because in 1985 the California Supreme Court reversed the
long-standing and analogous rule that a tort action for
damages could not be based on a false promise where
the promise itself was unenforceable under the statute of
frauds. n24
n24 In Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39
Cal.3d 18, 29 [216 Cal.Rptr. 130, 702 R2d 212],
the Supreme Court disapproved the then 44-year-old
rule of Kroger v. Baur (1941) 46 Cal.App. 2d 801,
803, that a tort action for damages could not be based
on a false promise where the promise itself was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. One of the
considerations of the Supreme Court which pointed
to the "'demise of the Kroger rule'" (39 Cal.3d at
p. 29) was "'Comment (c) to section 530 of the
Restatement Second of the Law of Torts [which]
states that a misrepresentation of one's intention is
actionable [fraud] even "when the agreement is oral
and made unenforceable by the statute of frauds, or
when it is unprovable and so unenforceable under the
parol evidence rule.""' (39 Cal. 3d at p. 29, italics
added; see 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts,
op. cit. supra, at § 687, pp. 788-789 & § 688, pp.
789-790.)
[**57]

However, while the Pendergrass rule may be subject
to criticism, and even questioned, it is still the law and
we are bound by it (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321,
369 P. 2d 937]), as was the court of appeal which criticized the rule 18 years ago in Coast Bank v. Holmes,
supra, 19 Cal.App. 3d at pages 591-592. (SeeGlendale
Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Marina View Heights Dev.
Co., supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 161.) (See fn. 25.)
Thus, under the Pendergrass rule, the trial court erred
in admitting evidence of Douglas's precontract promise
that the wing fuel tank "will not rupture." n25
n25 Evidence of Douglas's promise in its sales
brochures, that "[t]he main landing gear will be
tested on the full-scale wing, etc., fuselage specimen to demonstrate the fail-safe integrity of the landing gear attaching structure and wipe-off character-
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istics of the landing gear design," was not barred
by the parol evidence rule. That promise does not
vary or contradict section A.(l) of Article 10 of
the Purchase Agreement which covers the subject.
(Bank of America etc. Assn. v. Pendergrass, supra,
4 Cal. 2d at p. 263.) The test is within the category
of bargained-for flight tests "to demonstrate compliance with the performance guarantees set forth in the
Detail Specification." (Art. 10, § A.(l).) Thus, it
is consistent with the matters covered by the agreement. Coast Bank v. Holmes, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d
at p. 591; Simmons v. Cal. Institute of Technology,
supra, 34Cal.2datp. 274.)
Likewise, the representation by Douglas in its
sales brochures regarding the "successful DC-8 and
DC-9 design experience" was not barred by the parol
evidence rule, as it is an independent representation,
not a promise directly at variance with the terms of
the contract. (Bank of America etc. v. Pendergrass,
supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 263.)
[**58]
[*422] Douglas argues it was prejudiced by the court's
error in admitting that evidence because its effect was to
permit Continental to parlay the qualified ("not likely")
contract language it had negotiated into an absolute guarantee that the fuel tank rupture would never occur and
to argue to the jury that since it did, Douglas must have
committed a species of fraud.
The question we must answer then is whether the erroneous admission of Douglas's precontract promise requires a reversal of this cause. If the single sentence to
which Douglas directs our attention [***798] were the
only representation on the subject of gear breakaway and
wing fuel tank rupture emphasized by Douglas in examining witnesses, and in closing argument, we might be
persuaded by Douglas's claim of prejudice. However,
it was not. Continental gave at least the same attention
and emphasis to several similar representations which
appeared in many of the brochures. Those other representations were factual, and thus admissible under the
fraud exception to the parol evidence rule, for reasons
which we explain below. The following are examples:
"The structure is designed and tested for crashworthiness. The landing [**59] gear, flaps, and wing engines/pylons are designed for wipe-off without rupturing
the wing fuel tank or fuselage shell structure." (Italics
added.)
and
"These multiple load paths [on the wing] are designed
to provide strength greater than that of the gear itself in
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order to prevent rupture of the fuel tank in the event of
impact with some obstacle during landing and taxiing."
(Italics added.)
and
"Under crash loading conditions, the main landing
gear is designed to break away from the wing structure without rupturing fuel lines or the integral wing
fuel tank." (Italics added.)
and
"The [wing] support structure is designed to a higher
strength than the gear to prevent fuel tank rupture due
to an accidental landing gear overload." (Italics added.)
In its supplemental post-oral-argument brief, Douglas
urges that the four representations quoted, supra, are
also inadmissible parol promises of future performance,
not admissible factual representations, because the aircraft [*423] was "to be delivered in the future" and
"Continental clearly understood that at the time . . .
the brochures [were] distributed, the aircraft was still in
the design stage." [**60]
Douglas's argument fails, however, to acknowledge
that one of Continental's main theories of the case was
that when these precontract representations were made,
there was in fact no such design in place with respect
to the landing gear's breakaway feature; n26 i.e., there
was never a written directive to accomplish such a design; Douglas's engineers never agreed on a description
of how the gear was to fail safely; and the many separate groups and departments at Douglas, responsible for
the design, never met and never coordinated a design approach or concept with respect to the breakaway feature.
(When the contract was entered two or three years later,
its incorporated Design Specification notably provided
instead that "[t]he main landing gear shall be designed
so that if it fails . . . the failure mode is not likely to
rupture the integral fuel tank or fuel lines.")
n26 With respect to the contract claim only, the
parties stipulated that the main landing gear, a "covered component," was designed in April 1969 for
purposes of determining whether that covered component had a design defect in view of the thenexisting state of the art.
[**61]
Therefore, the four representations from the
brochures, quoted supra, which unequivocally announced that the landing gear breakaway design was then
a fait accompli, were admissible as factual representations by Douglas to Continental that it had already ac-
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complished its safety-oriented design for that particular
feature of the aircraft. n27 That evidence was properly
considered by the jury on each of Continental's relevant
theories of fraud.
n27 We have considered the other issues raised
in Douglas's post-oral-argument supplemental brief
and find them equally lacking in merit.
All the representations from the brochures pertaining
to the breakaway feature of the DC-10, quoted supra,
were read to the jury in Continental's closing argument.
Counsel did not unduly emphasize the single promissory
representation from Douglas's brochures which, as we
discussed, was admitted in error. Further, that promise
was less the subject of inquiry during Continental's examination of witnesses than were the other representations [**62] about the breakaway feature.
[***799] Thus, we must conclude, after an examination of the entire record, that the challenged evidence of
promissory fraud was merely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence on that subject; consequently,
its admission was not prejudicial to Douglas's cause.
(Cal. Const., art., VI, § 13; Kalfus v. Fraze (1955) 136
Cal.App.2d 415, 423 [288 P.2d 967]; 9 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure, [*424] Appeal, op. cit. supra, at § 338,
pp. 345-346.) There was here no miscarriage of justice.
(Ibid.)
G. The Precontract Promotional Materials Can Form
the Basis of Continental's Fraud Claims.
Douglas's contention that the precontract promotional
brochures cannot form the basis for a fraud claim is devoid of merit. n28
n28 For that reason, and for reasons which become
apparent in the following sections, we need not discuss whether Douglas's representation in the Detail
Specification itself was false.
First, Douglas argues that "[t]he Uniform Commercial
Code and [**63] cases interpreting it have recognized
that general promotional observations of this type are
merely expressions of opinion that are not actionable as
express warranties nor as 'fraudulent statements.'" With
respect to Continental's fraud claims, the only causes of
action with which we are now concerned, the cases cited
by Douglas do not support its argument.
The alleged false representations in the subject
brochures were not statements of "opinion" or mere
"puffing." They were, in essence, representations that
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the DC-10 was a safe aircraft. (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975)
14 CaUd 104, 111-112 [120 Cal.Rptr. 681, 534 P.2d
377, 74A.L.R.3d 1282].) In Hauter, the Supreme Court
held that promises of safety are not statements of opinion ~ they are "representations of fact." (Ibid.; Keith
v. Buchanan (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 13, 21-22 [220
Cal.Rptr. 392].)
Next, Douglas urges that the statements in the
brochures are not actionable because they are not express warranties under Commercial Code section 2313
and, further, "they were effectively disclaimed by the
parties' contract." The point Douglas [**64] is apparently making with respect to the fraud claims is that the
integration clause of the parties' contract bars any representations in the brochures which are at variance with
their negotiated agreement.
We do not accept Douglas's argument, because to do
so would be to nullify Code of Civil Procedure section 1856, subdivision (g), the fraud exception to the
parol evidence rule, which specifically allows evidence
of representations which contradict or vary the terms of
a contract in order to establish fraud. The integration
clause has no effect on the fraud exception to that rule.
(2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, op. cit. supra, at § 972,
pp. 918-919.) "Such evidence does not contradict the
terms of an effective integration since it shows that the
purported instrument has no legal effect." (Id. at § 997,
p. 944.)
[*425] H. There Is Substantial Evidence That
Douglas's Misrepresentations Regarding Landing Gear
Breakaway Were Material and That Continental
Reasonably Relied on Them in Deciding to Purchase
the DC-10.
Douglas contends in its opening brief that there was no
substantial evidence that its precontract representations
were material or that Continental reasonably [**65] relied on them in deciding to purchase the DC-10.
"When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that
there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the
power of an appellate court begins and ends with the
determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding." (Mother Lode Bank v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp. (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 807, 810-811
[120 Cal.Rptr. 429].) In assessing the sufficiency of
the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the judgment, drawing all reasonable
inferences and disregarding all contradictory evidence.
(Campbell v. Southern Pacific Co. (1978) 22 Cal. 3d
51, 60 [148 Cal.Rptr. 596, 583 R2d 121].)
[***800] Here, the evidence is overwhelming that
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Douglas's representations, that the landing gear were
designed to break away from the wing without rupturing the wing fuel tank (as quoted in section F, supra),
were material and Continental justifiably relied on them.
The materiality of the representations can hardly be
questioned. Any airline shopping for aircraft [**66] to
service its customers naturally searches for planes that
are safe. (Cf. Hauter v. Zogarts, supra, 14 Cal.3d at
p. 113.)
While it is true, as Douglas urges, that to sustain its
fraud verdict, Continental was required to demonstrate
that those representations were of such materiality that
the contract would not have been entered without them
(Adkins v. Wyckoff (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 684, 689
[313 P.2d 592]), it is equally true that they "need not be
the sole cause of damage" (\hsquez v. Superior Court
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 814, fn. 9 [94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484
P.2d 964, 53 A.L.R.3d 513]; Wennerholm v. Stanford
Univ. Sch. of Med. (1942) 20 Cal. 2d 713, 717 [128
P.2d522, 141A.L.R. 1358]).
Further, reliance is also established "where the representation substantially influenced [the] choice, even
though other influences operated as well." (5 Witkin,
Summary Cal. Law, Torts, op. cit. supra, at § 711, p.
811; see BAJI No. 12.51.) Thus, Douglas's argument,
that Continental [*426] [**67] must prove a clean landing gear breakaway was a sine qua non of its decision to
purchase the DC-10, rather than the L-1011, must fail.
Moreover, it is not necessary to show reliance upon
false representations by direct evidence, (\hsquez v.
Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 814.) "'The
fact of reliance upon alleged false representations may
be inferred from the circumstances attending the transaction which oftentimes afford much stronger and more
satisfactory evidence of the inducement which prompted
the party defrauded to enter into the contract than his direct testimony to the same effect.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
In fact, where representations have been made in regard
to a material matter and action has been taken, in the
absence of evidence showing the contrary, reliance on
the representations will be presumed. (Ibid.)
Here, both materiality and reliance are demonstrated
by the fact that Continental evaluated the DC-10 breakaway design in its "Tri-Jet Evaluation," which compared
the DC-10 with the L-1011 for the purpose of deciding
which aircraft to purchase. Douglas was the only possible source for the [**68] information; there was no way
Continental could independently investigate or analyze
the adequacy of that design.
An examination of the Tri-Jet Evaluation shows that,
in evaluating the DC-10, Continental's engineers fol-
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lowed virtually the exact format set forth in a Douglas
briefing memorandum. n29 Donald DuPont, the
Continental engineer who evaluated the aircraft's structures, recalls using Douglas brochures to prepare the
DC-10 main landing gear evaluation. The wording of
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Flight Controls
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Stairs
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In fact, under the heading "Main Landing Gear
Support," the Continental engineers simply paraphrased
the description from Douglas's brochures in [**69] its
evaluation: " . . . Multiple load paths are provided
for fail safe capability.
[*427] The wing structure
[***801] is stronger than the main landing gear to prevent fuel tank rupture in the event of a crash induced
gear 'wipe-off.'"
Numerous witnesses testified that Douglas made oral
presentations to Continental regarding the DC-10 structure and landing gear design and provided Continental
personnel with the promotional sales brochures.
Martin Taylor, Continental's vice-president responsible for the DC-10 evaluation, said Continental asked for
and received assurances that if the plane went off the runway, no fire would result from landing gear failure. He
recalled that during numerous briefings, Douglas represented that the gear was designed to break away without
rupturing the fuel tank. He said that was a very important subject to Continental.
Richard Adams, Taylor's superior, reviewed and relied on the Tri-Jet Evaluation in determining the DC-10
was a safe airplane. He testified that had he been told by
his subordinates that the DC-10 gear was not designed
to break away without rupturing the fuel tank, he would
"definitely not" have recommended that Continental purchase the aircraft. [**70] Alexander Damm, Adams's
superior, and the President of Continental, said the technical evaluation of the two planes was very important to
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portions of the Tri-Jet Evaluation was the same as, or
similar to, that in many of the brochures.
n29
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him in deciding which aircraft to purchase. He, too,
would not have recommended an aircraft he did not believe to be safe.
The foregoing evidence provides more than substantial
evidence that Continental relied on Douglas's representations regarding landing gear breakaway in choosing to
purchase the DC-10 and that those representations were
material.
Douglas next argues, however, that if Continental did
so rely, its reliance was unreasonable and unjustified as
a matter of law. In support of that argument, Douglas
points to the qualified language on the subject of landing gear breakaway in the parties' negotiated contract
and the contract's integration clause which recited that
the Purchase Agreement contained the complete statement of the terms between the parties.
Douglas's reasoning, however, ignores the clear mandate of our legislature that, when fraud is alleged, the
parol evidence rule does not apply, and evidence of precontract representations which vary or contradict the
terms of an integrated contract are admissible. (Code
Civ. [**71] Proc, § 1856, subd. (g); 2 Witkin, Cal.
Evidence, op. cit. supra, at § 972, pp. 918-919.)
The theory of the exception is that such evidence does
not contradict the terms of an effective integration, since
it shows the purported instrument has no legal effect.
(2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, op. cit. supra, at § 997,
pp. 944-945.)
[*428] While we acknowledge that
the exception renders the bargain of the parties and the
integration clause of their contract meaningless, our ac-
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ceptance of Douglas's argument would nullify the fraud
exception to the parol evidence rule which has been a
part of California statutory law since the Code of Civil
Procedure was adopted in 1872. That we cannot do; we
must obey the mandate of our Legislature.
Finally, Douglas appears to argue in its reply brief,
both with respect to representations in the Design
Specification and the brochures, that there is no substantial evidence of a "knowing or reckless misrepresentation." We disagree. Fraudulent intent may be established by inference from the circumstances and the acts
of the parties. (Miller v. National American Life Ins.
Co., supra, 54 Cal.App.3datp. 338; [**72] seeDelos
v. Farmers Insurance Group, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d at
p. 658.)
Here, Douglas's sales brochures contain representations which amount to absolute, unqualified guarantees
that the landing gear "is" or "are" designed to break away
without rupturing the wing fuel tanks. However, the
contract's Design Specification states the landing gear
"shall be designed" so that under certain specified conditions the landing gear "is not likely" to rupture the wing
fuel tanks. By that language Douglas revealed that even
at that later date, when the contract was executed, there
was still no design yet in place which would warrant an
absolute [***802] guarantee regarding the breakaway
characteristics of the landing gear.
Although the record is replete with evidence of fraudulent intent, that fact standing alone supports a finding
that Douglas was, at the least, reckless in making representations to Continental, in its sales brochures and
briefings, that the landing gear was designed to break
away without rupturing the wing fuel tanks. Certainly
Douglas's sales representatives should have known
whether a particular feature of the aircraft Douglas was
promoting with [**73] such vigor was already designed
or was still being designed (so that its performance was
yet uncertain).
"[Fjalse representations made recklessly and without
regard for their truth in order to induce action by another are the equivalent of misrepresentations knowingly
and intentionally uttered." (Yellow Creek Logging Corp.
v. Dare (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 50, 55 [30 Cal.Rptr.
629].) Therefore, there is substantial evidence of the
requisite intent for intentional fraud. A fortiori, there
is also substantial evidence of the intent required for
negligent misrepresentation.
For the foregoing reasons we conclude the evidence
supports the jury's findings of liability on either or both
of those theories of fraud.
[*429] I. The Trial Court's Treatment of the Service
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Life Policy Claim Did Not "Poison" the Entire Lawsuit.
Douglas contends the trial court erred in submitting
to the jury Continental's claim based on the Service Life
Policy and in vague terms complains "prejudicial admission of documents and testimony relating to this spurious
issue poisoned the entire lawsuit. . . . "
Douglas's only specific complaint, however, is that
its postaccident [**74] "Service Bulletins" regarding
landing gear modification, admitted on the "spurious"
contract claim to show a design defect, were improperly
considered by the jury on the fraud claims, inasmuch
as the trial court refused its requests for an instruction
that the bulletins could not be considered "in determining
whether Douglas committed negligent misrepresentation
or fraud." (See Evid. Code, § 1151.)
The record shows, however, that Douglas did not object to the admission of one of the bulletins in evidence
and did not request a limiting instruction when either
bulletin was admitted. The bulletins were admissible not
only to show notice and a defect with respect to the contract claim, but were also admissible, and could properly
be considered by the jury, on the factual question pertaining to Douglas's statute of limitations defense to the
fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action.
Thus, while the trial court may have erred in refusing Douglas's requested limiting instructions, this court
cannot say the jury's consideration of those bulletins
with respect to Continental's fraud theories so prejudiced Douglas's case that there was here a miscarriage
of justice. (Cal. Const., [**75] art. VI, § 13.)
J. The Jury Was Properly Instructed That the Measure
of Damages for Fraud Is the Market Value of the
Aircraft.
Douglas argues the trial court erred in instructing the
jury on the measure of damages for fraud. Specifically,
Douglas complains the trial court permitted Continental
to recover the market value of the aircraft under a
"benefit-of-the-bargain" theory, whereas the damages
should properly have been measured by the "out-ofpocket" rule.
According to Douglas, the proper measure of damages in fraud actions involving the sale of property is
"explicitly and exclusively" set forth in [*430] Civil
Code section 3343 as "the difference between the actual
value of that with which the defrauded person parted and
the actual value of that which he received" - the "outof-pocket" rule - plus additional damages arising out of
the particular transaction, as detailed in subdivisions (a)
(1) through (4).
The court, however,

instructed the jury that
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Continental could recover as damages [***803] the
market value of the aircraft at the time of the accident, less the amount of damages from causes other
than the fraud, and less the value of the parts salvaged.
Douglas maintains [**76] the court's damage formula
used a benefit-of-the-bargain measure which improperly
allowed Continental to use its fraud cause of action to recover contractual-type expectations damages which Civil
Code section 3343 forbids.
Thus, Douglas raises two questions: (1) Does Civil
Code section 3343 set forth the exclusive (out-of-pocket)
measure of damages for fraud actions and (2) in such actions, is the out-of-pocket rule the only measure of damages which may be applied? We answer both questions
in the negative for reasons we explain below.
In Stout v. Turney (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 718 [150
Cal.Rptr. 637, 586 P.2d 1228], which involved an action for fraud in the sale of real estate, the Supreme
Court, while discussing a damages question under Civil
Code section 3343, unequivocally acknowledged the
1963 enactment of the California Uniform Commercial
Code, "which in section 2721 n30 permitted full
'benefit-of-the-bargain' recovery to defrauded persons
subject to its provisions." (22 Cal.3d at p. 726, fn.
omitted.) n31 Here, Douglas's sale of the DC-10 [*431]
fleet to Continental was clearly governed [**77] by the
provisions of the California Uniform Commercial Code.
n30 California Uniform Commercial Code section
2721 provides in pertinent part: "Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available under this division for nonfraudulent
breach. . . . "
n31 A benefit-of-the-bargain measure of recovery
is also appropriate under Civil Code section 3343.
Douglas relies on Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948)
31 Cal.2d 744, 762 [192 R2d 935], in which the
Supreme Court held that section 3343 requires the
exclusive use of the out-of-pocket rule as a measure
of damages for fraud. However, Douglas ignores
the holding of Vford v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal. 2d
736 [336 P. 2d 534], in which the Bagdasarian rule
was modified when the court, in order to achieve
a just result, refused to limit recovery to plaintiff's
out-of-pocket loss. Thereafter, in Coleman v. Ladd
Ford Co. (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 90 [29 Cal.Rptr.
832], the Court of Appeal created a new exception
to the Bagdasarian interpretation of section 3343,
relying on the Supreme Court's departure from the
out-of-pocket rule in Ward. In Coleman, the court
declared fraud damages could be recovered under an
alternative and cumulative "'loss of bargain' rule."
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(Id. at pp. 93, 94; cited in Stout v. Turney, supra,
22 Cal. 3d at p. 726; see Hartman v. Shell Oil Co.
(1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 240, 246-247 [137 Cal.Rptr.
244].) "Both Ward and Coleman evidence the courts'
concern over the mechanical application of the 'out
of pocket' rule required by the Bagdasarian interpretation of section 3343." (Notes (1964) 11 UCLA
L.Rev. 859, 884.)
[**78]
In its opinion, the Stout court noted the Legislative
Counsel's comment to section 2721 in which counsel
observed that the purpose of the section, "'according to
the [California Uniform Commercial Code] comments,
is to make the remedy of buyer or seller where there is
fraud as broad as, and coextensive with, the remedies
where fraud is absent [and that the] section would perhaps n32 change the rule of Civil Code § 3343 stating
the so-called "out-of-pocket" rule . . . and substitute
or permit the so-called "loss of bargain" rule . . . .'
[Citation.]" (22 Cal. 3d at pp. 726-727, fn. 10.)
n32 Douglas, pointing to the words "would perhaps" in the Legislative Counsel's comment to section 2721, argues the comment is mere speculation.
However, the court's acknowledgment, 15 years after this state's adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code, that section 2721 permits full benefit-of-thebargain recovery to persons subject to its provisions
(22 Cal. 3d at p. 726), now removes any doubt as to
the effect of that section.
[**79]
The Stout court also cited (at pp. 726-727) to a law
review comment, Deceit Damages in California: Old
Problem ~ New Departure? (1974) 14 Santa Clara
Law. 325, 345-347, which stated: "The adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code in California further complicated the tangle of rules for fraud damages. California
Commercial Code section 2721 allows defrauded persons to secure the benefit of their bargain. The provision
was intended to equalize the remedy of buyer or seller in
fraud and breach of warranty cases. California's 'outof-pocket' statute [Civ. Code, § 3343] was not repealed
despite its sharp conflict with the Commercial Code."
n33 (Id. at p. 347, italics added, fns. omitted.)
n33 Other law review articles of this state also
suggest that section 2721, rather than Civil Code
section 3343, governs when the fraudulent transaction involves the purchase of goods. (See, e.g.,
Sebert, Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in
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Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving
the Objective of Full Compensation (1986) 33 UCLA
L.Rev. 1565, 1601, fit. 127; Hurd & Bush,
Unconscionability: A Matter of Conscience for
California Consumers (1973) 25 Hastings L.J. 1,
27-28, Jh. 151.)
[**80] [***804]
And, Bernard E. Witkin, in his treatise on Torts (6
Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts,
§ 1441, p. 916), lists California Uniform Commercial
Code section 2721 as an exception to the out-of-pocket
rule of Civil Code section 3343, noting "[t]he purpose
of [section 2721] is to give the defrauded buyer of goods
the same remedies as those specified for breach of warranty, and therefore in a proper case to give him the
benefit of his bargain." n34 (Italics added.)
n34 Douglas nonetheless maintains that principles of statutory construction lead to the conclusion
that Civil Code section 3343 supersedes California
Uniform Commercial Code section 2721. Relying
on Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976)
16Cal.3dl,
7[128 Cal.Rptr. 673, 547R2d 449],
it argues that the provisions of two different codes
dealing with the same subject matter must be regarded as a single statute and harmonized to the extent possible. According to Douglas's argument, if
they cannot be reconciled, the later statute controls.
Pointing to the 1971 amendment to section 3343,
Douglas argues that section 3343 is the later and controlling statute, inasmuch as the Commercial Code
was adopted earlier, in 1963. We are not persuaded.
The rule of statutory construction most relevant
here was stated by our Supreme Court in People
v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, at page 479 [82
Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 R2d580], as follows: "'It is the
general rule that where the general statute standing
alone would include the same matter as the special
act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will
be considered as an exception to the general statute
whether it was passed before or after such general
enactment.'"
Here, Civil Code section 3343 is a general statute
which provides the measure of damages when a
party has been defrauded in the purchase, sale or
exchange of all manner of property. In contrast,
California Uniform Commercial Code section 2721
is a special statute which provides remedies for fraudulent transactions involving solely consumer goods.
Therefore, under the rules of statutory construction,
section 2721 is the controlling statute.
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[**81]
[*432] The appropriate remedy for this case is contained in California Uniform Commercial Code section
2714, subdivision (2), which provides: "The measure
of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at
the time and place of acceptance between the value of
the goods accepted and the value they would have had if
they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances
show proximate damages of a different amount." (Italics
added.)
In comment number three of the Uniform Commercial
Code comments to section 2-714, it is noted that
"[s]ubsection (2) describes the usual, standard and reasonable method of ascertaining damages in the case of
breach of warranty but it is not intended as an exclusive
measure. . . . "
For example, in Harlan v. Smith (Ala. Civ. App. 1986)
507 So.2d 943, 945, the court held a party's use of a
product for a period of time after sale without notice of
a defect constituted "special circumstances" which took
the case out of the "time and place of acceptance" provisions of section 2-714, subdivision (2). Therefore, the
party who lacked notice needed to prove the value of the
item at the time of the effective discovery of the [**82]
defect rather than its value at the date of acceptance.
(Ibid.)
Most analogous to the instant matter are cases which
involve breach of a warranty of title, where the purchaser
used the goods for a period of time without any notice of
defective title and, after discovery of the defect, is completely dispossessed of the item. In those cases, too, the
courts have found special circumstances which take the
case out of the time and place of acceptance provisions of
section 2714. They hold the correct measure of damages
is the value of the product at the time the buyer effectively lost [*433] possession and use of it, not the price
of the item at the time of sale. (See, e. g., City Car Sales,
Inc. v. McAlpin (Ala. Civ.App. 1979) 380 So. 2d 865,
868, cert. den. (Ala. 1980) 380 So.2d 869; Schneidt
v. Absey Motors, Inc. (N.D. 1976) 248 N.W.2d 792,
798; De Weber v. Bob Rice Ford, Inc. (1979) 99 Idaho
847 [590 P.2d 103, 105]; Ricklefs v. Clemens (1975)
216 Kan. 128 [531 P.2d 94, 99]; Metal Craft, Inc. v.
Pratt (1985) 65Md.App. 281 [500A.2d329, 336-337];
[**83] Canterra Petro. v. Wstern Drill. & Min. (N.D.
1987) 418 N.W.2d 267, 275; see also Annot., Measure
of Damages in Action for Breach of Warranty [***805]
of Title to Personal Property under UCC § 2-714 (1979)
94A.L.R.3d583.) n35
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n35 In a case decided before the 1935 enactment
of Civil Code section 3343, and during the period
when California subscribed to the benefit-of-bargain
rule in fraud cases, the Supreme Court observed that
the "measure of damages which a person is ordinarily entitled to recover in an action for deceit in the
sale of property is the difference between the actual
value of the property and its value had the property
been as represented, and that the measure of recovery
is not affected by the price paid." (Hines v. Erode
(1914) 168 Cal. 507, 510 [143 P. 729]; 6 Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law, Torts, op. cit. supra, at §
1441, pp. 914-915.)
(See fh. 36.) Here, special circumstances take this
case out of the time and acceptance [**84] provisions of
section 2714 and require the measure of damages to be
the market value of the aircraft at the time Continental
effectively lost use of it, namely, on the date of the accident. n36 However, inasmuch as Continental was able
to sell the salvageable parts, that amount was properly
subtracted from Continental's damages. So, too, any
damage to the aircraft from the impact alone was not
chargeable to Douglas.
n36 With respect to trespass and other tortious injury to personal property, "[i]f the property is wholly
destroyed, the usual measure of damages is its market value." (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts,
op. cit. supra, at § 1453, p. 927, italics in original.)
Therefore, the instruction to the jury, to measure
Continental's fraud damages by subtracting from the
market value of the aircraft, at the time of the accident, the value of the salvageable parts and the amount
of damages due to the impact alone, was in all respects
correct. n37
n37 Contrary to Douglas's contention, this formulation of Continental's damages remedy does not
include a recovery for lost profits, which Continental
waived at trial.
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1978, until January 1, 1983, and at 10 percent per annum
thereafter until January [*434] 30, 1986." Douglas correctly asserts the 10 percent prejudgment interest awards
in the judgment were improper.
In Pacific-Southern Mortgage Trust Co. v. Insurance
Co. of North America (1985) 166 Cal. App. 3d 703, 716717[212 Cal.Rptr. 754], citing article XV, section 1, of
the California Constitution, the court held that "[i]n the
absence of any legislative act to the contrary, the rate of
prejudgment interest is 7 percent," and reduced the trial
court's prejudgment interest award from 10 percent to
7 percent. (Accord, Northrop Corp. v. Triad Intern.
Marketing S.A. (9th Cir. 1988) 842 E2d 1154, 1155,
fn. 2; Stan Lee Trading, Inc. v. Holtz (C.D.Cal. 1986)
649F.Supp. 577,583.)
Since there is no relevant legislative act [**86] specifying a rate of prejudgment interest for a fraud claim,
n38 the constitutional 7 percent rate applies and the judgment must be modified accordingly.
n38 There was no statutory enactment providing
for a rate of prejudgment interest until 1985. In that
year, the legislature added subdivision (b) to section 3289 of the Civil Code, effective January 1986.
(Stats. 1985, ch. 663, § 1, p. 2251.) As amended
in 1986 (Stats. 1986, ch. 176, § 1, eff. June 23,
1986), that subdivision provides as follows: "If a
contract entered into after January 1, 1986, does not
stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation shall
bear interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum after
a breach."
II. The Service Life Policy Claim
Inasmuch as the fraud judgment must be upheld, as
modified, we need not discuss Douglas's contentions
regarding the alternative judgment on the jury's award
for breach of the Service Life Policy.
The judgment is modified to reflect an award of prejudgment interest in the amount of $ 9,549,750, calculated [**87] at the rate of 7 percent per annum from
March 1, 1978, until January 30, 1986. n39 As so
modified, the judgment is affirmed.

[**85]
K. Prejudgment Interest May Be Awarded at No More
Than 7 Percent Per Annum.
In its Consolidated Final Judgment, the trial court
awarded Continental prejudgment interest on the $ 17
million fraud verdict and the $ 13.4 million contract verdict "at the rate of 7 percent per annum from March 1,

n39 The formula for calculating prejudgment interest is: principal X rate of interest X number of
days interest accrued / 360.
[*435] [***806] The parties are to bear their own
costs on appeal.
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FEDERAL M I N I N G & ENGINEERING
CO., Limited, v. POLLAK.
No. 3213.

Supreme Court of Nevada.
Jan. 4, 1939.
1. Mines and minerals <§=M04

contract or other transaction by its officers
or agents, thereby ratifies the contract or
other transaction, and is estopped to deny
ratification unless the' rights of the public
are involved or unless the contract is in
violation of some positive law or well-settied rule of public policy.
8. Mines and minerals <3=al05(2)

The obtaining of corporate note and
A mining corporation was estopped from
mortgage by director to whom mining corpo- asserting invalidity of note and mortgage
ration was indebted was not evidence of executed by corporation to director at a spefraud which would invalidate note and mort- cial meeting of which the directors were
gage, where director did not vote on giving not given written notice and which was not
of mortgage and thereafter continued to loan attended by a quorum consisting of a mamoney to the corporation.
jority of the directors plus one as required
by by-laws, where note and mortgage were
2. Mines and minerals <§=*I04
executed in good faith to secure director's
A transaction by which director was to
loans without which the corporation could
sell his stock and the note and mortgage exenot have continued in business, and the dicuted to him by mining corporation, and by
rector did not procure execution of note and
which buyer was to be given a lease on minmortgage by fraud and did not vote on the
ing property after director acquired title
motion calling for execution of note and
thereto by foreclosure of the mortgage, and
mortgage, and all the directors knew of the
by which a sum of money called advance
giving of the note and mortgage and acroyalty was paid by buyer to director's acquiesced therein.
count as a payment for the mortgage and
stock, did not indicate such fraud as would 9. Corporations <&»309(5)
invalidate corporation's prior execution of
That a person lending money to corponote and mortgage to director.
ration and taking security therefor is an
3. Mines and minerals C=I04
A special meeting of which no written
notice was given to directors as required
by by-laws of mining corporation, and which
was not attended by a majority of directors
plus one, which the by-laws provided should
constitute a quorum, was not a legal meeting
and no legal action could be taken at such
meeting.

officer of corporation does not of itself invalidate the transaction, but merely require^
that the evidence be subjected to a close
scrutiny as to the good faith of the officer,
and such a transaction is valid if fairly entered into.

10. Pleading <S>237(4)
An order requiring plaintiff to amend his
reply to conform to the proofs submitted was
not error, notwithstanding that order was
4. Estoppel <©=»92(l)
A person cannot accept the benefits de- not made during trial of case but on the
rived from a transaction and repudiate the settlement of the findings on question of corporation's ratification and estoppel to deny
burdens connected with the transaction.
validity of mortgage, where the case was
5. Corporations <§=>426(I0)
tried on the theory that ratification and esA corporation cannot avail itself of the toppel were in issue.
benefits of moneys loaned to it for its corporate purposes, and disavow a mortgage 11. Mines and minerals <£=>I04
In action to foreclose mortgage executed
given without authority by its agents to seby mining corporation to director loaning
cure the loan.
money to corporation, refusal to allow as a
6. Estoppel <§=*92(l)
credit to the corporation a sum paid to diThe rule that a person cannot both benerector by third person in connection with
fit by and repudiate an instrument rests uptransaction by which director was to sell his
on the equitable ground that a person canstock and mortgage to third person and was
not claim inconsistent rights in regard to
to give third person a lease on the corporathe same subject
tion'.: mining property was not error, where
transaction was not to be completed until
7. Corporations <§=»426(I0)
A corporation, which knowingly accepts after director acquired title to mining propor retains the benefit of an unauthorized erty by foreclosure of the mortgage.
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12. New trial <S=*I02(I)
The denial of motion for new trial on
ground of newly discovered evidence was
proper where due diligence to procure such
evidence at the trial was not shown.

decree and from an order denying its motion for a new trial. The parties will
henceforth be referred to respectively as
appellant, or the corporation, and respondent.

»

The following salient facts appear in evidence : Appellant, a mining corporation, on
or about August 1933, secured from one
Hanson, a lease and option to purchase
the mining claims situate in Mineral County, Nevada, described in the mortgage involved. By the terms of the lease and option the purchase price was to be $15,000,
payable in installments, with final payment
of $14,000 to become due the last of July
1934. Hanson was to pay $1,500 of the
purchase price to O. J. Belleville, one of
the directors of the appellant corporation
as a ten percent commission for consummating the deal, and $3,000 thereof to one
Howell, for certain maps and data pertaining thereto. After securing the lease and
option the corporation entered into possession of the mining property and began operation of the same.

Appeal from Fifth Judicial District
Court, Mineral County; Wm. D. Hatton,
Judge.
Action by Robert M. Pollak against the
Federal Mining & Engineering Company,
Limited, to foreclose a mortgage on certain
mining property and personal property appurtenant thereto. From a decree for the
plaintiff and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, the defendant appeals.
Decree and order affirmed.
Walter Rowson, of Reno, for appellant:
Forman & Forman, of Reno, for respondent.
DUCKER, Justice.
The plaintiff in the lower court, respondent here, commenced this action for the
foreclosure of a mortgage on certain mining property and personal property appurtenant thereto.
It was alleged in the complaint that the
mortgage was given by the defendant to
secure a promissory note made, executed
and delivered by it to plaintiff in the sum
of $25,000. Facts showing the necessity
of appointment of a receiver to take possession of the mortgaged premises and
property were alleged. Defendant answered, denying generally the material allegations of the complaint. It was alleged that
the note sued on was procured by plaintiff
by means of false and fraudulent statements and representations, fraudulent concealment of facts and without proper corporate action. Like allegations were made
with respect to the mortgage. It was also
alleged that both note and mortgage are
invalid and without consideration,, and that
the mortgage is therefore void. The necessity of appointing a receiver was denied.

In January 1934 appellant sold to respondent and received payment therefor in
cash, stock in the corporation to the amount
of $5,000. Shortly thereafter appellant
commenced to borrow money from him for
the purposes of the corporation in connection with said mining property. Beginning
in March 1934 and extending to and including August 3tlst of that year, respondent had at various times advanced suras of
money to appellant for such purposes,
amounting to $6,221.55.

" A stockholders meethrg was held in April
1934 at which respondent was elected a director of the corporation. The remaining
directors elected at that time were O. J.
Belleville, P. B. Beamer, Edwin E.
Sprague, Elmer E. Sprague, H. W. Lang,
Dr. Barnard, Harry Kankamp and M. E.
Bohannan, who thereafter, with respondent, constituted the board. A directors
meeting was held at that time at which
respondent was elected president of the
corporation. Elmer Sprague was elected
secretary and H. W. Lang treasurer at this
The affirmative allegations of piaintifFs meeting.
answer were denied in the reply.
Respondent advanced $2,000 to the comThe trial court found in favor of plaintiff to the extent of seventeen thousand
nine hundred and one dollars and fortythree cents, and a decree of foreclosure
was entered accordingly. The appeal,
which was taken by defendant, is from this
85 P.2d—34

pany at that time,, and in June following
advanced $2,006 more. Soon thereafter the
company was again 4n, financial difficulties,
and the time to make final payment to, Hanr
son O*L the lease ang option was nearing.
Han&qn e x t e n d the tinae to the last of
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August In the latter part of that month paid said additional expenses id the amount
the company was considerably in debt. It of $1,500. A resolution was'adopted at the
had no money to meet its obligations or meeting authorizing the secretary and
to make the final payment on the lease and treasurer to execute the note arid morf,
option. In this exigency, Elmer Sprague, gage. Respondent testified that O. J. Belleon Aug. 20th, wired respondent at Fort ville was present at the meeting, but the
Wayne, Indiana, where the latter lived, for latter testified that he was not present, and
financial help, and was told by a return the lower court accepted his testimony.
wire on Aug. 22nd, that respondent could The by-laws of the corporation provide
furnish no more capital. On the same day that a majority of the directors plus one,
Sprague sent him another pressing wire of shall constitute a quorum. So a quorum of
the same import. Being unable to secure the directors was not present at the special
any money from respondent, Sprague went meeting at which the note and mortgage
to Fort Wayne and induced him to come were given to respondent No written noto Nevada to pay off Hanson. While in tice of the special meeting was given to the
Indiana Sprague also conferred with di- directors, as provided by the by-laws.
rectors Kankamp and Dr. Barnard, conThe court found, among other findings,
cerning the matter. They understood that
final payment was soon to become due; as follows:
that a meeting of the directors was to be
"That at a meeting of the five directors
held in Mina about August 28th and it was
6t the defendant corporation held- ta Mina,
expected to get the money from respondent Nevada, August 31> 1 9 ^ the said, secretary
to make the payment. Sprague informed and treasurer of defendant were purthem that their presence would not be nec- portedly authorized and directed to execute
essary to form a quorum. Respondent and and deliver said mortgage; that 119 written
Elmer Sprague flew to Salt Lake City, notice was given to the remaining oifW
where they met director Edwin E. Sprague, tors of the defendant corporation of the
and discussed with him the proposition of said meeting prior to the hording thereof,
respondent putting up the money to make but that all of the remaining directors oC
final payment. From Salt Lake City re- said defendant corporation had knowledge
spondent and Elmer Sprague went to Mina, that said meeting was to be held and thk
in Mineral County, and thence to the min- general purpose thereof; that tkevdiuecing property on August 31st With the ex> tors vat attendance at said meeting; inception of Kankamp^ T>r, Barnard and Ed- cluding'the plaintiff, constituted a majority
win E. Sprague, the remaining, directors of all I the directors: of - said defendant
were in Mina and went with respondent and corporation,, but that- said director co&
Elmer Sprague to the mining property. On stkuted one les? than a. quorum (a majority
their return to Mina on -the evening of the phis one) provided lor by the by-laws oaf
31st of August a meeting; of the directors the" defendant; that the consideration^ of
was held at the Baker Hotel* at which the said promissory note and mortgage
it was agreed that if respondent, would ad- consisted of moneys advanced by plaintiff
vance the money to make final-payment to to defendant corporations in the sum <*f
Hanson, and also money to the corporation $17,901.43, including taxes hereinafter
to meet unpaid bills, taxes due* water rent mentioned; that apportion; of the moneys
due, and an additional accrued nayrofl, the *o> advanced wersvadvacceri sirimltftttcousiy
corporation would execute; and deliver to whir the said signing amd purported ex?
him the note and mortgage in question. ecKtkav and delivery of said note and
This was done and respondeat gave Hanson mortgage andfarsupply tfarfmixiaae pficc
a check for $9,55$> in payment of the bal- of the? mining ckims described: irt sail
ance of the purchase pripe? and gave the mortgage, and were advanced, by plaintiff
corporation his checkjo? $2,72Q.45, for ob- upon the purported condkioa, as adopted
ligations of the corporation then due^ The by said meeting of directors, that such
total o f all the sums advanced by respond- moneys and any, moneys tfrefetofpjr^ i |
ent to the ottforatkm' and in its behalf, thereafter advanced by plaintiff to a?was $18,500. To this was* inducted* in Hie ftt*&n* cofpor^n^lfdtt»>*e f*ficttfW*>'1
note and mortgage the said surt ef $5,000 sdidf todte 2nd ^kfrt&*g#f fBkt-ifef
paid by him tb Hie corporation, atad< the ccfffter&fen'fe&cfetM"skiff
sum of $1,500 for^dtfittocml expensed of id the sin* df $17£0P.4* sfrtnade^
the corporation, making in^aH f$fe son* of tittf, and said man*^>w*f* iis^ft^flef**^
$25*600. Respondent testified >
- that * It* hid *ftt (g^ratftif fftrife
ttit^te^r^$

that all off*
holders: ofc*
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that all of the directors, officers and stockholders of the defendant corporation for
a long time past, have been upon notice
or have had knowledge of the advancement
and acceptance of the said aggregate sum
of $17,901.43, and of the use of the same
as aforesaid, and of the execution and
delivery of the said note and mortgage,
and have by their acquiescence and the
said corporation has by its acquiescence,
ratified the same as the debt and mortgage
of the corporation to the extent of
$17,901.43, and is estopped to deny the
same.
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wanted security for his outlay and Belleville thought he should have it. When he
got it we find Belleville on hand wanting
to know what was to be done about his
commission. That he was not present at
the meeting does not appear to be through
any connivance of respondent. Respondent
testified that he was there and probably
thought he was. Having told respondent
that he would not put up money unless
he had control or security, respondent
would have naturally wanted him present
to vote like he talked.

[1] The obtaining of the note and
mortgage by respondent is no evidence of
fraud. He did not vote on the motion.
After the execution of the note and mortgage he continued to put up money for
corporate purposes. Thereafter he made
several unsuccessful attempts to make a
deal for the sale of the property, and was
"That no fraud was practiced by plain- finally forced to commence suit to retiff in any of the transactions involved imburse himself.
in this court."
[2] One of the incidents that appellant
These findings are supported by sub- dwells upon as indicating fraud, is that
stantial evidence, except possibly, as to all after this action was instituted respondent
of the directors having knowledge that entered into a deal with one Mooney to sell
the special meeting was to be held. Edwin to him his mortgage and stock for $26,000,
E. Sprague swears he knew nothing of the and by which Mooney was to be given a
meeting until some time after. Belleville lease on the mining property, and in which
testified he did not know that the meeting he paid to respondent's account $3500,
was to be held. However, it appears he which was designated advance royalty, and
was not averse to respondent having which was to apply as a- payment by
security for the money he advanced, or was Mooney to respondent for his mortgage and
to advance. He testified that he went stock. We see nothing fraudulent in this
with respondent and the other directors transaction. It was fully explained by reto the mining property on the 31st of spondent. Moreover, it was a transaction
August, and while there respondent said accruing some time after the execution of
to him, "What is the matter with the the note and mortgage, and was wholly
property, why doesn't it pay?" "I told him immaterial. The same is true as to other
that the property was all right, it was negotiations respondent had for the sale
the management. And he said that he of the property during several years after
had $8,700 in. the property, and I told the execution of the note and mortgage.
him it was wocjji fifty thousand dollars
The trial court disallowed a substantial
of any man's, fiwmey, but that I would
not put it up unless I had control or part of respondent's claim included in the
mortgage. No allowance was made for
security."
the sum of $5000 paid by respondent for
The record justified the finding *as to the his stock in the company, or for the sum of
absence of fraud on the part 6fc respond- $1500 additional expense or for sundry
ent We will not attempt, to answer all other advancements, reducing the claim, as
of the contentions of respondent in this heretofore stated, from $25,000 to $17,respect, a few general comments will suf- 901.43. It was found that the latter amount
fice. Of all of the directors, respondent, represented payments accepted by the corso far as the record shows, was the only poration for its corporate purposes.
one who put up any real money to obtain
title to the property involved and to try
[3-5] The question is presented whethto put it on a producing basis. He was er, under the facts of the case, the judgliberal in this respect, and his liberality ment was warranted, on the ground of
held good for some time. Naturally he ratification by acquiescence, or estoppel, for
' T h a t the defendant has failed to pay
taxes upon the property described in the
mortgage for the years 1934 and 1935,
which said taxes were a lien and charge
upon the property described in said mortgage; that plaintiff herein has paid said
taxes in the sum of $648.07.
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it must be conceded that notice of the special meeting was not given to all of the directors, nor was there a quorum present
when the note and mortgage were executed. As heretofore pointed out, the by-laws
required that a written notice of any special meeting must be given, and that a majority plus one should constitute a quorum.
Consequently a legal meeting* was not held
for want of proper notice. Defanti v. Allen Clark Co., 45 Nev. 120, 198 P. 549;
Clark Realty Co. v. Douglas, 46 Nev. 378,
212 P. 466. Aside from that, legal action
was not and could not have been taken for
lack of a quorum. Appellant's contention
in these respects must be allowed. But
generally speaking, it is a well settled rule
of law that one cannot accept the benefits
derived from a transaction and repudiate
any burden connected with it. To state
the rule more specifically in its application
to the facts of this case, a corporation cannot avail itself of the benefits of moneys
loaned to it for its corporate purposes, and
disavow a mortgage given without authority by its agents to secure the loan.
The rule is analogous to that which governs in a case where a party avails himself of the benefits flowing*from a part of
an instrument and would repudiate the
part carrying a burden.
[6] In Alexander v. Winters, 23 Nev.
475, 49 P. 116; Id., 24 Nev. 143, 50 P. 798,
it was held that this could not be done, the
court saying: <fIt is well settled that a
person shall not be allowed at once to bene«fit by and repudiate an instrument, but, if
he chooses to take the benefit which it confers, he shall likewise take the obligations
or bear the onus which it imposes." 24
Nev. 143, 146, 50 P. 798, 799. The principle rests upon the equitable ground that
no man can be permitted to claim inconsistent rights in regard to the same subject. 2 Herman on Estoppel, aad Res Adjudicata, Section 1028.
[7] The generally accepted rule is thus
stated in 2 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, at page 826, anjd following: "Unless
the rights of the public are involved or unless the contract is in violation of some
positive law or well-settled rule of, public
policy, as a general rule, if a corporation^
with knowledge of the facts, accepts or retains the benefit of an unauthorized eontract or other transaction by its officers OP
agents, as where it receives and uses- or
retains money or property paid by'the other

party, or accepts the benefits of services,
etc., it thereby ratified the contract or other
transaction, or will be estopped to deny
ratification." The authority goes on to
say: "This rule is based upon the doctrine
of ratification in toto, under which a principle must either ratify the whole transaction or repudiate the whole. He cannot
separate the transaction and ratify die part
that is beneficial to him, repudiating the
remainder; but if he, of his own election
and with full knowledge, accepts and retains the benefits of an unauthorized transaction, he must also accept the part that
is not beneficial, and will be held to have
ratified the whole. In some states this rule
is adopted by statute/'
[8] We have no such statute in this
state, but in view of the decisions heretofore rendered by this court, the question as
to the applicability of the rule to the facts
of this case is not aa open one m our jurisdiction.
The rule was applied in Defanti v. Allen
Clark Co., 45 Nev. 120, 19& P. 549. In
that case the mortgage was. made by two
of the trustees of the corporation, which
received the benefit oi the loan thtis secured. The third remaining trustee; Allen
Clark, received no notice of the meeting
and contended that he had no knowledge
of the transaction until a few .days before
the institution of the suit for foreclosure..
The^court held the giving of the mortgage was an invalid* act, but as the corporation had received the money derived from
the mortgage loan, the decree of foreclosure should be affirmed. * Appellant contends1 that the facts in Defanti v. Allen
Clark Co., Supra, are so dissimilar to those
of the instant case that it is not an author*
ity in point. We think it*is controlling.
In some respects the facts in* the cases are1
strikingly similar, and iir others not so*
variant as to invoke a different rule, ftr
each there was an invalicTa&rof executing*
a mortgage on the corporate property ata* meeting of which proper notice had lot
been given to all^of the directors. hiJeads
the motley represented by the mortgage
was of the utmost benefit to the coupara*
Hon; tit fact of Itfe-savtn$r quality i* botfc
cases. In the instant case the moneys ad&
vaiieed ^ by < respondent 'were substantially
die* tally resource of th* corpo&titta ft*
its corporate purposes;, and saved? the lot*
of titkto almost all of to mining property*
If respondent had not put upr|9,5l§ otPtktit
31st o* August 1934, tht; last day of tb*
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Hough v. Reserve Gold Mining Company,
supra, we held that a corporation could
enter into a valid contract to purchase
property from one of its officers. We said
[page 745]: "In such a case the better
view, sustained by the weight of authority,
is that a contract between a corporation
and an officer thereof 'is not void per se,
nor is it voidable, except for unfairness
or fraud for which it will be closely
In the Defanti v. Allen Clark Co. Case a
scrutinized in equity.' "
similar portending disaster was averted by
In Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, supra,
the mortgage loan, as indicated in the opinion. The court said [page 551] : ' T h e the court said [page 589] : "While it is
loan was personally negotiated by Emily true that the defendant, as a director of
Clark, wife of Allen L. Clark, to protect the corporation, was bound by all those
the property of the corporation from being rules of conscientious fairness which courts
sacrificed, as well as to pay other existing of equity have imposed as the guides for
dealing in such cases, it cannot be mainobligations."
tained that any rule forbids one director
But appellant contends that essential
among several from loaning money to the.
elements are lacking in the instant case
corporation when the money is needed, and
that were present in Defanti v. Allen Clark
the transaction is open, and otherwise free
Co., supra, namely, knowledge on the part
from blame."
of the corporation through knowledge of
The court in Terhune v. Weise, supra,
all of its directors, of the giving of the
mortgage and the reception of the benefits held valid an agreement between a failing
derived from the loan secured, and ac- corporation and one of its officers, whereby
quiescence therein. A number of cases in return for advancements to the corporaare presented by him in support of his tion to enable it to continue business, the
position that such are essential elements to officer was given assignment of contracts,
show ratification by acquiescence or es- as the agreement was made in good faith
toppel. But we think all are present in and could not be questioned as a preferthe instant case. As previously shown, the ence.
court found them to be present.
In Foster v. Belcher's Sugar Refining
Direct evidence, and evidence from Co., supra, the directors of the corporation
which such knowledge is fairly inferable, were commended by the court for loaning
supports such finding. To analyze it and money to it for legitimate purposes of the
show its probative force in this regard, corporation, and held it a valid claim
would serve no useful purpose and impress against the corporation.
this opinion with the vice of inexcusable
The evidence in the instant case points
prolixity. See Clark Realty Co. v. Doug- clearly to the good faith of respondent
las, 46 Nev. 378, 212 P. 466, for a recogni- and the directors who sought to authorize
tion of the rule we approve herein.
the note and mortgage.
extension of time to make final payment on
the option, the corporation would have
been wrecked. In addition he, at the same
time, put up $2,720.45, and subsequently
large sums were advanced by him in good
faith, which were disallowed. All of this,
in addition to the large sums he had advanced for the benefit of the corporation
prior to said 31st of August.

[9] Appellant contends that the respondent being an officer of the corporation takes the case out of the rule we have
approved, and invalidated the transaction.
This is not so. Such fact only subjects the
evidence to a close scrutiny as to the good
faith of the officer of -a corporation who
loans money to it and takes security therefor. That such a transaction is valid if
fairly entered into, is settled law. Hough
v. Reserve Gold Mining Company, 55 Nev.
375, 35 P.2d 742; Foster v. Belcher's
Sugar Refining Co., 118 Mo. 238, 24 S.W.
63; Terhune v. Weise, 132 Wash. 208, 231
P. 954, 38 A.L.R. 94; Twin-Lick Oil Co. v.
Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 23 L.Ed. 328. In

[10] On the question of ratification and
estoppel the court ordered respondent to
amend his reply to conform to the proofs
submitted, which was accordingly done.
The order was made by the court on the
settlement of the findings when appellant
objected to the findings relating to ratification and estoppel. Respondent asserts that
the amendment was probably unnecessary
and was ordered by the court out of an
abundance of caution.
He cites Zenos v. Britten-Cook Land &
Livestock Co., 75 Cal.App. 299, 242 P. 914,
to sustain his theory, and refers to the
Defanti Case in which this court decided
the same on the theory of estoppel, on the
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pleadings made in the lower court without
In re AMES.
there having ever been any amendments
to the pleadings. Be that as it may, there
No. 3226.
was no error in the order. The case was
No. 3227.
tried on the theory that ratification and
Supreme Court of Nevada.
estoppel were in issue, and considerable
evidence directed thereto was introduced.
Dec. 30, 193a
Appellant therefore could not have been
misled by the fact that the amendment was Attorney and client <S=>38
Under statute authorizing Supreme
not made during the trial of the case.
Court to adopt rules which shall be effective
[11] Error is predicated upon the re- only after publication, where from uncon.
fusal of the court to allow as a credit to tradlcted testimony it appeared that rui*
the corporation the sum of $3500 designated adopted by the Board of Governors of the
as advance royalty paid by Mooney to re- State Bar of Nevada, and approved by the
spondent. The refusal of the court to al- Supreme Court, prohibiting the circulation
low it was based on the theory that if it of professional cards by making them avail,
was allowable in any event it should have able to others than the persons with whom
been made the subject of a set-off on the attorney is In personal contact, was
counterclaim, and in the absence of such adopted on August 1, 1936, but was not puba pleading there was no issue made there- lished until January, 1937, attorney was not
in. There was no error in this ruling. If, guilty of professional misconduct because of
as claimed by appellant, knowledge thereof allegedly unauthorized distribution of prowas gained subsequent to the filing of its fessional cards on or about October, 193&
answer in the suit, a supplemental answer OompXaws, « 540-590, 568,. 8377.
setting up the claim was in order. Moreover, as heretofore pointed out, the deal
Disbarment proceedings by the Local Adin which the $3,500 was involved was entered into after the commencement of the ministrative Committee of the State Bar of
suit and was made as a part payment to Nevada, in and for District No. 5, against
respondent for his mortgage and stock. W. B. Ames, attorney at law,, wherein the
This transaction was to be completed after defendant was found guilty and it was
respondent received a deed for the mining recommended that h« be suspended for
property. It is difficult to see how the cor- three years and until further order of the
poration had any interest in the payment. Supreme Court. On petition for review.
Findings,, conclusions, and recommenda[12] The motion for a new trial was tions* of the Loeal Administrative Commitproperly overruled. The motion was sup- tee and of the Board of Governors annulled
ported by the affidavit af the attorney of and set aside, and proceedings- dismissed
appellant on the ground of* newly discoverClyde D. Souter, of Reno, for petitioner.
ed evidence. Assuming, without deciding,
R.
K. Wittenberg, of Reno, for Nevada
that the newly discovered evidence claimed
State Bar.
is material and not cumulative, dne diligence to procure it at the trial is. not
COLEMAN, Chief Justice.
shown. Such diligence must appear beThe
Local Administrative Committee of
fore a new trial would be warranted on
the,
State
Bar ofT Nevada, in and for District
the ground of newly discovered evidence.
No, £, on or about December 11, 1936, iled
Howard v. Winters, 3 Nev. 539; Pinschow- a complaint against WVB. Ames, an attorer v. Hanks, 18 Nev. 99, 1 P. 454 j. State v. ney at law, wherein it is averred, after alCook, 13 Idaho 45, 88 P. 240.
leging preliminary matter:
"That heretofore,fco-wit,on or aboutOo»
We have examined all the other errors
fober* 1936, with the intent then and thereclaimed and have discovered none.
by to solicit professional employment, said
The decree and order denying, the mo- accused caused) to be printed anddistribtion for a new trial should be affirmed* and utedina conspicuous place in a public pbse
it is so ordered.
uVReaa, Washes' County, Nevada, frequent
ed by the* genera^ public; to-rwi^ the puhBc
TABER, C J„ and COLEMAN,, J-^ con- lobby of the APHS Hotel^a large nuabqr
eff tj& ,pr«iS£§ai«sal'rqards c*f the asousj^
cur.
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William G. SCHRAFT, Appellant,
v.
Dan LEIS, et al., Appellees.
No. 55954.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
Aug. 14, 1984.
Plaintiff shareholder sought to recover
on ground that defendant shareholder received unauthorized salary and profit sharing benefits, wrote checks after dissolution,
and unfairly competed with corporation. A
counterclaim was filed for supervised dissolution of corporation, tortious interference
with corporation's business, and use of corporate property for one's personal benefit.
The Sedgwick District Court, David P. Calvert, J., granted defendant's request for
supervised dissolution, and awarded the
plaintiff judgment against defendant on a
credit card claim, but dismissed all other
claims, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Herd, J., held that: (1) fiduciary duty owed by defendant to corporation
and to plaintiff was properly discharged as
to salary increase; (2) plaintiff was barred
from asserting profit-sharing claim by estoppel, waiver, laches and ratification; (3)
defendant was not chargeable with lack of
good faith toward corporation when new
company formed by him worked for former
client of corporation shortly after dissolution; (4) act of defendant in writing wage
checks without plaintiffs cosignature did
not amount to a breach of his fiduciary
duty; (5) trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider affidavits of
certain witnesses on plaintiffs motion for
new trial; and (6) recovery to which a
plaintiff was entitled on his lease claim was
properly diminished by amount of damages
which he should have mitigated.
Affirmed.

1. Corporations <s=»54, 57
The bylaws of a corporation are selfimposed rules, resulting from an agree-

ment or contract between the corporation
and its members to conduct the corporate
business in a particular way, and operate to
prescribe the rights and duties of the members with reference to the internal government of the corporation, the management
of its affairs, and the rights and duties
existing among the members.
2. Corporations Q=*57
Bylaws may be waived expressly or
impliedly by a corporation or by a continued disregard thereof by parties for whose
benefit they were enacted.
3. Corporations <s=>308(4)
Use of bylaws requiring that the board
of directors would approve all salaries was
waived where plaintiff, a fifty percent
shareholder, entered into an informal
agreement setting a $200 salary for defendant, also a fifty percent shareholder,
and thus ratified setting of that salary by a
method other than that which was authorized by bylaws.
4. Appeal and Error <&=>989, 1010.1(6)
The scope of review on appeal is to
determine whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether the findings are
sufficient to support trial court's conclusions of law.
5. Corporations s=»190
Finding that defendant, an equal fifty
percent shareholder with plaintiff in corporation, was not to be held to terms of
contract regarding amount of his salary
when parties had agreed that salary would
be based on condition of company and services performed was supported by evidence.
6. Corporations <3=>308(1)
A director or officer of a corporation
working as an operating manager has a
claim for the value of his services even if
there has been no resolution of the board
of directors fixing his compensation.
7. Corporations <3=>308(1)
There was an implied contract to pay a
fair and reasonable salary to the defend-
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ant, an equal fifty percent shareholder with
the plaintiff in corporation, for his duties
as a managing officer of the corporation in
the absence of an express agreement between the parties as to the amount of the
salary and the terms of increases in that
salary.
8. Corporations <s»307
The fiduciary duty owed by a managing officer to the corporation and its shareholders includes full disclosure of corporate
matters.
9. Corporations <3=*307
Duty of full disclosure which defendant, an equal fifty percent shareholder with
plaintiff in corporation, owed to corporation
and its shareholders was properly discharged with respect to increase in his salary as a managing officer of corporation as
long as plaintiff had both actual and constructive knowledge of that increase.
10. Estoppel e=>52.15
Estoppel involves an assertion of
rights inconsistent with past conduct, silence by those who ought to speak, or
situations where it would be unconscionable to permit persons to maintain a position
inconsistent with one in which they may
have already acquiesced.
11. Estoppel <s=>52.10(2)
Doctrine of waiver implies that a party
has voluntarily and intentionally renounced
or given up a known right or has caused or
done some positive act or positive inaction
which is inconsistent with the contractual
right.

14. Equity <3=>72(1)
Delay does not in itself constitute laches and an action generally will not be defeated by laches alone unless some prejudice has resulted therefrom to rights or
interests of adverse party.
15. Principal and Agent <3=>163(1)
Ratification is the adoption or confirmation by a principal of an act performed
on his behalf by an agent without his authority.
16. Principal and Agent <^ 170(3)
Upon acquiring knowledge of an
agent's unauthorized act, the principal
should promptly repudiate the act, otherwise he will be presumed to have ratified
and affirmed the act.
17. Corporations <3=>190
Estoppel <$=>63
Act of plaintiff, an equal fifty percent
shareholder with defendant in corporation,
in signing corporate minutes establishing
and terminating profit sharing plan operated to bar plaintiff, whether by estoppel,
waiver, laches or ratification, from thereafter asserting improper payment of profit
sharing benefits to defendant.
18. Estoppel <3=>59
A person asserting estoppel as a defense must exercise good faith under the
maxim that "one who seeks equity, must
do equity."

12. Estoppel e=»52.10(2)
Waiver is consensual in nature but the
intention may be inferred from conduct and
the knowledge may be actual or constructive.

19. Corporations <3»315
An officer or director is not chargeable
with lack of good faith toward his corporation in regard to a contract previously held
by it once the corporation has refused to
renew or accept that contract and is free to
form a new company and secure a contract
for the new company.

13. Equity <3=»67
Doctrine of laches is an equitable device designed to bar stale claims where an
excessive amount of time has passed prior
to assertion of claim.

20. Corporations <3=>185
Defendant, an equal fifty percent
shareholder with plaintiff in corporation,
did not breach fiduciary duty to corporation
when his new company performed services
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for a former client of corporation's shortly
after dissolution where corporation was not
in a position to work for that client after
advent of dissolution.
21. Corporations <3=>312(4)
The party objecting to the act of the
managing officer of a corporation in writing checks in violation of a corporate resolution requiring cosignatures cannot recover unless he proves injury to himself or the
corporation by showing that the checks
were unreasonable or improper.
22. Corporations <®=>182.1(3)
Act of defendant, an equal fifty percent shareholder with plaintiff in corporation, in writing wage checks without the
plaintiffs cosignature was not a breach of
the defendant's fiduciary duty where the
checks were not only reasonable in amount,
but were for the defendant's wages and
vacation pay, and no damage to the plaintiff was shown.
23. Corporations ®=>190
Punitive damages were not subject to
being awarded against defendant, an equal
fifty percent shareholder with plaintiff in
corporation, in absence of evidence of a
breach of a fiduciary duty.
24. Appeal and Error <s=>980, 981
New Trial <3=*82, 99
The grant or denial of a new trial on
grounds of surprise or newly discovered
evidence is discretionary on the part of the
trial court and will not be reversed on
appeal unless a clear abuse of that discretion is shown.
25. New Trial <S=>140(1), 150(4)
The burden is on the party seeking a
new trial to show that the new evidence
could not with reasonable diligence have
been produced at trial and, if the party
does not meet the burden, the trial court
does not abuse its discretion in refusing to
consider the contents of a supporting affidavit which contains the new evidence.

26. New Trial <3=>150(4)
Refusing to consider on plaintiffs motion for new trial, the affidavits of witnesses who had testified at trial was not an
abuse of discretion where the plaintiff had
every opportunity to examine each of those
witnesses and to elicit the information set
forth in the affidavits, yet failed to show
that the new evidence, particularly that
included in the affidavits, could not have
been produced at trial.
27. Damages <s=»62(l)
Recovery to which plaintiff was entitled as owner in action on a lease for rent
was properly diminished by amount of
damages which should have been mitigated
by plaintiff since he actually expelled defendant by changing locks on offices and
thereafter failed to mitigate his damages.
28. Warehousemen <3=>34(7)
Ruling prorating $740 per month lump
sum claimed by plaintiff as lessor and
award of $275 per month against defendant
lessee for warehouse space was supported
by substantial evidence.
29. Evidence <s=>351
Business records and writings are admissible hearsay if they were made in the
regular course of business at or about the
time of the act recorded and if the sources
of information from which they were made
and the circumstances surrounding their
preparation were trustworthy.
30. Evidence <3=>373(1)
The custodian of the business records
need not be called to lay the information
for their admission on their exception to
the hearsay rule if the records can be identified by someone else who is qualified by
knowledge of the facts. Rules of Evid.
K.S.A. 60-460(m).
31. Evidence <3=*382
Determination of the presence of factors concerning admissibility of business
records and writings under an exception to
hearsay rule is within the trial court's discretion. Rules of Evid. K.S.A. 60-460(m).
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32. Evidence ^351
Testimony of an accountant respecting
information he found in work papers of
corporation's former accountant was admissible under business records exception
to hearsay rule in that papers, of which the
accountant was the custodian, were apparently "books and records" since they represented the corporation's only accounting
after the last posting in the formal books,
and the sources of information and method
of time of preparation reflected trustworthiness. Rules of Evid. K.S.A. 60-460(m).
Syllabus by the Court
1. The bylaws of a corporation are
the rules of law for its government. The
term "bylaw" may be further defined according to its function, which is to prescribe the rights and duties of the members
with reference to the internal government
of the corporation, the management of its
affairs, and the rights and duties existing
among the members. Bylaws are self-imposed rules, resulting from an agreement
or contract between the corporation and its
members to conduct the corporate business
in a particular way. Until repealed, bylaws
are the continuing rule for the government
of the corporation and its officers. See 18
Am.Jur.2d, Corporations § 168.
2. Corporations have power to waive
provisions of their bylaws introduced for
the protection of the company, and they
may do so expressly or impliedly. Corporate bylaws may also be waived by a continued disregard thereof by the parties for
whose benefit they were enacted. 18 Am.
Jur.2d, Corporations § 173, pp. 703-04.
3. Where the trial court has made
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
scope of review on appeal is to determine
whether the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether
the findings are sufficient to support the
trial court's conclusions of law. See City
of Council Grove v. Ossmann, 219 Kan.
120, Syl. J 1, 546 P.2d 1399 (1976).
4. A managing officer of a corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the corpora-

tion and shareholders. This duty includes
full disclosure of corporate matters. See
Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 665 P.2d
743 (1983).
5. A director or officer of a corporation working as an operating manager has
a claim for the value of his services even if
there has been no resolution of the board
of directors fixing his compensation.
6. Estoppel involves an assertion of
rights inconsistent with past conduct, silence by those who ought to speak, or
situations where it would be unconscionable to permit persons to maintain a position
inconsistent with one in which they have
already acquiesced. See Harrin v. Brown
Realty Co., 226 Kan. 453, 458-59, 602 P.2d
79 (1979).
7. Waiver implies a party has voluntarily and intentionally renounced or given
up a known right, or has caused or done
some positive act or positive inaction which
is inconsistent with the contractual right.
Waiver is consensual in nature but the
intention may be inferred from conduct and
the knowledge may be actual or constructive. See Stratmann v. Stratmann, 6
Kan.App.2d 403, 410-11, 628 P.2d 1080
(1981).
8. The doctrine of laches is an equitable device designed to bar stale claims
where an excessive amount of time has
passed prior to the assertion of a claim.
Delay, by itself, does not constitute laches
and an action generally will not be defeated
by laches alone unless some prejudice has
resulted therefrom to the rights or interests of the adverse party.
9. Ratification is the adoption or confirmation by a principal of an act performed on his behalf by an agent, which
act was performed without authority.
Upon acquiring knowledge of his agent's
unauthorized act, the principal should
promptly repudiate the act, otherwise it
will be presumed he has ratified and affirmed the act. See Equity Investors, Inc.
v. Ammest Group, Inc., 1 Kan.App.2d 276,
Syl. Ml 5-6, 563 P.2d 531, rev. denied 225
Kan. 843 (1977).
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10. A person asserting estoppel as a
defense must exercise good faith, under
the maxim that "one who seeks equity,
must do equity."
11. An officer or director is not
chargeable with lack of good faith toward
his corporation in regard to a contract previously held by it once the corporation has
refused to renew or accept that contract.
In such a case the officer or director is free
to form a new company and contract for
the new company. Parsons Mobile Products, Inc. v. Remmert, 216 Kan. 256, Syl.
1! 8, 531 P.2d 428 (1975).
12. Where the managing officer of a
corporation writes checks in violation of a
corporate resolution requiring co-signatures, the party objecting to the checks
must prove injury to himself or the corporation by showing the checks were unreasonable or improper, in order to recover.
13. The granting or denial of a new
trial on grounds of surprise or newly discovered evidence is discretionary on the
part of the trial court, and will not be
reversed unless a clear abuse of discretion
is shown. The burden is on the party seeking the new trial to show the new evidence
could not with reasonable diligence have
been produced at trial. Where the party
does not meet this burden, a trial court
does not abuse its discretion in refusing to
consider the contents of a supporting affidavit which contains the new evidence.
14. In an action on a lease for rent,
when evidence is uncontroverted that the
owner could have mitigated his damages
his recovery is diminished by what would
have been the mitigated amount.
15. Business records and writings are
admissible hearsay if they were made in
the regular course of business at or about
the time of the act recorded and if the
sources of information from which they
were made and the circumstances surrounding their preparation were trustworthy. The custodian of the business records
need not be called to lay the foundation for
their admission if the records can be identified by someone else who is qualified by
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knowledge of the facts. The determination
of the presence of factors concerning admissibility is within the trial court's discretion.
Kenton D. Wirth, Wichita, argued the
cause and was on brief, for appellant.
J. Michael Morris of Sargent, Klenda,
Haag & Mitchell, Wichita, argued the
cause, and Gary M. Austerman and John B.
Morris, Wichita, of the same firm, were
with him on brief, for appellees.
HERD, Justice:
This is an action incident to the dissolution of a closely held corporation. William
G. Schraft, a fifty percent shareholder,
sued Dan Leis, the other fifty percent
shareholder, who had been general manager of the corporation. Schraft alleged Leis
received unauthorized salary and profitsharing benefits, wrote checks after dissolution, and unfairly competed with the corporation. Schraft also sued the corporation for rent, damage to rental property,
and indebtedness on a note. Leis counterclaimed for supervised dissolution of the
corporation, tortious interference by
Schraft with the corporation's business,
and use of corporate property for personal
benefit.
Continental Structures, Inc., was formed
in March, 1974, by appellant, William G.
Schraft; appellee, Daniel Leis; and Roy
Arnett. Each was a one-third shareholder.
Arnett and Leis had been employees of a
metal building construction company which
had been a tenant of Schraft's. Continental Structures was to engage in the business of metal building construction and repair.
Since the alleged overpayment of salary
to Leis is the major portion of this lawsuit,
we will examine the salary arrangements
in some detail. Prior to incorporation, the
parties agreed Arnett and Leis would manage the business for which they would receive salaries. Their salaries were initially
to be the same as Arnett and Leis had
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received from their prior employer, which
was $300 and $200 per week respectively.
Schraft was not involved in management,
thus was to receive no salary.
After incorporation, each of the shareholders became a director and an officer.
Arnett was elected president, Schraft vicepresident, and Leis secretary-treasurer.
The bylaws, as adopted, contained the following salary provisions:
'The Board of Directors, from time to
time, as it may determine, shall have
authority to appoint such superintendents, general managers or other managing officers as may be deemed necessary
or advisable, and to fix the salaries thereof."
The minutes of the corporation also contain
the following statement as to salary:
"The Board of Directors shall approve a
salary . . . [for Arnett and Leis] consistent with his position and what the corporation can reasonably afford based on
profits and expenses."
However, there was never a formal corporate resolution setting a specific salary for
Arnett or Leis.
Beginning in 1974, the salaries of Arnett
and Leis were increased without formal
corporate action. By the end of 1974, Arnett had gone from $300 to $400 per week
and Leis from $200 to $250, and then to
$300 per week. On March 28, 1975, Arnett
wrote a letter to Schraft wherein he apprised him of the salary increases. The
letter stated:
"It was my understanding that as
President of Continental Structures, Inc.
I would take a salary relevant to
the position and what the business could
afford, based on profits etc."
Schraft acknowledged receipt of the letter
but did not discuss the salary matter with
Arnett at that time.
The letter also referred to a "monthly
computer cost analysis" which, according
to Schraft, was subsequently discussed.
Schraft desired the analysis so he could
have a monthly operating statement for the

business. He testified when the company
was formed it was agreed the company's
financial information would be placed in a
computer and the parties would receive a
monthly computer analysis. Arnett testified, in accordance with his letter, that he
did not feel the expense of the computer
was justified since the corporate books r e
fleeted the costs of doing business. He,
therefore, terminated the reports.
Schraft testified he repeatedly requested
a monthly "comprehensive cost analysis."
Schraft claims the failure to provide such
statements resulted in his not being aware
of the salary increases. Schraft, however,
admitted receiving various financial statements from Continental. He estimated
that between 1974 and 1978 he received six
or seven such statements. Arnett testified
Continental's first accountants prepared
such statements routinely on a quarterly
and year-end basis as well as on demand.
Such statements were delivered to all three
shareholders. Arnett also testified that
from 1974 to 1976 Continental was a subchapter S corporation and copies of the
corporate tax returns were delivered to the
shareholders during these years. Schraft
testified he did not see the returns until
1980.
The building leased by Continental for
offices was owned by Schraft. Schraft's
office was located in the same building.
As a result, the books, records, and tax
returns of Continental were readily available to Schraft. He testified he did not
avail himself of the opportunity to view the
company financial statements.
Schraft also admitted between 1974 and
1977 he did not talk to Continental's accountants. In 1977, Continental changed
its accountant to Ray Eyman, who was
recommended to the company by Schraft.
Eyman had prepared Schraft's personal tax
returns. Schraft testified he talked to Eyman from time to time and received verbal
information from him about the company.
From 1979 on, Eyman kept the corporate
books at his home. Eyman also furnished
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financial statements to Schraft, as had the
previous accountants.
In August, 1978, Arnett was terminated
as president and manager of the company
because of a seventy thousand dollar loss
for 1977. Schraft testified although he did
not see the actual 1977 tax return until it
was filed in 1981, Eyman furnished him
with the figures from the front page of
that return at the time of Arnett's termination. The first page of the 1977 return
shows the compensation of the managing
officers. It was, of course, in excess of the
initial amounts agreed upon.
Arnett testified that some time after his
termination in August and before November, 1978 Schraft mentioned the matter of
unauthorized salary. Arnett ignored the
matter. Schraft denied that he learned of
Arnett's salary at this time. In November,
1978 the company agreed to buy Arnett's
shares. After the buy-out, Schraft and
Leis each became fifty percent shareholders.
Leis became president of the company.
Schraft testified that after the meeting
electing Leis president, Leis stated that he
should receive the same salary Arnett had.
Schraft made no reply. He explained his
lack of response saying he did not want to
discuss the matter at that time. He later
assumed the subject was dropped since it
was not brought up again. He never asked
Leis about the salary and did not check the
books of the company.
Schraft became treasurer of the company, as well as vice president, when Leis
became president. The duties of the treasurer specified in the bylaws were to "have
custody of all money . . . of the corporation
and
keep regular books of account
In November 1979, Leis and Schraft discussed a list of employees and proposed
wages. At the conclusion Leis told Schraft
he wanted an additional $150 per week,
raising his salary to $650 per week.
Schraft claims this is the first time he
knew Leis was receiving a salary greater
than the original $200 per week.

After the November 1979 meeting on
salaries, the relationship between Schraft
and Leis deteriorated. Their efforts to arrive at an agreement to buy or sell the
company failed. In April 1980 Schraft filed
the present action. At a special meeting of
the board of directors, held August 14,
1980, it was agreed to dissolve the corporation. Various resolutions, incident to the
dissolution, were adopted.
These resolutions were: (1) The corporation would proceed to pay off of its liabilities; (2) the officers were directed to do all
things necessary to dissolve the corporation; (3) all employees, except Delbert Story, were to be terminated at 5:00 p.m.,
August 15, 1980; (4) no distribution of assets to the shareholders would be made
without mutual agreement; (5) the checking account would be changed to require
two signatures on each check; (6) all officers were terminated immediately except to
sign instruments necessary to liquidate and
dissolve the corporation; and (7) all credit
cards were cancelled.
The next day, on August 15, 1980, Leis
signed payroll checks for the employees
without Schraft's co-signature. Among
these checks were three salary checks to
himself, each in the amount of $429.96.
Following the resolution to dissolve the
company, Leis formed a new company, Superior Structures, Inc. Schraft testified
Superior did work on a building for a former client of Continental's, completing the
work before August 26, 1980.
Trial was to the court. At the close of
Schraft's case, the court dismissed the
claims against Leis for unauthorized salary, unfair competition, and writing checks
the day after dissolution. In addition, the
court dismissed a portion of Schraft's claim
for rent against Continental and dismissed
other claims of which no complaint is made
on appeal.
Leis had counterclaimed
against Schraft for tortious interference
with Continental's business and unauthorized use of corporate assets. At the close
of Leis's evidence, the court dismissed the
tortious interference claim and the unau-
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thorized use claim except for Schraft's use
of corporate credit cards after dissolution.
The court made findings of fact and conclusions of law on the remaining issues.
Schraft was awarded judgment against
Continental of $3300 for rent and $3000 on
a note. Continental was granted judgment
against Schraft for $115.00 on the credit
card claim. The court granted Leis's request for supervised dissolution of the company.
Schraft filed a motion to amend the judgment or for a new trial. The court denied
the motion but made additional findings.
Schraft appealed.
Appellant Schraft first argues the trial
court erred in dismissing his claims for
breach of fiduciary duty and unfair competition.
Schraft's principal claim in this case is
that Leis received unauthorized salary in
the amount of $75,000 from Continental
Structures Inc. He contends he had no
knowledge prior to 1979 Leis' salary had
been increased beyond the initial $200 per
week. He maintains the payment of salary
in excess of the original $200 constitutes
breach of the corporate bylaws and Leis'
fiduciary duty to the corporation and appellant individually.
Leis contends it was agreed prior to incorporation that he and Arnett would receive salaries in the same amount as they
were receiving in their prior employment
with salary increases allowed consistent
with the condition of the company and services they performed. He acknowledges
no formal board of directors action was
taken to increase either his or Arnett's
salaries. But appellee also contends there
was an implied agreement to pay a reasonable salary for his work. He also argues
Schraft had knowledge, actual and constructive, of the salary increases and failed
to complain or take any action.
Appellant aruges the corporate bylaws
provide the board of directors is to set
salaries and since no formal board action
was ever taken to increase appellee's sala-

ry above the initial $200, all salary received
above that amount is unauthorized.
[1] The bylaws of a corporation are the
rules of law for its government. The term
"bylaw" may be further defined according
to its function, which is to prescribe the
rights and duties of the members with reference to the internal government of the
corporation, the management of its affairs,
and the rights and duties existing among
the members. Bylaws are self-imposed
rules, resulting from an agreement or contract between the corporation and its members to conduct the corporate business in a
particular way. Until repealed, bylaws are
the continuing rule for the government of
the corporation and its officers. See 18
Am.Jur.2d, Corporations § 168.
[2,3] As previously stated, it is undisputed no formal board action was taken to
set appellee's original salary despite the
agreement between the parties that the
board would approve all salaries. Rather,
it was by informal agreement that it was
initially set at the $200 level. Thus,
Schraft ratified the setting of Leis' salary
by a method other than that authorized by
the corporate bylaws. It has been stated:
"Corporations have power to waive
provisions of their bylaws introduced for
the protection of the company, and they
may do so expressly or impliedly. Also,
corporate bylaws may be waived by a
continued disregard thereof by the parties for whose benefit they were enacted." 18 AmJur.2d, Corporations § 173,
pp. 703-04.
See also 8 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the law
of Private Corporations § 4200, pp. 730-31
(rev. perm. ed. 1982). The use of the bylaws, therefore, was waived by both parties.
Appellant next argues appellee is to be
held to the terms of his salary contract,
regarding the amount of the salary and
when it would be increased. For support
appellant cites Sweet v. Stormont Vail Regional Medical Center, 231 Kan. 604, 647
P.2d 1274 (1982), and Manhattan Build-
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ings, Inc. v. Hurley, 231 Kan. 20, 643 P.2d
87 (1982). Appellee does not dispute this.
There is disagreement, however, as to the
terms of the employment contract.
[4, 5] The trial court heard conflicting
testimony as to the employment contract
and found the parties had agreed salaries
would be taken based on the condition of
the company and services performed. Arnett testified at trial the salaries taken
were consistent with that standard. Further, appellant admitted the $650 per week
appellee requested in November 1979 was
fair compensation for the work appellee
performed. We have held where the trial
court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law, the scope of review on appeal
is to determine whether the findings are
supported by substantial competent evidence and whether the findings are sufficient to support the trial court's conclusions of law. See City of Council Grove v.
Ossmann, 219 Kan. 120, Syl. U 1, 546 P.2d
1399 (1976). The trial court's finding that
the salary taken was fair for the work
performed is supported by the evidence and
must, therefore, be upheld.
[6,7] The trial court fortified the foregoing finding by also finding there was an
implied agreement appellee would receive a
fair salary for his duties as a managing
officer of the corporation. A director or
officer of a corporation working as an operating manager has a claim for the value of
his services even if there has been no resolution of the board of directors fixing his
compensation. See 19 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations § 1402, p. 795. See also Sauberli v.
Sledd, 143 Kan. 350, 55 P.2d 415 (1936).
Thus, in the absence of an express agreement as to the amount of his salary and the
terms of increases in that salary, there was
an implied contract to pay a fair and reasonable salary to appellee. The trial court
properly found the salary received was fair
and reasonable for the work performed.
[8,9] It is undisputed Leis owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to
Schraft. Thus, he owed Schraft the duty

of full disclosure of corporate matters.
See Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 665
P.2d 743 (1983); Newton v. Hornblower,
Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 582 P.2d 1136 (1978).
The trial court found this duty properly
discharged as to the salary issue since appellant had both actual and constructive
knowledge of the salary increase. The trial court's finding was supported by substantial competent evidence and will not be
disturbed on appeal.
The trial court further found the appellant was barred from asserting the profitsharing claim by estoppel, waiver, laches
and ratification. These rulings are based
on the finding that Schraft had signed the
corporate minutes establishing and terminating the profit-sharing plan.
[10] Estoppel involves an assertion of
rights inconsistent with past conduct, silence by those who ought to speak, or
situations where it would be unconscionable to permit persons to maintain a position
inconsistent with one in which they have
already acquiesced. See Harrin v. Brown
Realty Co., 226 Kan. 453, 458-59, 602 P.2d
79 (1979).
[11,12] Waiver implies a party has voluntarily and intentionally renounced or given up a known right, or has caused or done
some positive act or positive inaction which
is inconsistent with the contractual right.
Waiver is consensual in nature but the intention may be inferred from conduct and
the knowledge may be actual or constructive. See Stratmann v. Stratmann, 6
Kan.App.2d 403, 410-11, 628 P.2d 1080
(1981).
[13,14] The doctrine of laches is an equitable device designed to bar stale claims
where an excessive amount of time has
passed prior to the assertion of a claim.
Delay, by itself, does not constitute laches
and an action generally will not be defeated
by laches alone unless some prejudice has
resulted therefrom to the rights or interests of the adverse party. See Stratmann
at 411, 628 P.2d 1080.
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[15,16] Ratification is the adoption or
confirmation by a principal of an act performed on his behalf by an agent which act
was performed without authority. Upon
acquiring knowledge of his agent's unauthorized act, the principal should promptly
repudiate the act, otherwise it will be presumed he has ratified and affirmed the act.
See Equity Investors, Inc. v. Ammest
Group, Inc., 1 Kan.App.2d 276, Syl. 1111 5-6,
563 P.2d 531 (1977).
[17,18] Appellant argues that since appellee's conduct was inequitable, appellee
may not rely on estoppel. In Newton v.
Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 515, 582 P.2d
1136, we held the person raising estoppel is
himself bound to exercise good faith. The
trial court specifically found in this case
there was no evidence of deceit on the part
of appellee. Appellant indicates no evidence to refute this finding. The appellee
was thus not barred from raising estoppel.
The trial court found the affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver, laches and ratification applied to appellant's claim for
unauthorized profit-sharing payments. Appellant testified at trial that in 1977 he was
presented with the two sets of minutes of
the board of directors' meetings, one dated
March 12, 1974, and the other March 9,
1976. One established and the other terminated an employee profit-sharing plan.
The minutes were prepared to satisfy an
IRS audit. Appellant testified he had not
known of the profit sharing plan prior to
signing the minutes in 1977. Appellant
testified he discovered much later that
money had been distributed to employees,
including $2102.46 to appellee, under the
plan.
Appellant contends the payments constituted a breach of fiduciary duty since they
were done without his knowledge. Appellant testified, however, he signed the corporate minutes discussing the plan in 1977.
Thus, he had actual knowledge of the plan
several years before filing this action but
failed to complain of it at the time. There
is no evidence that payments made under
the plan were concealed from the appellant

or that he inquired about the plan after
signing the minutes. The trial court, therefore, did not err in applying estoppel, waiver, laches and ratification to appellant's
claim for improper payments under the
profit-sharing plan.
Appellant also contends appellee breached a fiduciary duty to Continental when
appellee's new company, Superior, did work
for a former client of Continental's shortly
after the dissolution resolution of August
14, 1980. The work was a new job, but
Continental had done work for the client
before.
[19] In Parsons Mobile Products, Inc.
v. Remmert, 216 Kan. 256, Syl. 11117-8, 531
P.2d 428 (1975), this court held:
"When the customer list of a business
is not confidential and the business is of
such a nature as to rely on open competition to secure orders a former employee
may solicit former customers of his employer without being guilty of unfair
competition." (Syl. H 7)
"An officer or director is not chargeable with lack of good faith toward his
corporation in regard to a contract previously held by it once the corporation has
refused to renew or accept that contract
In such a case the officer or director is
free to form a new company and secure a
contract for the new company." (Syl.
118).
[20] In this case, after the resolution to
dissolve was adopted Continental was not
in a position to work for the client. The
trial court found there was no company for
appellee or Superior Structures to compete
against We agree.
[21,22] Appellant next claims the trial
court erred in dismissing his claims for
checks which were written solely by appellee on August 15, 1980. As part of the
August 14, 1980, dissolution agreement the
checking account was to be changed to
require the signatures of both appellant
and appellee on all company checks. Appellant contends appellee had the burden as
a fiduciary to establish these checks were
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fair and taken in good faith since they were
written contrary to the dissolution agreement. The record shows the checks written by appellee were for his wages and
vacation pay. Appellant does not argue
that appellee was not entitled to this money, but complains only that the checks were
written without his co-signature. The
checks were for wages, reasonable in
amount, and there was no damage to appellant by the failure of appellee to have them
co-signed. Thus, the trial court did not err
in ruling appellee did not breach a fiduciary
duty by writing the wage checks without
the co-signature of appellant.
[23] The final issue raised by appellant
as to the breach of a fiduciary duty is that
the court erred in dismissing the claim for
punitive damages. Punitive damages are
proper when a breach of fiduciary duty is
involved. Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224
Kan. 506, Syl. 1113, 582 P.2d 1136. In this
case, the trial court properly dismissed the
claim for breach of fiduciary duty against
appellee; thus, under the circumstances it
was required to also dismiss the claim for
punitive damages.
Appellant next argues the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to consider
on appellant's motion for new trial the affidavits of witnesses who had testified at
trial. The affidavits included in the motion
were those of Arnett; Don Riley, Continental's attorney; and Shirley Garrity, appellant's accountant.
In Arnett's affidavit, he states after the
pre-incorporation agreement a misunderstanding arose as to whether the salaries
were to remain at the initial level. Arnett's
position was the salaries could be increased. Consistent with his trial testimony, the affidavit states he expressed this
position in a March 1975 letter to Schraft.
The affidavit states, however, Schraft objected to this and it was then agreed that
the board of directors would determine the
salaries.
In denying the motion for new trial, the
trial court stated it had not considered the

affidavits. The court noted each affiant
had testified at trial, and that Arnett's affidavit contradicted his trial testimony. The
court concluded such contradictory evidence is not allowed after the fact.
[24] On appeal, appellant argues Arnett's affidavit shows the statement in his
letter respecting salary was never the
agreement of the parties and the trial
court's finding to that effect is erroneous.
Motions for new trial are governed by
K.S.A. 60-259, which provides:
"A new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues when it appears that the
rights of the party are substantially affected:
"[Because of] [e]rroneous rulings or
instructions of the court.
" . . . That the verdict, report or decision is in whole or in part contrary to the
evidence.
" . . . For newly discovered evidence
material for the party applying, which he
could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial."
[25] We have held the granting or denial of a new trial on grounds of surprise or
newly discovered evidence is discretionary
on the part of the trial court, and will not
be reversed unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. See Bott v. Wendler, 203
Kan. 212, 229, 453 P.2d 100 (1969). The
burden is on the party seeking the new
trial to show the new evidence could not,
with reasonable diligence, have been produced at trial. Where the party does not
meet this burden, a trial court does not
abuse its discretion in refusing to consider
the contents of a supporting affidavit. See
Connolly v. Frobenins, 2 Kan.App.2d 18,
25, 574 P.2d 971, rev. denied 225 Kan. 843
(1978).
[26] In this case, Arnett, Riley and
Garrity all testified at trial as appellant's
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witnesses. Appellant had every opportunity to examine each of them and elicit the
information set out in the affidavits. The
appellant failed to show the new evidence,
particularly that included in Arnett's affidavit, could not have been produced at trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the affidavits
or in denying the motion for a new trial.
The next issue is whether the trial court
erred in ruling there was no evidence of a
rental agreement on Continental's offices
which were located at 805 South Main,
Wichita, in a building owned by appellant,
and that appellant failed to mitigate his
damages. In addition to the office space,
Continental also rented warehouse space
from appellant at 1711 South Knight, Wichita.
Schraft testified he was seeking $8880 in
rent from the company for the period September 1, 1980, to September 1, 1981. This
sum represented a monthly rental of $740
for both the office space and the warehouse. Appellant testified he could not
separate the rent for the two facilities.
Among the resolutions adopted by the
board of directors at the August 14, 1980,
meeting dissolving the corporation was the
following:
"FURTHER RESOLVED: Delbert
Story, employee of Continental Structures shall be placed in charge of seeing
that all physical assets of the corporation
are delivered to 1711 South Knight,
Wichita, Kansas, as soon as possible."
The intention of the shareholders was for
Continental to move from the office space
on Main to the warehouse as soon as practical.
Despite this intent and resolution, the
furniture and other office equipment was
not moved from the office on Main Street
until a year later, in August 1981, when an
auctioneer removed it for sale.
The trial court found there was insufficient evidence of a rental agreement for
805 S. Main and that appellant had failed to
mitigate his damages. On a motion to

amend or for new trial the court found
additionally appellant had directed Delbert
Story to change the locks on Continental's
office on Main shortly after the August 14
resolution. Leis was not given a set of
new keys. The court found the furniture
and equipment had remained on the premises because of the actions of appellant and
he had breached his duty to the corporation
to preserve its assets. Further, appellant
made no effort to relet the offices until the
furniture was removed in August of 1981.
The court did find rent was due for the
warehouse space at 1711 S. Knight. Rent
for the warehouse was set by the court at
$275 per month, plus interest
[27] On appeal, appellant complains of
the court's ruling concerning the existence
of a rental agreement for 805 S. Main.
Appellant points to appellee's answer to the
second amended petition which contains an
admission by appellee that a rental agreement existed for 805 S. Main and 1711 S.
Knight. Despite admission as to the existence of a rental agreement, appellant was
properly not allowed to recover due to his
failure to mitigate damages and actual expulsion of appellee by changing the locks
on the offices. Appellant does not argue
the trial court erred in its ruling on mitigation. For this reason, Schraft was properly
denied rent on the office at 805 S. Main.
[28] Appellant next complains of the
court's proration of the $740 per month
lump sum claimed by appellant and the
award of $275 per month for the warehouse space. Appellant contends this was
done without supporting evidence. Appellant's second amended petition, however,
includes a lease, attached as an exhibit,
covering only the 1711 S. Knight property,
with rent set at $275 per month. Since
appellant was unable to state how much of
the $740 per month he claimed was attributable to the separate properties, the only
evidence of rent due for 1711 S. Knight
was the written lease for $275. The trial
court's ruling is supported by substantial
competent evidence.
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The final issue is whether the trial court
erred in allowing the testimony of accountant Steve Houlik from the work papers of
Continental's former accountant or in determining the amount due appellant on a
note.
From 1977, to the date of dissolution of
the company, Ray Eyman was Continental's accountant. Eyman, however, could
not testify at trial for health reasons which
had led to memory loss. Accounting testimony, therefore, was received from Shirley
Garrity, on behalf of appellant, and Steven
Houlik, on behalf of appellee. Garrity testified based only upon her review of the
company's books and records. She stated
from her review of the general ledger, Continental owed appellant $7719.24.
On cross-examination, Garrity testified
the ledger book was posted only through
March 31, 1979. She found no assets and
liabilities listed for the period after that
date, although there was an operating journal reflecting deposits and payments for
the period April 7, 1980, through September 15, 1980. She never obtained or requested Eyman's work papers.
At the August 14, 1980, meeting dissolving the corporation, a resolution was
adopted retaining Houlik to bring "the
books of account to date, prepare any tax
returns . . . and . . . perform any accounting services in conjunction with the liquidation and dissolution of the corporation."
Houlik testified at trial the general ledger
was only fully posted through March 31,
1978. It is unclear whether the difference
between this date and the March 31, 1979,
date testified to by Ms. Garrity is merely a
clerical error. Entries after that date were
found by Houlik in Eyman's work papers.
Houlik testified there were entries in the
work papers for the year ending March 31,
1979, which showed Continental performed
jobs for appellant, thereby resolving any
indebtedness to appellant.
After evaluating the testimony of the
two accountants, the trial court determined
the books and work papers considered to-

gether showed $3000 was owed by the company to appellant.
[29] On appeal, appellant argues the
court erred in receiving Houlik's testimony
based on Eyman's work papers since the
work papers were inadmissible hearsay and
were admitted without proper foundation.
If the work papers were not admitted, the
company's indebtedness to appellant would
remain at the $7719.24 amount shown in
the general ledger. The court held the
work papers were hearsay but admissible
under the business records exception to the
hearsay rule, K.S.A. 60-460(m), which allows the admission of:
"Writings offered as memoranda or
records of acts, conditions or events to
prove the facts stated therein, if the
judge finds that (1) they were made in
the regular course of a business at or
about the time of the act, condition or
event recorded and (2) the sources of
information from which made and the
method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their
trustworthiness."
[30,31] In State v. Cremer, 234 Kan.
594, Syl. 11 2, 676 P.2d 59 (1984), this court
discussed the proper foundation for the
admission of business records.
"K.S.A. 60-460(m) does not require
that the custodian of business records be
called to lay the foundation facts for
their admission into evidence. The foundation facts may be proved by any relevant evidence and the person making the
entries in the records need not be called
to authenticate them if they can be identified by someone else who is qualified
by knowledge of the facts. The policy of
the section is to leave it up to the trial
court to determine whether the sources
of information, method, and time of preparation reflect trustworthiness."
[32] Eyman was not available to testify
at trial because of his health problems. It
was clear from the testimony of Garrity
and Houlik that the formal records of the
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company were not fully posted after 1978
or 1979. Houlik, who had been hired by
corporate resolution to complete the company's accounting, testified the missing postings were in Eyman's work papers. Since
the papers; represented the company's only
accounting after the last posting in the
formal books, they appear to be the company's "books and records." Houlik had obtained the papers from Mr. Eyman; therefore, Houlik was their custodian.
The trial court determined the sources of
information and method of time of preparation reflected trustworthiness. The ab-

sence of entries in the formal corporate
ledgers and the existence of entries in Eyman's work papers were rationally explained. We find no abuse of discretion by
the trial court in allowing Houlik's testimony based upon the records.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Holmes, J., not participating.
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THATCHER et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COM-

MISSION et al.
No. 7178.

client for a fee, since the Legislature, under its police powers, has right to give
commission full power to regulate and fix

fees.

U.C.A.1943, 6—0-40, 42— 1—81.*

Supreme Court of Utah,
June 9, 1949.

7. Workmen's compensation <3=>ll
One of the purposes of the compensation act is to provide an employee with a
1. Attorney and client 0=^140
remedy without delays, expenses, and unThe judiciary has power to determine
certainties of a court trial.
what is a reasonable attorney fee when
the law or the contract of the parties pro- 8. Workmen's compensation C=»I983
vides for a reasonable fee.
Though attorneys may not hope to be
2. Constitutional law <S=?89(I)
Freedom of contract is a constitutional
right which may give birth to, but which
is not itself, a property right, and is subject to reasonable police regulation. 1
3. Attorney and client <^I44
An attorney's fee is left to agreement
between attorney and his client, subject to
right of court to discipline the attorney
where the fee charged is unconscionable,
or advantage is taken of the ignorance of
the client. U.C.A.1943, 6—0—40.

compensated to the full measure of the value of their time and work in a compensation proceeding, they must not be limited
by the Industrial Commission to such niggardly fees that they cannot afford to accept
compensation cases.
U.C.A.1943, 42—
1—81.

9. Workmen's compensation <£»I983
Though attorney and client in compensation cases may contract on a fee for services performed by the attorney before the
Industrial Commission and before the Supreme Court, such contract is not binding
4. Attorney and client G=32
on commission, and no greater sum can be
The judiciary does not regulate attorcharged than that fixed by commission, if
neys in the sense that it supervises them in fee so fixed is within limits of reasonabletheir office transactions, and the matter of ness. U.C.A.1943, §§ 6—0—40, 42—1—81.
fixing fees is generally a matter of agreement. U.C.A.1943, 6—0—40.
10. Constitutional law <3=?3I8
5. Constitutional law <@»55, 80(2)
Workmen's compensation <§=543
Statute purporting to authorize the Industrial Commission to regulate attorney's
fees in a compensation proceeding is not
unconstitutional on ground that it is an
unwarranted legislative and executive interference with the judicial branch of the
government in violation of the Constitution.
U.C.A.1943, 6—0—40, 42—1—81; Const,
art. 1, § 7.

When work done by attorneys in compensation proceeding is not great and compensation to be allowed is comparatively
small, Industrial Commission may fix attorney's fees without first granting attorneys a hearing, without denying attorneys
due process of law, especially where all
services performed are in matters which
never reach the Supreme Court. U.C.A.
1943, 42—1—81; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend.
14, § 1.

6. Constitutional law <£=>89(4)
Workmen's compensation <§»43
Statute purporting to authorize Industrial Commission to regulate and fix attorney's fees in a compensation proceeding is
not an invalid impairment of freedom of
right of an attorney to contract with his

11. Constitutional law €=318
If attorneys or applicant ask for a
hearing on reasonableness of attorney's fees
in a compensation proceeding either before fees are fixed, or for a rehearing after
fees are fixed, hearing or rehearing should
be granted in order to satisfy requirements

IMcGrew v. Industrial Commission,
96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 6C8.

2Tite v. Tax Comission, 89 Utah 404,
57 P.2d 734; Ellis v. Industrial Commission, 91 Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363.
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of due process. U.C.A.1943, 42—1—81;
Decision of commission set aside ar.d
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14, § 1.
case remanded for further proceedings.
Thatcher & Young, Ogden, for plaintiffs.
Where attorneys for compensation
Grover A. Giles, Attorney General, and
claimants sent letter to Industrial Com- Zar E. Hayes and S. D. Huffaker, Assistant
mission stating that they had agreed with Attorneys General, for defendants.
one of the claimants for an attorney's fee
of $1,000, and that, if commission had any
W O L F E , Justice.
doubt as to reasonableness of fee, attorneys
Certiorari to the Industrial Commission
would like to be heard on matter, but com- to review a decision allowing the attormission ignored such request for a hearing neys for the applicant a fee of $375 in the
and awarded only §375 attorney's fee, there matter of Rosenbaum v. Industrial Commiswas denial of due process. U.C.A.1943, sion.
42—1—81; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14, § 1.
Plaintiffs are co-partners licensed to
practice law and doing business as attor13. Workmen's compensation C=3|983
Industrial Commission is not arbitrary neys-at-law under the firm name of Thator unreasonable in fixing attorney's fee in cher & Young.
compensation proceeding unless it fixes fee
In February, 1946, Morris Dewayne
which a reasonable mind, familiar with val- Rosenbaum died of injuries while in the
ue of attorney's services, wrould say was less employment of another.
His widow
than reasonable. U.C.A.1943, 42—1—SI.3 claimed compensation for his death on the
ground that when injured he was employed
14. Workmen's compensation <§=>I983
by one Sholty who had more than three
Industrial Commission in compensation
persons in his employ. The real issue was
proceeding cannot fix attorney's fee above
as to whether Rosenbaum, was, at the time
amount which attorney and client have
of his injury, in the employ of Sholty or of
agreed to. U.C.A.1943, 42—1—81.
one Seashore, who had less than three persons in his employ and who was, there15. Workmen's compensation <§=M983
Where fee of attorneys representing fore, not subject to the Workmen's Comcompensation claimant was contingent on pensation Act. The commission decided
success, case was lost before Industrial the case against Mrs. Rosenbaum, the
Commission when attorneys agreed to rep- widow of the deceased workman, holding
resent claimants, case was a close one turn- that the deceased was at the time of his ining largely on interpretation of a contract, jury in the employment of Seashore. The
decision of commission was set aside by widow thereupon consulted with the plainSupreme Court, and on remittitur commis- tiffs herein who undertook to obtain a resion awarded claimants $7,250, $1,000 fee versal of the commission's order denying
agreed on between attorneys and claimants an award, agreeing to charge a fee only in
the event that they should be successful
was reasonable. U.C.A.1943, 42—1—81.
If successful, a fee reasonable in amount
PRATT, C. J., dissenting.
was to be agreed upon between the widow
and her attorneys, plaintiffs herein. From
this point, we outline in some detail the
Original certiorari proceeding by Roy work of plaintiffs in order that the reader
D. Thatcher, LeRoy B. Young, and Paul may have some idea of the services perThatcher, copartners doing business under formed.
12. Constitutional law @=>3I8

the firm name and style of Thatcher &
Young, against the Industrial Commission
of the State of Utah and others to review
a decision of the commission allowing the
plaintiffs a fee of $375 in a compensation
proceeding.

The plaintiffs, as attorneys for the dependents of the deceased Rosenbaum, filed
with the Industrial Commission an application for rehearing which was denied.
Plaintiffs then took the case to this court
with the result that the order of the Indus-

3 Ellis v. Industrial Commission, 91 Utah 432, & P.2d 263.
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trial Commission was, by a divided decision, fixing the fees of plaintiffs is without auset aside. See Rosenbaum v. Industrial thority and null and void.
ComrtL, Utah, 185 P.2d 511.
(2) That the action of the commission in
fixing the fees without notice to plaintiffs
The respondents in the Rosenbaum case
and opportunity to be heard was without
filed a brief on rehearing but failed to file
due process of law and a denial of the equal
a petition for rehearing. Thereupon the
protection of the laws in violation of Secplaintiffs herein, attorneys for dependents
tion 1, Amendment XIV, of the Constituof deceased Morris Dewayne Rosenbaum,
tion of the United States and of Article I,
filed a motion in this court for the issuance
Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah.
of a remittitur. The respondents filed a mo(3) Even if Section 42—1—81, U.C.A.
tion to be relieved of their default in fail1943,
giving the commission authority to
ing to file a petition for rehearing. The
regulate
and fix fees is valid, it acted armotion to remit the record was denied and
the motion of respondents to be relieved of bitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably in
default was granted. The plaintiffs herein, refusing to approve the agreed fee of one
as attorneys for the dependents of Rosen- thousand dollars ($1,000) and in fixing such
baum, thereupon prepared and filed a reply fee at the sum of three hundred and sevenbrief to respondents' brief for rehearing. ty-five dollars (^375).
We consider the contentions in the order
The petition for rehearing was denied by
this court and the record thereupon re- set forth above.
The argument on the first contention runs
mitted to the Industrial Commission.
Thereafter plaintiffs and the widow of as follows: That in our tripartite form of
Rosenbaum agreed between them that the government the legislative and executive
sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000) was cannot intrude upon the judiciary and vice
a reasonable fee, which the widow, acting versa; that the judiciary has the parafor all the dependents, agreed to pay. On mount power to lay down rules of practice
remittitur the commission vacated its pre- and procedure, although the legislature may
vious order denying an award, and entered make reasonable regulations in aid of that
an order awarding to the dependents of the power but not supersede it; that the judecedent benefits in the sum of seven thou- diciary has the sole power to license and adsand two-hundred and fifty dollars ($7,250), mit attorneys to practice before the bar beat the same time fixing the fee of the plain- cause as officers of the court they are part
tiffs herein for legal services rendered to of the judicial system; that the judiciary
the dependents of Rosenbaum at three hun- has the sole power to discipline attorneys
dred and seventy-five dollars ($375). The for unprofessional conduct and in pursuplaintiffs thereupon filed with the Industrial ance thereof to suspend and disbar attorCommission their application for a rehear- neys guilty of such conduct; that this court
ing on the ground that the sum of three has exercised and is in the process of exerhundred and seventy-five dollars ($375) cising its power in all three of the above
was inadequate for the services performed named fields. It does not clearly appear
and that one thousand dollars ($1,000) was from plaintiffs' brief whether they expresa reasonable fee. The petition for rehear- ly contend that the judiciary has the power
ing was by the commission denied, hence to regulate the conduct of attorneys in their
practice of the law and to fix or regulate
this review.
their fees. It appears, however, that it
The plaintiffs contend: (1) That Section would be necessary for us so to find in
42—1—81, U.C.A.1943, purporting to au- order to reach the conclusion they ask us
thorize the Industrial Commission to regu- to reach. At any rate, they contend that if
late and fix attorney's fees, is unconstitu- any branch of the government has such
tional and void as an unwarranted legisla- power in respect to attorneys it is the jutive and executive interference with the ju- diciary and not the legislative nor the
executive branches.
dicial branch of the government in that it
violates Article V, Section 1, of the ConIt is not necessary in this opinion for us
stitution of Utah and therefore the order to determine or even to discuss the difficult
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questions of what are legislative, executive
and judicial functions nor to fix the boundaries of each field. Attention is called
to the lengthy treatise on this matter contained in Tite v. Tax Commission, 89 Utah
404, 57 P.2d 734.
It should be noted that Article V of our
Constitution says that "no person charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall
exercise any functions appertaining to
either of the others, except in the cases
herein expressly directed or permitted."
(Emphasis added) It does not say that
no person charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of those
departments shall not exercise functions
which partake in their nature of the quality
of those functions exercised by either of the
other departments. Modern governments
could not exist if that were the case. What
was probably intended was that the function of primary law making shall be exercised by the legislature; that the executive
department shall have the duty of execution
and enforcement of the laws (which duty
may require manifold regulations and even
secondary law making functions within the
limits and according to the standards set by
the legislature); that the judiciary shall
have the final power and duty of interpreting the laws. Administrative agencies in
order to operate must at the outset exercise
powers fundamentally in nature either judicial, legislative or executive or a combination of all, but they derive such power from
the legislative branch and, while they must
in many cases interpret the laws which instituted them or other laws with which
they must deal, these laws are subject to
final adjudication and review by the judicial branch. We know by tradition and
custom in a general way what masters all
three of these departments deal with. It
would be fruitless and unwise to try to delineate in advance of specific and concrete
cases the boundaries separating the functional activity of any of the departments.
The plaintiffs would not, we think, deny
any of the above observations. What they
contend for is that the regulation and fixing of fees of attorneys is essentially and
solely the power of the judiciary and that
if such regulation and fixing the fees of at-

Utah

181

torneys is an exercise of the police power,
it must be applied by the judicial branch
of the government.
[1-5] Our difficulty with this argument
is that we are not aware of any power in
the judiciary to fix or regulate attorney's
fees. We do not think it can be inferred
from the power to promulgate rules of
practice and procedure nor from the power to provide for the examination, licensing
or regulation of admission to the bar of
persons seeking to practice law, nor from
the auxilliary power to discipline attorneys
as officers of the court for unprofessional
conduct. It is unnecessary at this time to
determine whether the judiciary has the
power to regulate or fix fees. It has the
power to determine what is a reasonable fee
when the law or the contract of the parties
provides for a reasonable fee. That is a
question presented by the litigation, and it
fixes the fees for its receivers and other
non-attorney officers. If there is power in
the courts to fix a fee scale or regulate
fees, it has not been exercised. In general
it has been left to the freedom of contract
which in the main opinion in the case of
McGrew v. Industrial Comm., 96 Utah 203,
85 P.2d 608, has been called a property
right.
Freedom of contract accurately
speaking, is a constitutional right which
may give birth to, but is not itself, a property right, and like many other constitutional rights is subject to reasonable police
regulation. So, likewise, the attorney's fee
is left to agreement between the attorney
and his client subject to the right of the
court to discipline the attorney where the
fee charged is unconscionable, or advantage
is taken of the ignorance of the client. But
such conduct would be unprofessional conduct and for that reason the court might
take cognizance of the case through the
grievance committee of the Bar. We must
therefore conclude that the judiciary does
not regulate attorneys in the sense that it
supervises them in their office transactions
and that the matter of fixing fees is generally a matter of agreement. If this were
not so, and if plaintiffs were correct in regard to their contention that the judiciary
has the sole right to fix or regulate fees,
the provision in Sec. 6—0-^40, U.C.A.1943,
formerly same section R.S.1933, reading:
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Since the amounts which may be awarded
under the compensation act are at all times
very modest, and in inflationary times practically penurious, it is apparent that the
very purposes of the act would be defeated
if attorneys were limited only by the canons
of professional ethics in the fixing of fees
for services rendered in compensation cases. To permit attorneys to charge usual
fees in cases of this sort might practically
emasculate any -value of the compensation
act to the workman. And by this, we do
not imply that attorneys habitually charge
exorbitant or unfair fees for their services.
Rather, in compensation cases, the attorneys must and are willing to accept for
their services less than they would receive
for the same amount of work in other types
of cases. This is more or less in the nature
of a professional duty somewhat similar to
The rule above stated was followed by
the duty to defend impecunious defendants
this court in Ellis v. Industrial Comm., 91
in criminal cases.
Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363. All of the judges
[8] And a word of caution to the comconcurring and dissenting in that case
r
agreed on that proposition even to the ex- mission may be appropriate here. W hile attorneys
may
not
hope
to
be
compensated
to
tent of holding that the Industrial Commission had the power to fix the fee for serv- the full measure of the value of their time
ices performed not only before the com- and work, they must not be limited to such
mission but before this court on certiorari niggardly fees that they cannot afford to acissued to the commission. See also Corbin cept compensation cases. And particularly
v. Wilkinson, 175 Okl. 247, 52 P.2d 45, 47, where it has become necessary to carry a
quoted with approval in the prevailing opin- compensation case to this court should the
ion of the Ellis case. If the rule were commission be at least moderately liberal in
otherwise, an overlarge share of the com- allowance of attorney's fees. Better that an
pensation much needed to support the fam- applicant should lose 15% to 20% of his
ily of the injured or deceased workman benefits in attorneys' fees than that he
might be diverted to the attorney. In some, should receive no benefits at all merely beif not in most cases, counsel for the appli- cause no lawyer could afford or would be
cant will have to take less than he might willing to accept his case and properly preproperly charge for work not involving sent it to the commission and the courts,,
workman's compensation, since the traffic for the main reason that the compensation
may not bear the full value of the services for such services would be grossly inadequate.
performed.
"The compensation of an attorney and
counselor for his services is governed by
agreement, express or implied, which is not
restrained by law," would be unconstitutional.
[6] The problem, therefore, reduces itself, not to one of determining what are the
powers of the judiciary in regard to regulation and fixing of fees, but of determining
whether the legislature has the right to impair the freedom of right to contract between an attorney and his client for a fee
by giving to the Industrial Commission full
power to regulate and fix reasonable fees
of attorneys in cases before the commission
in which attorneys have been employed.
We have no doubt that legislature, under its
police powers, has such right in compensation cases.

[7] One of the purposes of the compensation acts was to provide the employee
with a remedy without the delays, expenses
and uncertainties of a court trial. Under
the compensation acts, both employer and
employee gave up certain rights—the employer losing his common law defenses and
the employee his right to sue for large damages. In return, the employer received a
liability limited and determinate and the
employee received the sureness of a prompt
and expeditious payment of his claim.

[9] It thus transpires that while the attorney and client in compensation cases may
have freedom of contract to agree on a fee
for services performed by the attorney before the Industrial Commission and before the Supreme Court, such contract is
not binding on the Commission and no.
greater sum may be charged than that fixed
by the Industrial Commission, if the fee so
fixed by it is within the limits of reasonableness even though the parties may haveagreed on a larger sum.
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[10-12] The plaintiffs contend secondly,
that they were denied due process of law in
that the Industrial Commission ignored
their request for a hearing as to what would
be a reasonable fee for the services performed. In this regard, the plaintiffs must
prevail. The plaintiffs, attorneys for the
defendants, sent a letter to the commission
stating that they had agreed with Mrs.
Rosenbaum for a lee of one thousand dollars ($1,000) and that if the commission
had any doubt as to the reasonableness of
this fee, they, the attorneys, would like to
be heard on the matter. Many times when
the work done is not great and the compensation to be allowed is comparatively small,
the commission may fix the fee without first
granting a hearing, This is especially the
case where all the services performed are
in matters which never reach the Supreme
Court. Economy of time and effort to all
concerned in those cases makes it practical
for the commission to fix a fee from its
experience in compensation cases without
hearing as to the value of the services performed. But if the attorneys or the applicant ask for a hearing on the matter either
before the fee is fixed or for a rehearing
after the fee is fixed on the amount of the
fee allowed, the same should be granted in
order to satisfy the requirements of due
process. The award of $375 attorneys' fee
must therefore be set aside and a rehearing
on that matter granted, and it is so ordered.
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fees for professional work. And it must be
kept in mind that here we are dealing with
compensation benefits.
Much could be
said regarding the amount of attorneys'
fees. Lawyers perform differently according to their ability and experience. Some
work faster and more accurately and thoroughly than others. Each brings to his
task his own capacity, expertness, ability,
dispatch and experience. The author in
a dissenting opinion in the case of Ellis
v. Industrial Commission, 91 Utah 432,
64 P.2d 363t dwelt at some length on these
factors. It may be briefly said that an
incompetent lawyer is apt to be a detriment
to his client and is usually overpaid, whatever he receives, while a competent, welltrained, and skillful attorney may ofttimes
be underpaid for the services he renders.

Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Utah
State Bar, adopted May 28, 1936, approved
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
March 1, 1937, with amendments effective
March 10, 1940, provides as follows:
"In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid
charges which overestimate their advice
and services, as well as those which undervalue them. A client's ability to pay cannot
justify a charge in excess of the value of
the service, though his poverty may require a less charge, or even none at all.
The reasonable requests of brother lawyers,
and of their widows and orphans without
ample means, should receive special and
[13] While ordinarily our power does kindly consideration.
not go beyond that of setting aside an order
"In determining the amount of the fee,
of the commission, in a case such as this it is proper to consider: (1) the time and
we think it wise to advise the commission labor required, the novelty and difficulty
as to some of the factors which enter into of the questions involved and the skill rethe determination of a reasonable fee for quisite properly to conduct the cause; (2)
legal work performed. The commission is whether the acceptance of employment in
perhaps not so cognizant as are we as to the particular case will preclude the lawwhat is a reasonable fee for services per- yer's appearance for others in cases likely
formed on a contingent basis for matters to arise out of the transaction, and in which
involving this amount of money recoverable there is a reasonable expectation that otherin a death case where the applicant pre- wise he would be employed, or will involve
vails. The commission would not be arbi- the loss of other employment while emtrary or unreasonable unless it fixed a fee ployed in the particular case or antagonwhich any reasonable mind, familiar with isms with other clients; (3) the customary
the value of attorneys' services would say charges of the Bar for similar services;
was less than reasonable. That of course (4) the amount involved in the controversy
means that there must necessarily be a and for the benefits resulting to the client
wide range because attorneys themselves from the services; (5) the contingency or
differ widely as to the reasonableness of the certainty of the compensation; and (6)
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the character of the employment, whether
casual or for an established and constant
client. No one of these considerations in itself is controlling. They are mere guides
in ascertaining the real value of the service.
"In determining the customary charges
of the Bar for similar services, it is proper
for a lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by a Bar Association,
but no lawyer should permit himself to be
controlled thereby or to follow it as his sole
guide in determining the amount of his fee.
"In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of
the administration of justice and not a mere
money-getting trade."
It should be noted the above does not
lay down a rule but presents guides
for the fixing of attorneys' fees and so expressly states. It happens in this case that
the plaintiffs were a firm of skillful and experienced attorneys.
They snatched a
brand from the burning in the sense that
the case was lost before the commission
when they agreed to represent Mrs. Rosenbaum. It was a close case turning largely
on the interpretation of a contract relationship which in turn revolved about the interpretation of conversation between Sholty
and Seashore susceptible of a varying
meaning to intelligent minds. The fee was
contingent on success.
It would be the duty of the commission
by evidence to fix a fee within the zone of
reasonableness. The commission would not
ordinarily be required to determine from
the evidence what would be the lower and
upper limits of the zone for the services in
any particular case. But it must be satisfied
from evidence adduced as to the reasonable
worth of the services Tendered that the fee
it fixes is within the zone. Evidence from
competent counsel as to the worth of services founded upon a statement of what work
was performed by the attorneys in the case
and the skill required will itself usually be
given in terms of a range for the reason
that the testifying attorney will be aware
that his opinion as to the worth of legal
services is only an opinion and will vary
somewhat from lawyer to lawyer depending to an extent upon the experience of the
testifying lawyer and the strata of clientele
with which he deals.

[14,15] The commission cannot fix
the fee above the amount which the attorney and his client have agreed to, but it
may in cases include that under the circumstances thereof, a fee agreed to may
be unreasonable in that it takes too much
of the compensation award, compensation
being what it is. While we make no pronouncement in this case binding on the
commission, we can say that the fee agreed
on in this case, to wit, $1,000, being on a
contingent basis, is within the range between the highest and lowest reasonableness. The client was fully satisfied with
that sum realizing that she owed it largely to the work, the faith and the conscientiousness of her attorneys.
The order of the commission is set
aside, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the views
herein expressed; costs to plaintiffs.
LATIMER
concur.

and

McDONOUGH,

JJ.>

WADE, Justice (concurring).
I agree with the result and generally
with the reasoning of the prevailing opinion. But I do not see how we can reach
this result without overruling Ellis v. Industrial Comm., 91 Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363.
In my opinion, while, under Sec. 42—
1—81, U.C.A.1943, the Industrial Commission is authorized to regulate and fix attorneys' fees, where attorneys are employed in industrial accident cases, it may
only fix such fees as will reasonably compensate the attorney for his services rendered. When the amount of the fee as
fixed by the commission is either so low or
so high that it is beyond the bounds of
what is reasonable compensation for the
services of the attorney, then it is arbitrary and this court roust set aside such an
award. In order to determine what is a
reasonable fee in a given case the commission should obtain all the evidence it
reasonably can under the circumstances,,
and to refuse to grant any hearing would
also be to act arbitrarily. The commission is not bound to follow the expert
opinion evidence on this question and in
some cases might be justified in finding
contrary to all of such evidence. It should
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always keep in mind that a person who has
suffered an industrial accident receives the
very mimmum of compensation and that
the attorneys' fees must be held down to
as low a sum as possible within reason.
The above section of the statute does
not expressly require the commission to fix
the attorneys' fees at a reasonable amount
but I think that was intended. The fee
of an attorney is his reward or wages or
compensation for his professional services. It is not a mere donation which may
or may not be withheld and ordinarily
he is entitled to what his services are
reasonably worth. He is as much entitled
to reasonable compensation for his services in this kind of a case as anyone else
who renders service. So when the statute authorized the commission to fix attorneys' fees it was intended that the
amount fixed woud be within the bounds
of what constitutes reasonable compensation for such services. I recognize that
industrial accident cases are different
from ordinary matters which a lawyer is
employed to attend to. However, I do not
believe that the legislature intended this
kind of work to be done without compensation or for unreasonably low compensation. If we adhere to the rule that such
compensation may be so fixed then many
cases will have to be litigated without the
benefit of legal counsel and many a deserving person who is entitled to compensation will be barred therefrom because the commission does not understand
the law correctly, and the applicant will
not be fortunate enough to contact a lawyer who would take his case, knowing
that he would not be adequately compensated for his services. The attorneys' fees
should therefore be fixed within the
bounds of reasonable compensation for the
services rendered and should be sufficient
so that the average lawyer can afford to
take that kind of case without losing money
by such employment.
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is first for the commission to determine
and only when the commission refuses to
hear evidence thereon or after hearing,
acts beyond the bounds of reasonableness,
does this court have the power to set aside
its decision. This is the same rule as is
applicable in any other finding of fact.
Here the fact found is what is a reasonable attorneys' fee. Where the evidence
does not reasonably justify the finding
then it is arbitrary and we set it aside.
This court is particularly competent to
pass on this question because its members
are lawyers and have some knowledge of
the value of such services.

In order to reach this conclusion I think
we must overrule the Ellis case, supra.
This is what I understand the dissenting
opinions in that case held, but I think
such a holding is contrary to the majority
holding. I think the difference was more
than merely the difference in opinion as to
what amount would be necessary to bring
the award within the bounds of a reasonable fee. The basis of the majority opinion in that case was as expressed by Mr.
Justice Folland that [91 Utah 432, 64 P.
371], "where the circumstances call for
a substantial fee, the commission would
be acting arbitrarily if it fixed a mere
nominal fee." In other words, we there
held that as long as the fee fixed was more
than a nominal sum regardless of how unreasonably low it might be, this court
could not set aside the decision. Such is
clearly not the rule adopted here in the
prevailing opinion. That opinion requires
that the fee fixed must be within the range
between the highest and lowest fee which
satisfies the requirements of reasonableness. The fee of $375 is not a nominal fee
any more than the fee of $300 was in the
Ellis case and if we adhered to the same
rules in this case which we followed in
that case, we would have to affirm the
decision of the Commission. To overrule the decision in principle without expressly so stating, tends to create confuOf course there may be a wide range
sion as to the effect of our decision.
between what one person, lawyer or judge
would consider a reasonable fee in a givPRATT, Chief Justice (dissenting).
en case. And in each mind there would
I am directing my dissent to that part
be some difference between the highest
and lowest bounds within the range of of the prevailing opinion which discusse5
reasonableness. In all cases the problem the first contention of plaintiffs.
207P.2d—12Va

186

Utah

207 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

The controversial section of our code
reads as follows:
"Section 42—1—81, U.C.A. 1943:

responsibility of applying this measure
upon the shoulders of the layman, the
least qualified of the three to understand
the application. This fact alone however,
means nothing. A jury of laymen have a
final determination of similar questions
of fact in trials before the courts. Many
administrative fact finding bodies have
given to them the power to make final determinations of questions of fact. Such
powers are not questioned if properly
limited—in the jury case by instructions
from the court; in legislation by standards or rules to govern their considerations. In the case of Revne v. Trade Commission, Utah, 192 P.2d 563, 3 A.L.R. 169,
certain standards were fixed and discussed
as a foundation for determining the price
of hair cuts. But has section 42—1—81
(quoted) any such limitations? No.

"In all cases coming before the industrial commission in which attorneys have
been employed, the commission is vested
with fuU power to regulate and fix the
fees of such attorneys." (Italics added.)
This is an ill-considered bit of legislation that overlaps the powers of the judiciary. No doubt the legislature had in the
back of its mind the thought that it would
be of benefit to the applicant before the
commission. What they failed to realize
was that it is rather effective in driving
attorneys away from that class of litigation. It might be classed as a mild form
of legislation comparable to a certain enactment of the territorial legislature of
this state. Chapter VIII, Laws of Utah
1852 was entitled: "An Act for the RegNo standards, rules or instructions are
ulation of Attorneys." Section 2 thereof given the commission to advise them as
reads:
to the method of determining the area of
"No person or persons employing coun- reasonableness within which they may fix
sel, in any of the courts of this Territory, the fees. Except by implication, there is
shall be compelled by any process of law not even an indication that the fees are to
be reasonable. The word "reasonable" is
to pay the counsel so employed for any
not used. Furthermore, the indifference as
services rendered as counsel, before, or
to the possible arbitrariness of the comafter, or during the process of trial in the
mission's rulings as to fees is evidenced in
case."
another way. No provision for appelIf this comparison appeals to the reader late review of the commission's finding as
as an exaggeration, let us examine the to those fees is provided. This may seem
matter for a moment.
a strange statement in view of the Ellis
The members of this court, all of whom case, 91 Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363, cited in
were practitioners at one time or another, the prevailing opinion, and our acceptance
have no difficulty in appreciating the fact of the present case. Our right to accept
that a reasonable fee for handling cases it is very questionable—so far as this statbefore the commission should be measured utory law is concerned. The only review
in the light of the attorney's employment contemplated by the Industrial Act is of
contracts and in the light of the funda- the award; and "award" is defined, par. 7,
mental purposes of our industrial acci- Sec. 42—1—42, as the finding or decision
dent laws. That is evidenced by the opin- of the commission as to the amount of
ions filed in this case. Such an apprecia- compensation due any injured, or the detion, however, is not something arising pendents of any deceased employee. The
out of judicial experience only. It arises award includes any of the appropriate
from an analysis of the purposes of the items covered by such sections as 42—1—
law. The practitioner knows it as well as 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66f and 75, in none of
the judge; and both know it far better which is reference made to attorneys'
than the layman, who is unfamiliar with fees. Such fees are not part of the award.
professional services, inexperienced in le- The fact that the alleged purpose of Secgal analysis, and easily impressed with ad- tion 42—1—81 is to prevent the attorney
verse thoughts about the legal profession. taking too great a part of the award as
Section 42—1—81, however, places the fees, is a recognition that the amount o£
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the award is not governed by the necessity
of paying attorneys' fees. When laymen
are handed "full pozver to regulate and fix
the fees"—to control the purse strings—
with no checks or balances, it is quite easy
for their minds to assume that rather
popular fear complex conceived in the belief that the legal profession is afflicted
with predatory instincts, and needs watching. As a result, situations develop just
as developed here: A fee fixed without
notice, without evidence, without knowledge of professional services—arbitrarily.
In the Ellis case we said that it did not
make any difference whether or not the
attorney had appeared before the commission ; that the commission's power included fixing fees for appearances solely
before the Supreme Court. Is that true,
regardless of the public interest in the administration of justice?
"The practice of law is so intimately
connected and bound up with the exercise
of judicial power in the administration of
justice that the right to define and regulate its practice naturally and logically
belongs to the judicial department of our
state government." In re Integration of
Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283,
275 N.W. 265, 268, 114 A.L.R. 151.
The power to affect the functioning of
the judicial branch of the government will
lie with the legislature only so long as
the courts surrender that power to them.
Integration Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.
W.2d 604, 151 A.L.R. 586. As a matter of
comity and in the interests of teamwork
between branches of the government, there
are times when an insistence upon a strict
adherence to division lines between branches of the government will accomplish
little, but when the legislation takes the
form of driving counsel away from a particular class of litigants, it is time for
the courts to guard their rights and insist
upon adherence to those divisions—not to
protect the attorneys, but to prevent the
maladministration of justice.
It is human nature to shy away from the
arbitrary control of others, and attorneys are no exception. Met with a law
in which the layman is givers such unbridled control of his fees,
attorney
prefers to switch his attentiur* to fields
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where arbitrariness is less apt to follow.
Who suffers as a result? The applicant
before the commission, as he (or she, as
in this case) is handicapped in acquiring
justice. He either must accept inferior
service, or must fight his battle alone
against astute well paid counsel of—in
many instances—his corporate employer.
In this case the applicant lost before the
Commission without counsel.
Counsel
saved the situation for her, and she recovered.
The attorney is a necessary part of our
judicial system. Ruckenbrod v. Mullins,
102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325, 144 A.L.R.
839; State v. Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240
N.W. 441. He is also a citizen and should
bear his share of the burdens of society—
his share of the regulations of society.
The really important line to be drawn is
between the legislation which affects him
merely as the citizen practicing a profession, and that which affects him in his
capacity as a court officer. The latter is of
public interest.
On July 30, 1886, 24 Stat. 107, 48 U.S.
C.A. § 1471, Congress enacted a law providing that the legislatures of the territories of the United States shall not pass
local or special laws regulating the practice in courts of justice. When our State
Constitution was adopted in 1896, this
provision became par. 6, Sec. 26, Art. VI,
of that Constitution. This has been interpreted in Lyte v. District Court, 90
Utah 369, 61 P.2d 1259. Recently, Chapter 33, Laws of Utah 1943, our legislature
recognized that, our Supreme Court has
the power to regulate the practice before
the courts; and provided that when the
court's rules of practice are made effective
they shall supersede all legislation in conflict therewith.
These enactments are
clear recognitions of the power in the
judiciary to govern the matters of practice in the administration of justice.
To discuss the section of our code, 42—
1—81, in controversy, on the basis of an
exercise of police power regulating attorneys, is to draw attention away from
the harm to the public in the administration of justice. The power to regulate the
practice of professions can be conceded;
but when legislation having the earmarks
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of such a purpose, in reality interferes thought the commission's determination
with the administration of justice, then should be upon a measure such as is outlined by the requirement of that rule.
the courts must take a hand.
This legislation does affect the admin- Nothing is said in the law about it.
istration of justice—and does affect the
practice before this court; and the power
to govern the conduct or fees of attorneys
as a matter of regulation is beside the
point. There is not much difference between saying attorneys shall not be paid
for their services (Chap. VIII, Laws of
Utah 1852, quoted), and saying that in
certain classes of cases they shall be paid
only what a designated layman or group
of laymen sees fit to grant them—the litigant loses the benefit of the expert presentation of his case to the court on review, and the preparation for review. It
makes no difference that by judicial interpretation we may place the proper safeguards around Section 42—1—81. This
brings the matter down to what is suggested in the prevailing opinion.
That opinion appears to recognize a deficiency in Section 42—1—81, although it
upholds its provisions. This recognition
appears in this way: The opinion quotes,
as a guide for fixing fees, Rule 12 of the
Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar with
amendments. There is, however, nothing
in the legislative enactment in question
which indicates that the
legislature

The question before us is not one of
whether or not the court has power to
fix a schedule of attorneys' fees; nor is it
one to regulate attorneys in their office
practice. It is a question of whether or
not the legislature should be permitted to
enact a section of the code which interferes with the administration of justice.
It is not a question merely personal to the
attorneys, but one of great public importance—one as to whether or not we
should take a backward step in the direction of the 1852 law, quoted, and interfere with the administration of justice by
driving the attorney away from the kind
of practice discussed herein. We can go
back over the years if we want, step by
step, but it might be advisable to think of
those steps in the light of their effect on
the administration of justice. The strength
of our government lies in the maintenance
of the strength and independence of its
branches.
Section 42—1—81, U.C.A.1943, should
be declared unconstitutional and, in so far
as this particular case is concerned, the
fee agreed upon between attorney and
client upheld.
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UNITED STATES of America
Ronald L. DAUGHERTY and Thomas E.
Daugherty, Individually and d/b/a
Daugherty & Daugherty Construction
Co., Inc., and Daugherty Brothers Construction, Inc.; Daugherty & Daugherty
Construction Co., Inc. and Daugherty
Brothers Construction, Inc.
No. CIV. 3-84-12.
United States District Court,
E.D. Tennessee, N.D.
Dec. 3, 1984.
Government brought action to assess
civil penalties under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act against two
corporations and their individual owners.
Following grant of summary judgment in
favor of Government against corporations,
cross motions for summary judgment were
filed as to individual liability. The District
Court, Hull, J., held that (1) fact that one
corporation was not qualified to do business in Tennessee did not provide basis for
holding individual shareholder and officer
liable, and (2) there was no basis for piercing the corporate veil or applying the alter
ego theory to hold individual shareholders
and officers liable for the civil penalties.
Judgment for defendants.
1. Corporations <3=>653
Failure of corporation to qualify to do
business in Tennessee did not subject
shareholder, officer, and director of corporation to liability for corporate debt under
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act Surface Mizung Control and Reclamation Act of 197?* §§ 101-908, 30 U.S.
C.A. §§ 1201-1328; T.C.A. § 48-1106(1, 3)
(now § 48-l-1106(a, c)).
2. Corporations *»640
Question of whether individual could
be held liable for corporate debt under alter ego theory of piercing the corporate

veil would be determined with reference to
the law of the state of incorporation.
3. Corporations <S=»1.4(4)
Under Kentucky law, factors to be considered in determining whether to disregard the corporate entity under the alter
ego theory are undercapitalization, failure
to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment or overpayment of dividends, siphoning of funds by majority shareholders, and
guarantee of corporate liabilities by major
shareholders.
4. Corporations «=»1.6(4)
Where there was no showing of undercapitalization, where corporate formalities
were generally observed, although the requisite number of directors were not elected,
where no dividends were paid, and where
no funds were siphoned or commingled,
although corporate principal borrowed
money to loan to the corporation when the
corporation could not otherwise obtain the
funds, corporate entity would not be disregarded under the alter ego theory so as to
permit individual to be held liable for civil
penalties assessed against corporation under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, §§ 101-908, 30
U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328; T.C.A. § 481106(1, 3) (now § 48-l-1106(a, c)).
5. Corporations *»54, 56
Under Kentucky law, bylaws may be
amended by board of directors and, although penalty is prescribed if failure to
amend the bylaws to conform with the conduct of business is a violation of statute,
the bylaws may be waived. KRS271A.135,
271A.640(2).
6. Corporations «»1.5(3)
Under Tennessee law, the "instrumentality rule" is adopted to pierce the corporate veil where a subsidiary company is a
mere instrumentality for the parent company; corporate veil wflTfie pierced where
there is parental domination of the finances, policy, and business practices, use
of the domination to commit fraud or other
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wrong, and proximate cause connecting the
wrong with injury to the plaintiff.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
7. Corporations «=1.4(4)
All surrounding circumstances must be
considered in determining whether the corporation is a mere instrumentality of the
shareholder; factors to be considered are
inadequate capitalization, fraud, commingling of funds, and failure to follow corporate formalities.
8. Corporations €=>1.6(4)
Where individual was sole shareholder
of corporation, where bylaws requiring at
least two directors were observed for some
time until individual shareholder was elected sole director and president/secretary,
where corporation held annual and special
meetings of the directors and shareholders
and recorded the minutes through 1980,
where sole shareholder managed the dayto-day operation of the business with help
from his foreman and received only a salary as compensation, and where individual
never received any loans from or made any
loans to the corporation and no corporate
property was used for personal business,
except a corporate vehicle, corporation was
not a mere instrumentality of the sole
shareholder so as to permit him to be held
liable for civil penalty imposed upon the
corporation under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
§§ 101-908, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328;
T.C.A. § 48-1106(1, 3) (now § 48-l-1106(a,
c».
9. Corporations e=»385
Corporate action taken without requisite number of officers, and directors may
be ultra vires, but, under Tennessee law,
the action is not invalid and lack of capacity
may be asserted only by certain parties in
specific situations. T.C.A. 48-1-405.
Robert S. More, Sp. Asst U.S. Atty., U.S.
Dept. of the Interior, Knoxville, Term., for
plaintiff.

Charles Wagner, Knoxville, Tenn., for
defendants.
MEMORANDUM
HULL, District Judge.
Pursuant to the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 [the Act], 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp.1984), plaintiff
brought a civil action for collection of civil
penalties assessed agamst Daugherty and
Daugherty Construction, Inc. [hereinafter
D & D]; Daugherty Brothers Construction,
Inc. [hereinafter DBC]; Ronald L. Daugherty, individually and doing business as
DBC; and Thomas E. Daugherty, individually and doing business as D & D. By
order of the Court entered August 7, 1984
[No. 43], summary judgment for plaintiff
was granted as to D & D and DBC. The
case is now before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue
of the liability of the individual defendants
for the corporate debt
Both D & D and DBC were assessed civil
penalties for surface mining violations in
1979 and 1980. Plaintiff seeks to "pierce
the corporate veil" and hold defendants
individually liable for the corporate debt on
several theories. First, plaintiff contends
that under the "identity theory" of piercing
the corporate veil Ronald Daugherty is liable for the corporate debt because (1) he
was the sole shareholder, director and
stockholder of DBC; (2) he conducted the
business of the corporation in violation of
the bylaws; (3) he exercised exclusive control of the corporation and acted without
authority; and (4) he used corporate property for personal business. Second, plaintiff contends that under the "alter ego"
theory of piercing the corporate veil, defendant Thomas E. Daugherty is liable for
the corporate debt because (1) he conducted
the business of the corporation in violation
of the bylaws; (2) he exercised dominant
control of the corporation; (3) no stock
dividend was paid; and (4) he loaned money
to the corporation and guaranteed the
debts of the corporation. Third, plaintiff
argues that defendant Thomas E. Daugher-
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ty is liable for the corporate debt because
D & D was a foreign corporationl not
qualified to do business in Tennessee.
[1] The Court first will address plaintiffs theories of liability with respect to
defendant Thomas Daugherty. This Court
previously has addressed the issue whether
under Tennessee law a shareholder, officer,
or director of a foreign corporation not
qualified to do business in Tennessee is
liable for a corporate debt, arising out of a
transaction of business in the state. In
United States v. Ryan, Civ. No. 3-83-130
(E.D.Tenn. Sep. 28, 1984), this Court held
that a shareholder, officer, or director of a
nonqualifying foreign corporation is not liable for the corporate debt. The Court reasoned that enactment of the Tennessee
General Corporation Act, Tenn.Code Ann.
§§ 48-101 to 48-1407, specifically sections
48-1106(1), (3), abrogated pre-Corporation
Act case law which held the shareholder,
director, or officer of a nonqualifying corporation liable for the corporate debt. Although the Tennessee courts have not addressed the issue, the decision is consistent
with the decisions of courts of states which
have adopted corporation acts similar to
the Teeaessee act. See e.g., National
A&ikQf Credit Management v. Burke,
645j|2ci 1323, 1325, 26 (Colo.App. 1982);
Mysels v. Barry, 332 So.2d 38 (Fla.App.
1976); McAteer v. Menzel Building Co.,
Inc., 300 N.E.2d 583, 13 IU.App.3d 394
(1973). Thus, the failure of D & D to
qualify to do business in Tennessee does
not subject Thomas Daugherty to liability
for the corporate debt
[2,3] The question whether Thomas
Daugherty may be held liabkfc-fbr the corporation debt under the "alter-q^i theory
of piercing the corporate veil mudt be determined with reference to the law of Kentucky because D & D was incorporated in
that state. Kentucky courts generally
have displayed an aversion to any disregard of the corporate entity. Thermothrift Industries, Inc. v. Mono-Therm Insulation Systems, Inc., 450 F.Supp. 398, 405
(W.D.Ky.1978). However, the Kentucky
1. D & D was incorporated in Kentucky. Affida-

courts have stated that, under the alter ego
theory, where there is such a unity of
ownership that the corporate separateness
has ceased and treatment as separate entities would sanction fraud and promote injustice, the corporate entity should be disregarded. White v. Winchester Land Development Corp., 584 S.W.2d 56 (Ky.App.
1979). The following factors must be considered in determining whether disregard
of the corporate entity would be appropriate: (1) undercapitalization; (2) failure to
observe corporate formalities; (3) nonpayment or overpayment of dividends; (4) siphoning of funds by majority shareholders;
and (5) guarantee of corporate liabilities by
major shareholders. Id. at 62.
The record in this case discloses that D &
D was incorporated in Kentucky in 1966
(Affidavit of Thomas E. Daugherty, No. 15,
[hereinafter TED Aff.]). One thousand
shares of stock were issued and subscribed,
Thomas Daugherty owning 500 shares and
Gene Daugherty owning 500 shares. (Id.).
In 1971 D & D redeemed the stock of Gene
Daugherty, making Thomas Daugherty the
sole shareholder. The bylaws required
three directors and officers. D & D operated in compliance with the bylaws until 1973
when only two officers and directors were
elected (TED. Aff. at 2). Thomas Daugherty served as a director and president, and
Lee Ann Philips served as a director and
secretary-treasurer and was also an officeradministrative employee. (Id*). Until 1981
the corporation held annual meetings of the
shareholders and board of directors and
occasionally held special meetings. Minutes of these meetings were recorded. The
corporate charter was revoked in 1982.
(T$yp Aff.). Prior to revocation of the
^IgptB^the corporation conducted a coal
i£jip&$ business apd had an office in Oneida, Teanessee, which it shared with another corporation. (Deposition of Thomas E.
Daugherty at 7, [hereinafter TED Depo.]).
The corporation employed a secretary, a
foreman, defendant Daugherty and occasionally his son. (Id. at 6-9). The bylaws
vit of Thomas E. Daugherty, No. 15, at 2.

674

599 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

authorized the president to supervise and in Thomas Daugherty. However, corpocontrol the affairs of the corporation. (By- rate formalities were observed, and the corlaws of D & D, Art. IV, § 4). As president, poration was operated as a separate and
Thomas Daugherty made day to day man- distinct entity. The record discloses no
agement decisions. (TED. Depo. at 9). He fraud. Thus, defendant Thomas Daugherreceived no money from the corporation ty may not be held liable for the corporate
other than a salary. (Id. at 12). No divi- debt.
dend was paid. (Id.). He borrowed money
[6,7] The final issue for determination
to loan to the corporation when the corpois whether defendant Ronald Daugherty is
ration could not otherwise obtain a loan.
liable for the corporate debt of DBC, a
(Id. at 13-14). The corporation executed
Tennessee corporation. The Tennessee
promissory notes for the loans. (Id.). All
courts clearly have adopted the "instruproperty owned by the corporation, except
mentality rule" to pierce the corporate veil
perhaps a corporate automobile, was used
where a subsidiary company is a mere inonly for corporate business. (Id. at 15-18).
strumentality for the parent company. UnThe corporate bank account was not used
der the instrumentality rule the corporate
for personal funds. (Id. at 18).
veil will be pierced where there is: (1)
[4,5] Based on the foregoing descrip- parental domination of the finances, policy,
tion of the corporate activity, the Court and business practice; (2) use of the domimust determine, in accordance with the fac- nation to commit fraud or other wrong;
tors previously set forth, whether D & D and (3) proximate cause connecting the
was the alter ego of Thomas Daugherty. wrong with injury to the plaintiff. ContiFirst, there is no proof of undercapitaliza- nental Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of
tion. Second, corporate formalities were Alamo, 578 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn.1979). Howgenerally observed. Failure to elect the ever, the rule with regard to piercing the
required number of directors is a de mini- corporate veil in the case of a sole sharemus deviation from the corporate formali- holder and a corporation is less clear. In
ties. Under Kentucky law, the bylaws may Oak Ridge Auto Repair Service v. City
be amended by the board of directors. Ky. Finance Co., 57 Tenn.App. 707, 425 S.W.2d
Rev.Stat 271A.135 (1981). If failure to 620 (1967), perm, to app. den. Aug. 7,
amend the bylaws to conform with the con- 1967, the Court held that the sole shareduct of business was a violation of the holder was liable for the corporate debt
statute, a penalty is prescribed. Ky.Rev. where the "meager record" indicated that
Stat § 271A.640(2) (1981). However, the the corporation was at most a mere instrugeneral rule is that the bylaws may be mentality of the shareholder. The opinion
waived. See 18 AmJur.2d, Corporations fails to discuss, however, what factors
§ 173 (1965). Third, no dividends were caused the corporation to be a mere instrupaid. Fourth, no funds were siphoned or mentality of the shareholder. In another
commingled. Fifth, Thomas Daugherty case with rather unusual circumstances2
borrowed money to loan to the corporation the Court held that the corporate entity
when the corporation could not otherwise would be disregarded to render justice. Fiobtain funds. Weighing these factors, the delity Trust Co. v. Service Laundry Co.,
Court finds insufficient grounds to disre- 160 Tenn. (7 Smith) 57, 22 S.W.2d 6 (1929).
gard the corporate entity. D & D was a It further has been held that where the
close corporation and of necessity the con- sole shareholder, officer and director had
trol of the corporation was primarily vested not treated the corporate assets as his own
2. In Fidelity Trust Co. v. Service Laundry Co.,
160 Tenn. (7 Smith) 57, 22 S.W^d 6 (1929), the
testatrix directed the executor to cancel the indebtedness of her nephews but if one nephew
was indebted and the other was not, the executor was to pay the nonindebted nephew a sum

equal to the debt. The court held that a note of
a private business corporation owned by the
nephew payable to the testatrix V** a debt of
the nephew because cancellati^ of the debt
would inure to his benefit
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and no fraud had been committed, the corporate veil could not be pierced. Kopper
Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co.,
436 F.Supp. 91 (E.D.Tenn.1977). The Court
believes that all the surrounding circumstances must be considered in determining
whether the corporation was a mere instrumentality of the shareholder. Factors to
be considered are: (1) inadequate capitalization; (2) fraud; (3) commingling of
funds; and (4) failure to follow corporate
formalities.

(Id). Ronald Daugherty never received
any loans from or made loans to the corporation. (Id at 12). No corporate property,
except for a corporation vehicle, was used
for personal business (Id at 12-13). The
corporate bank accounts were never used
for personal funds or to pay personal obligations. (Id at 14). In 1979 a transfer of
corporate indebtedness was made to Rondale, Inc., a business in which Ronald
Daugherty owned a 25% interest. (Id at
14-17).

The record discloses that DBC was incorporated in Tennessee in 1973. (Affidavit of
Richard Daugherty, No. 14, [hereinafter
RD Aff.], at 2). One thousand shares of
stock were issued and subscribed, Richard
Daugherty owning 500 shares and Troy
Daugherty owning 500 shares. (Id). In
1976 Richard Daugherty bought Troy
Daugherty's stock and became the sole
shareholder. (Id). The bylaws provided
for three officers (with one person allowed
to serve simultaneously in two offices, with
the exception of president) and not less
than two directors. (By-laws of DBC, Art.
Ill, § 1; Art. IV, § 1). The bylaws were
observed until 1976, when Ronald Daugherty was elected sole director and president/secretary. (Defendant Ronald L.
Daugherty's Answers to Plaintiffs First
Set of Interrogatories, [hereinafter RD Interrogs.], at 5). Through 1980 the corporation held annual and special meetings of
the directors and shareholders and the minutes of these meetings were recorded. The
charter was revoked in 1983. (RD Aff. at
3). Before the charter was revoked the
corporation operated from an office in
Oneida, Tennessee. (Deposition of Ronald
Dougherty, [hereinafter RD Depo.], at 8).
DBC employed a secretary, a foreman, and
Ronald Daugherty. (Id at 9-11). Ronald
Daugherty managed the day to day operation of the business with help from his
foreman. (Id at 9-11). Ronald Daugherty
received as compensation only a salary.

[8,9] Considering the circumstances as
a whole, the Court cannot find that DBC
was a mere instrumentality of Ronald
Daugherty. Because DBC was a close corporation, out of necessity Ronald Daugherty made the controlling corporate decisions.
However, under the bylaws, as president,
he was authorized to supervise the affairs
of the company. (By-laws, Art. IV, § 3).
Plaintiff says that because Ronald Daugherty conducted the business of DBC in violation of the bylaws requiring at least two
directors and three officers, the actions of
Ronald Daugherty were without authority
and subject him to liability for the corporate debt under Tennessee Code Annotated
§ 48-1-405 (1984). This Court has held
that section 48-1-405 is inapplicable where
the corporation has been duly incorporated
and is in legal existence. United States v.
Phillips, Civ. No. 3-84-157, unpublished
slip op. (E.D.Tenn. Aug. 28, 1984). The
corporate action taken without the requisite number of officers and directors may
have been ultra vires; but under the Tennessee Code such action is not invalid and
such lack of capacity may be asserted only
by certain parties in specific situations.
See Tenn.Code Ann. § 48-1-405 (1984).
Further, where all the shares are owned by
one shareholder, the corporation is required
to have only one director.3 Tenn.Code
Ann. § 48-l-802(a)(l) (1984). To the extent
that the bylaws provide for more than one
director and officer, the bylaws may be

3. Apparently even though the corporation has
only one shareholder and one director, it is
required to have a president and a secretary, not
the same person. Tenn.Code Ann. § 48-1-811
(1984). Thus, the action of a corporation not in

compliance with the statute may be ultra vires.
Again, as stated in the text, such action though
ultra vires is not invalid and may not be asserted by plaintiff herein. See Tenn.Code Ann.
§ 48-1-405 (1984).
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waived. See 18 AmJur.2d, Corporations,
§ 173 (1965). The record discloses that
D6C was operated as a separate and distinct entity. There is no proof of commingling of funds or fraud or other improper
purpose. The corporate formalities observed. The mere fact that Ronald Daugherty was the sole shareholder, director and
officer is insufficient grounds to disregard
the corporate entity. Kopper Glo Fuel,
Inc. v Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F.Supp.
91 (E.D.Tenn.1977).
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is DENIED
and defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Order Accordingly.

Terry Wayne ROGERS, Plaintiff,
FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER CO. a
foreign corporation, and Fruehauf Corporation, a foreign corporation, Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs,
v.
BIRMINGHAM MANUFACTURING CO.,
INC., an Alabama corporation, Third
Party Defendant
No. 82-1335-CIV-EPS.
United States District Court,
S.D. Florida,
Miami Division.
Dec. 3, 1984.
In products liability action, defendant
filed third-party complaint against nonresident manufacturer of trailer, asserting
court's jurisdiction under state long-arm
statute. On manufacturer's motion to dismiss, the District Court, Spellman, J., held
that (1) Florida long-arm statute could not

be applied retroactively against manufacturer, where product at issue had been sold
prior to statute's effective date, and (2)
defendant could not assert state's jurisdiction over manufacturer on basis of statute
providing for jurisdiction over party which
distributed property to person in state
through wholesalers or distributors, in absence of any allegation that manufacturer
exercised control over its wholesalers or
distributors within state.
Motion granted.

1. Federal Courts «=»76
Florida long-arm statute could not be
applied retroactively to allow service as to
alleged wrongful act or omission committed before enactment of statute. West's
F.S.A. § 48.193.
2. Federal Courts <**77
For purposes of products liability defendant's third-party complaint against
nonresident manufacturer, essential date
for application of Florida long-arm statute
was date on which product was sold, and
thus, court could not assert jurisdiction
over manufacturer under long-arm statute,
where product giving rise to action was
sold prior to statute's effective date.
West's F.S.A. § 48.193.
3. Federal Courts <*»76.15
Assertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendant under Florida statute authorizing such jurisdiction over party which
distributes property to person in state
through brokers, wholesalers, or distributors requires that alleged injury be occasioned by defendant's business activities
within state. West's F.S.A. § 48.181.
4. Federal Courts <*=>94
Plaintiff who asserts Florida jurisdiction under statute providing for jurisdiction
over party who distributes personal proper
ty to person within state through brokers,
jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors must
allege and prove that defendant had requisite degree of control over broker, jobber,
wholesaler, or distributor alleged to have

TabF

Tabl

FLETCHER CYC CORP

§915

§915, Effect of statutory provisions.
A majority of jurisdictions have enacted statutes providing
that contracts or transactions between an interested director
and the corporation are not automatically void or voidable solely
by reason of the director's interest.1 The Revised Model
Business Corporation Act defines a conflict of interest transaction as a transaction with the corporation in which a director
has a direct or indirect interest.2 The Revised Act provides that
a conflict of interest transaction is not voidable by the
corporation solely because of the director's interest in the
transaction if the transaction was fair to the corporation, or, if
the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest
were disclosed or known to the board of directors, a committee
of the board of directors, or the shareholders entitled to vote,
and the transaction was authorized, approved, or ratified.3 The
Model Act provisions and most state statutes pertaining to
director's conflict of interest reject the common-law principle
that all conflict of interest transactions entered into by directors
are automatically voidable at the option of the corporation
regardless of the fairness of the transaction or the manner in
which the transaction was approved by the corporation.4 Most
state statutes governing corporate transactions with interested
directors are a response to earlier doctrines which held that all
contracts between directors and corporations on whose boards
they sat were voidable at the instance of any aggrieved
shareholder.5 Such statutes generally provide that conflict of
interest transactions will not be voidable at the instance of an
aggrieved shareholder if (1) they are fair, or (2) they are
approved by a "disinterested" majority of the directors, or (3)
they are ratified by the shareholders. As stated in an excellent
analysis appearing in the Harvard Law Review, "Most transactions between corporations and their directors are valid under
the disinterested' director exception, since generally only a
direct pecuniary interest in a transaction will disqualify a
director from voting to ratify it."6 "Even if the disinterested
director' route is not available, self-dealing majority shareholders may ratify their contracts with the corporation by means of
a shareholder vote . . . . And although many state courts speak
in terms of a high burden of proof on the director seeking to
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demonstrate the fairness' of his self-dealing, the consensus of
commentators is that such standards are not effective."7
The California statute declares that no contract or other
transaction between a corporation and one or more of its
directors, or between a corporation and any corporation in
which one or more of its directors has a material financial
interest, is either void or voidable because such director or
directors are present at the meeting of the board or a committee
thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or
transaction, provided that any one of three conditions is met.8
The conditions are: (a) the fact of the director's interest is
known to the board and the contract or transaction is authorized or approved by a vote sufficient without counting that of
the director, or (b) the contract or transaction is approved or
ratified, with knowledge of the director's interest, by a majority
of the shareholders, or (c) the contract or transaction be just and
reasonable as to the corporation at the time it was authorized or
approved.9 The effect of the California statute is to permit
contracts between the corporation and a majority of its directors
just as it permits contracts to be made between two corporations
with a majority of their directors in common.10 However, the
California court has held that the burden of proving fairness is
on the person seeking to uphold the transaction and further that
mere disclosure is not sufficient to otherwise sustain an
otherwise unfair transaction.11 New York has enacted a statute
which is similar to the California provision.12 The Delaware
General Corporation Law contains a section relating to the
validity of contracts or transactions involving one or more
interested directors or officers,13 and the Delaware statute
specifically applies even though the disinterested directors be
less than a quorum.14
Statutes sometimes expressly prohibit loans by banks or
other corporations to directors or other corporate officers15 or
prohibit the issuance of bonds to a director,16 or prohibit a
director or officer of a bank from purchasing or selling for his or
her personal benefit any obligation or asset of the bank for a
sum less than shall appear on the face of the obligation.17
The effect of the various statutes on interlocking directorates is considered in another section.10

489

FLETCHER CYC CORP

§915
1

United States. United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat.
Life Ins. Co., 447 F2d 647, 653 (reviewing statutes); Smith v. Robinson,
343 F2d 783 (applying North Carolina statute).
Alabama. Ala Code § 10-2A-63.
Arizona. Ariz Rev Stit Ann
§10-041.
California. Cal Corp Code
§310.
Colorado. Colo Rev Stat
§7-5-114.5.
Connecticut. Conn Gen Stat
§33-323.
Statute relating to corporate
transactions with directors and others was inapplicable to agreement
approved by board of directors and
executed prior to effective date of the
statute. Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain
Co., 153 Conn 527, 218 A2d 526.
Delaware. Del Code Ann Tit 8,
§144.
Florida. Fla Stat §607.124.
Georgia.
Ga Code Ann
§ 14-2-155.
Idaho. Idaho Code §30-1-41.
Illinois. Ill Rev Stat ch 32, par
8.60.
Indiana. Ind Code §23-1-10-6.
Kansas.
Kan
Stat
Ann
§ 17-6304; Oberhelman v. Barnes Investment Co., 236 Kan 335, 690 P2d
1343.
Kentucky. Ky Rev Stat
§271A.205.
Louisiana. La Rev Stat Ann
§ 12:84.
Maine. Me Rev Stat Ann Tit
13A, §717(1).
Maryland. Md Corps & Ass'ns
Code Ann §2-419.

Michigan. MSA §§21.200(545),
21.200(546);
MCL
§§450.1545,
450.1546.
Minnesota.
Minn
Stat
§302A.255.
Missouri.
Mo Rev
Stat
§351.327.
Montana. Mont Code Ann
§35-1-413.
Nebraska. Neb Rev Stat
§21-2040.01.
Nevada. Nev Rev Stat §78.140.
New Hampshire. NH Rev Stat
Ann §293-A:41.
New Jersey. NJ Rev Stat
§§14A:6-8(1), 14A:6-8(2).
New York. NY Bus Corp Law
§713.
North Carolina. NC Gen Stat
§55-30(b); S&W Realty & Bonded
Commercial Agency, Inc. v. Duckworth & Shelton, Inc., 274 NC 243,
162 SE2d 486 (NC Gen Stat §55-30
(b)).
Smith v. Robinson, 343 F2d 783
(applying North Carolina statute).
Ohio. Ohio Rev Code Ann
§1701.60.
Oklahoma. Okla Stat tit 18,
§ 1.175a.
Oregon. Or Rev Stat §57.265.
Pennsylvania. Pa Cons Stat tit
15, §1409.1.
Rhode Island. RI Gen Laws
§7-1.1-37.1.
South Carolina. SC Code Ann
§33-13-160.
Tennessee. Tenn Code Ann
§48-1-816.
Vermont. Vt Stat Ann tit 11,
§ 1888.
Virginia. Va Code §13.1-691.
Washington. Wash Rev Code
§23A.08.435.
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West Virginia. W Va Code
§31-1-25.
Wisconsin. Wis Stat § 180.355.
Wyoming.
Wyo
Stat
§17-1-136.1.
Rev Model Bus Corp Act §8.31;
Model Bus Corp Act §41.
See also Rev Model Bus Corp
Act Ann 3rd §8.31, Official Comment.
As to form of contracts in which
directors are adversely interested, see
Fletcher Corp Fms §1068 (4th Ed).
Webber, Arkansas corporate fiduciary standards—interested directors' contracts and the doctrine of
corporate opportunity, 5 U Ark Little
Rock LJ 39; Mintz & Schwartz, Interlocking directorates and interest
group formation, 46 Am Soc Rev 851;
Clatterbuck, Section 21-2040.01: Interested director transactions and
considerations of fairness, 58 Neb L
Rev 909; Moore, The "interested"
director or officer transaction, 4 Del J
Corp L 674; Anderson, Conflict of
interest: efficiency, fairness and corporate structure, 25 UCLA L Rev
738; Murphy, Keys to unlock the
interlocks: Dealing with interlocking
directorates, 11 U Mich JL Ref 361.
2
Rev Model Bus Corp Act § 8.31
(a).
3
Rev Model Bus Corp Act § 8.31
(a).
4
See Model Bus Corp Act Ann
3rd §8.31, Official Comment.
See also §930.
5
Marsh, Are directors trustees?:
Conflict of interest and corporate
morality, 22 Bus Law 35.
See Note, 91 Harv L Rev 1874,
citing Fletcher Cyc Corp §§929-930
(Perm Ed).

§915

•Note, 91 Harv L Rev 1874.
7
Note, 91 Harv L Rev 1874,
citing Fletcher Cyc Corp §§929, 930
(Perm Ed).
See also, Folk, State statutes:
Their role in prescribing norms of
responsible management conduct, 31
Bus Law 1031; Cary, Federalism and
corporate law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale LJ 663.
8
California. Cal Corp Code
§310; Thrasher v. Thrasher, 27 Cal
App 3d 23, 103 Cal Rptr 618; American Center For Education v. Cavanar,
26 Cal App 3d 26, 102 Cal Rptr 575;
Cechettini v. Consumer Associates,
Ltd., 260 Cal App 2d 295,67 Cal Rptr
15 (validity upheld under former Cal
Corp Code §§820, 823 where approved by sole shareholder), or approved.
'California. See Caminetti v.
Prudence Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n (Cal
App), 142 P2d 41, affd 62 Cal App 2d
945, 146 P2d 15.
10
Ballantine, Law of Corporations (Rev Ed), p 175.
11
California.
Thrasher
v.
Thrasher, 27 Cal App 3d 23, 103 Cal
Rptr 618 (dominating officer and
director held liable on loan contract
notwithstanding former Cal Corp
Code §820); Remillard Brick Co. v.
Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal App
2d 405, 241 P2d 66.
12
NY Bus Corp Law §713.
13
Del Code Ann Tit 8, § 144.
United States. Under Delaware
Gen Corp Law § 144(a)(l, 3), a contract or transaction is not void or
voidable solely by reason of being
between the corporation and one of
its directors if material facts as to
interest of the director and as to the

491

§915.1

FLETCHER CYC CORP

contract or transaction are disclosed
or known to board of directors and
the board in good faith authorizes the
contract or transaction by affirmative
vote of majority of disinterested directors, or if the contract or transaction is fair to the corporation as of
time it is authorized, approved or
ratified by the board. Weiss v. Kay
Jewelry Stores, Inc., 470 F2d 1259,
1268.
Delaware. Weiss v. Kay Jewelry Stores, Inc., 470 F2d 1259 (applying Delaware statute).
Illinois. By the terms of the
Delaware provision, any transaction
between a corporation and one of its
directors apparently need not be fully
disclosed in order for it to be valid;
however, the fairness of any such
transaction to the corporation at the
time of its approval must be affirmatively shown by the individual at-

tempting to enforce the contract.
Harris Trust & Savings Bank v.
Joanna-Western Mills Co., 53 111 App
3d 542, 368 NE2d 629.
14
Delaware. Del Code Ann Tit
8, § 144(a)(1).
15
See §1245.
16
United States. Toledo, St. L.
& K. C. R. Co. v. Continental Trust
Co., 95 F 497.
17
Montana. Montana statute
providing that no director or officer
of bank shall for his own personal
benefit purchase or sell or be interested in purchase or sale of any obligation or assets of bank for sum less
than shall appear on face of obligation prohibited bank president from
purchasing realty from bank which he
later leased to oil company. Johnson
v. Kaiser, 104 Mont 261, 65 P2d
1179.
"See §962.1.

§915.1. —Charter and bylaw provisions.
In order to meet modern business conditions, there has
been a growing tendency to insert in the articles or certificate of
incorporation or bylaws provisions permitting interested directors to contract with the corporation and permitting contracts
between corporations with common directors.1 In fact it is
common knowledge that this is a standard provision inserted in
corporate articles by all law firms.2 Many of these directors'
immunizing clauses seem to give an unrestrained authorization
for contracts with directors with common directors, despite
fraud or unfairness or the lack of an independent quorum or
vote.3
The law is not clear as to the legal effect of these clauses
although in a few cases courts have upheld charter provisions
permitting the counting of interested directors for quorum
purposes.4 The charter of the Sperry Corporation specifically
addresses itself to this problem: "Any director whose interest in
any such contract or transaction arises solely by reason of the
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1

4

See chap 39.
See chap 37.
3
See chap 25.

See chap 23.
See chap 11.
6
See chaps 40, 41.

2

5

§3001. Form and contents—In general.
So far as the body of the contract is concerned, no special
rules apply, except that if the contract is intended to bind only
the corporation, it should clearly appear as one of the parties
and the promises and covenants should be in its name. Unless
there is a statutory provision to the contrary, corporations may
make their contracts in the same manner as individuals.1 So in
the absence of an acceptance of an offer by any officer or agent,
there can be no acceptance by the corporation,2 subject to the
rules relative to implied contracts or promissory estoppel.3
Moreover, in accordance with basic contract law, the acceptance
on behalf of the corporation must be unequivocal and the terms
of the contract must be reasonably certain,4 including mutuality
of obligation.5 If the surrounding facts and circumstances show
that the party in interest was not dealing with the corporation
but with one of its officers individually, the corporation is not
bound.6 However, a corporation has a duty to reveal its
corporate status to the persons with whom it deals.7
A corporate contract may take the form of a resolution of
the board of directors.8 But as a general rule a vote or other
action on the part of the board of directors need not be a formal
resolution entered on the minutes or records of the corporation,
unless it is expressly required by statute.9 If a corporation, by a
vote of a majority of the directors, adopts a resolution to enter
into a certain contract, it is binding, although a formal contract
is not thereafter executed between the parties.10 However, if the
resolution which authorizes the contract also directs the manner
of entering into and executing it, those directions must be
followed.11 The formalities of a corporate resolution may not be
required where the contracting party is a close corporation,
since courts are likely to permit the shareholders and directors
to bind their company by personally executing the agreement.12
In accordance with well-settled rules of contract law, a
memorandum of a proposed contract, intended by all the parties
merely as a basis for negotiating a future formal contract, does
122
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not constitute a binding corporate agreement, especially where
the memorandum is not signed by the corporation but by an
officer individually,13 and where the directors may withdraw
their assent at any time before it is reduced to writing and
formally executed as a written instrument.14 If the assent of the
board of directors to a corporate contract is not a matter of
record, it may be proved by parol evidence.15
1

Alabama. University of Alabama v. Moody, 62 Ala 389.
California. Yeng Sue Chow v.
Levi Strauss & Co., 49 Cal App 3d
315, 122 Cal Rptr 816.
Oregon. Doehler v. Lansdon,
135 Or 687, 298 P 200.
Texas. Smallwood v. Southdown, Inc., 382 F Supp 1106 (D Tex).
Virginia. Altavista Cotton
Mills v. Lane, 133 Va 1, 112 SE 637.
Wisconsin. Blunt v. Walker, 11
Wis 334, 78 Am Dec 709.
2
California. See Southern California Acoustics Co. v. C.V. Holder,
Inc., 71 Cal 2d 719, 79 Cal Rptr 319,
456 P2d 975.
Colorado. Central Inv. Corp. of
Denver v. Container Advertising Co.,
28 Colo App 184, 471 P2d 647 (corporation's acceptance of offer not within reasonable time under circumstances and hence no binding contract).
Illinois. Lee Shell Co., Inc. v.
Model Food Center, Inc., I l l 111 App
2d 235, 250 NE2d 666.
Pennsylvania. See F.W. Wise
Gas Co. v. Beech Creek R. Co., 437
Pa 389, 263 A2d 313 (jury question as
to acceptance by railroad of plaintiff s
offer to purchase certain real estate
not needed for railroad purposes).
3
See §2580.
4
United States. In re Colorado
Mercantile Co., 299 F Supp 55 (ap-

plying Colo Rev Stat
Ann
§155-9-402(1).
Colorado. The Colorado statutory amendment of its Uniform Commercial Code §9-402(1) eliminating
the requirement of a manual signature would be given retroactive effect
so as not to render invalid a corporation's filed financing statement for
failure to sign it manually. In re
Colorado Mercantile Co., 299 F Supp
55 (applying Colo Rev Stats Ann
§155-9-402(1)).
Illinois. Lee Shell Co., Inc. v.
Model Food Center, Inc., I l l 111 App
2d 235, 250 NE2d 666.
An alleged acceptance by a corporate contractor which changed the
terms of the subcontractor's bid
amounted to a rejection and counterproposal and no contract was created
between the parties where the subcontractor refused to execute presented documents, nor could the contractor invoke the doctrine of promissory
estoppel in view of its own conduct in
failing to accept the bid. Brook v.
Oberlander, 49 111 App 2d 312, 199
NE2d 613.
North Carolina. Howell v.
CM. Allen & Co., 8 NC App 287, 174
SE2d 55.
5
United States. Merlite Land,
Sea & Sky, Inc. v. Palm Beach Inv.
Properties, Inc., 426 F2d 495 (applying Florida law).
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Florida. Merlite Land, Sea &
Sky, Inc. v. Palm Beach Inv. Properties, Inc., 426 F2d 495.
Kentucky. Buttorff v. United
Electronic Laboratories, Inc., 459
SW2d 581 (Ky).
Texas. Texas Gas Utilities Co.
v. Barrett, 452 SW2d 508 (Tex Civ
App) (written contract to furnish
natural gas by utility company unenforceable for lack of mutuality of
obligation).
6
Louisiana. Collins v. Cliff Oil
& Gas Co., Inc., 177 So 120 (La App)
(oil and gas lease).
Mississippi. Brownlee Lumber
Co. v. Gandy, 125 Miss 71, 87 So 470.
See §3034.
7
Georgia. Rizk v. Tucker Coal
& Brick Co., 147 Ga App 155, 248
SE2d 215.
8
Illinois. Public Service Co. v.
Leatherbee, 311 111 505, 143 NE 97
(resolution authorizing stipulation to
easement).
Maryland. Schlens v. Poe, 128
Md 352, 97 A 649 (legal effect of
resolution cannot be changed by
memorandum on records after adjournment of meeting without consent of other parties).
Pennsylvania. Lafean v. American Caramel Co., 271 Pa 276, 114 A
622.
Wisconsin. A corporation has
the power to enter into a contract
evidenced by a resolution. Peters v.
Peters Auto Sales, Inc., 37 Wis 2d
346, 155 NW2d 85 (citing Fletcher
Cyc Corp §3001 (Perm Ed)).
•United States. Where an
equipment lease was signed by the
president who was intimately concerned with the everyday operations

of the corporation, the lack of evidence of an authorizing directors'
resolution or a corporate seal was
insufficient under Pennsylvania law
to invalidate the lease on ground that
it was improperly executed. Speyer,
Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,
275 F Supp 861.
California. Allen v. Central
Counties Land Co., 21 Cal App 163,
131 P 78 (not needed for employment
contract).
Virginia. Altavista Cotton
Mills v. Lane, 133 Va 1, 112 SE 637.
10
Pennsylvania. Lafean v.
American Caramel Co., 271 Pa 276,
114 A 622.
11
Iowa. Black Hawk Nat. Bank
v. Monarch Co., 201 Iowa 240, 207
NW 121.
12
South Dakota. See First Nat.
Bank of Beresford v. Nelson, 323
NW2d 879 (SD).
13
Iowa. Segner v. Guaranty
Fund Realty Co., 194 Iowa 582, 189
NW 745.
Texas. Hoover v. Self, 279 SW
572 (Tex Civ App).
14
Idaho. Where the lessee
signed an equipment lease agreement
in blank and the blanks in the printed
form were not filled in by the corporate lessor's representative in accordance with an oral agreement or understanding between the parties prior
to the execution of the written instrument, the alleged fraud presented a
question of fact for determination by
the trial court under the evidence.
C.I.T. Corp. v. Hess, 88 Idaho 1, 395
P2d 471.
Texas. Hoover v. Self, 279 SW
572 (Tex Civ App).
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contract because not approved at a directors' meeting when a
quorum was present, where the buyer has expended money in
reliance and the seller has ratified the contract.5
1

Georgia. E. Frederics, Inc. v.
Felton Beauty Supply Co., 58 Ga App
320,198 SE 324 (contemplated signature of secretary not necessary).
Louisiana. A provision in an
agreement that the times and
amounts of installment payments by
corporation shall be determined by its
president was potestative, but of no
effect with regard to the other party
who had performed. Muhoberac v.
Saloon, Inc., 210 So 2d 572 (La App).
Oklahoma. McCray v. Sapulpa
Petroleum Co., 102 Okla 108, 226 P
875 (approval of board required).
Oregon. Salquist v. Oregon Fire
Relief Ass'n, 100 Or 416, 197 P 312.

Pennsylvania. Car Advertising
Co. v. Rohr McHenry Distilling Co.,
49 Pa Super 442.
2
United States. Barnes v. Red
Bayou Oil Co., Inc., 271 F 297 (approval of board necessary).
Massachusetts. Eastern Advertising Co. v. E.L. Patch Co., 235 Mass
580, 127 NE 516.
3
United States. Barnes v. Red
Bayou Oil Co., Inc., 271 F 297.
4
Texas. Transcontinental Oil
Co. v. Wofford, 6 SW2d 165 (Tex Civ
App).
9
Pennsylvania.
Greensboro
Gas Co., 222 Pa 4, 70 A 940.

{3016. Ratification, waiver and estoppel—In general.
Defectively executed contracts of a corporation may be
ratified by it so as to be binding,1 as where it receives and
retains the benefit of the transaction, with full knowledge of all
the facts.2 The ratification may be express, or may be inferred
from silence and inaction, and, if the corporation, after having
full knowledge of the unauthorized act, does not disavow the
agency and disaffirm the transaction within a reasonable time,
it will be deemed to have ratified it.3 Thus, continued acquiescence by the directors in a defectively executed contract, with
knowledge of the circumstances attending its execution, and
their failure to object, may render it binding on the company.4
Accordingly, even though a contract is made by an officer or
agent of a corporation in his or her own name, the corporation
will nevertheless be liable where it has adopted the contract,
acquiesced in it, or received the benefits of it. s Thus, an
agreement purporting to be only the individual undertaking of
certain stockholders, and signed only by them, may bind the
corporation, where it was in fact executed for and in behalf of
the corporation which received the benefits of it.* A deed
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executed without authority may be rendered the binding deed of
the corporation by ratification.7 Although failure to object can
constitute ratification if the trier of fact draws the inference
from such silence that the principal intended to affirm the
agent's conduct, silence is not as a matter of law sufficient to
constitute ratification.8
The fact that it appears on the face of a deed that the
corporation caused it to be executed, which deed has since been
recognized as valid, is sufficient, after a lapse of more than
thirty years, to establish presumptively the authority of the
corporate grantor to execute the deed.9 A corporation cannot
deny the proper execution of an indorsement on a negotiable
instrument which is signed by the same officer who on its behalf
executed the instrument itself. "If this person had authority to
draw the bill, he certainly had authority to indorse it."l0 Defects
and irregularities in the execution of corporate instruments may
also be waived by the conduct and course of dealing of the
parties.11
On the other hand, if officers of a corporation make
contracts in their own name and upon the security of their own
property, and there is nothing to show that corporate liability
was intended by either party to the contract, the corporation is
not liable although it received the benefits of the contract.12
1

United States. In re Boston
Confectionery Co., 282 F 726 (lack of
formal vote immaterial where all but
one director knew of transaction); In
re C.W. Bartleson Co., 275 F 390.
Alabama. Taylor v. Agricultural
& Mechanical Ass'n, 68 Ala 229.
California. Kruce v. Parlier
Winery, 208 Cal 723, 284 P 671
(execution of promissory note).
Connecticut. Mercer v. Steil, 97
Conn 583, 117 A 689.
Illinois. Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Chicago & P.R Co., 86 HI 246, 29
Am Rep 28.
Kentucky. Union Motor Co. of
Paducah v. Taylor, 206 Ky 398, 267
SW 170.

Minnesota. Anderson v. Campbell, 176 Minn 411, 223 NW 624
(informal approval of directors estopped corporation).
New York. Spitzer v. Bom, 194
App Div 739, 185 NYS 875, revg 111
Misc 595, 182 NYS 327.
Oklahoma. A corporation, like
a natural person, may ratify, affirm,
and validate any contract made or
done in its behalf which it was capable of making or doing in the first
instance. East Cent Oklahoma Elec.
Cooperative, Inc. v. Oklahoma Gas &
Electric Co., 505 P2d 1324 (Okla).
Virginia. Altavista Cotton
Mills v. Lane, 133 Va 1,112 SE 637.
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Corporation's ratification of unauthorized contracts in general, see
§752 et seq.
2 United States. In re Boston
Confectionery Co., 282 F 726; Murphy v. Bankers Commercial Corp.,
Ill F Supp 608 (applying New
Alabama. Taylor v. Agricultural
& Mechanical Ass'n, 68 Ala 229. York
law).
Arizona. Air Technical Development Co. v. Arizona Bank, 101
Ariz 70, 416 P2d 183.
California. Campbell v. Hanford, 67 Cal App 155, 227 P 234.
The fact that the corporation
knew all the terms of a contract
through its president who signed the
contract in his individual name, acted
upon an assumption that it had executed the contract and accepted the
benefits payable under the contract
constituted a ratification of the contract by the corporation which cured
any defect in the execution of the
instrument. Fairlane Estates, Inc. v.
Carrico Const. Co., 228 Cal App 2d
65, 39 Cal Rptr 35.
Connecticut. Mercer v. Steil, 97
Conn 583, 117 A 689.
Missouri. Buffalo Trust Co. v.
Producers' Exchange No. 148, 224
Mo App 199, 23 SW2d 644.
New York. Spitzer v. Born, 194
App Div 739, 185 NYS 875, revg 111
Misc 595, 182 NYS 327 (payment of
rent).
Murphy v. Bankers Commercial
Corp., I l l F Supp 608.
Virginia. Altavista Cotton
Mills v. Lane, 133 Va 1, 112 SE 637.
See §§3011, 3012.
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Nebraska. D&J Hatchery,
Inc. v. Feeders Elevator, Inc., 202
Neb 69, 274 NW2d 138.
4
United States. In re Gilchrist
Co., 278 F 235.
California. Associates Discount
Corp. v. Tobb Co. 241 Cal App 2d
541, 50 Cal Rptr 738.
Connecticut. Stambovsky v.
Saddle Peak Productions, 8 Conn
App 371, 513 A2d 162.
Massachusetts. Anderson v.
K.G. Moore, Inc., 6 Mass App 386,
376 NE2d 1238 (contract to repurchase stock known to and acquiesced
in by all directors, officers and shareholders enforceable despite lack of
procedural formalities).
Nebraska. Unauthorized acts
of an officer may be ratified by a
corporation by conduct implying approval and adoption of the act in
question. D&J Hatchery, Inc. v.
Feeders Elevator, Inc., 202 Neb 69,
274 NW2d 138.
9
United States. Keyes v. First
Nat. Bank, 25 F2d 684.
Arkansas. Bryant Lumber Co.
v. Crist, 87 Ark 434, 112 SW 965.
California. Rauer v. Fernando
Nelson & Sons, 53 Cal App 695, 200
P 809.
Colorado. American Agency &
Investment Co. v. Gregg, 90 Colo 142,
6 P2d 1101 (assignment of contract
not necessary).
Missouri. Morton v. Manchester Inv. Co., 181 Mo App 364,168 SW
904.
Oklahoma. Citizens' State
Bank of Denison, Tex. v. Drumright
State Bank, 116 Okla 213, 244 P 178.
Utah. McGarry v. Tanner &
Bakes Co., 21 Utah 16, 59 P 93.
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Wisconsin. Carl Miller Lumber
Co. v. Meyer, 183 Wis 360, 196 NW
840.
What constitutes ratification of
unauthorized signature under UCC
§3-404, 93 ALR3d 967.
6
United States. American Preservers' Trust v. Taylor Mfg. Co., 46
F 152.
7
Connecticut. Howe v. Keeler,
27 Conn 538.
Mississippi. Rivervalley Co. v.
Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank, 331 F Supp
698 (corporation held estopped under
Mississippi statute and circumstances involved from asserting that
officers not authorized to executed
note and deed of trust).
Tennessee. Turner v. Kingston
Lumber & Manufacturing Co., 59 SW
410 (Tenn Ch).
• United States. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F2d 367
(CA7, 1978).
• Oregon. Altschul v. Casey, 45
Or 182, 76 P 1083.
10
Missouri. Buffalo Trust Co.
v. Producers' Exchange No. 148, 224
Mo App 199, 23 SW2d 644.
"Arizona. The trend of authority is to uphold as binding on a

corporation the contracts or obligations executed on its behalf by an
officer or stockholder who owns all or
practically all of the outstanding
stock, even though there is lack of, or
defect in, some corporate step or
action. Russell v. Golden Rule Min.
Co., 63 Ariz 11, 159 P2d 776; Air
Technical Development Co. v. Arizona Bank, 101 Ariz 70, 416 P2d 183.
North Carolina. A lease made
to several motor bus companies as
lessees is binding on the company
signing it by its president, who stated
that he had an oral agreement with
the other named lessees for the use of
premises, such statement, and user of
the premises by the lessee signing,
amounting to a waiver by it of signatures of others named as lessees.
Raleigh Banking & Trust Co. v. Safety Transit Lines, 198 NC 675,153 SE
158.
Wyoming. Farmers' State Bank
of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322,222
P 45.
xt
Colorado. Sperry v. Pittsburg
Short Method Smelting & Refining
Co., 9 Colo App 314, 48 P 315.

§3017. —Estoppel arising from implied or ostensible
agency.
A corporation which suffers appearances to exist, and its
officers and agents so to act, as to give persons dealing with it
reason to believe that they are dealing with the company, is
liable on a contract of its officers entered into under these
circumstances.1
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redemption, and the decree of foreclosure is afterwards reversed on the
ground that the mortgage is invalid
because the corporation had no power
to make the loan secured by it, the
parties are entitled to be restored to
their former rights, as nearly as possible. Thompson v. Davis, 297 111 11,
130 NE 455.
Michigan. Day v. Spiral
Springs Buggy Co., 57 Mich 146, 23
NW 628.
Missouri. Wellston Trust Co. v.
American Surety Co., 224 Mo App
241, 14 SW2d 23.
New York. McVity v. E.D.
Albro Co., 90 App Div 109, 86 NYS
144.
•United States. Jenson v. Toltec Ranch Co., 174 F 86.

•United States. Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Georgia v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 114 F
263.
10
Illinois. Western Cottage
Piano & Organ Co. v. Burrows, 168
111 App 120.
11
Roberts v. W.H. Hughes Co.,
86 Vt 76„ 83 A 807.
12
Iowa. See Wisconsin Lumber
Co. v. Greene & Western Tel. Co.,
127 Iowa 350, 101 NW 742.
South Dakota. Sweeney v.
United Underwriters Co., 29 SD 576,
137 NW 379.
See also § 1538.
13
Illinois. Melvin v. Lemar Ins.
Co., 80 111 446.
See also § 1541.

§3572. Restoration as condition to rescission.
Where a corporation is permitted to rescind an ultra vires
contract, it must restore the benefits received under it.1 The
equitable doctrine which imposes on a corporation or the other
party to an ultra vires contract the obligation to restore what it
or they have received under the contract applies when affirmative relief by rescission and recovery of property is sought in a
court of equity. A corporation cannot maintain a suit in equity
to rescind or cancel an ultra vires contract, as a lease, for
example, and recover what it has parted with, if it retains
money or property which it received under the contract.2 The
same principle applies where a corporation borrows money
without authority and secures payment of the money by delivery
of securities. Neither the corporation nor its receiver can
repudiate the transaction and recover the securities in equity
without repayment of the money received by it.3 So if a lumber
company makes an ultra vires contract to build a railroad in
consideration of an agreement to convey standing timber at a
reduced price, and then repudiates the agreement to build the
road as ultra vires, the grantor of the timber may recover the
164
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difference between the contract price and the actual value of the
timber.4
1

United States. Lewis v. FifthThird Nat. Bank, 274 F 587; Shearer
v. Farmers Life Ins. Co., 262 F 861;
Anderson v Kentucky Title Trust
Co. of Louisville, 5 F Supp 384.
Where an action is brought by a
corporation to set aside a transfer of
certain property on the ground that
the transfer was unauthorized, it is
incumbent upon it to show that it has
made a tender to the defendant of the
amount it received on the property,
or, at the least, a clear and definite
offer to restore such amount. An offer
by the corporation to allow the
amount in question to apply in reduction of a judgment which it might
secure against the defendant does not
fulfill the requirement. The basis of
this holding is that he who seeks
equity must do equity; that there
must be restoration before suit or at
least a bona fide offer to restore
whatever has been received as consideration from the other party for the
transfer before there can be a rescission of the contract. Alaska & C.
Commercial Co. v. Solner, 123 F 865.
While a national bank cannot
repudiate its ultra vires contract until
it disgorges its benefits, the rule does
not apply where the bank does not
have in its possession any such benefits , and the plaintiff refused to
repossess the property, as it could
have done, but notified the bank's
receiver that it proposed to sell the
inventory and sue for the difference.
Birdsell Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 20 F
Supp 571.
Illinois. Warner v. Munson, 280

111 App 484.
Iowa. Upon the insolvency of a
bank and the acceptance by the
officers of an insurance company of
the bank stock and certificates of
deposits in payment of the money on
deposit with the bank, the bank was
entitled to have the property returned
before the insurance company could
repudiate the transaction. Fidelity
Ins. Co. v. German Sav. Bank, 127
Iowa 591, 103 NW 958.
Michigan. Mead v. DetroitTraverse Realty Co., 251 Mich 478,
232 NW 355.
Minnesota. Benson Lumber Co.
v. Thornton, 185 Minn 230, 240 NW
651.
New York. Losie v. Ken-Vic,
43 NYS2d 914 (Misc), affd 44 NYS2d
473 (App Div); McVity v. E.D. Albro
Co., 90 App Div 109, 86 NYS 144.
2
United States. United Lines
Tel. Co. v. Boston Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 147 US 431, 37 L Ed 231,
13 S Ct 396; New Castle Northern R.
Co. v. Simpson, 23 F 214; Memphis &
L.R. Co. v. Dow, 19 F 388; Manville
v. Belden Min. Co., 17 F 425; American Union Tel. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry.
Co., 1 F 745, 1 McCrary 188.
Kansas. Brown v. Atchison, 39
Kan 37, 17 P 465.
Missouri. Buford v. Keokuk
Northern Line Packet Co., 69 Mo
611.
3
Ohio. A state superintendent of
banks who has taken charge, for liquidation, of the affairs and business
of an insolvent state bank which had
committed an ultra vires act in secur-
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ing a private deposit of trust funds by
giving collateral to secure the deposit,
cannot take possession of the collateral without paying to the depositor
the amount owing to it, where there
is no claim that any equities of third
persons has intervened. State v.
Dean, 47 Ohio App 558, 192 NE 278.
Texas. If it were true that a
national bank were without power to

secure title to stock in another corporation pledged to it as collateral, the
pledgor, nevertheless, could not
retake the stock without payment of
the loan. Fulton v. National Bank of
Denison, 26 Tex Civ App 115, 62 SW
84.
4
North Carolina. Herring v.
Wallace Lumber Co., 163 NC 481, 79
SE 876.

§3573. Action on implied contract—Right to maintain.
The obligation to restore property or money received under
an ultra vires contract, on refusing to perform the contract, is
enforced when possible, even in courts of law, by allowing an
action quasi ex contractu to be maintained,1 although in some
cases recovery is denied if the contract is contrary to public
policy or prohibited by charter or statute.2 Such an action
disaffirms the ultra vires contract and does not enforce it.3 This
rule is often applied in national bank cases.4
1

United States. Citizens' Cent.
Nat. Bank v. Appleton, 216 US 196,
54 L Ed 443, 30 S Ct 364, affg 190
NY 417, 83 NE 470; De La Vergne
Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German
SavingB Inst, 175 US 40, 44 L Ed 65,
20 S Ct 20; Waters v. Disbrow & Co.,
70 F2d 572; Falk v. Levine, 60 F Supp
660 (applying Massachusetts law);
Birdsell Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 20 F
Supp 571; Anderson v. Kentucky
Title Trust Co. of Louisville, 5 F
Supp 384; Coon v. Smith, 4 F Supp
960.
See Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 US 24, 35
L Ed 55, 11 S Ct 484.
The fact that a contract by a
national bank to receive and collect
securities and reinvest the proceeds
for the owner was ultra vires does not
relieve the bank of the obligation to

return the securities or account to the
owner for their value. Emmerling v.
First Nat. Bank of Pembina, 97 F
739.
Arizona. McQueen v. First Nat.
Bank of Mesa City, 36 Ariz 74, 283 P
273.
Colorado. Stockyards Nat.
Bank of Denver v. Brown, 81 Colo
331, 255 P 624.
Illinois. Mercantile Trust Co. of
Illinois v. Kastor, 273 111 332, 112 NE
988; United States Brewing Co. v.
Dolese & Shepard Co., 259 111 274,
102 NE 753; Awotin v. Atlas
Exchange Nat. Bank, 265 111 App 238,
275 111 App 530, affd 295 US 209, 79
L Ed 1393, 55 S Ct 674 (contract for
repurchase of securities).
Indiana. State Life Ins. Co. v.
Nelson, 46 Ind App 137, 92 NE 2.
Massachusetts. Nashua & L.R.
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X. WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES
14200. Waiver.
Bylaws which are not required to be adopted by the charter
or statute and which operate in favor of the corporation are
subject to waiver, both express and implied, by the corporation,
considered as an entity separate and apart and having rights
distinct from those of its stockholders or members.1 It has been
held that the waiver may even take place after the member's
death, where prior to death the member took the steps setting in
motion the waiver.2 Indeed it has been held that provisions of
the bylaws of a mutual benefit society which attempt to put it
beyond the power of the society to waive compliance with the
bylaws by its members are nugatory.3 It would seem that the
fact that a corporation does waive its bylaws cannot be objected
to by third persons.4 A corporation and its majority stockholder
do not waive the right to enforce a bylaw restricting stock sales
to outsiders by entering into an option agreement with a minority stockholder without advising the minority stockholder of the
bylaw restriction.5
Where there are statutes, usually specially applicable to
fraternal benefit corporations, restricting the power of
subordinate bodies or their officers to waive the constitution or
bylaws of the corporation, waiver cannot be predicated on the
acts or omissions of an officer of a subordinate body,9 although
it was held that the statute did not apply to a waiver by the
supreme body although the waiver was predicated on an omission of a subordinate body toward the parent body.7 The power
of a subordinate body to waive bylaw regulations of the parent
body has been doubted.8 It has been held that such a statute
does not apply to a foreign benefit corporation.11
When the board of directors has power to adopt bylaws, it
has power to waive those adopted,10 unless the right of waiver is
authoritatively limited, as by the statute, charter, or certificate
of incorporation;11 but when the power to make bylaws is vested
in the stockholders or members, and they have made bylaws for
the protection of the corporation, they cannot be waived by the
directors or other officers of the corporation.12 It is the general
rule that the officers of a mutual association cannot waive a
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bylaw relating to the substance of the contract between it and
its members.13
Stockholders or members may waive the bylaws, particularly those which operate in their favor or which advance or
protect their rights as stockholders or members.14 The waiver
can be express or implied; noncompliance with formalities does
not necessarily negate an interpretation that waiver has
occurred.15 Similarly, the members of a mutual association may
permit the directors or other officers to act in disregard of a
bylaw, even one relating to the substance of the contract
between it and the members, or they may ratify their action,
and in that case there is a waiver of the bylaw by the stockholders.16 Where the corporation acts or contracts in disregard of a
bylaw with the consent or acquiescence of the stockholders or
members, there is a waiver of the bylaw, whether it is afterwards
sought to set up the bylaw as against strangers or as against its
stockholders or members.17
A corporation will not be permitted to assert in an action to
enforce liability against it that the liability was incurred in
contravention of its bylaws where there has been a continued
disregard of bylaws acquiesced in by the stockholders.18
Knowledge of the facts rendering a bylaw applicable is, of
course, essential to its waiver,19 but since waiver depends solely
on the intention of the party against whom it is invoked, knowledge by a member of a benefit society of the waiver of a bylaw a
finding of waiver.20 Waiver must be pleaded.21
Where a bylaw of a fraternal benefit society constitutes an
important part of the contract between the society and its members, the waiver of it is not to be inferred from slight evidence.22
In any event, the question whether there has been a waiver of a
bylaw is ordinarily one of fact for the jury.23
1

United States. Bank of Commerce v. Bank of Newport, 63 F 898;
United States v. Daugherty, 699 F
Supp 671 (ED Tenn 1984) (applying
Kentucky law).
Alabama. Mutual Building &
Loan Ass'n of Eufaula v. Guice, 27

Ala App 7, 166 So 864, cert den 231
*** 872> 166 So 868 (forfeiture for
nonpayment of dues waived).
Arkansas. Woodmen of the
World Life Ins. Society v. Counts,
221 Ark 143, 252 SW2d 390 (president waived bylaw prohibiting double
indemnity policy for person of draft
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age); Springfield Mut. Ass'n v. Atnip,
169 Ark 968, 279 SW 15.
California. Supreme Lodge of
Fraternal Brotherhood v. Price, 27
Cal App 607, 150 P 803.
Connecticut. Richmondville
Mfg. Co. v. Prall, 9 Conn 487.
Delaware. McKenney v. Diamond State Loan Ass'n, 8 Houst 557,
18 A 905.
Georgia. Mathews v. Fort Valley Cotton Mills, 179 Ga 580,176 SE
505.
Illinois. Kresin v. Brotherhood
of American Yeomen, 217 111 App
448.
Indiana. Almy v. Commercial
Travelers* Ass'n, 59 Ind App 249,106
NE 893; Supreme Tent Knights of
Maccabees of World v. Volkert, 25
Ind App 627, 57 NE 203.
Iowa. Kesler v. Farmers' Mut.
Fire & Lightning Ins. Ass'n, 160 Iowa
374, 141 NW 954; Thornburg v.
Farmers' Life Ass'n, 122 Iowa 260,98
NW 105; Watts v. Equitable Mut.
Life Ass'n of Waterloo, 111 Iowa 90,
82 NW 441.
Kansas. Boman v. Bankers'
Union of World, 76 Kan 198,91 P 49.
Kentucky. United States v.
Daugherty, 599 F Supp 671 (ED
Tenn 1984).
Maryland. Continued disregard
of a bylaw may be equivalent to an
express repeal. Poole v. Miller, 211
Md 448, 128 A2d 607, citing this
treatise.
Massachusetts. Blabon v. Hay,
269 Mass 401, 169 NE 268; Clark v.
New England Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 6
Cush 342.
Minnesota. Swedish Christian
Mission Soc. of Minneapolis v. Law-

rence, 79 Minn 124, 81 NW 756;
Wiberg v. Minnesota Scandinavian
Relief Ass'n, 73 Minn 297, 76 NW 37;
Davidson v. Old People's Mut. Ben.
Society, 39 Minn 303, 39 NW 803.
Mississippi. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America v. Graham, 57 So 2d 870
(Miss); Bank of Holly Springs v. Pinson, 58 Miss 421.
Missouri. Shartle v. Modern
Brotherhood of America, 139 Mo
App 433, 122 SW 1139; Laker v.
Royal Fraternal Union, 95 Mo App
353, 75 SW 705.
New Hampshire. Currier v.
Continental Life Ins. Co., 53 NH 538;
Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Keyser,
32 NH 313.
A bylaw requiring a certain percentage of the subscriptions to the
corporation's capital stock to be paid
at the time of subscribing, and declaring that subscriptions without the
payment shall be void, is intended for
the benefit of the corporation only,
and may be waived by it, and, if the
corporation accepts and treats as
valid subscriptions unaccompanied
by payment, the subscribers are
bound Piscataqua Ferry Co. v. Jones,
39 NH 491.
New York. Chemical Nat.
Bank of New York v. Colwell, 132
NY 250, 30 NE 644; Robinson v.
National Bank, 95 NY 637; Isham v.
Buckingham, 49 NY 216, 222; Knox
v. Eden Muaee American Co., Ltd.,
25 NYS 164, affd 74 Hun 483, 26
NYS482.
A bylaw provision relative to the
giving of notice of suspension to a
member who had disappeared may be
waived by the corporation; and where
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the notice was required to be given at
once upon receiving notice of the
member's disappearance, it was
waived by receiving dues from his
beneficiary for five years after that
without giving notice, especially
where the circumstances were such as
to raise an estoppel against the corporation. Steuernagel v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 234 NY 251,
137 NE 320, affg 198 AD 1002, 190
NYS 953.
Pennsylvania. Hughes v. Citizens' Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co.,
226 Pa 95, 75 A 15; Susquehanna
Mut/ Fire Ins. Co. v. Elkins, 124 Pa
484, 17 A 24; Botko v. National
Slovak Soc. of United States of
America, 122 Pa Super 603, 186 A
758 (tender of payment of back dues
in beneficial society).
Rhode Island. American Nat.
Bank v. Oriental Mills, 17 RI 551, 23
A 795.
A bylaw providing that prior to a
sale of stock to a third person the
holder shall make a written offer of it
through the treasurer to the stockholders, may be waived. American
Nat. Bank v. Oriental Mills, 17 RI
551, 23 A 795.
Tennessee. Snyder v. Supreme
Ruler of Fraternal Mystic Circle, 122
Tenn 248, 122 SW 981.
Texas. Modern Woodmen of
America v. Harper, 94 SW2d 156
(Tex Com App); Sovereign Camp,
W.O.W. v. Sabalza, 93 SW2d 177
(Tex Civ App) (forfeiture of life
insurance policy for failure to pay
assessment); Grand Lodge, Knights
& Daughters of Tabor v. Vann, 282
SW 265 (Tex Civ App) (method of
changing beneficiaries); Sovereign

Camp, W.O.W. v. Ray, 262 SW 819
(Tex Civ App) (insurable age limits).
Washington. Frank v. Switchmen's Union of North America, 87
Wash 634, 152 P 512.
Wisconsin. Ledebuhr v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 112 Wis 657, 88
NW 607; Morrison v. Wisconsin Odd
Fellows' Mut. Life Ins. Co., 59 Wis
162, 169, 18 NW 13.
Wyoming. A corporation may
waive provisions of the articles of
incorporation as to the manner of
executing corporate instruments,
where the provision is in effect only a
bylaw. Farmers State Bank of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322, 222 P 45.
Waiver of bylaw creating lien on
shares of stock, see § 4207.
2
Texas. Grand Lodge Knights
& Daughters of Tabor v. Vann, 282
SW 265 (Tex Civ App).
3
Minnesota. Leland v. Modern
Samaritans, 111 Minn 207, 126 NW
728.
Missouri. Cline v. Sovereign
Camp Woodmen of World, 111 Mo
App 601, 86 SW 501.
Texas. Modern Woodmen of
America v. Harper, 94 SW2d 156
(Tex Com App).
4
California. Supreme Lodge of
Fraternal Brotherhood v. Price, 27
Cal App 607, 150 P 803.
Indiana. Almy v. Commercial
Travelers' Ass'n, 59 Ind App 249,106
NE893.
5
California. Tu-Vu Drive-In
Corp. v. Ashkins, 38 Cal Rptr 348,
391 P2d 828.
Texas. McCurry v. The
Praetorians, 90 SW2d 853 (Tex Civ
App).
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Alabama. Jones v. Sovereign
Camp, W.O.W., 233 Ala 216, 171 So
359.
Mississippi. Sovereign Camp,
W.O.W. v. Valentine, 170 Miss 707,
155 So 192.
Texas.
Sovereign
Camp,
W.O.W. v. Todd, 283 SW 659 (Tex
Civ App).
7
Alabama. Jones v. Sovereign
Camp, W.O.W., 233 Ala 216, 171 So
359.
New York. Where a waiver by
the supreme body of the order was
based on knowledge of a subordinate
lodge which it was the duty of the
latter as agent for the supreme body
to collect and communicate to it, but
which was not so communicated.
Steuernagel v. Supreme Council of
Royal Arcanum, 234 NY 251,137 NE
320, affg 198 AD 1002,190 NYS 953.
8
Arkansas. It may well be
doubted whether a subordinate lodge
of a fraternal insurance society has
the power to waive a requirement of
the constitution and laws of the
supreme lodge relative to membership in the society. Supreme Lodge
Knights & Ladies of Honor v. Johnson, 81 Ark 512, 99 SW 834.
Illinois. Camp clerk of local
lodge of beneficiary association, in
accepting and receiving for delinquent dues and filling out forms in
connection with it, acts within apparent scope of his authority and, if he
thereby waives forfeiture, the waiver
will bind association. Blair v. Modern
Woodmen of America, 282 111 App 36.
New York. Bradley v. O'Hare,
11 AD2d 15, 202 NYS2d 141 (power
of local union to waive the express
provisions of an international union's

constitution not implied), citing this
treatise.
• N e w York. Steuernagel v.
Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum,
234 NY 251,137 NE 320, affg 198 AD
1002, 190 NYS 953.
10
Georgia. Mathews v. Fort
Valley Cotton Mills, 179 Ga 580, 176
SE505.
Indiana. State v. Wiley, 100 Ind
App 438, 196 NE 153, citing this
treatise.
Louisiana. Hill v. American
Co-op. Ass'n, 195 La 590,197 So 241,
quoting this treatise.
Action of board of directors in
electing plaintiff comptroller of corporation for one year was held not
ultra vires because corporation's
bylaws provided that board of directors shall elect comptroller to serve
during pleasure of board since directors by electing plaintiff for one year
abrogated bylaws to that extent. Hill
v. American Co-op. Ass'n, 195 La
590, 197 So 241.
Mississippi. Bank of Holly
Springs v. Pinson, 58 Miss 421.
New Jersey. Magnus v.
Magnus Organ Corp., 71 NJ Super
363,177 A2d 55.
Wyoming. Farmers' State Bank
of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322,222
P45.
11
Louisiana. Hill v. American
Co-op. Ass'n, 195 La 590,197 So 241,
quoting this treatise.
New Mexico. Contract reemploying corporate treasurer and
comptroller as comptroller for succeeding year was not nullified by corporate bylaw requiring election of
treasurer by board of directors after
annual election of directors, where
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bylaws were amendable by board of
directors, since action of the board in
entering into the employment contract modified in its legal effect all
inconsistent bylaws and prevailed
over them. Jennings v. Ruidoso Racing Ass'n, 79 NM 144, 441 P2d 42.
Wyoming. Farmers' State Bank
of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322, 222
P45.
12
Louisiana. Hill v. American
Co-op. Ass'n, 195 La 590,197 So 241,
quoting this treatise.
Massachusetts. Mulrey v.
Shawmut Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 4 Allen
116; Hale v. Mechanics' Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 6 Gray 169.
Wyoming. Farmers' State Bank
of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322, 222
P45.
13
Massachusetts. Crowley v.
A.O.H. Widows' & Orphans' Fund,
222 Mass 228, 110 NE 276; Brewer v.
Chelsea Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Gray
(Mass) 203, 209; Lyon v. Supreme
Assembly of Royal Soc. of Good Fellows, 153 Mass 83, 26 NE 236.
The law is well settled that the
officers of a mutual insurance company cannot waive the company's
bylaws which relate to the substance
of the contract between a member
and his associates in their corporate
capacity. McCoy v. Roman Catholic
Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Mass 272, 25 NE
289.
New Jersey. Kocher v.
Supreme Council Catholic Benev.
Legion, 65 NJL 649, 48 A 544.
North Dakota. J.P. Lamb &
Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 18 ND 253, 119 NW 1048.
Oklahoma. Home Forum Bene-

fit Order v. Jones, 5 Okla 598, 50 P
165.
14
California.
Horner
v.
Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n,
175 Cal App 2d 837, 1 Cal Rptr 113
(waiver of bylaw limitation on union
officers salaries), citing this treatise.
Colorado. The stockholders
may waive a bylaw requiring notice of
assessments to be published in a
newspaper. Grand Valley Irr. Co. v.
Fruita Improvement Co., 37 Colo
483, 86 P 324.
Florida. Coleman v. Coleman,
191 So 2d 460 (Fla App) (waiver and
estoppel as to bylaw restriction on
transfer of stock), quoting this
treatise.
Kansas. Schraft v. Leis, 236
Kan 28, 686 P2d 865 (action incident
to dissolution of close corporation
involving two 50% shareholders, one
having been general manager).
Pennsylvania. Section of the
bylaws of corporation providing that
the bylaws could be altered, amended,
modified or added to by the vote of
stockholders holding a majority of
the stock of the company was not
intended to exclude the right of all
the stockholders to waive provisions
of the bylaws made for their benefit.
Elliott v. Lindquist, 356 Pa 385, 52
A2d 180.
Texas. Where all of the stockholders authorized a five-year contract for their comptroller they
waived the bylaw provision of a oneyear term for officers, as the bylaws
permitted their amendment and if
the stockholders and directors could
change the bylaws they could waive
their application in a particular case.
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Dixie Glass Co., Inc. v. Pollack, 341
SW2d 530 (Tex Civ App).
Wisconsin. A member of a
mutual insurance company may
make a binding waiver of the invalidity of an amendment to the company's bylaws which constitutes a
breach of his contract. Voss v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 137 Wis
492,118 NW 212.
15
Alabama. Resolution that
was interpreted as ratification of
directors' acts was not a nullity
merely because it was not presented
by the resolution committee; compliance with technical requirements was
not necessary to decide that waiver
had occurred Elgin v. Alabama Farm
Bureau Federation, 431 So 2d 1151
(Ala).
Kansas. Schraft v. Leis, 236
Kan 28, 686 P2d 865 (waiver may be
inferred and knowledge may be actual
or constructive).
1i
Alabama. Kelly v. Mobile
Building & Loan Ass'n, 64 Ala 501.
California. Underbill v. Santa
Barbara Land, Building & Improvement Co., 93 Cal 300, 28 P 1049.
Missouri.
McMahon
v.
Supreme Tent Knights of Maccabees
of World, 151 Mo 522, 52 SW 384;
Galvin v. Knights of Father Mathew,
169 Mo App 496, 155 SW 45.
Wyoming. Farmers' State Bank
of Riverton v. Haun, 30 Wyo 322,222
P45.
17
California. Underbill v.
Santa Barbara Land, Building &
Improvement Co., 93 Cal 300, 28 P
1049.
Georgia. Mathews v. Fort Valley Cotton Mills, 179 Ga 580,176 SE
505; Tifton Production Credit Ass'n

v. Burkhalter Chevrolet Co., 92 Ga
App 571, 89 SE2d 210.
Illinois. Where a provision as to
the age limit of members is waived,
the company cannot set up that the
member was over age to escape liability to the beneficiary. Kresin v.
Brotherhood of American Yeoman,
217 111 App 448.
Maryland. It cannot be said
that the secretary of a building and
loan association was not authorized
to collect dues from a stockholder at
his home, where the association had
acquiesced for a long time in the
practice, although a bylaw provided
for the receipt of dues by the secretary at the regular meeting time and
place of the association but where no
bylaw specifically prohibited payment of dues at other times or places.
Patterson Park Permanent Bldg.
Union No. 3 of Baltimore City v.
Juengst, 153 Md 36,137 A 498.
Cooperative housing corporation's long time practice of collecting
administrative fees from selling members caused a waiver or repeal by
acquiescence of any bylaw provision
which prohibited the practice. Greenbelt Homes, Inc. v. Nyman Realty,
Inc., 48 Md App 42, 426 A2d 867,
citing this treatise.
New Hampshire. Currier v.
Continental Life Ins. Co., 53 NH 538.
New Jersey. Magnus v.
Magnus Organ Corp., 71 NJ Super
363, 177 A2d 55.
New York. Haff v. Long Island
Fuel Corp., 233 AD 117, 251 NYS 67.
Pennsylvania. McCloskey v.
Charleroi MounUin Club, 390 Pa
212,134 A2d 873, citing this treatise;
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Susquehanna Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Elkins, 124 Pa St 484, 17 A 24.
Vermont. Henry v. Jackson, 37
Vt431.
Washington. A bylaw may be
abrogated by nonusage by directors
with knowledge and acquiescence of
stockholders. Huxtable v. Berg, 98
Wash 616, 168 P 187.
18
New Hampshire. Salvail v.
Catholic Order of Foresters, 70 NH
635, 50 A 100.
New York. Where during the
entire existence of a corporation the
bylaws have been disregarded, the
corporation cannot take advantage of
such delinquency to avoid notes given
by it in settlement of a valid debt.
Haff v. Long Island Fuel Corp., 233
AD 117, 251 NYS 67, citing this
treatise.
Washington. Blair v. Metropolitan Sav. Bank, 27 Wash 192, 67 P
609.
19
California. Underhill v.
Santa Barbara Land, Building &
Improvement Co., 93 Cal 300, 28 P
1049.
Illinois. Blair v. Modern Woodmen of America, 282 111 App 36; Modern Woodmen of America v. Wieland,
109 HI App 340, 351.
Knowledge of the agent may be
charged to the corporation. Kresin v.
Brotherhood of American Yeomen,
217 131 App 448.
New York. Knowledge of a
subordinate lodge of a fraternal benefit society may be imputed to the
supreme body. Steuernagel v.
Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum,
234 NY 251,137 NE 320, affg 198 AD
1002, 190 NYS 953.
Texas. Modern Woodmen of

America v. Harper, 94 SW2d 156
(Tex Com App).
20
California. Underhill v.
Santa Barbara Land, Building &
Improvement Co., 93 Cal 300, 28 P
1049.
Missouri. Watkins v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 188 Mo
App 626, 176 SW 516; Galvin v.
Knights of Father Mathew, 169 Mo
App 496, 155 SW 45.
A fraternal benefit society will
not be estopped to take advantage of
a bylaw by its continued nonenforcement of it when it does not appear
that the member alleging the estoppel
knew of the nonenforcement, since
the member was not misled or
deceived by it. Shartle v. Modern
Brotherhood of America, 139 Mo
App 433, 122 SW 1139.
21
Nebraska. The fact that
there has been a waiver of a bylaw
must be pleaded. Swett v. Antelope
County Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 91
Neb 561, 136 NW 347.
22
Massachusetts. Crowley v.
A.O.H. Widows' & Orphans' Fund,
222 Mass 228, 110 NE 276.
Burden of proving waiver rests
on beneficiary alleging it. Blair v.
Modern Woodmen of America, 282 111
App 36.
Application for certificate and
bylaws of society are part of contract
between society and members, see
§ 4198.
^Massachusetts. Crowley v.
A.O.H. Widows' & Orphans' Fund,
222 Mass 228, 110 NE 276.
Minnesota. Villmont v. Grand
Grove U.A.O.D., 111 Minn 201, 126
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NW 730; Leland v. Modern SamariTexas. Jury properly found on
tans, HI Minn 207,126 NW 728.
the evidence that both stockholderNew York. In regard to a non- seller and stockholder-purchaser of
profit cooperative housing corpora- the corporation's stock waived any
tion, it has been held that the accept- applicable bylaw restrictions on
ance of rent by the corporation was transfers of stock. Kensinger v.
not a waiver of a tenant-shareholders McDavid, 380 SW2d 54 (Tex Civ
violation of the corporate rules and App).
regulations. Linden Towers CooperaWisconsin. Reisz v. Supreme
tive No. 1, Inc. v. Bass, 47 Misc 2d Council American Legion of Honor,
60, 262 NYS2d 243.
103 Wis 427, 429, 79 NW 430.
South Carolina. Fortune v.
Sovereign Camp W.O.W., 175 SC
177, 178 SE 872.

§ 4 2 0 1 . Estoppel and laches.
Under the doctrine of estoppel, a corporation may be prevented from availing itself of the full force and effect of a particular bylaw as against a stockholder or member.1 Thus, a fraternal benefit corporation which has made it impossible for a
member to pursue or exhaust the means provided, by it to secure
the allowance of a claim for benefits, cannot avail itself of a
bylaw requiring exhaustion of all internal remedies as a condition precedent to suit in the courts.2
A stockholder may be estopped, by consent or acquiescence,
to object to the mode in which a bylaw was adopted,3 or to
object to the validity or enforcement of a bylaw,4 except, it
seems, where the objection is that the bylaw is contrary to the
charter, public law or public policy.8 The rule of estoppel has
been held applicable to a transferee with notice.9 A member's
laches may also prevent the member from objecting to a bylaw.7
But a corporation and its majority stockholder are not estopped
to enforce a bylaw restricting sales to outsiders where the defendant minority shareholders cannot claim lack of knowledge of
the restriction^
1

California. A corporation
leading its members to rely on an
amendment of the bylaws, to their
prejudice, is estopped to contend

afterwards that the amendment was
« ly adopted. Buford v. Florin
F™& Growers' Ass'n, 210 Cal 84,291
P 170.
Florida. Coleman v. Coleman,

n o t le al
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